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July 31, 1789, chap. 5, sec.17, V. XVII-635.
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May 8, 1792, chap. 36, sec. 3, V. XVIII-123.
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March 1, 1793, chap.19, sec. 8, V. XVIU-236.
May 8, 17!!4, chap. 23, V. XIX-517.
May 19, 1796, chap. 30, sec.12, V. XVIII-236.
March 3, 1797, chap. 13, V. XVII-284; V. XVIII-585; V. XIX-5;
. V. X-661, 708.
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May 3, 1798, chap. 37, V. XVII-258.
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March 2, 1799, chap. 21, V. XVII-613.
March 2, 1799, chap. 22, sec. 93, V. XVII-84.
March 2, 1799, chap. 22, sec. 61, V. XVII-635.
March 2, 1799, chap. 22, V. XVII-84, 635; V. XX-198, 309, 677.
March 3, 1799, chap. 46, sec. 12, V. XVIII-237.
May 10, 1800, chap. 54, V. XVIII-283.
February 27, 1801, chap. 15, V. XVIII-442.
March 30, 1802, chap. 13, V. XIX-479.
March 30, 1802, chap. 30, sec. 12, V. XVIII-237.
May 1, 1802, chap. 41, V. XVIII-441.
February 24, 1804, chap. 14, V. XVIII-442.
April 10, 1806, chap. 20, V. XVII-299, 399, 438.
April 21, 1806, chap. 48, V. XVII-258.
April 23, 1808, chap. 55, V. XIX-61; V. XX-143.
March 3, 1809, chap. 28, V. XVIII-450.
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April 30, 1810, chap. 37, sec. 32, V. XIX-517.
April 30, 1810, chap. 37, V. XX-680.
May 4, 1812, chap. 75, V. XVIII-442.
June 26, 1812, chap, 108, sec. 5, V. XVII-66.
July 22, 1813, chap.16, V. XX-450.
Mar~h 30, 1814, chap. 37, sec. 12, V. XVII-66.
April 18, 1814, chap. 82, sec. 4, V. XVIII-280.
March 3, 1815, chap. 94, sec. 3, V. XVII-506.
April 27, 1816, chap. 107, sec.1, V. XVII-635.
April 29, 1816, chap. 150, V. XVIII-441.
April 29, 1816, chap.160, V. XVII-596.
March 1, 1817, chap. 22, V. XVII-284.
March 3, 1817, chap. 45, V. XVIf-442; V. XVIIl-453; V. XIX-386; V.
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April 20, 1818, chap. 79, sec. 4, V'. XVIl-635.
April 20, 1818, chap. 79, secs. 11 and 25, V. XX-662.
April 20, 1818, chap.109, V . XVII-596."
March 2, 1819, chap. 45, V. XVIII-202; V. XX-18.
May 15, 1820, chap, 102, V. XVII-11.
May 15, 1820, chap.104, V. XVIII-442.
March 2, 1821, chap.15, V. XVIII-24.
March 1, 1823, chap. 21, sec. 5, V. XVII-270, 635.
March 1, 1823; chap. 21, sec. 13, V. XX-663.
March 1, 1823, chap. 21, sec. 25, V. XX-312.
March 1, 1823, chap. 35, V. XVII-68:>.
March 3, 1825, chap. 64-, V. XIX-517; V. XX-680.
March 3, 1825, chap. 106, V. XVII-597.
May 13, 1826, chap. 39, V. XVII-597.
May 20, 1826, chap. 77, V. XVII-597.
May 22, 1826, cbap.151, V. XVII-597.
March 3, 1827, chap. 79, V. XVII-597.
January 25, 1828, chap. 2, V. XVII-31.
May 19, 1828, chap. 5f>, sec. 8, V. XVII-635; V. XX-663.
May 24-, 1828, chap. 117, V. XVII-49.
May 28, 1830, chap. 14-8, sec. 3, V. XIX-44.
May 29, 1830, chap.179, V. XVII-439.
May 29, 1830, chap. 208, V. XVII-259; V. XIX-374.
March 2, 1831: chap. 66, V. XVII-284.
March 22, 1832, chap. 51, V. XVII-597.
J une 2 , 1 32, chap.152, V. XVIII-544.
July 9, 1 32, chap. 174 , V. XVII-260.
Joly 11, 1 32 chap.194, V. XVJI-285.
July 13, 1 32 chap. 199, V. XVIII-301.
July 14 1 32 chap. 227, ec. 15, V. XVII-635.
:\Jar ·h 3 1 33, chap. 96, V. XVIII-301.
Jun HJ, l 3t chap. 57, V. XVIIf-301.
June 1 , 1 3l, chap . 5 , V. XVIII-302.
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June 26, 1834, chap. 87, V. XVII-681.
June 30, 1834, chap. 161, V. XVIII-237; V. XIX-47-0.
June 30, 1834, chap. 162, V. XVII-260 •
.March 3, 1835, chap. 27, V. XVII-49.
March 3, 1835, chap. 43, V. XVIII-301.
July 2, 1836, chap. 270, sec. 8, V. XX-680.
Jn1y 3, 1836, chap. 276, sec. 13, V. XVIII-US.
January 18, 1837, chap. 3, V. XVIII-419.
March 3, 1837, chap. 33, V. XX-681.
July 5, 1838, chap. 162, sec. 15, V. XVII-94.
July 5, 1838, chap. 162, V. XIX-428, 440.
July 7, 1838, chap. 194, V. XIX-429.
March 3, 1839, chap. 81-82, V. XIX-284.
March 3, 1839, chap. 82, sec. 3, V. XIX-121.
September 4, 1841, chap. 16, V. XVII-259; V. XIX-374-.
September 11, 1841, chap. 25, V. XVII-104.
April 14, 1842, chap. 22, V. XVII-281.
August 11, 1842, chap. 127, V. XVII-597.
August 14, 1842, chap. 178, V. XVII-597.
August 23, 1842, chap. 183, sec. 2, V. XIX-122, 284.
August 26, 1842, chap, 202, sec. 12, ¥. XIX-122 .
.A.ugm1t 30, 1842, chap. 270, V. XVII-270, 434, 635; V. XX-664.
August 31, 1842, chap 279, V. XX-360.
March 3, 1843, chap. 84, V. XIX-651.
)larch 3, 1845, chap. 69, V. XVIII-249.
March 3, 1845, chap. 77, V. XVII-532.
March 3, 1845, chap. 77, sec. 4, V. XIX-172.
February 11, 1846, chap. 7, V. XX-664.
July 30, .1846, chap. 74-, sec. 8, V. XVII-269; V. XX-664.
July 30, 1846, chap. 74, V. XVII-434.
August 6, 1846, chap. 84, V. XX-310.
February 11, 1847, chap. 8, sec. 9, V. XVII-157.
March 2, 1847, chap. 35, V. XX-352.
March 3, 1847, chap. 61, V. XVII-11.
May 17, 1848, chap. 42, V. XVIII-444.
June 2, 1848, chap. 60, V. XVII-597.
Jnly 29, 18481 chap. 118, V. XVII-72.
August 3, 1848, ~hap. 121, sec. 12, V. XVII-103.
August 7, 1848, chap. 141, V. XVIII-565.
August 14, 1848, chap. 177, V. XIX-371; V. XX-43.
January 26, 1849, chap. 25, V. XVII-597.
March 2, 1849, chap. 80, V. XVII-11.
March 2, 1849, chap. 87, V. XVIII-522.
March 3, 1849, chap. 108, V. XVIIf-453.
March 3, 1849, chap. 129, V. XVII-353; V. XX-153.
March 3, 1850, chap. 25, sec. 7, V. XVII-157.
September 9, 1850, chap. -!9, V. XIX-67.
September 9, 1850, chap. 50, sec. 16, V. XIX-531.
September 9, 1850, chap. 51, V. XVIII-194; V. XIX-323.
September 20, 1850, chap. 61, V. XVII-27.
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September 27, 1850, chap. 76, sec. 14, V. XIX-371.
September 28, 1850, chap. 84, V. XVI!-27; V. XVIII-170, 522.
March 3, 1851, chap. 20, V. XIX--517.
March 3, 1851, chap. 21, sec. 3, V. XIX-347.
March 3, 1851, chap. 25, V. XX-352.
March 3, 1851, chap. 35, V. XVII-597.
March 3, 1851, chap. 38, V. XVII-270, 635.
March 3, 1852, chap. 152, sec. 2; V. XIX-189.
August 30, _1852, chap. 106, V. XVII-507, 629.
August 31, 1852, chap . 108, V. XVIII-305.
August 31, 1852, chap. 112, V. XVIII-345.
February 3, 1853, chap. 41, V. XVII-221.
February 14, 1853, chap. 69, sec. 9, V. ~IX-371.
February 26, 1853, chap. 80, V. XVIII-125; V. XIX-64; V. XX-400.
February 26, 1853, chap. 81, V. XVII-420.
March 2, 1853, chap. 90, V. XIX-372; V. XX-44.
March 3, 1853, chap. 97, V. XVII-622; V. XIX-554.
March 3, 1853, chap. 143, V. 'XVII-133.
March 3, 1853, chap. 145, secs. 6 and 7, V. XVII-407.
March 27, 1854-, chap. 25, V. XVIII-573.
March 28, 1854, chap. 30. sec. 5, V. XX-309.
May 30, 1854, chap. 59, V. XIX-67.
July 1, 1854, chap. 61, V. XVII-661.
July 17, 1854, chap. 83, V. XX-742.
July 17, 1854, chap. 84, V. XIX-372, 636.
July 22, 1854, chap. 103, V. XIX-8; V. XX-118, 285.
August 4, 1854, chap. 247, sec. 6, V. XVIII-203; V. XX-18.
February 21, 1855, chap. 117, sec. 3, V. XVIII-195.
February 28, 1855, chap. 127, V. XVII-127.
March 1, 1855, chap. 133, V. XIX-226.
·
March 2, 1855, chap. 147, V. XVII-27; V. XVIII-522.
March 3, 1855, chap . 173, V. XVII-78.
March 3, 1855, chap. 175, V. XVII-622.
March 3, 1855, chap. 175, sec. 4, V. XIX-555.
March 3, 1855, chap. 199, V. XVII-212.
June 3, 1856, chap. 43, V. XIX-522.
June 3, 1 56, chap. 4.4, V. XIX-572.
August 18, 1856, chap. 127, V. XIX-226.
February 7, 1857, chap. 36, V. XVII-212.
February 21, 18:-7, chap. 57, V. XIX-478.
March 3, 1 57, chap. 97, V. XVIII-355.
March 3. 1 :-1, chap. 101, V. XVII-270.
March 3, 1857, chap. 106, V. XVII-10.
Marc:h 3, 1 57, chap. 117, V. XVIII-522.
June 3, 1 58, chap. 85, V. XVII-221.
Jnn 12, 185 , chap.155, sec. 3, V. XVII-414.
June 14, 1 - , hap. 164, V. XVIII-249.
February 26, 1 -9, chap. 59, V. XVII-407.
far h 3, 1 - , chap. 7 , V. XX-361.
darch 3, 1 -9, chap. 7 , V. XVIII-555.
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March 3, 1859, chap. 83, sec. 7, V. XX-352.
June 15, 1860, chap. 131, sec. 4, V. XVIII-249.
June 21, 1860, chap. 167, V. XX-285.
June 22, 1860_, chap, 181, V. XIX-53.
January 29, 1861, chap. 20, sec. 3, V. XIX-117, 364:.
February 21, 1861, chap. 49, sec. 3, V. XVII-178.
Februa.ry 21, 1861, chap. 49, V. XVII-127.
February 28, 1861, chap. 59, V. XIX-67.
March 2, 1861, chap. 68, sec. 28, V. XVII-635.
March 2, 1861, chap. 70, V. XX-152.
March 2, 1861, chap. 84, sec.10, V. XVII-38~.
March 2, 1861, chap. 84, V. XVIII-216.
June 29, 1861, chap. 20, V. XVII-1.
July 25, 1861, chap. 20, V. XVII-532.
July 27, 1861, chap. 21, V. XVII-595; V. XIX-538; V. XX-136, 365.
August 2, 1861, chap. 37, V. XX-715.
Augnst 3, 1861, chap. 42, V. XVII-128, 180; V. XX-688.
Augnst 3, 1861, chap. 42, secs.16 and 17, V. XIX-208.
August 5, 1861, chap. 45, sec. 8, V. XX-134.
August 5, 1861, chap. 45, V. XVII-229; V. XX-4:13, 701.
Augnst 6, 1861, chap. 65, V. XX-715.
· December 21, 1861, chap. 1, V. XVII-128.
December 24, 1861, chnp. 3, V. XVII-439.
February 25, 1862, chap. 33, V. XX-318.
June 2, 1862, chap. 93, V. XX-499.
June 7, 1862, chap. 98, V. XX-412.
July 1, 186:?, chap. 120, sec. 6, V. XX-12.
July 1, 1862, chap. 120, sec. 19, V. XX-581.
July 1, 1862, chap. 120, V. XVII-130, 295; V. XVIII-502, 603; V.
XIX-78.
July 1, 1862, chap. 120, secs. 3 and 7, V. XVII-406.
July 1, 1862, chap. 120, sec. 13, V. XVII-377.
July 2, 1862, chap. 130, V. XVII-129.
July 11, 1862, chap.142, V. XX-318.
July 11, 1862, chap. 142, sec, 1, V. XIX-279.
July14, 1862, chap.163, V. XVII-106, 655.
July 14, 1862, chap.166, V. XVIlI-40.
July 14, 1862, chap, 166, sec.12, V. XVIII-172.
July 16, 1862, chap. 183, V. XVII-117.
July 16, 1862, chap. 184, V. XVII-344.
July 17, 1862, chap. 195, V. XX-334.
July 17, 1862, chap. 200, sec, 12, V. XX-688.
July 17, 1862, chap. 200, sec.17, V. XVII-19; V. XIX-206,
July 17, 1862, chap. 201, V. XVII-4.
.
February 4, 1863, chap. 20, V. XVII-533. .
February 9, 1863, chap. 25, V. XX-22.
Febrnary 21, 1863, chap. 53, V. XVIII-141.
February 25, 1863, chap. 58, V. XVII-288; V. ~-477.
March 3, 1863, chap. 73, V. XX-318.
March 3, 1863, cuap. 74, V. XVII-504.
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March 3, 1863, chap. 75, V. XIX-538.
March 3,·1863, chap. 75, sec. 35, V. XVIII-203; V. XX-18.
March 3, 1863, chap. 76, V. XX-706, 715.
March 3, 1863, chap. 76, sec.1, V. XIX-227 .
.March 3, 1863, chap. 78, V. XX-155.
March 3, 1863, chap. 79, V. XX-421.
March 3, 1863, chap. 79, sec.16, V. XVIII-98.
March 3, 1863, chap. 99, V. XVIII-279.
March 3, 1863, chap.117, V. XX-44.
March 3, 1863, chap.119, V. XVIII-1.U.
March 14, 1864, chap. 31,. V. XIX-636.
April 1, 1864, chap. 45, V. XX-22.
April 1, 1864, chap, 45, sec. 2, V. XVIII-203.
April 21, 1864, chap. 63, V. XVII-118; V. XX-360.
May 5, 1864, chap. 80,V. XIX-522.
May 12, 1864, chap. 85,V. XIX-377.
May 26, 1864, chap. 95, V. XIX-372.
June 3, 1864, cbap.106, sec.12, V. XVII-290.
June 3, 1864, chap.106, V. XX-477.
June 15, 1864, chap.124,V. XX-23.
June 25, 1864, chap.150, V. XX-155.
June 27, 1864, chap.164, sec. 2, V. XX-27.
June 30, 1864, chap.171, V. XIX-691.
June 30, 1864, chap.171, sec. 23, V. XVII-270, 635; V.XX-665.
June 30, 1864, chap.173, sec.14, V. XVII-433.
June 30, 1864, chap.173, V. XVII-501; V. XIX-124.
July 1, 1864, chap.197, V. XVII-658.
July 2, 1864, chap. 216, V. XVIII-501, 603; V. XX-12.
July 2, 1864, chap. 217, V. XXVIII-571; V. XIX-88.
July 2, 1864, chap. 217, sec. 2, V. XVIII-358.
July 4, 1864, chap. 247, V. XVIII-172.
July 4, 1864, chap. 247, sec. 5, V. XVIII-41.
March 3, 1865, chap. 79, V. XVH-19.
March 3, 1865, chap. 80, sec. 7, V. XVII-271, 635; V. XX-665.
March 3, 1865, chap. 84, sec. 3, V. XVIIl-41.
March 3, 1865, chap. 88, sec. 2, V. XVII-377.
March 3, 186fl, chap. 89, sec. 9, V. XVIII-249.
March 3, 1865, chap. 98, V. XVII-506.
March 16, 1866, chap. 84, V. XIX-590.
March 28, 1866, chap. 297, V. XVII-354.
April 9, 1866, chap. 31, V. XVIII-184.
April 12, 1866, chap. 40, V. XIX-385.
June 6, 1866, chap. 106, sec. 1, V. XVIII-17.
June 12, 1866, chap. 114, V. XVII-658.
July 3, 1866, chap. 158, V. XIX-572.
July 3, 1 66, rha.p. 159, V. XVII-131.
July 13, 1 6 , chap. 176, ec. 7, V. XVIII-203.
July 13, 1866, cba.p. 17~, ec. 5, V. XVII-20, 22.
July 13, 1866, chap. 18-1, sec. 9, V. XVJI-434; V. XX-535.
July 18, 1866, cha.p. 201, V. XVIII-127, 562.
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July 18, 1866, chap. 244, V. XX-400.
July 23, 1866, chap. 208, V. XVII-506.
July 25, 1866, chap. 231, V. XVff-56, 560.
July 25, }i866, chap. 231, sec. 6, V. XIX-590.
July 27, 1866, chap. 278, V. XIX-135.
July 28, 1866, chap. 298, V. XVII-106.
July 28, 1866, chap. 298, sec. 9, V. XVII-272, 635.
July 28, 1866, chap. 299, V. XVII-4, 53, 60,197,362,612; V. XX-288.
July 28, 1866, chap. 299, sec. 17, V. XVII-402.
July 28, 1866, cbap. 299, sec. 32, V. XVII-8, 60.
July 28, 1866, chap. 299, sec. 37, V. XVII-462.
July 28, 1866, chap. 297, V. XX-155.
January 19, 1867, chap. 8, V. XX-334.
February 21, 1867, chap. 57, Vol. XX-588.
February 22, 1867, chap. 61, V. XIX-83.
February 25, 1867, chap. 79, V. XVII-4.
March·2, 1867, chap. 145, sec. 9, V. XVII-94.
March 2, 1867, chap. 159, V. XVII-11, 35, 53,196,363.
March 2, 1867, chap.159, sec. 2, V. XVII-403.
March 2, 1867, chap. 167, V. XVIII-441.
March 2, 1867, chap. 172, V. XVII-126.
March 2, 1867, chap. 174, V. XVII-36, 496, 556; V. XIX-590.
March 29, 1867, chap. 14, V. XX-365.
February 25, 1868, chap.13, V. XVII-616.
March 30, 1868, chap. 37, V. XVIII-216.
March 30, 1868, chap. 38, V. XIX-611.
March 30, 1868, chap. 38, sec. 2, V. XIX-204.
June 25, 1868, chap. 72, V. XVlI-342; V. XVIII-389; V. XIX-686 ..
July 20, 1868, chap. 186, sec. 61, V. XVII-646.
·
July 20, 1868, chap. 186, sec. 107, V. XIX-307.
July 23, 1868, chap. 227, V. XX-10.
July 27, 1868, chap. 273, sec. 8, V. XVIII-585.
July 27, 1868, chap. 273, V. XIX-700.
December 15, 1868, chap. 2, V. XVII-100.
March 3, 1869, chap. 123; V. XVII-219; ,V. XIX-429.
March 3, 1869, chap. 127, sec. 1, V. XVII-377.
March 3, 1869, chap. 152, V. XIX-13.
January 21, 1870, chap. 9, V. XX-353, 688.
March 3, 1870, chap. 122, V. XVII-371.
March 25, 1870, chap. 30 V. XVII-581.
April 6, 1870, chap. 47, V. XVIII-444.
May 4, 1870, chnp. 69, V. XVII-378.
June 17, 1870, chap. 132, sec. 2, V. XVlI-235.
June 22, 1870, chap. 150, V. XVIII-125; V. XX-656, 716.
June 22, 1870, cl1ap. 150, sec. 1, V. XX-722.
June 22, 1870, chap. 150, sec. 171 V. XIX-64.
July 1, 1870, chap. 180, V. XX-635.
July 1, 1870, chap. 189, V. XIX-6; V. XX-52.
July 1, 1870, chap. 189, sec. 7, V. XVIII-586.

xx
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July 1, 1870, chap. 202, V. XIX-11; V. XX-119.
July 7, 1870, chap. 210, sec. 7, XVIII-191.
Juiy 11, 1870, chap. 241, V. XVIII-216.
July 12, 1870, chap. 251, V. XVIII-216, 569 •
.July 14, 1870, chap. 255, V. XVIl-613.
July 14, 1870, chap. 255, sec. 15, V. XVII-470.
July 14, 1870, chap. 256, V. XVII-3-!9.
July 14, 1870, chap. 256, sec. 3, V. XX-128.
July 15, 1870, chap. 294, V. XVII-94; V. :XVIII-311; V. XX-688.
July 15, 1870, chap. 294-, sec. 17, V. XVII-14.
July 15, 1870. chap. 294, sec. 20, V. XVII-462.
July 15, 1870, chap. 294, sec. 24, V. XVII-110.
Jnly 15, 1870, chap. 295, V. XVII-126, 320, 496, 556.
July 15, 1870, chap. 295, sec. 5, V. XVII-178.
February 21, 1871, chap. 62, V. XVII-489.
February 28, 1871, chap, 99, V. XVIII-102.
Fel>ruary 28, 1871, chap. 100, V. XVII-629.
March 3, 1871, chap. 113, sec. 2, V. XIX-426.
March 3, 1871, chap. 114, V. XVII-195.
l\farch 3, 1871, chap. 115, V. XVIII-356.
farch 3, 1871, chap. 116, V. XVIII-302; V. XX-360.
March 3, 1871, chap. 117, V. XVII-37, 126.
March 3, 1871, cl.mp. 117, sec. 9, V. XIX-171.
March 3, 1871, chap. 117, sec. 10, V. XVII-50, 58.
March 3, 1871, chap. 122, sec. 23, V. XIX-135.
Dec·ember 21, 1871, chap. 5, V. XVII-510.
March 5, 1872, chap. 30, V. XIX-378.
larch 27, 1872, chap. 65, V. XVII-510.
)lay 2, 1872, chap. 32, V. XVII-372.
May 18, 1872, chap. 172, V. XVII-342.
June 1, 1872, chap. 256, V. XVIII--216.
June 1, 1872, chap. 256, sec. 5, V. x.·-696.
June 5, 1872, chap. 306, V. XVII-320, 497.
June 7, 1872, chap. 322, V. XYIII-55; V. XIX-182•
.June 8, 1 72: chap. 335, V .. XVII-78; V. XVIII-250.
Jnn , 1 72, chap. 335, sec. 167, V. XIX-518 .
.Jun ' , 1 72, cl.tap. 335, ec. 316, V. XIX-3-!8.
,Jun , 1 72, chap. 3-!2, V .../YIII--11.
Jun , 1 72, chap. 346, V. XX-318.
Jun , 1 7'2, chap. 362, V. XVIII-356 .
.TUlH' 10, 1 7'2, chap. H9. V. ~· nI-60.
Deeemher 17 18L, chap. l, V. XTIII-4:26, 512.
I• ehrnary 1, 1 73, ,-hap. 8, Y. X nII-20-!.
F ·brnary 12. 1 7:3, <·hap. 1:n, Y.. · YIII--!19.
farc·h 1. 1 78, chap. 21:-3, ec. 4, Y. x.· -3 9.
Ian·h :l, 1 73, ·hap. 2:m, V .• ·nrr-:3 :.? ; Y. XX-153.
.Marl'h 3, 1 73 ..c·liap. 22H, c. 2, Y .• · • · -15.
73. c•hap. :l.! . Y .• •• •-2:.? L
,;t ,•lwp. 2::11. V .• ' VII-179.
7:3 ch p.:?:31 , .22, V .• ·1.·-1n.

ACTS OF CONGRESS CITED.

1

XXI

March 3, t873, chap. 234, secs. 3 and 4, V. XVIII-41.
March 3, 1873, chap. 234, sec. 25, V. XVII-191, 442.
March 3, 1873, chap. 236, V. XVIII-302.
March 3, 1873, chap. 244, V. XVIII-127; V. XX-100.
March 3, 1873, chap. 260, sec. 6, V. XVII-217.
March 3, 1873, chap. 268, V. XVIII-323.
March 3, 1873, chap. 311, V. XVII-.510.
March 3, 1873, chap. 332, sec. 4, V .. XVII-442.
March 5, 1874, chap. 46, V. XVIII-182.
March 24, 1874, chap. 64, V. XX-52.
May 11, 1874, chap.165, sec. 3, V. XVIII-190.
May 18, 1874, chap.182, V. XVII-169.
June 9, 1874, chap. 259, V. XVII-580; V. XVIII.--246.
June 9, 1874, chap. 260, V. XVIII-55.
June 9, 187-t, chap. 261, V. XVII-169.
June 18, 1874, el.tap . 298, V. XVIII-41, 75, 327, 401.
Jupe·19, 1874-, chap. 323, V. XVII-169.
June 20, 1874, chap. 328, V. XVII-684.
June 20, 1874, chap. 328, sec. 3, V. XVIII-121; V. XIX-65, 153; ' .
XX-222, 235.
.
June 20, 1874, chap. 328, sec. 5, V. XX-600.
June 20, 1874, chap. 337, V. XVII-354, 490.
June 20, 1874, chap. 343, secs. 3 and 4, V. XVII-121, 144,409; V. XX50, 725.
.
June 22, 1874, chap. 388, V. XIX-320.
June 22, 1874, chap. 391, V. XVIII--1169; V. XIX-227; V. XX-592.
June 22, 1874, chap. 391, sec. 4, V. XVIII-70; V. XX-675, 690,754.
June 22, 1874, chap. 391, sec. 9, V. XVII-683.
Jnne 22, 1874, chap. 391, sec. 12, V. XVIII-326.
June 22, 1874, chap. 391, sec. 14, V. XVII-275, 638; V. XIX-543, 606.
June 22, 1874, chap. 391, secs. 17 to 20, V. XIX-348; V. XX-660, 727 •
.June '.32, 1874, chap. 391, sec. 25, V. XX-36.
June 22, 1874, chap. 392, sec. 1, V. XVII-331; V. XVIII-394.
June 22, 1874, chap. 392, V. XVII-4-95.
June 22, 1874, chap. 395, V. XX-155.
June 22, 1874, chap. 415, V. XVII-169.
Jnne 22, 1874, chap. 419, V. XIX-695.
June 23, 1874, chap. 453, V. XVIII-292, 376.
June 23, 1874, chap. 456, sec.12, V. XX-297.
June 23, 1874, chap. 458, V. XX-428.
June 23, 1874, chap. 458, sec. 2, V. XIX-502.
June 23, 1874, chap. 459, V. XVIII-299.
June 23, 1874, chap. 465, V. XVII-85, 212.
June 23, 1874, chap. 469, sec. 6, V. XIX-444.
June 29, 1874, chap. 5371 V. XVII-477.
February 8, 1875, chap. 36, V. XVIl-337, 613.
February 8, 1815, chap. 36, sec. 7, V. XX-630.
February 8, 1875, chap. 36, secs. 19 and 20, V. XIX-98; V. XX-534, 681·
February 18, 1875, chap. 80, V. XIX-160.
February 19, 1875, chap. 90, V. XVIII-238, 487.
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February 22, 1875, chap. 95, sec. 1, V. XIX-178 .
.March 1, 1875, chap. 115, V. XVII, 462.
March 31 1875, chap.130, V. XIX-426. ·
March 3, 1875,chap. 131, V. XVII-219; V. XVIII-559; V. XIX-161,
429.
March 3, 1875, chap.132, V. XVII-73.
March 3, 1875, chap. 133, V. XVIII,---41 ; V. XIX-265; V. XX-145.
March 3, 1875, chap. 134, V. XVIII-605.
March 3, 1875, chap. 136, sec. 2, V. XVIII-140, 480, 516; V. XIX-105,
234; XX-622.
March 3, 1875, chap.141, sec. 5, V. XVIII-239.
March 3, 1875, chap. 14:9, V. XVII-229; V. XX-135, 364, 626.
March 3, 1875, chap. 152, V. XIX-547.
March 3, 1875, chap. 178, V. XIX-204, 610.
December 24, 1875, chap. 1, V. XVIII-300.
March 23, 1876, chap . 30, V. XVII-235 .
.April 21, 1876, chap. 72, sec. 1, V. XVIII_:_574.
May 1, 1876, chap. 89, V. XVII-683; V. XX-5 .
•June 10, 1876, chap. 122, V. XVII-104; V. XVIII-582 .
.June 20, 1876, chap. 136, V. XX-311 .
.June 26, 1876, chap. 146, V. XVII-466 .
.July 12, 1876, chap. 179, V. XVIII-:-271, 307.
.July 12, 1876, chap. 186, sec. 2, V. XVII-79.
~Tuly 21, 1876, 'chap. 220, V. XVII-169 .
.July 22, 1876, chap. 225, V. XVIII-300 .
.July 24, 1876, chap. 226, V. XVII-463, 517.
.July 29, 1876, chap. 239, V. XVII-42 .
.July 31, 1876, chap. 246, V. XIX-159; V. XX-545.
August 11, 1876, cha,p. 260, V. XX-296.
Augn t 14, 1876, chap. 266, V. XVII-169.
Augu t 15, 1876, chap. 287, V. XVII-419; V. XVIII-399.
August 15, 1876, chan. 289, V. XVII-73; V. XX-215.
ugust 15, 1876, chap . 290, V. XIX-277.
August 15, 1876, chap. BOO, V. XVII-234.
August 15, 1876, chap. 302, V. XVII-495 .
.A.ngust 15, 187~, chap. 305, V. XVIII-317.
January 31, 1877, chap. 41, V. XIX-444.
:F el>rnary 27, 1877, chap . 69, V. XVII-50, 120,127,257; V. XVIII-275;
V. XX-353.
Fel,ruary 2 , l 77, chap. 72, V. XX-744.
February 28, 1877, chap . 74, V. XVII-169 .
.Mar,·h 3, 1 77, chap. 101, V. XVII-73; V. XVIII-41.
March 3. 1 77, chap. 103, sec . 5 and 6, V. XVII-184, 63L
March 3, 1 77, chap. 106, V. XVH-8 .
far h 3, 1 77, chap. 107, V. XVIII-26 .
)Jareb 3, 1 77, chap. 10 , V. X lll-26+:
Iar h 3, 1 77, chap. 10 , , cs. 3 and 6, V. XVII-255.
larch 3, 1877, liap. 1
c. 19 V. XX-307.
~larch 3, 1877, chap. 12 , V. X II-169.
:\Iaroh 3, 1877, chap. 130, V. X II-19 .
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March 3, 1877, chap. 133, V. XVII-61.
March 3, 1877, chap. 161, V. XVII-316.
February 22, 1878, chap. 11, V. XVIII-194 .
.February 28, 1878, chap. 20, Y. XVII-123.
February 28, 1878, chap. 20, sec. 3, V. XVIII--418; V. XX-125, 725.
April 29, 1878, chap. 66, V. XX-467, 472.
April 301 1878, chap. 76, V. XVII-592.
April 30, 1878, chap. 76, sec. 2, V. XVIII--435.
May 7, 1&78, chap. 90, sec. 2, V. XVII-394.
1'1ay 7, 1878, chap. 96, V. XVIII-506, 599; V. XIX--491; V. XX-12.
May 7. 1878, chap. 96, sec. 3. V. XVII-217.
May 17, 1878, chap. 107, V. XVII-245, 515.
May 17, 1878, chap. 107. sec. 5, V. XVIII-250.
June 3, 1878, chap. 150 sec. 3, V. XVIiI--435.
June 3, 1878, chap. 151, sec 4, V. XVIII--435 •
.June 3, 1878, chap. 151, V. XVII-592.
June 7, 1878, chap. 162, V. XIX-81.
Jurie 11, 1878, chap. 180, V. XVII-354, 495,575.
June 11, 1878, chap. 180,. sec. 1, V. XVII-158.
June 11, 1878, chap. 180, sec. 2, V. XVII--476.
June 11, 1878, chap. 181, V. XX-1-19.
June 14, 1878, chap. 188, V. XVIII-251.
June 18, 1878, chap. 263, V. XVII-95, 422,560; V. XX-149.
" June 18, 1878, chap. 263, sec. 8, V. XVII-390.
• June 18, 1878, chap. 263, sec. 9, V. XVII-170.
June 18, 1878, chap. 263, sec. 15, V. XVII-71, 243,335; V. XIX-295, 571.
June 19, 1878, chap. 311, V. XVII[-413.
June 19, 1878, chap. 329, sec. 1, V. XVII-305.
June 19, 1878, chap. 329, V. XVIII-540.
June 20, 1878, chap. 359, V. XVIII-131, 202; V. XIX-160.
June 20, 1878 chap. 367, V. XVJII-252.
July 11, 1878, chap. 180, V. XVII-490.
December 12, 1878, chap. 2, V. XVII-2.
December 16, 1878, chap. 5, V. XVIII-266.
January 30, 1879, chap. 36, V. XVII-169.
March 1, 1879, chap. 125, V. XVII-117,580, 646; V. XVJII-276.
March 2, 1879, chap. 22, V. XVII-533.
March 3, 1879, chap. 180, V. XVII-5301 632; V. XX-224, 384.
March 3, 1879, chap. 1801 sec. 1, V. XIX-593.
March 3, 1879, chap. 180, sec. 5, V. XVII-159.
March 3, 1879, chap. 180, secs. 11 and 25, V. XVII-165
March 3, 1879, chap. 180, sec. 20, V. XVII-308.
March 3, 1879, chap. 180, sec. 17, V. XVII-188.
March 3, 1879, chap. 180, sec. 29, V. XVII-184, 255.
March 3, 1879, chap. 290, V. XVII-401.
March 3, 1879, ch;P· 182, V. XVII-89, 424,510,518; V. XIX-265.
March 3, 1870, cliap. 182, :par. 3, V. XX-538.
,
·
March 3, 1879, chap. 290, V. XVIII-73.
March 3, 1879, chap. 187, sec. 2, V. XVII-356; V. XIX-HJO.
March 3, 1879, chap. 180, V. XX-224.

XXIV

ACTS OF CONGRESS CITED.

May 3, 1879, chap. 189, V. XVII-169.
1une 2, 1879, chap. 11, V. XX-467.
June 18, 1879: chap. 26, V. XVII-510.
· June 21, 1879, chap. 34, V. XVII-86, 88.
juue 23, 1879, chap. 35, sec, 1, V. XVII-170.
June 23, 1879, cha,p. 35, sec. 2, V. XVII-463.
June 28, 1879, chap. 43, V. XVIII-464.
April 1, 1880, chap. 4.0, V. XVII-169.
April 1, 1880, chap. 41, V. XVII-104; V. XX-517.
April 7, 1880, chap. 48, V. XVII-241.
April 7, 1880, chap. 78, sec. 2, V. XVII-166.
May 11, 1880, chap. 85, V. XVII-531.
May 18, 1880, chap. 96, V. XVIII-190.
May 28, 1880, chap. 108, sec. 4, V. XVIII-247, 380.
May 28, 1880, cha1), 108, V. XVII-579.
June 10, 1880, chap. 187, V. XVII-169.
June 10, 1880, chap. 190, sec. 3, V. XX-674.
June 10, 1880, chap. 190, sec. 7, V. X Vlll-120.
June 14, 1880, chap. 211, V. XVIII-190; V. XX-300
June 15, 1880, chap. 221, V. XVII-169.
June 15, 1880, chap. 223, V. XVII-262.
June 15, 1880, chap. 225, V. XVII-86.
June 16, 1880, cllap. 235, V. XVll-88, 321.
June 16, 1880, chap. 236, V. XVII-327, 401; V. XVIII-40, 674.
June 16, 1880, chap. 2-13, V. XVIII-304.
June 16, 1880, chap. 248, V. XIX-636.
December 23, 1880, chap. 7, V. XIX--260, 319.
January 18, 1881, chap. 23, V. XIX-561.
January 18, 1881, chnp. 23, sec. 5, V. XIX-50.
January 20, 1881, chap. 24, V. XVII-103.
February 8, 1881, chap. 34, V. XVII-82.
February 9, 1881, chap. 41, V. XVIII-76.
Fehrnary 18, 1881, chap. 61, V. XIX-636.
Fel>ruary 23, 1881, chap. 73, V. XVII-495.
Felm1ary 24, 1881, chap. 79, V. XVII-93, 148; V. XIX-265.
March 3, 1881, chap. 130, V. XVII-85.
March 3, 1881, chap. 132, V. XVII-229, 381.
)larch 3, 1 81, chap. 133, V. XVII-63, 234; V. XIX-50.
:March 3, 18 1, chap. 133, ec. 2, V. XIX-280.
:\far ·h 3, l 81, chap. 13-1, sec. 4, V. XVII-102 .
.. larch 3, 1 1, chap. 13-1, ·ec. 6, V. XVII-100.
~larch 3 1 1, chap. 135, V. 'Vll-253.
)far h 3, 1 1, chap. 136, V. XVII-109, 190,456,482; V. XIX-34; V.
L'-301.
larch 91 1 2 chap. 2 1 V. XVII-510; V. XVIII-357 .
• larch 17 1 -, chap. 41, V . .XVIII-371.
.larch .2, 1 2, chap. 47, V .• ·nI-314;,V. XVI(I-94, 596; V. XX331.
April 11, 1 2, chap. 75, V. 'VII-509; V. XVIIl-79.

ACTS OF CONGRESS CITED.

XXV

May 1, 1882, chap. 115, V. XVII-626; V. XIX-32; V. XX-373.
May 4, 1882, chap. 116, V. XVll;---514.
May 6,1882, chap. 126, V. XVII-416; V. XVIII-388, 542; V. XIX-369;
XX-171, 602, 693.
May 6, 1882, chap. 126, sec. 1, V. XVII-483.
May 6, 1882, chap. 126, sec. 12, V. XVIII-90.
May 15, 1882, chap. 144, V. XVII-410.
May 17, 1882, chap. 163, V. ~VII-647; V. XIX-253.
May 26, 1882, chap. 190, V. XIX-576, 595.
June 5, 1882, chap. 195, V. XVIII-298.
June 30, 1882, chap. 254, V. XIX-265, 422.
July 12, 1882, chap. 290, V. XVIII-495.
July 12, 1882, chap. 290, sec. 9, V. XX-725.
July 12, 1882, chap. 290, sec. 13, V. XVII-472.
July 15, 1882, chap. 294, V. XVII-587; V. XIX-193.
July 25, 1882, chap. 3-!9, V. XVIII-74; V. XIX-211.
July 31, 1882, chap. 360, V. XX-215.
August 2, 1882, chap. 375, V. XVII-453; V. XVIII-190, 482.
August 3, 1882, chap. 376, V. XVIII-109, 185, 196; V. XIX-155, 486,376,704; V. XX-217, 259, 372, 380.
August 3, 1882, chap. 376, secs. 1 and 2, V. XX-70, 79, 171.
August 3, 1882, chap. 376, sec. 2, V. XVIII-500.
August 3, 1882, chap. 376, sec. 4, V. XVIII-239.
August 3, 1882, chap. 381, V. XVIII-484.
August 5, 1882, chap. 389, V. XVIII-433; V. XIX-555; V. XX-260.
August 5, 1882, chap. 389, sec. 4, V. XlX-508; V. XX-610, 751.
August 5, 1882, chap. 390, V. XIX-265.
August 5, 1882, chap. 391, V. XVII-495, 555; V. XVIII-96, 397; V.
XIX-170,303,353.
August 7, 1882, chap. 433, V. XVII-510; V. XVIII-205, 357, 484; V.
XIX-131; V. XX-56. 82.
August 7, 1882, chap. 439, V. XVIII-229.
Jan nary 6, 1883, chap. 13, V. XIX-67, 481.
January 9, 1883, chap.15, V. XX-158.
January 16, 1883, chap. 27, V. XVII-554, 623; V. XVIII-173, 245,410;
V. XX-584, 649.
January 16, 1883, chap. 27, sec. 2, V. XX-276.
January 16, 1883, chap. 27, sec. 6, V. XX-397.
January 16, 1883, chap. 27, sec. 7, V. XIX-412.
January 16, 1883, chap. 27, sec. 9, V. XVIII-83.
February 14, 1883, chap. 44-, V. XVIII-426, 512.
March 2, 1883, chap. 64, V. XVII-585.
March 3, 1883, chap. 93, V. XIX-265.
March 3, 1883, chap. 96, V. XIX-74.
March 3, 1883, chap. 97, V. XVII-555; V. XVIII-207, 413, 567.
March 3, 1883, chap.116, V. XX-116.
March 3, 1883, chap.119, V. XVII-658.
March 3, 1883, chap.121, V. XVII-539, 613,646,672; V. XVIII-1, 63, 69,.
82, 14-0, 148,163,316,368,383,461, 467, 475, 478, 510, 527, 531, 534, 535, 538,.
552,606; V. XIX-103, 105, 157, 272, 335, 367, 527, 687, 691; V. XX-7, 77,
194. 622.

XXVI

ACTS OF CONGRESS CITED.

March 3, 1883, chap. 121, sec. 7, V. XVII-634; V. XVIII-288, 364, 469,
479,483,496,516; V.XIX-18,543,604.
March 3, 1883, chap. 121, sec. 10, Y. XVII-650; V. X, VIII-14.
March 3, 1883, chap. 121, sec. 645, V. XX-314.
March 3, 1883, chap.121, sec. 2499, V. XIX, 302.
March 3, 1883, chap. 121, sec. 2503, V. XVIII-263.
Maren 3, 1883, chap. 123, V. XVII-620.
March 3, 1883, chap.123, sec. 2, V. XX-132.
March 3, 1883, chap. 128, sec. 4, V. xvfn-352; V. XIX-420, 509; V•
. XX-128, 303,437, 671.
March 3, 1883, chap. 133, V. XVIII-565.
March 3, 1883, chap, 130, secs.10 and 12i V. XX-353, 483,515,
March 3, 1883, chap.142, seo.1, V. XVIII-271.
March 3, 1883, chap.143, V. XVIII--79, 175,205.
May 1, 1884, chap. 37, V. XX-610.
May 13, 1884, chap. 46, V. XVIII-82.
May 17, 1884, chap. 53, V. XVIII-139, 559; V. XIX-678, 701.
May 21, 1884-, chap. 55, V. XVIII-147.
May 29, 1884, chap. 60, V. XVIII-154.
June 3, 1884, chap. 64, V. XVIII-298.
June 26, 1884, chap.121, V. XVIII-111, 196,234,282,285; V. XIX-690;
V.XX-368.
June 26, 1884, chap. 121, sec. 10, V. XVIII-253.
June 26, 1884, chap. 121, sec. 12, V. XVIII-99.
June 26, 1884, chap. 121, sec. 14, V. XVIII-53, 197, 260, 382.
June 26, 1884, chap. 121, sec. 21, V. XIX-661.
June 26, 1884, chap. 121, i:;ec. 26, V. XVIII-63.
June 26, 1884, chap. 121, &ec. 27, V. XVlII-55,
June 26, 1884, chap. 121, sec. 29, V. XIX-646.
July 4, 1884, chap. 180, sec. 1, V. XIX-161, 561.
July 4, 1884, chap. 180, sec. 8, V. XX-562.
July 5, 1884, chap. 214, V. XVIII-544; V. XX-603.
July 5, 1884, chap. 215, V. XVIlI-133, 164.
July 5, 1884, chap. 217, V. XVIII-205, 349; V. XIX-265,
Jnly 5, 1884, chap. 220, V. XVIIl-90, 542; V. XIX-369; V. XX-171,
602, 730.
Jnly 5, 1884, chap. 220, sec. 6, V. XIX-510; V. XX-693.
July 5, 1884, chap. 221, V. XVIII-198; V. XX-369.
July 5, 1884, chap. 222, V. XIX-223.
July 5, 1884, chap. 227, V. XIX-193.
July 5, 18 4, chap. 229, V. XVIII-66, 482; V. XIX-35.
Jnly 5, 1 , chap. 229, sec. 2, V. XVIII-201.
July 5, 1 4, chap. 229, aec. 4, V. XVIII-188; V. XX-111,
Jul)· 5 1 , chap. 234, sec. 3, V. XVIII-49, 54, 93.
July 7, 1 4, chap. 331, V. XVIII-172; V. XIX-701.
July 7, 1 , chap. 332, V. XVIIf--33, 79, 91, 205, 464,
Jul 7, 1 84 hap. 334, V. XX- 252.
July 7, 18 , hap. 335, V. X IH-567.
January 13, 1 -, chap. 20, V. XX-613.

ACTS OF CONGRESS CITED.

XXVII

February 26, 1885, chap. 164, V. XIX-345; V. XX.-71, 89, 380, 531.
February 28, 1885, chap. 260, V. XVIII-174.
March 3, 1885, chap. 331, V. XVIII-353.
March 3, 1885, chap. 335, V. XIX-694.
March 3, 1885, chap. 342, V. XVIII-215, 250.
March 3, 1885, chap. 343, V. XVIII-173; V. XIX-701.
March 3, 1885, chap. 360, V. XVIII-328, 353, 411 ;- V. XIX___.:265.
March 3, 1885, chap. 361, V. X:.VIII-14-7.
March 3, 1886, chap. 894, V. XX-617.
March 19, 1886, chap. 22, V. XLX- j'fi7.
April 15, 1886, chap. 50, V. XIX-96.
May 15, 188_6, chap. 33S, V. XVIII-440; V. XX-744.
May 17, 1886, chap. 338, V. XX-149.
May 17, 1886, chap. 341, V. XIX-223.
May 20, 1886, chap. 363, V. XVIII-514.
June 1, 1886, chap. 395, V. XIX-43.
June 19, 1886, chap. 421, V. XX-368.
June 19, 1886, chap. 421, sec. 7, V. XVIII-565.
June 19, 1886, chap. 421, sec. 8, V. XVIII-445.
June 19, 1886, chap. 421, sec. 11, V. XIX-129.
June 30, 1886, chap. 574, V. XIX-265.
June 30, 1886, chap. 585, V. XIX-608.
July 8, 1886, chap. 747, V. XIX-137.
July 10, 1886, chap. 761, V. XVIII-484.
July 28, 1886, chap. 800, V. XX-539.
July 29, 1886, chap. 810, V. XIX-471.
August 2, 1886, chap. 840, sec. 2, V. XVIII-490.
August 3, 1886, chap. 849, sec. 1, V. XIX-235.
August 3, 1886, chap. 849,· sec. 7, V. XIX-54.
August 4, 1886, chap. 897, V. XIX-259.
August 4, 1886, chap. 902, V. XX-33.
August 4, 1886, chap. 907, V. XVIII-501.
August 5, 1886, chap. 929, V. XVIII....:..438, 463,481; V. XIX-34; V.
XX-111.

August 5, 1886, chap. 930, V. XVIII-438.
February 3, 1887, chap. 90, sec. 3, V. XX-522.
February 4, 18871 chap.104, V. XVIII-587.
February 4, 1887, chap. 104, sec. 11, V. XIX-47.
February 8, 1887, chap. 119, V. XIX-14, 184,256,559; V. XX--43.
February 8, 1887, chap, 119, sec. 9, V. XVIII-594.
February 8, 1887, chap. 119, sec. 4, V. XVIII-161.
February 8, 1887, chap. 119, sec. 5, V: XIX-232.
February 9, 1887, chap. 127, V. XIX-265.
February 12, 1887, chap.129, V. XIX-61.; V. XX-144.
February 23, 1887, chap. 220, V. XX-71, 89,380.
February 28, 1887, chap. 272, sec . 7, V. XIX-25.
March 2, 1887, chap. 320, V. XIX-95.
March 3, 1887, chap. 340, V. XIX-26.
March 3, 1887, chap. 345, sec. 5, V. XVIIl-598; V. XIX-492.
March 3, 1887, chap. 34~, V. XVIH-591.

XXVIII

ACTS OF CONGRESS CITED.

March 3, 1887, chap. 353, V. XVIII-576; V. XX-44-8.
March 3, 1887, chap. 356, V. XIX-29.
March 3, 1887, chap . 359, V. XX-753.
March 3, 1887, chap. 362, V. XIX-80, 154; V. XX-34.
March 3, 1887, chap. 364., V. XX-613.
March 3, 1887, chap. 376, V. XIX-68, 525; V. XX-224.
March 3, 1887, chap. 391, sec. 4, V. XIX--236.
March 3, 1887, chap. 397, V. XVIII-596; V. XX-331.
January 20, 1888, chap. 2, V. XIX-596.
March 5, 1888, chap . 23, V. XIX-131.
March 29, 1888, chap. 45, V. XIX-297
.
March 30, 1888, chap. 47, V. -X.IX-~92, 292; V. XX-462.
April 4, 1888, chap. 59, V. XIX-134, 242.
April 5, 1888, chap. 64, V. XIX-269.
Apnl 24, 1888, chap. 194, V. XX-611.
May 30, 1888, chap. 336, V. XIX-199.
June 4, 1888, chap. 340, V. XIX--183.
June 29, 1888, chap. 496, V. XIX-317.
June 29, 1888, chap. 503, sec. 8, V. XIX-253.
July 11, 1888, chap. 614, V. XIX-219.
July 11, 1888, chap. 615, V. XIX-320, 327.
July 18, 1888, chap. 677, V. XIX-328.
Angnst 1, 1888, chap . 728, V. XIX-674; V. XX-630.
Aurrust 11, 1888, chap. 860, V. XIX-396; V. XX-498.
August 11, 1888, chap. 860, secs. 9 and 10, V. XIX-599, 676; V. XX-·
l12.'
.
August 13, 1888, chap. 868, V. XX -158 .
.Angnst 14, 1888, chap. 890, secs. 1 and 3, V. XIX--222.
Aurrnst 21, 1888, chap. 899, V. XX-613.
September 13, 1888, chap. 1015, V. XIX-370.
September 13, 1888, cliap. 1015, sec. 3, V. XX-730.
eptember 22, 1888, chap. 1027, V. XIX-269.
September 26, 1888, chap. 1039, V. XIX-668.
October 1, 1888, chap. 1064, V. XIX-369; V. XX-174, 602.
October 2, 188 , chap. 1069, V. XIX-564; V. XX-3.J:.
October 19, 1888, chap. 1210, V. XX-75.
October 19, 1 , chap. 1216, V. XX-522.
January 4, 1889, chap. 19, sec. 2, V. XIX-296.
February 9, 1 9, chap. 119, V. XIX-617.
February 9, 1~ 9. chap. 122, V. XX-398.
February 12, 18 9, chap. 135, V. XIX-312.
February 14, 1889, chap. 166, V. XIX-2 3.
F bru:iry 22, 1 9, cbap. 180, Y. XX-246.
F brnary 22, 1 9, chap. 1 O, sec. 14, V. XIX-635.
F lmrn.ry 26, 1 9, ·hap. 27 , V. XX-484, 554.
11arcb 1, 1 9, ·hap. 317, V. XIX-309 .
.,far h 1, 1 9, chap. 32 , V. XX-43 , 669.
!arch 1, 1 9, chap. 332, V. XIX-339 · V. XX-50, 178.
~larch 1, 1 · , chap. 333, V. XIX-293 4 2.

ACTS OF CONGRESS CITED.

XXIX

March 2, 1889, chap. 370, sec. 4, V. XIX-286.
March 2, 1889, chap. 371, V. XX--485, 554.
March 2, 1889, chap. 374, V. XIX-324.
March 2, 1889, chap. 390, V. XX-289.
March 2, 1889, chap. 396, V. XIX-303; V. XX-615.
March 2, 1889, chap. 405, V. XX-742.
March 2, 1889, chap. 405, sec. 25, V. XIX-467.
March 2, 1889, chap. 405, sec. 28, V. XX-711.
M11,rch 2, 1889, chap . 410, V. XX-383.
March 2, 1889, chap. 411, V. XIX-375; V. XX-34, 75.
March 2, 1889, chap. 412, V. XIX-309, 511.
October 19, 1889, chap. 1210, V. XX-89.
March 3, 1890, chap. 5'0, V. XX-:181.
April 4, 1890, chap. 63, V. XX-555.
Aprit25, 1890, ebap. 156, V. XIX-600, 703; V. XX-90, 298,452,576,577,
598,641.
April 25, 1890, chap. 156, secs. 2 and 3, V. XIX-700,
April 25, 1890, chap . 156, sec. 6, V. XX-237, 567.
April ~6, 1890, chap. 160, V. XX-298.
May 2, 1890, chap. 182, V. XIX-569.
May 2, 1890, chap. 182, sec. 4, V. XIX-683,
May 2, 1890, chap. 182, sec. 29, V. XIX-586.
May 14, 1890, chap. 207, V. XX-24.
May 16, 1890, chap. 216, V. XX-242.
Juue 10, 1890, chap. 407, V. XIX-661; V. XX-408.
June 10, 1890, chap. 407, sec. 7, V. XX-247, 660.
June 10, 1890, chap. 407, sec. 8, V. XIX-656.
June 10, 1890, chap . 407, sec. 9, V. XX-683.
June 10, 1890, chap. 4-07, sec. 12, V. XX-40
June 10, 1890, chap. 407, sec. 13, V. XIX-666; V. XX-39.
June 10, 1890, chap. 407, sec. 14, V. XX-183.
June 10, 1890, chap. 407, sec. 15, V. XX-229, 230,238,274.
June 10, 1890, chap. 407, sec. 19, V. XIX-602.
June 10, 1890, chap. 407, sec. 22, V. XX-731.
June 10, 1890, chap. 407, sec. 26, V. XIX-668.
June 10, 1890, chap. 407, sec. 29, V. XX-5.
June 16, 1890, chap. 426, V. XIX-617.
June 27, 1890, clwp. 634, sec. 1, V. XIX-587.
June 30, 1890, chap. 639, V. XIX-581. _
June 30, 1890, chap. 640, V. XX-49.
July 11, 1890, chap. 667, V. XIX-625, 702; V. XX-60, 559, 650.
July 14, 1890, chap. 706, V. XX-559.
July 14, 1890, chap. 707, V. XX-599.
July 14, 1890, chap. 708, V. XX-124, 318.
August 19, 1890, chap. 806, V. XIX-o74; V.XX-482.
August 19, 1890, chap. 807, V. XX-301.
August 30, 1890, chap. 837, V. XIX-702, 7,0 5; V. XX-35, 176.
September 19, 1890, chap. 907, V. XX-700.
September 19, 1890, chap. 907, sec. 4, V. XIX-677; V. XX-102, 603,
September 19, 1890, chap. 907, sec. 7, V. XX-4-80, 488.

XXX

ACTS OF CONGRESS CITED.

September 19, 1890, chap. 907, sec. 12, V. XX-749,
September rn, 1890, chap. 908, V. XIX-679; XX-203, 1-!8.
September 27, 1890, chap. 1001, V. XX-67, 129. 3211, 377.
September 30, 1890,-chap. 1126, V. XX-315, 423.
October 1, 1890, chap. 1241, sec. 3, V. XX-434.
October 1, 1890, chap. 1244, V. XIX-687, 690; XX-357, 648.
October 1, 1890, chap. 1244, sec. 2, V. XX-630.
October 1, 1890, chap. 1244, sec. 3, V. XX-290.
October 1, 1890, chap. 1244, sec. 10, V. XX-699.
October 1, 1890, chap. 1244, sec. 50, V. XX-81.
October 1, 1890, chap. 1244-, sec. 54, V. XIX-669.
October 1, 1890, chap. 1244, secs. 231 and 232, V. XX-2.
October 1, 1890, chap. 1244, sec. 233, V. XX-3 . .
October 1, 1890, chap. 1244, secs. 241 and 726, V. XIX-697; V. XX-2.
October 1, 1890, chap. 1244, sec. 354, V. XX-622.
October 1, 1890, chap. 1244, sec. 432, V. XX-314.
October 1, 1890, chap. 1244, sec. 4-93, V. XX-72.
October 1, 1890, chap. 1244, sec. 752, V. XX-719.
October 1, 1890, chap. 1246, V. XX-583.
October 1, 1890, chap. 1259, V. XX-346.
October 1, 1890, chap. 1266, V. XX-752.
Octobor 1, 1890, chap. 1266, secs. 5 and 9, V. XX-314, 395.
Jannary_21, 1891, chap. 85, V. XX-613.
January 24, 1891, chap. 91, V. XX-320.
February 10, 1891, ch;tp. 127, secs . 3 an(l 4, V. XX-211, 6'.)8,
February 28, 1891, chap. 382, V. XX-549.
March 2, 1891, chap. 496, V. XX-13.J., 24-1, 363,412,548,701.
March 3, 1891, chap. 519, V. XX-98, 162, 294,305,322,409.
Marcil 3, 1891, chap. 527, V. XX-54.
March 3, 1891, chap. 539, V. XX-123 .
.i:'.Carch 3, 18n, cbn,p. 540, V. XX-222.
March 3, 1891, chap. 542, V. XX-2 9,237,381,483.
March 3, 1891, chap. 543, sec. 15, V. XX-220.
March 3, 1891, chap. 543, sec. 31, V. XX-518.
March 3, 1891, chap. 544, V. XX-41, 395.
March 3, 1 91, chap. 545, V. XX-392.
~larch 3.1 91, chap . 547, V. XX-261.
)larch 3, 1 91, chap. 551, V. XX-372, 380,416.
i:arch 3, 1 91, chap . 551, sec. 2, V. XX-530.
)!arch 3 1 91, chap. 551, sec. 7, V. XX-69, 79,218.
)larch 3, 1 91, chap. 551, sec. 8, V. XX-260.
Mar•h 3 1 91, hap. 551 ec. 10, V. XX-685, 706.
March 3, 1 91 hap. 559, V. XX-542 .
Mar ·b 3, 1 91 chap. 562, V . X · - 3.
:\larch 3, 1 91 •hap. 565, V. XX-753.
:\Iay 5 1 92 hap. 6
. XX--667.
11, ~- - 1 2 chap. 60 ec . 2, 3, 4 V. XX, 730•
.. fay 1 92, chap. 62, XX-427.
J-qly 5.1 2 chap. 147, V. XX-574-591.
July 6 1 92 chap. 15-1-, . ~·x-42r,.

ACTS OF CONGRESS CITED.

XXXI

July 13, 1892, chap. 158, V. XX-4-80, 496,526.
July 13, 1892, chap. 164-, V. XX-517.
July 13, 1892, chap. 165, V. XX-598.
July 14, 1892, chap. J 71. V. XX-508.
July 16, 1892, chap.197, V. XX-559, 601.
July 28, 1892, chap. 315, V. XX-4-34.
July 29, 1892, chap. 322, V. XX-:-550.
· August 1, 1892, chap. 352, V. XX-440, 4-45, 454, 459, 464, 465,487,501.
August 5, 1892, chap. 380, V. XX-554, 577, 599, 623.
August 5, 1892, chap. 381, V. XX-567., 595,599,623.
August 5, 1892, chap. 381, sec. 2, V. XX-577.
February 15, 1893, chap.114, V. XX-645.
:February 27, 1893, chap.168, V. XX-684.
March 1, 1893, chap. 182, V. XX-559, 596.
March 1, 1893, chap. 183, V. XX-604.
March 1, 1893, chap. 186, V. XX~593.
March 3, 1893, chap. 199, V. XX-652.
March 3, 1893, chap. 208, V. XX-566, 595,628,697.
March 3, 1893, chap. 209, V. XX-620.
March 3, 1893, chap. 209, sec.10, V. XX-750.
March 3, 1893, chap. 209, sec.16, V. XX-724.
March 3, 1893, chap. 211, sec. 5, V. XX-607, 671,717,728.
March 3, 1893, chap. 212, V. XX-576, 617.
November 3, 1893, chap.13, V. XX-687.
December 21, 1893, chap. 3, V. XX-735•
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Section 12 .••. XVIII, 252; XX, 467.
Section 25 .... XIX, 502.
Section 28 .... XVII, 4-19.
Section 30 .... XVII, 419.
Section 105 .... XVII, 300,
Section 106 .... XVII, 300.
Section 108 .... XVII, 300.
Section 140 .... XX, 522.
Section Hcl. ... XX, 522.
Seetion 161. ... XVII, 210; XIX, 403; XX, 703,729.
Section 163 .... XVII, 622; XVIII, 245; XIX, 555,626,
Section 164- ... XVIII, 245; XIX, 555.
Section 166 .... XX, 703,752.
Section 167 .... XVII, 622.
Section 177 .... XVII, 531, 536; XVIII, 50, 59; XIX, 133, 500; XX, 8.
Section 178 .... XVII, 531, 536; XVIII, 57; XIX, 500; XX, 9.
Section 179 .... XVII, :531, 536; XVIII, 50, 59; XIX, 133, 500; XX, 8.
Section 180 .... XVII, 531, 536; XX, 9.
Section 181. ... XVIII, 59; XX, 9.
Section 182 .... XX, 9.
Section 18,L ... XVII, 247.
Section 185 .... XVII, 247.
Section 189 .... XVIII, 125, 136; XIX, 63, 64, 329; XX, 657.
Section 190 .•.• XX, 696.
Section 191. ... XVII, 237; XX, 252.
Section 216 .... XVII, 19.
Section 219 .... XX, 589.
Section 221 .... XVII, 146.
Section 222 .... XVII, 146; XVIII, 444.
Section 223 .... XVII, 146.
Section 226 .... XVIII, 444.
Section 235 .... XX, 679.
ection 236 .... XVII, 441; XIX, 386,
Section 24-8 .... XVII, 236.
Section 249 .... XX, 193, 715.
Section 251 .... XX, 193.
Section 255 .... XVIT, 125, 219; XIX, 394, 430.
Section 269 .... XVIJ:, 236 ; XX, 678.
Section 271. ... XVIII, 456.
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Section 273 .... XVII, 236; XX, 679.
Section 276 •••• XX, 678.
Section 277 _... XVII, 341; XIX, 30, 540; XX, 678.
Section 283 .... XX, 679.
Sectfon 292 _... XIX,31.
Section 293 .••• XIX, 31.
Section 294 .... XIX, 31.
Section 295 ..•• XIX, 31.
Section 296 .... XIX, 31; XX, 279.
Section 297 ..•. XVII, 441.
Section 299 .... XX, 50, 235.
Section 302 _... XVIII, 276.
Section 321. _.. XVII, 113.
Section 349 .... XVIII, 60; XX, 656.
Section.350 .... XX, 656,716.
Section 354 .... XVIII, 489; XIX, 547.
Section 355 .... XIX, 63, 547; XX, 299.
Section 356 .... XVII, 358; XVIII, 59, 366, 489, 521; XX, 5'1, 160, 180, 211,
. 221, 250, 252, 270, 272, 290, 383, 385, 421, 440, 464, 465, 527,
536,583,589,592,614,702,724,739.
Section 357 .... XIX, 547.
Section 358 .... XVIlI, 60; XX, 657, 722, 723.
Section 360 .... XX, 656.
Section 361. ... XVI!I, 60; XX, 656.
Section 362 .... XVIII, 136; XIX, 329; XX, '716.
Section 363 .... XVII, 506; XIX, 329.
Section 365 .... XVIII, 125, 136.
Section 366 .... XVIII, 59, 125. 136.
Section 367 .... XVIII, 137.
Section 369 .... XVIII, 57.
Section 376 .... XX, 714.
Section 379 .... XVII, 143; XX, .714.
Section 380 .... XIX, 152, 634.
Section 383 .... XX, 611.
Section 390 .... XX, 681.
Section 396 .... XVII,293; XVIII, 589.
Section 398 .... XIX, 39,513.
Section 405 .... XX, 251.
Section 409 .... XVII, 278; XVIII, 278, 315.
Section 416 .... XIX, 504.
Section 418 ..•. XVIII, 178.
Section 419 .... XVIII, 178.
Section 420 .... XVIII, 178.
ection 421. ... XVII, 155, 649.
ection 22 .... XVII, 155.
ec ion 439 .... X III, 432 - XIX, 133.
ction 441. ... X II 206, 393.
e tion442 .... XI
1.
ction 143 .••. XL 82.
tion 44 .... XIX, 2.
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Section 450 .... XVII, 305.
Section 451. .. . XVII, 305.
Section 453 .... XVIII, 4:35, 454; XIX, 714.
Section 455 .... XVII, 210.
Section 463 .... XVII, 210.
Section 467 .... XX, 609.
Section 4-71. ... XVII, 210, 340; XX, 181.
Section 473 ... . XVII, 677.
Section 479 ... . XVIII, 276.
Section .J.81 .... XVII, 206.
Section 483 .. .. XVII, 207.
Section 487 .... XVII, 407.
Section 489 ... . XVII, 679.
Sectior. 508 .... XVII, 210.
,
Section 559 .... XVIII, 453.
Seotion 563 .... XIX, 174.
Section 623 .... XIX, 531.
Section 624 .... XIX, 531.
Section 625 .... XIX, 531.
Section 626 .... XIX, 531.
Section 628 .... XX, 495.
Section 683 .... XIX, 312.
Section 707 .... XX, 548.
Section 748 .... XX, 495.
Section 758 .... XVIII, 307.
Section 760 .... XIX, 444.
.
Section 767 .... XVII, 192; XIX, 63; XX, 233.
Section 770 .... XVIII, 122; XIX, 153; XX, 654.
Section 771 .... XVIII, 109; XIX, 355, 356; XX, 233.
Section 778 .... XVIII, ?08.
Section 787 .... XIX, 295.
Section 788 .... XIX, 294.
Section 790 .... XVII, 529.
Section 795 .... XVII1, 276.
Section 823 .... XIX, 63; XX, 236.
Section 824 .... XVIII, 193; XX, 229, 400, 709.
Section 827 .... XVII, 192, 24~, 479; XVIII, 12~; XIX, 355; XX, 654, 709.
Section 829 .... XVIII, 123.
Section 833 .... XVIII, 122,123.
Section 834 .... XVIII, 122; XIX, 356; XX, 236.
Section 835 .... XVIII, 122; XIX, 63.
Section 836 .... XV III, 192.
Section 838 .... XVIII. 126; XX, 399.
ection 841. ... XVIII, 290.
Section 843 .... XIX, 63.
Section 846 .... XIX, 357.
Section 847 .... XVII, 247.
Section 853 .... XIX, 159.
Section 855 .... XVII, 248.
Section 856 .... XVII, 248.
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Section 860 .... XVII, 54, 616.
Section 906 .... XVIII, 346.
Section 1063 .... XX, fi48, 687.
Section 1076 ••.. XX, 678.
Sect1ou 1089 .••• X.VllI, 549.
Section 1090 .... XVIII, 549.
Sec ti on 1094 .... XVII, 359; XIX, 283; XX, 688.
Section 1104 .... XVII, 47.
Section 1108 ... ,XVII, 47,
Section llll .... XVII, 14.9.
Section 1.112 _. _. X.VII, 149.
Section ll18 .. .. XVIL 149.
Section 1119 .... XVII, 149.
Section 1132 . .. . XVII, 198.
Section 1133 .. .. XVIII, 350,
Section ll53 __ ._XIX, 426.
Section 1191. ... XVIII, 276.
Section 1193 .... XVII, 3, 466.
Section ll94 __ .. X YII, 198.
Section 1202. __ .XVIII, 281, 317, 562.
Section 1204 .... XVII, 65, 67, 199,466, 611.
cction 1206. __ .XVII, 571.
Section 1207. _.. XVII, 572.
Section 120!) .... XVII, 4.0.
Section 1210 .... XY II, 40.
Section 1219 .... XVII, 12, 53,196,363,403.
Section 1222 .... XYIII, 12; :XIX, 600; XX, 605.
, ection 1223 .... XYIII, 13; XIX, 204,610.
Section 122.L ... XVIII, 11; XIX, 600; XX, 605.
Section 1225 .... XX, 688.
, ectio11 1229 .... xnr, 20; XVIII, 373.
, t·ctiou 1230 .... XYII, 19.
,'ec·tion 123:- ___ .XVIII, 20-1.
,·eetion 1212 .... XIX, 476.
, ection 1259 .... XVlII. 204; XIX, 285, 500; XX, 353,
""cctiou 1260 . ....:X, 68!).
, ection 1261. ... ,.'\'II, .J.3.
,:e ·tion 1262 ....• 'YII, 95.
ction 1263 .... XVII, 95 .
,'edion 1263 .... • 'YIII, J.3f.l; ./IX, 500,
, •cti<,u 127:L ... • ' VU, ::590.
, Pction 127' .. _.XYII, 462.
, ('('lion 12 1. ... xr.·. 567. u21, 623.
, ·tiou 1:! ·2 .. _.• ·rx G:?l, 623 .

. (•t·lion 12 ;; ___ .• ·ix. •171.
• •c·tion 117 ....• ·vur, 20!. ·
dion ]:! ....•. \'II, 162.
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Section 1306 .... XIX, 621.
Section 1307 .... XIX, 621.
Section 1308: ... XIX, 621.
Section 1313 .... XVII, 359.
Section 1325 .... XVII, 68.
Section 1332 .... XVII, 359.
Section 13,12 .... XV lll, 281; XIX, 106.
Sectiou 1349 .... XVIII, 276.
Sectio11 1362 .... XIX, 590.
Section 1368 .... XIX, 169.
Section 1370 .... XVII, 49.
Section 1371. ... XVII, 49, .
Section 1372 .... XVII, 49.
Section 1375 . . :.XIX, 170.
Section 1376 .... XIX, 170.
Section 1377 .... XIX, 170.
Section 1378 .... XVIII, 156.
Section 1380 .... XIX, 171.
Section 1381. ... XVIII, 156.
Section 1382 .... XVIII, 156.
Section 1383 .... XVIII, 276; XIX, 171,175;
Section 1390 .... XIX, ~ 71; XX, 358.
Section 1392 .... XIX, 171.
Section 1399 .... XVII, 103.
Section 1400 .... XVII, 103.
Section 1401. ... XVII, 103.
Section 1412 .... XVII, 189, 400, 556.
Section 1413 .... XVII, 126.
Section 1440 .... XIX, 204.
Section 1442 .... XVII, 128, 154, 182; XVIII,
Section 1444 .... XVII, 182.
Section 1448 .... XVII, 128,181. ·
Section 1449 .... XVII, 181.
Section 1450 .... XVII, 181.
Section 1451. ... XVII, 181. . ·
Section 1452 .... XVII, 181.
Section 1453 .... XVII, 181.
Section 1454 .... XVII, 181; 'X VIII, 96.
Bection 1455 .... XVII, 181.
Section 1457 .... XVII, 155.
Section 1460 .... XVII, 495.
Section 1461 .... XVII, 36, 496,
Section 1467 .... XX, 244.
Section 1471. ... XVIII, 177.
Section 1472 .... XVII: 155.
Section 1474 .... XVII, 37; XIX, 170.
Section 1475 .... XVII, 37.
Section 1476 .... XVII, 37; XVIII, 156; XX,
Section 1477 .... XX, 358.
Section 1478 ..•. XVII, 126; XX, 358,
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Section 1479 ..•. XX, 358.
Section 1480 .... XVII, 50, 127; XIX, 171; XX, 358.
Section 1483 .... XVII, 119, 193.
Section 1485 .... XVII, 57.
Section 1486 .... XVII, 56.
Section 1493 .... XVII, 118; XX, 358.
Section 1496 .... XX, 358.
Section 1506 .... XVII, 22, 76.
Section 1513 .... XIX, 351.
Section 1514 .... XIX, 351.
Section 1515 .... XIX, 351.
Section 1519 .... XIX, 303.
Section 1521 .... XVII, 193; XIX, 353.
Section 1525 .... XIX, 303.
•
Section 1528 .... XVII, 103.
Section 1541 .... XX, 96.
Section 1556 .... XVII, 126, 332, 556; XVIII, 156; XIX, 170, 592.
Section 1557 .... XVII, 332.
Section 1558 .... XVII, 154, 332.
Section 1561. ... XVII, 322, 331, 498.
Section 1562 .... XVII, 332; XVIII, 394.
Section 1565 .... XVII, 156.
Sectioli 1583 .... XVII, 156.
Section 1588 . ... XVII, 96, 156, 180, 498.
Section 1590 .... XVII, 498.
Section 1591 .... XVII, 37, 496.
Section 1593 .... XVIII, 96.
Section 1591 .... XVIII, 96.
Section 1608 .... XVII, 14.9.
Sectio11'1610 .... XVII, 14.9.
Section 1612 .... XIX, 622 ..
ection 1621 .... XIX, 618; XX, 576.
Section 1622 .... XVII, lJ:9.
ection 1624 .... XVII 1 22,332; XIX, 183, 473, 502.
ection 1661. ... XIX, 61.
ction 1671. ... XX, 619.
Section 167 .... XVIII, 184.
ction 1697 .... XVIII, 157; XIX, 23; XX, 16,276.
, ction 169 .... XVIII 276.
, ection 1735 .... x1..·, 23.
, ctiou 1736 .... XIX, 24.
, ' ction 1710 .... ,'L', 220.
e tion 1715 .... ~-IX, 19 .
, e tion 1751. ... XVII 193.
, rtio1117:'G .... ,' II, 153,419; XIX,220,281.
cr-tiou 1757 ...../YIU, 11<2 · 'IX, 220,284.
tion 1761. ... XVII, 153 :'21.
e tiou 17 3 .... X III 304 · XIX, 2 5; XX, 686.
tiou 17 .•.. ·1..·, 63 2 -.
ction 17&1. ... XIX, 121.
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Section 1765 .... XVIL 323, 685; XVIII, 206; XIX, 63, 121,385; XX, 222.
Section 1766 .... XVII, 31,429,607,678.
Section 1767 .... XVIII, 34,576,577; XIX,'404.
Section 1768 .... XVII, 476.
Section 1769 .... XVIII. 28; XX, 4-48.
Section 1772 .... XVIII, 576.
Section 1781 .... XVII, 420.
Section 1782 .... XVII, 420; XVIII, 161.
Section 1790 .... XIX, 402, 404.
Section 1841. ... XVII, 649; XX, 451.
Section 1843 .... XVII, 649; XX, 451.
Section 1846 .... XIX, 319.
Section 1850 .... XIX, 322, 339.
Section 1851. ... XIX, 321, 337.
Section 1852 .... XIX, 260, 319.
Section 1860 .... XIX, 337.
Section 1861. ... XVIII, 540.
Section 1873 .... XIX, 530.
~ection 1875 .... XVII, 649; XX, 451.
Section 1876 .... XVII, 649; XX, 451.
Section 1886 .... XIX, 320, 322.
Section 1889 .... XIX, 338.
Section 18H3 .... XVII, 498, 565.
Section 1894 .... XVII, 622 . .
Section 1913 .... XIX, 530.
Section 1918 .... XIX, 530.
Section 1923 .... XIX, 320.
Section 1955 .... XVII, 582; XVIII, 139.
Section 1956 .... XVIII, 585.
Section 1958 .... XVIII, 585.
Section 1960 .... XX, 52.
Section 1961. ... XX, 52.
· Section 1962 .... XX, 52, 62, 511, 638.
Section 1963 .... XIX, 432; XX, 52, 635.
Section 1964 .... XX, 52.
Section 1965 .•.. XX, 52.
Section 1966 .... XX, 52!
Section 1967 .... XX, 52.
Section 1968 .... XX, 52.
Section 1969 .... XX, 52,407.
Section 1970 .•.. XX, 52.
Section 1971 •... XX, 52.
Section 1977 .... XIX, 174.
Section 1989 .... XIX, 570.
Section 2011 .... XVIII, 104.
Section 2012 .... XVIII, 104.
Section 2031 ••.. XVII, 684.
Section 2032 .... XIX, 646.
Section 2045 .••. XVII, 393.
Section 2052 .... XX, 495.
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Section 2064 _.. . XX, 492.
Section 2074 .... XX, 495.
Section 2094 .... XVII, 74.
Section 2103 .... XVIl, 445; XVIII, 8,238,486,498.
Section 210-L __ .XVII, 446.
Section 2116 .... XVIII, 487.
Section 2117 ____ XVIII, 91.
Section 2118 .... XX, 246.
Section 2125 .... XVIII, 545.
Section 2132 .... XVII, 260.
Section 2134. __ .XVII, 35.
Section 2137 ____ XVIII, 5J5.
Section 2139 ____ XIX: 307.
Section 2140 .... XIX, 308.
Section 2145. __ .XVII, 567.
Section 2146 .... XVII, 567.
Section 2147 .... XX, 246.
Section 2149 ____ XX, 24.6.
Section 2150 .•.. XVIII, 5±5.
Section 2154 .... XVII, 569.
Section 2155 .... XVII, 569.
Section 2165 .... XVII, 534.
Section 2174 .... XVII, 534.
Section 2215 .. _.XVIII, 276.
Section 2238 ____ XVII, 161.
Section 2281. ___ XVIII, 573.
Section 2290 .... XVII, 161.
F,ection 2291. ... XVII, 161.
Section 2297 ___ .XVII, 162.
Section 2318 .... XVII, 231.
ection 2319 .... XVII, 231; XX, 167
ction 2320 .... XVII, 232.
ection 2322 .... XVII, 232.
ec:tion 2324 .... XVII, 23~.
·cction 2392 .... XVII, 249 .
...,ection 2449 .... XVII, 407.
ction 2456. _.. XIX, 189.
, e tiou 2-161. •.. XVlI, 283; XIX, 381.
, ·1·tion 2462 ... _XL.", 3 1.
, ction 2463 .... XIX, 3 1.
, c:tion 2479 .... XVII, 2 .
, I' tion 24 2 .... XVIII, 171.
c<"ti 11 '.!1 1 7 .... XVII, 3.
, ' ct ion 2 H •.... XVIII, 107 381; XIX, 272, 301.
, edio11 '.!5 ..••• • vu, 5 0 5 '3 · . .."VIII 2 · XIX, 245.
, etiou 2;-02 ....• ·1.·, ' 7.
, ctiu11 2303 ....• -YII 3; · •· III 263· .. ·x, 194 .
. •dion '.!'" L ...• ·vn 10:i; .·r.·,
. ,. ·tiou :?:- :i ....• -VIII, 163.
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Section 251-L ... XX, 199.
Section 2533 •••• XVIII, .'."i91.
Section 2534 .... XVIII, 591.
Section 2576 .... XVII, 685.
Section 2583 .... XVII, 685.
Section 2605 .... XVII, 685.
Section 2606 .... XVII, 685.
Section 2607 .... XVII, 685.
Section 2613 .... XVII, 476.
Section 2614 .... XVIII, 360.
Section 2615 .... XVIII, 360; XX, 731.
Section 2619 .... XVIII, 295, 458.
Section 2621 .... XVII, 685.
Section 2630 .... XVIII, 98.
Section 2632 .... XIX, 630.
Section 2634 .... XIX, 630.
Section 2636 .... XIX, 630.
Section 2637 .... XVII, 685.
Section 2649 .... XX, 676.
Section 2650 .... XIX, 422.
Section 26!:l3 .... XIX, 402, 404.
Section 2722 .... XIX, 629.
Section 2723 .... XIX, 631.
Section 2733 .... XVII, 685; XIX, 420.
Section 2737 .... XVII, 685.
Section 2746 .... XIX, 631.
Section 2749 .... XVII, 533.
Section 2751 .... XVII, 533.
Section 2757 .... XIX, 505.
Section 2774 .... XX, 677.
Section 2785 .... XVII, 275; XVIII, 360; XX, 7.
Section 2795 .... XX, 201.
Section 2796 .... XX, 201.
Section 2797 .... XX, 201.
Section 2798 .... XX, 201.
Section 2802 .... XVIII, 326.
Section 2809 .... XVII: 82.
Section 2838 .... XVIII, 322.
Section 2841 .... XVII, 275; XX, 5.
Section 2843 .... XVII, 275.
Section 2845 .... XVII, 275.
Section 2849 .... XVII, 275.
Section 2853 .... XVII, 275; XIX, 227.
Section 2854 .... XVII, 275.
Section 2855 .... XIX, 227.
Section 2859 .... XVII, 683.
Section 2860 .... XIX, 227.
Section 2865 .... XX, 390.
Section 2866 .... XX, 389.
Section !:l867 .... XX, 677.
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Section 2868 .... XVII, 83.
Section 2873 .... XVII, 84.
Section 2874 .... XVII, 83.
Section 2880 .... XIX, 319.
Section 2891 .... XX, 198.
Sect.ion 2892 .... XX, 198.
Section 2894 .... XX, 198.
Section 2899 .... XVIII, 579.
Section 2900 .... XVII, 268; XVIII, 259; XX, 665.
Section 2902 .... XVIII, 360.
Section 2904 .... XVII, 635.
Section 2905 .... XVII, 635.
Section 2906 .... XVII, 107, 274, 635; XVIII, 470, 478, 516.
Section 2907 .... XVII, 293,635; XvIII, 288,469,496; XIX, 542,604.
Section 2908 .... XVII, 268, 635; XVIII, 288; XIX, 542, 604.
Section 2922 .... XVIII, 360.
Section 2930 .... XVIII, 64, 199, 360.
Section 2931.. .. XVII, 336; XIX, 239, 664; XX, 187.
Section 2932 .... XIX, 238, 664; XX, 18.
Section 2940 .... XX, 732.
Section 2949 .... XVIII, 350.
Section 295L ... XIX, 608; XX, 37.
Section 2855 .... XIX, 608; XX, 37.
Section 2956 .... XX, 37.
Section 2957 .... XX, 37.
Section :&960 .... XX, 36.
Section 2961. ... XX, 36.
Section 2962 ..•• XVIII, 381; XX, 36.
ection 2963 .... XX, 36.
Section 296-! .... XX, 36.
Section 2965 .... XX, 36.
Section 2970 .... XVII, 580; XIX, 669; XX, 36.
ction 2971. ... XVII, 650.
ection 2972 .... X II, 655; XX, 36.
·tion 2973 .... XX, 36.
ection 2977 .... XVII, 650; XX, 36, 726.
'ection 29 0 .... XX, 36.
ction 29 L .... XIX, 103.
tion 2!) 3 .... XX, 199.
ction 2!J ' I .... XYIII, 519 •
• Pctio11 2!)!]0 .... XX, 726 .
.., tion 3 0 ... . X.:, 309.
tion 3 O:l •••• ~-. -,726.
·tion: 006 .... XVIII 262.
,.e·tion301L ...• ·n111:3.
::ictiou 3012,t .... . . ·nr. 336,642; XIX, 664.
ct ion 301. .... .: L ' , 6 1.
action 3 1 ......:VIII. 2· XIX, 638.
•ction ::J :;, ....... ·ix 2 .
ection 3 L ... ;KVIII, 127.
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Sectjon 3085 .... XVIII, 127; XX, 402.
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Section 3086 .... XVIII, 545.
Section 3088 ..•. XVII, 83.
Section 3102 .... XX, 27, 88.
Section 3114 .... XVIII, 562.
Section 3120.·... XVII,4-35.
Section 3142 .... XVIII, 560.
Section 3143 .... XVUI, 276.
Section 3144 .... XVIII, 276.
Section 3164. ... XVIII, 127.
Section 3176 .... XVII, 433.
Section 3221. ... XVIII, 270.
Section 3229 .... XVII, 214.
Section 3240 . ... XIX, 311.
Section 3241. ... XIX, 311.
Section 3248 .... XVIII, 44.
Section 3288 .... XVIII, 92.
Section 3330 .... XVII, 580; XVIII, 246.
Section 3395 .... XVII, 113.
Section 3397 .... XVII, 112.
Section 3,106 .... XVII, 112.
Section 3408 .... XVII, 54-0; XIX, 100;. XX, 682.
Section 3409 .... XVII, 54.0.
Section '.3412 .... XIX,120.
Section 3413 .... XIX, 100.
Section 341'1 .... XVII, 540.
Section 3415. ~ .. XVII, 540.
Section 3424 .... XVII, 113.
Section 3433 .... XVIII, 82; XIX, 241:.
Section 3445 .... XVII, 114.
Section 3446 .... XVII, 111,114.
Section 3448 .... XIX, 307.
Sect.ion 3469 .... XVII, 214; XVIII, 60, 73; XIX, 345; XX, 531, 685,727.
Section 3477 .... XVII, 266,545; XVIII, 129; XIX, 240,485; XX, 117,580.
Section 3480 .... XVIII, 4-21.
Sectioi;i 3481 .... XX, 241.
Section 3483 .... XVII, 90.
Section 3490 .... XVIII, 72.
Section 3491. ... XVIII, 72.
Section 3492 .... XVIII, 72 .
. Section 3cl93 .... XYIII, 72.
Sectiou 3Ml6 .... XVIII, 278.
ection 3510 .... XIX, 17.
Section 3513 .... XVIII, 418.
Section 3526 .... XX, 126.
Section 3538 .... XX, 462.
Section 3564- .... XVIII, 324.
Section 3565 .... XVIII, 324.
Section 3570 .... XX, 100.
Section 3577 .•.. XIX, 280.
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Section 3583 .... XIX, 99; XX, 682.
Section 3585 .... XVII, 123, 145.
Section 3588 .... XVII, 123.
Section 3589 .... XVII, 123.
Section 3600 .... XVIII, 275, 277.
Section 3617 .... XVII, 593.
Section 3618 .... XVU, 481, 532.
Section 3620 .... XX, 25.
Section 36::!2 .... XIX, 557.
Section 3623 .... XVII, 576.
Section 3624 .... XVII, 577.
Section 3639 .... XX, 25.
Section 3648 .... XVII, 431,609; XVIII, 93; XX, 747.
Section 36:5.J. .... XVII, 219.
Section '3657 .... XVII, 124; XIX, 394.
Section 3658 .... XVII, 125; XIX, 394.
~ection 3660 .... XVII, 234.
•
Section 3661. ... XVII, 234.
Section 3661 .... XVII, 234.
Section 3662 .... XVII, 234.
Section 3663 .... XVII, 234.
Section 3664. ... XVII, 234.
Section 3665 .... XVII, 234.
Section 3666 .... XVII, 234.
Section 3667 .... XVII, 23,1,
Section 3668 .... XVII, 234.
Section 3669 .... XVII, 23-1..
Section 3670 .... xvn, 23-!.
Section 3671. ... XVII, 234.
Section 3672 .... XVII, 23,1.
Section 3673 .... XVII, 2::;6.
, ection 3675 .... XVII, 238.
,_ection 3676 .... XVIII, 136.
, cction 3678 .... XVII, 481, 576 ; XVIII, 466, 569.
, ection 3679 .... XVIII, 216; XIX, 653; XX, 219.
Section 36 1 .... XVIII, 136.
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OPINIONS
OF

HON. WILLIAM H. H. MILLER, OF INDIAN.A .
.APPOINTED MARCH 5, 1889•

.BID MADE UNDER MIST.AKE OF FACT.
Where an advertisement is made for propositions for installing an
electric-light plant, and one of the bids is in the sum of $4,350, but
the bidder subsequently asks to recall the bid, claiming it had been
made erroneously instead of $9,350,, the real bid: Held, that if it
were the fact that the bid was made under a mistake of fact it is no
bid at all, and ought not to be considered.
DEP .ARTMEN'.l.' OF JUSTICE,

January 14, 1891.
Sm : Your communication of January 6 instant, asking
an opinion as to your power to allow a reca11 of the bid of the
Western Electric Company of Chicago, Ill., made under an
advertisement inviting proposals for installing an electriclight plant at the navy-yard, Brooklyn, N. Y., has received
my consideration.
The bids under this advertisement were opened on December 16, 1890, and on the following day a telegram was
received from the Western Electric Company to the effect
that its bid of $4,350, which appears to be the lowest bid,
was erroneously made, and an affidavit was subsequently
laid before you detailing the circumstances under which the
alleged real bid of $9,350 was mistakenly made as above.
I do not understand that the bid has been accepted; but if
it had been, it would not be binding on the Western Electric
Company, being made under a mistake of fact. If, therefore,
the fact be that Lhe bid was made under a mistake of fact, it
is no bid at all, and ought not to be considered.
Very respectfully, yours,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRET.ARY OF '.l.'HE NAVY.
1
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BOUNTIES ON SUGAR UNDER THE TARIFF ACT OF 1890.
By the tariff act of October 1, 1890, chapter 1244, section 233, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is not authorized to issue the licenses
provided for by the section for the engaging in the production of sugar
prior to April 1, 1891.
Sugar produced between March 31, 1891, ancl July 1, 1891, is not Antitled
to the bounty given by said act to producers of domestic sugar.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 14, 1891.
Sm: Your communication of D~cember 18, 1~90, asking
an opinion on the question whether the tariff act of October
1, 189u, authorizes the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to
issue the licenses therein provided for prior to April 1, 1891,
and pay to manufacturers the bounty on sugar produced
between March 31 and July 1, 1891, has received my consideration.
As that part of the act "providing terms for the admission
of imported sugars and molasses and for the payment of
bounty on sugars of domestic production" does not take
effect until the.1st day of April, 1891 (T. I., 241), I do not see
how the provision authorizing the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue to issue licenses to producers of sugar (T. I., 233)
can be said to become operative before April 1, 1891, when
the part of the law of which the provision for licenses is a
component goes into effect. Certainly the provision for
licenses is one of the ''terms" for thepaymentof bounty, and,
therefore, comes within the express declaration of the law
that it shall not be enforced until April 1, 1891.
Thi bring me to the question whether sugar produced
between March 31 and July 1, 1891, is entitled to the bounty
given by the law to producers of domestic sugar.
The a t provides (T. I., 231) that ''on and after" July 1,
1 91, and until July 1, 1905, a bounty of 2 cent per pound
ball be paid to the producer of sugar of a certain standard
fr m b t , orghum, or ugar cane grown within the United
at
r fr m mapl ap produced within the United tates,
rnty of 1¾ nt per p und on uch ugar of a certain oth r t n ard "und r uch rule and r gulation as
the
mmi i n r of Internal evenue, with the approval of
the er tary f the Tre ury, hall pre cribe."
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It further provides (T. I., 232) that '' The producer of said
sugar to be entitled to said bounty shall have first filed prior
to July first of each year with the Commissioner of Internal
Revm:ue a notice of the place of production, with a general
deserjption of the machinery and methods to be employed
by him, with an estimate of the amount of sugar proposed
to be produced in the current or next ensuing year, including
the number of maple trees to be tapped, and an application
for a license _to so produce, to be accompanied by a bond in
a penalty, and with sureties to be approved by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, conditioned that he will faithfully observe all rules and regulations tbat shall be prescribed for such manufacture and production of sugar."
It is next provided (T. I., 233) that "the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, upon receiving the application and bond
herein before provided for, shall issue to the applicant a
license to produce sugar from sorghum, beets, or sugar cane
grown within the United States, or from maple sap produced
within the United States, at the place and with the machinery and by the methods described in the application; but
said license shall not extend beyond one year from the date
thereof."
The requirement that the sugar producer, intending to
claim the bounty, shall file with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, '' prior to July :first of each year," a notice
of the place of production, with a general description of
the machinery and methods to be employed by him, with an
estimate of the amount of sugar proposed to be produced,
including the number of maple trees to be tapped, was to .
enable the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to make all
necessary arrangements and preparations for the protection
of the Treasury against fraudulent claims for bounty, and I
think it was intended by Congress that he should have that
information each year well in advance of the times when the
several species of sugar mentioned in the act are manufactured or produced.
To say, then, that Congress intended that the statements
of sugar producers should be received and considered and
the necessary arrangements and preparations based on them,
for the administration of the act and the prevention of
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frauds by unscrupulous sugar producers, should all be made
and the licenses applied for granted after April 1, 1891, and
in time for the production of sugar between that date and
the 1st of July next ensuing, is, to my mind, unreasonable
and incompatible with the manifest purpose of Congress to
give the Oom:µiissioner of Internal Revenue ample time to
make every needed preparation for an intelligent and effective execution of this important law. I can not believe that
Congress intended to require that these novel and untried
provisions of law should be set in operation in this precipitate way and under such circumstances of disadvantage to
the Government.
It seems to me that the contention that the producers of
maple sugar are entitled to bounty on sugar produced prior
to July 1, 1891, is erroneous in giving too literal a construction to the language of T. I., 231-that is, in supposing that
the language of that paragraph was. intended to limit the
time for the payment of the bounty instead of the time of
the production of the sugar. The meaning of the paragraph
seems to me to be the same as it would be if the provision
were that "there shall be paid to the producer of the various classes of imgar on and after July 1, 1891." In other
words, if the language of the paragraph were so transposed
as to read as follows :
''To the producer of sugar testing," etc., ''on and after
July 1, 1891, and until July 1, 1905, there shall be paid," etc.
This construction seems to be strongly reinforced by the
con ·ideration that any other construction would make this
law give a bounty upon maple sugar for fifteen year', wherea
upon other sugars it would be given for only fourteen year ,
ince it appears from the paper ubmitted that no ugar,
xcept maple, i produced uetween April and July. It is
not er dil.>le that it wa the purpose of Oongres to thu
di crirni11ate b tween maple and other ugars, or to fix any
1 articular da for he payment of bounty. The time when
th pa Tm nt · w re to be made wa not f great ignificance
and wa left t be r gulat d by the ommi ion er f Int rnal
I Yenu und r T. I., 231, bu it wa the evident purpo e of
C ngr · · t limit th• p riod <lurin ,. which the b unty might
be arn . T king all of the di.ff r ut paragraphs tog ther
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it seems clear that it was not intended that bounties should
be demandable on sugars produced prior to the :first day of
July next.
Very respectfully, yours,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

SEPARATE ENTRY FOR PACKAGES CONTAINED IN ONE IMPORTATION.
The act of May 1, 1876, chapter 89, providing for the separate entry of
packages contained in one importation wais not repealed by section 29
the customs administrative act of June 10, 1890. The repeal of section
2841, Revised Statutes by that act has no effect upon the act of 1876,
because the latter forms no part of section 2841. The act of 1876 is of
a limited and special character and it is not to be presumed that Congress had it in contemplation when the statute of June 10, 1890, was
passed. The form of oath prescribed by the act of 1876, referring to
section 2841, Revised Statutes, is not affected by the subsequent legislation modifying and afterwards repealing that section and substituting a declaration by the importer, consignee, or agent in the place of
tho former oath.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTIOE,

January 20, 1891.
SIR: Your communication of January 3 instant asks an
opinion upon the question "whether the act of May 1, 1876,
entitled 'an act to provide for the separate entry of packages contained in one importation' (19 Stat., p. 49), is or is
not repealed by section 29 of the aet of June 10, 1890 (the
so-called customs administrative act), which section, among·
other things, repeals section 2841 of the Revised Statutes of
the United States."
The act of May 1, 1876 (supra)., provides as follows:
'' That a separate entry may be made of one or more packages contained in an importation of packed packages con.
signed to one importer or consignee, and concerning which
packed packages, no invoice, or statement of contents or
values, has been received."
Every such entry shall contain a declaration of the whole
number of parcels contained in such original packed pack~
age, and shall embrace all the goods, wares, and merchan-
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dise imported in on~ vessel at one time for one and the same
actual owner or ultimatA consignee.
"SEC. 2. That the importer, consignee, or agent's oath prescribed by section twenty-eight hundred and forty-one of the
Revised Statutes is hereby morlified for the purposes of this
act, so as to require the importer, consignee, or ag·ent to
declare therein that the entry contains an accomit of all the
goods - - imported in the - - whereof-- - - is master,
from --for account of--; which oath, so modified, shall,
in each case, be taken on the entry of one or more packages
contained in ari original package. But nothing in this act
contained shall be construed to relieve the importer, consignee, or agent from producing the oath of the owner or ultimate consignee in every case now required by law; or to
provide that an importation may consist of less than the
whole number of parcels coritained in any packed package,
or packed packages, consigned in one vessel at one time, to
one importer, consignee, or agent.
"SEC. 3. That all provisions of law inconsistent herewith
are hereby repealed."
It appears that at the time the act of 1876 was passed, a
large express business, in the way of bringing small parcels
from other countries to this country, had grown up, but,
owing to the fact that such small parcels were usually,brought
packed together in large packages, such as trunks or boxes,
there was no way, under the existing law, by which any one
of the several parcels belonging to different persons contained
in a packed package could be admitted to separate entry at
the cu -tom-hou e, nor was there any way by which the packed
pa ·kage could be entered by the express carrier, until the
own r of all the parcels contained in the package, generally
livin O' more or le s remotely from the port of entry, bad sent
in th ir invoic . Thi produced vexatious delays to those
wn r of par ·el who were ready with their invoices and
d ir u · t
t th ir property, but were compelled to wait for
f the in v i
•overi11g all the other parcel
with their .
f th old law, requiring the
r
a an ntirety, that wa remwhi ·h a we have seen, expre ly
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. authorizes the owner of one .or more parcels contained in a
packed package to make separate entry thereof.
Section 2785, Revised Statutes, which is the provision that
caused the inconvenience remedied by the act of 1876, is still
in force, there being no express or implied repeal thereof by
the act of June 10, 1890; and I discover nothing in .the latter
act which is inconsistent with the act of 1876, for the a9t of
1890 relates to the entries of entire packages covered by one
invoice, while the act of 1876 relates to separate entries of
several parcels contained in one package and belonging to
several owners.
It is to be observed, furthermore, that as the act of 1876
relates only to the manner of making entry, all the other
regulations of a general character, touching the collection
of t,he revenue by customs, apply to merchandise entered
under that act.
The repeal of section 2841, Revised Statutes, by the act of
June 10, 1890, bad no effect on the act of 1876, because the
latter formed no part of section 2841. It is true the act of
1876 adopted, with a modification, the form of oath prescribed
by section 2841 to be taken on entering merchandise by an
importer, consignee, or agent, but that did not make the act
a part of the section.
When section 2841 was amended and reenacted by the
act of March 3, 1883, no notice was taken of the act of 1876
in the section as reenacted, but the act of 1876 was treated
as in force and unaffected by the act of 1883.
The act of 1876 is not incorporated ir.to section 2841 in
the revised edition of 1878 of the Revised Statutes, but is
printed therein in brackets, as a separate law between that
section and section 2842.
Moreover, the act of 1876 is legislation of a very limited
and special character, and, according to a well-settled rule
of statutory interpretation, it is not to be presumed from
any general expressions used tbat Congress had that act in
contemplation when the statute of June 10, 1890, was
pa sed. (Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S., 556, 570; State v.
Stoll, 17 Wall., 425,436; Movins v. Arthur, 95 U.S., 144,146;
Rounds v. Wayma1·t Borough, 81 Pa. St., 395; Endl. Stat.,
223.)
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The view above taken is much strengthened by the consideration that it is hardly reasonable to infer that Congress
intended to produce such an inconvenience to the importing
business of the country as would have been involved in the
repeal of the act of 1876.
The act. of 1876 being still in force, your attention is called
to the point that the form of oath prescribed by that act, by
reference to section 2841, Rev. Stats., is not affected by the
subsequent legislation modifying and afterward repealing
that section, and substituting a declaration by the importer,
consignee, or agent in the place of the former oath. (Endl.
Stat., .233; Sedgw. Stat., p. 229, ed. 1874; Turney v. Wilton,
36 Ill., 385; Spring, etc., Works v. San Francisco, 22 Ual., 434;
Sika v. Chicago, etc., R. R., 21 Wis., 270.)
This, I believe, disposes of the question submitted.
Very respectfully, yours,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRETARY

OF

THE TREASURY.

VACANCY IN HEAD OF DEPARTMENTS.
Where there is a, vacancy in the hea,d of a Department, it can not be temporarily fill ed for a longer period than ten days, either by operation
of law or by designation of. the President. 17 Opin., 535, in so far as
it holds that twenty days may be taken by the President, by allowing
the statutory occupation of the office for ten days without designation
and then making a designa,tion for an additional ten days not accepted.

DEPAR'.I.'MENT

OF JUSTICE,
January 31, 1891.

nee, r iclrn
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shall, unless otherwise directed by the President, as provided by section one hundred and seventy-nine, perform the
·duties of such head until a successor is appointed, or such
absence or sickness shall cease."
Section 178 makes a similar provision for chiefs of bureaus.
Sections 179, 180, and 181 are as follows:
"SEC. 179. In any of the cases mentioned in the two preceding sections, except the death, resignation, absence, or
sickness of the .Attorney-General, the President may, in his
discretiou , authorize and direct the head of any other Department or any other officer in either Department, whose appointment is vested in the President, by and with the ad vicfl and
consent of the Senate, to perform the duties of the vacant
office until a successor is appointed, or the sickness or
absence of the incumbent shall cease."
'' SEC. 180. A. vacancy occasioned by dea1,h or resignation
must not be tempora.rily filled under the three preceding
sections for a longer period than ten days."
"SEC. 181. No temporary appointment, designation, or
assignment of one officer to perform the duties of another, in
the cases covered by sections one hundred and seventy-seven
and one hundred and seventy-eight, shall be made otherwise
than as provided by those sections, except to :fill a vacancy
happening during a recess of the Senate."
Section ] 82 provides that any officer performing the duties
of another officer under the foregoing sections is not to
receive any extra compensation.
It seems to me impossible to escape the effect of section
180 in limiting to a period of ten days the time during which
the vacant office may be filled, either by the statutory succession provided in section 177, or the designation by the
President provided in section 179, or by both. The temporary :filling of the vacancy is that provided under the three
sections preceding section 180. The first of those sections is
section 177, which provides only for succession by operation
of law, while section 179 refers to succession by designation
of the President.
This construction is fully borne out by opinions of my
predeces~ors. On September 11, 1884, Mr. Attorney-General
Brewster (18 Opin. of A.ttys. Gen., 58) advised the President
upon the occasion of the death of Secretary Folger "that
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under sections 177, 179, 180, and 181 of the Revised Statutes
uo statutory succession or assignment of some other officer
to the vacancy is valid for a longer period in all than ten
days." An opinion to the same effect was rendered by Mr.
Acting Attorney-General Phillips (18 Opin., 50) on August
27, 1884, in construing sections 178 and 180 of the Revised
Statutes. See also opinions of Mr. .Attorney-General Brewster (17 Opin., 530); of Mr. Attorney-General Devens (16
Opin., 596; of Mr. Attorney-General Hoar (13 Opin., 7).
The secti0.n s under discussion are a mere revision of the
act of July 23, 1863 (15 Stats. at Large, 168), a reading of
which supports the view here taken.
It has been urged that the ten-day limitation applies only
to the designation by the President and not to the temporary
supplying of the vacancy by operation of law.
The reasons of much cogency against rnch a construction
are:
First, that it would place no limitation upon the time in
which the "first or sole assistant" might fill the vacancy,
which does not seem consistent with the expressed legislative
.
purpo e; and,
Second, it makes the reference in section 180 to the three
precedi11g sections mean exactly the same as if the language
had been the two preceding sections. In other words, it
make the reference to section 177 meaningless; for the use
in ection 177 of the words '' unless otherwise directed by
th Pre ident" is an exception out of that section and not
an affirmative provi ion to which reference could properly
be made under section 180.
In an 01 inion by Mr. Attorney-General Brewster (17 Opin.,
533) it e ru to be held that twenty days may be taken by
b
r ident under ectiou 178 by allowing the ·tatutory
· ·npation of the office, without de ignation for teu day-,
ancl th u making a de. ignation for an additional ten days.
o thi on ructi n I can not a nt. If the ten day 'limit, i n ap1 li " to a tatutory occupation by an a i tant or
d 1 u y at all then i
m to me the period of tern porary
1 ngthen d by tacking the ten day by
n h en cla ,
i. pr p rt c tha hi
r I r w t r i dir c ly in
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ing Attorney-General Phillips, above referred to, and is also
seemingly in conflict with his own later opinion in 18th Opinions, p. 58 (s-upra).
Upon the whole, therefore, I am of the opinion that the
natural and proper construction of these sections discovers a
legislative purpose that a vacancy caused by death or resignation in the office of Secretary of the Treasury shall be
permanently filled by constitutional appointment within ten
days. It may be that the action of an assistant secretary,
after the expiration of ten days, would not be invalid, being
the action of an officer de facto, but the statute, even if directory, is no less obligatory upon those called upon to act
under it than if mandatory, although the legal effect of
action or non-actiou under such statute may be very different.
Very respectfully,

W. H. H. MILLER.
The PRESIDENT.

TRANSPORTATION OF ENLISTED MEN OF THE NAVY.-BONDAIDED RAILROAD.
Section 6 of the act of July 1, 1862, chapter 120, interpreted to include
seamen as well as land troops. The Government having contracted
with the West Shore Railroad, a corporation of the State of New
York, for the immediate transportation to San Francisco of certain
enlisted seamen then in the city of New York, and a portion of the
route being over railroads aided by the United States in pursuance
of the act of July 1, 1862, and a question having arisen as to whether
payment of said contract price should be made to the West Shore
Railroad, held that the question was essentially a judicial one; that a
construction shonld not be put on the law by the Executive Department that would enable the bond-aided railroad to receive payment
from the Treasury for services that; are in effect services rendered to
the Government; and that all compensa,tion to the bond-aided rail'road
in so far as such service was performed by the said aided railroad
should be witheld until the rights of such railroad are adjusted by
an agreement in compliance with the terms of the law or are judicially determined.

DEPAR'l'MENT

JUSTICE,
.February 4, 1891.
Sm: Your communication bearing date January 3, 1891,
with four inclo~ures, au(l relating to the claim of the West
Shore Railroad Company for payment for the transportation
OF
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of 157 enlisted men of the Navy from New York, N. Y., to
Vallejo Junction, Cal., is received.
You request my opinion upon two questions, as follows:
"Whether the transportation of enlisted men of the Navy
is included among the services to be performed for the Government as required by the acts of Congress relating to railroads that have been aided in whole or in part by the United
States; and
"Whether, if the transportation of enlisted men of the
Navy be not included among such services, it is required by
law that the amount of the compensation for which said
railroads agree to transport enlisted men of the Navy be
charged against the appropriation for such transportation
and retained by the United States under the provisions of
the second section of the act approved May 7, 1878 (Stat. at
L., vol. 20, p. 58)."
Section 6 of the ''Act to aid in the construction," etc.,
passed July 1, 1862 (12 Stats., 489), makes the grants upon
condition that the company, among other things, shall "transport mails, troops, and munitions of war, supplies, and public stores upon said railroad for the Government whenever
required to do so by any department thereof;" and provides
that "all compensation for services rendered for the Government shall be applied to the payment of said bonds and'
interest until the whole amount is fully paid."
Section 10 of the act to amend the act above cited, passed
July 2, 1864 (13 Stats., 356), modifies and amends as therein
set forth, and also subordinates the lien of the United States
bond to that of the authorized bonds of the companies, but
adds that this shall be so, '' except as to the provisions of the
sixth section of the act to which this is an amendment, relating to the transmi sion of di patches and the transportation
of mail , troops, munitions of war, supplies, and public stores
for the Government of the United States."
e tion 5 f aid act provides that one-half of the compenation arned by the companies in performing services for
th
nited Stat
hall be paid over to the companie ; but
by a le t r nactment thi conce ion to the companie i
ith rawn.
a ·t are commented upon and construed in the case
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of the United Sta,tes v. Central Pacific R. R. Co., 118 U. S.,
235, as follows:
"By the act of July 1, 1862, 'all compensation for services
rendered for the Government' was to be applied to the payment of the bonds issued by the United States to aid in
building the road. By the act of July 2, 1864, only 'onehalf of the compensation for services rendered for the Government' by said company was required to be applied to the
payment of the bonds. The act of May 7, 1878, merely
restored the provisions of the act of July 1, 1862, and again
required all compensation for services rendered the Government to be applied to the payment of the bonds. This compensation, as we have seen, has been limited by the decisions
of this court to compensation for services rendered by the
aided roads."
It appears that in October, 1890, the Navy Department
was in urgent need of the immediate transportation to San
. Francisco of 157 men who were enlisted seamen then in the
city of New York.
Not being able to obtain satisfactory rates and methods of
transportation otherwise, bids and offers for the same were
sought from such common carriers as it was thought might
furnish the desired facilities.
On the 27th of said month Mr. C. E. Lambert, general
passenger agent of the West Shore Railroad (a corporation
of the State of New York), in response to a request for a
bid to perform the service sought by the Department, submitted to Commodore F. M. Ramsay, chief of Bureau of
Navigation of said Department, an offer to transport the
p~rty, on the basis of $49.51 per capita, from New York to
Sau Francisco, in manner specified.
It was uuderstood that the route would be over the West
Shore Railroad, New York, Chicago and St. Louis Railroad,
Chicago and Northwestern Railway, Union Pacific Railway,
and Southern Pacific Company's Railroad.
It is understood that the price stated was reasonable and
was the lowest rate obtainable. The offer was accepted on
the part of the Government, the service was performed, and
the compensation due therefor and remaining unpaid under
the contract so made is $7,773.07.
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The practical question presented is, whether the United
States shall pay the West Shore Railroad the above amount,
or whether the disbursing and accounting officers of the
Government should, under the laws, withhold from the West
Shore Railroad the portion of said amount earned by bondaided railroads and apply the same to the indebtedness of
such roads to the Government. as their proportionate
interests shall be ascertained.
The conditions set forth in said section 6 of the act of 1862,
and continued under section 10 of the act of 1864, are t,h at
the railroad shaU transport mails, troops, and munitions of
war, supplies, and public stores for the Government whenever
required to do so by any Department thereof.
It is manifest that this transportation of munitions, supplies, and stores can not be properly limited to those for the
use of land forces only.
The title · of the act of 1862 is "An act to aid in the construction of a railroad * * * and to secure to the Government the use of the same for postal,. military, and other
purposes."
It can not be said that there is anything in either act or in
any amendment to indicate an intent to exclude the Government from a right to transport its sea forces as well as its
land forces, under the provfaions of these acts.
·
It is suggested that the word troops as used in said sections
does not include seamen, and that it does not cover tbe "157
enli ted men of the Navy" transported from New York to
Va11~io Junction.
While miUtary use employs the term troop to <;l.esiO'nate a
b dy of cavalry, and common usage applies the word troops
to oldiel' in general, yet the word troop, in its broad and
original n e, i stated to mean a collection of people, a company, a number, a multitude.
·
In vi w of the well-known object and purposes of Congre s
in relation t thi railroad legi fation, it is improbable that
it wa int ml d to I ave out the tran portation of marines or
. amen v r th . e road und r the provision of said acts.
I i. m re Ir , bl that Congr
intended the general
rm tr p t in lu l nli ted m n of the avy when tran , ·r :. th
the exigencies of the public

r I

iI:
I \
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Subsequent legislation has not exte~ded the privileges of
these railroads in the direction now in view, but has, on the
contrary, asserted the duty of the Government to protect the
financial interests of the public in dealing with them.
Section 2 of the act of March 3, 1873 (17 St,at., 485), as
incorporated into section 5260, Revised Statutes, enacts as
follows:
"The Secretary of the Treasury is directed to withhold all
payments to any railroad company and its assigns on account
of freights or transportation over their respective roads of
any kind, to the amount of payments made by the United
States for interest upon bonds of the United States issued
to any such company, and which sha.Il not have been reimbursed, together with the 5 percentum of net earnings due
and unapplied, as provided by law."
Section 2 of the act to alter and amend, etc., passed March
7, 1878 (20 Stat., 56), enacts:
"That the whole amount of compensation which may, from
time to time, be due to said several railroad companies
respectively for services rendered for the Government shall
be retained by the United States, one-half thereof to be presently applied to the liquidation of the interest paid and to
be paid by the United States upon the bonds so issued by it
as aforesaid, to each of said corporations severally, and the
other half thereof to be turned into the sinking fund hereinafter provided for the uses therein mentioned."
Under the exacting requirements of these statutes it does
not appear to be justifiable to pay out of the Treasury moneys
that are to go to an aided railroad on account of the transportation of these enlisted seamen without a judicial determination of the questions involved.
The questions arising out of the transactions under consideration are essentially judicial in their nature, and such a
construction of the laws as may enable the bond-aided railroads to receive payment from the Treasury for services that
are in effect " services rendered for the Government," should
not receive Executive sanction.
I ad vise the withholding of all compensation earned by
any bond-aided railroad in performing the service under consideration, in so far as such service was performed upon such
aided railroad, until the questions of the rights of such rail-
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roads in the premises are adjusted by an agreement that shall
be in compliance with the terms of the law, or until such
questions shall be judicially determined.
The inclosures submitted by you are herewith returned.
Very respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER• .
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

BONDS OF U. S. CONSULAR OFFICERS.
It is competent for the Secretary of State, under section 1697 of the
Revised Statutes, to accept as sureties upon official bonds of U. S. consular officers, corporations organized under State or United States
laws as surety or guaranty companies authorized by their charter to
undertake such obl~gations.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 11, 1891.
Sm: By your letter of February 4, inclosing correspondence with the Secretary and Comptroller of the Treasury,
you ask my opinion whether you may Jawful1y accept as
sureties upon official bonds of U. S. consular officers corporations organized under State or United States laws known
as surety companies, or whether in approving such bonds
you must require natural persons as sureties. Section 1697,
Revised Statutes, provides that"Every consul-general, consul, and commercial agent,
before he recaives his commission or enters upon the duties
of his office, shall give a bond to the United States, with
such sureties, who shall be permanent residents of the United
State , as the Secretary of State shall approve, in a penal
sum," etc.
Thi ection was enacted in 1856, at which time, perhaps,
no corporation for the purpo e of furnishing security upon
official bond bad any existence in this country, and uch
corporation were, therefore, not at that time within the cont mplation of Con°·re , . In recent years, however, numeru,· c·orporation of thi, kind have been created by State and
1 ral t, nt , and th ir u e ha become fr quent, not to
, a · O' •n •raJ. In c n, trui11 o- a ta tut it is a cardinal rule
t try t arriv at th l g-i. lative purpo e; but, at the ame
ime, tbi purp e · not al ay limited by the legi lative
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thought at the time of its enactment. The effect of statutes is frequently modified by circumstances. For instance
the provision in the judiciary act of 1789, for reasonable
notice of the time and place of taking depositions, often
meant, then, a notice of weeks or months, where now a notice
of as many days would be sufficient. It is not difficult to
suggest other cases in which the · developments in steam,
electricity, and generally iu the arts would affect the construction of statutes. Without further discussion, however,
it is sufficient to say that, upon questions quite similar to the
one now under consideration, two opinions were given by
my immediate predecessor.
Where a statute required the Secretary of the Navy, before
making contracts for the construction of vessels, to invite
proposals for the work "which shall be subject among other
regulations to such provisions as to bonds and securities for
the quality and due completion of the work as the Secretary
• of the Navy shall prescribe," Mr. Attorney-General Garland
held that it was competent for the Secretary to accept a
guaranty corporation as surety on such bond. (See Opinion
July 15, ·1887.)
Section 1383, Revised Statutes, enacted in 1812, requires
that a pay officer of the Navy" shall, before entering upon
the duties of his office, give a bond, with two or more sufficient sureties, to be approved by the Secretary of the Navy,
for the faithful performance thereof." By an opiniou bearing date August 2, 1888, Mr. Attorney-General Garland held
that it was lawful for the Secretary of the Navy to approve
a pay officer's bond secured by such corporations solely, or
in combination with natural persons, as sureties under this
statute.
The only language in section 1697 which could be claimed
to di tinguish that case from one arising under section 1383
is the requirement that the sureties shall be permanent residents of the United States; but there is nothing in this
dii:-tinction, because it is uniformly held that a corporation
is a re ident ·and citizen of the sovereignty by which it is
created.
I am therefore of Opinion that it is competent for the Secr~tary _of State, _unde: section 1697, to accept as surety,
either m conuect10n with a natural person or with another
5687-VOL 20-2
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like company authorized by its charter to un<lertake such
obligations, a surety or guaranty company.
Of course, in this, as in every other case, the duty of careful investigation as to the solvency of the sureties is with
the Secretary.
Respectfully, yours,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRET.A.RY OF ST.A.TE.

COMPENSATION OF SOLDIERS-EXTRA DUTY.
Section 35 of the act of March 3, 1863, chapter 75, prohibits allowance
of extra pay to soldiers for special services rendered between Septemb~r 1, 1863, and October 20, 1863.
The question is not affected by the fact that in the act of _February 9,
1863, chapter 25, an appropriation was made for such services rendered
during the fiscal year, July 1, 1863, to June 30, 1864, for section 35 of
the draft act passed three weeks later, above considered, took away
any authority impliedly conferred by this appropriation. (10 Opin.,
472, overruled; 15 Opin., 362, followed.)

DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE,
February 11, 1891.
Sm: By letter of the 19th of December, the late Secretary
of the Treasury submitted to the .Attorney-General a statement of the claim of Ira D. Bronson, late private Company K,
Second Kansas Cavalry, for compensation for extra duty performed in September and October, 1863, now pending in the
office of the Second Comptroller, and requested an opinion as to
whether the 35th section of the act of March 3, 1863 (12 Stat.
L., 736), prohibit. payment of the extra pay allowed by the
act of March 2, 1 19 (3 Stat. L., 488), as amended by the act
of Augu t 4, 18'"'4, ection 6 (10 Stat.·L., 576).
The tatement of the claim submitted hows that Bron on
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The q°=estion presented involves the construction of section
35 of the act of March 3, 1863 (12 Stat. L., 736), which is as
follows:
"SEC. 35. And be it further enacted, That hereafter details to special service shall only be made with the consent
of the co~manding officer of forces in the :field; and enlisted
men, now or hereafter detailed to special service, shall not
receive any extra pay for such services beyond that allowed
to other enlisted men."
'
Does this section prohibit the allowance of extra pay to
soldiers for special service 1 Two Attorneys-General have
answered the question, one in the affirmative and the other
in the negative. Attoruey-General Bates, on April 3, 1863
(10 Opin., 472), held that the section did not prohibit the
al1owance of extra pay for special services, while AttorneyGeneral Devens, on September 4, 1877 (15 Opin., 362), without referring to the opinion of Attorney-General Bates, held
that it did. The opinion of Attorney-General Bates was invoked on a claim for extra pay by enlisted men detailed for
special services as clerks of the staff officers of the War
Department. It appears from the statement of the Second
Comptroller that the accounting officers of the Treasury followed this opinion in its application to that particular special
service, but refused to allow extra pay for any other.
The Attorney-General is asked to review these conflicting
opinions and to decide which shall be followed.
By the act of March 2, 1819 (3 Stat. L., 1819, chapter 45),
entitled '· An act to regulate the pay of the Army when
employed on fatigue duty," it was provided:
"That whenever it shall be found expedient to employ the
Army at work on fortifications, in surveys, in cutting roads,
and other constant labor, of not less than ten days, the noncommissioned officers, musicians, aud privates so employed
shall be allowed :fifteen cents and an extra gill of whisky or
spirits each per cla.y while so employed."
By the sixth section of "An act to increase the pay of the
rank and :file of the Army and to encourage enlistments,"
passed .Augu t 4, 1854 (10 Stat., 576), the act of 1819 was
amended as follows:
"That the allowance to soldiers employed at work on fortifications, in surveys, in cutting roads, and other constant
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labor, of not less than ten days, authorized by the act
approved March second, eighteen hundred and nineteen,
entitled 'An act to regulate the p ay of the Army when
employed on fatigne duty,' be incr eased to twenty-five cents
per day for men employed as laborers and teamsters, and
forty cents per day when employed as mechanics, at all stations east of the Rocky Mount ains, and to thirty-five cents
and fifty cents per day, respect ively, when the men are
employed at stations west of those mountains."
Under the two provisions of faw j ust _quoted, soldiers
detailed to special service continued to receive the extra pay
therein allowed until 1863, as will appear from the appropriations for incidental expenses of t he Quartermaster's Department in each annual Army appropriation bill.
On March 3, 1863, the provision which is the subject of
discussion was enacted as the t hi rty-fifth section of ''An act
for enrolling and calling out tlie natfonal forces and for other
purposes." This was genera.Hy known as t he draft act. It
was made necessary by the failul'e of the Government to
secure through volunteer enlistments a sufficient number of
soldiers to put dowu the rebellion. It was enacted at the
darkest hour of the civil war, when the fate of tlie nation
, eeme<l trembling in the balance. The Army in the :field l!ad
been reduced by death , disease, desertion, and absence. It
was intended to remedy the evil and increase th e forces in
the 1ield. The principal plan provided therein was by concriptiou. Tlie other very important means adopted was to
reduce to a minimum the euli ted men who were not eu o-aged
in the nctive service in t lrn :field.. Nearly all the section' of
the aC't wllich do not provi<l the procedure in the con ·cription are directed to brino-ing enli ted men back t o their regim nt.
at the front.' The new and tringent provi ion
ao-ain. <le rter, all(] th fr accomplice , the offer of immunity for th ir r turn ou th pa _ag- of the act: the reduction
of th pay of fti · I'>' on 1 < v l>y 011 -half and the limjtation
up n Ii I w r f p;m11tin er fnrloucrh , ther in contained I am
<1 m
f tbi purpo. of Co1Jg-r
ection 5 i to be
<· u ·trn cl , .· in pari materia with "b •. e proyi ion . For th
.· aJ~ of ·l am . h laugua
f tlJ e tion i r p at d :
-:'T'h, th •r af ~rd •t, ii.·
;p ·ial. rvi
lt, 11 onl Tl> marl
with h
f th · mm, 11di1Jg- fti r of :fi r e · in t he
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field; and enlisted men, now or hereafter detailed to special
service, shall not receive extra pay for such services beyond
that allowed to other enlisted men."
By the first clause it was taken out of the power of anyone
to withdraw for special services men at the front, without the
consent of the commanding officers in the field. In this way
those who were held responsible for the success of the Army
were given the power to prevent the reduction of their forces
through special details made by those in authority.who were
not in the field. The second clause was intended to take
away from the soldier the inducement to seek such detail for
extra pay. The freedom from danger enjoyed by those specially detailed was ample compensation for the difference
in amount of labor. In my opinion the intention of Congress
in the last clause of the section was to abolish extra pay
entirely.
Senator Wilson, of Massachusetts, who reported the bill
from the committee in which it had been prepared, made a
short statement of its provisions, to be found on pages 976,
977, and 978 of the Congressional Globe for tlrn third session
of the Thirty-seventh Congress, 1862-'63, part 2. Section 35
in the act as it passed was section 34 in the bill as reported.
On page 978 he states section 34 as follows:
" Section 34. Details to special service are to be made
only with consent of the commanding officer in the field, and
no extra pay for special service to be allowed."
Attorney-General Bates' opinion is based on what must
be regarded as a very narrow construction of the language
used, and fails wholly to give effect to the intention of Congress, standing out in every line of the whole act, to increase
the fight,ing force. His reasoni.ng is that the prohibition is
not against extra pay, but against extra pay beyond that
allowed to other enlisted meu, which he says was provided
by the act of 1819 and of 1854. This is based on the words
taken literally, without regard either to the rest of the act
or the existing state of the law. And even in this narrow
view the construction can not be supported. The words
"other enlisted men" mean, of course, enlisted men other
than tho8e to whom reference has previously been made.
The only enlisted men previously referred to are those "now
or hereafter detailed for special servi~e." The clause may
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be correctly paraphrased, therefore, as follows: "And
enlisted men, now or hereafter detailed to special service,
shall not receive extra pay beyond that allowed to enlisted
men uot so detailed." Enlisted men, not detailed to special
service, received no extra pay. And, therefore, men detailed
to special service were to receive none.
Another objection to the construction of Attorney-General
Bates is that it renders the clause nugatory and useless;
for, thus construed, it worked no change in existing law.
Before the section was enacted, there was no authority to
give enlisted men extra pay except that contained in the acts
of 1819 and 1854, and the extra pay thus authorized was,
of course, limited l>y the terms of those acts. The effect of
Attorney-General Bates' opinion, therefore, was to give the
clause in question the effect of forbidding that which there
was no authority or power to do before it was passed. While
this is often done in penal statutes, and sometimes may be
done where the questfon of authority is doubtful, it is certainly not usual in a case like that under consideration, where
there was not the slightest ground for claiming the previous
existence of such authority, and where, so far as appears, no
claim of the kind had ever been made.
The act of March 1, 1864 (13 Stat., 38, 39), is a legislative
con truction of section 35, opposed to that of AttorneyGeneral Bates. Section 2 provides that "the thirty--tifth
ection of the act entitled 'An act for enrolling and calling
out the national forces and for other purposes,' approved
March three, eighteen hundred and sixty-three, shall not
be de med hereafter to prohibit the payment to enli ted men
employed at the Military Academy of the extra-duty pay
heretofore allowed by law to enlisted men when employed
at con tant labor for not le ~ than ten days continuously."
Thi. plainly implie that before the pa age of this act, the
hir ·-fifth ction of the act of March 3, 1 63, had properly
b n cl em to prohibit, the payment of any xtra-d uty pay
11li. t d m
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draft a<'.t was passed some three weeks later and took away
any authority impliedly conferred by this appropriation act
to give soldiers extra-duty pay.
A similar appropriation in the Army appropriation act for
the year ending June 30, 1865, passed June 15, 1864 (14 Stat.,
126), must be satisfied by a refere-t1ce. to section 2 of the act
of April 1, 1864 (13 Stat., 39), above referred to, which in
effect repealed section 35 of the draft act so far as it applied
to enlisted men on duty at the Military Academy. Moreover,
the services upon which the claim under consideration is
based were rendered in September and October, 1863, that
is to say, in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1864, while the
appropriation act of June 15, 1864, applied only to services
rendered during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1865.
The difficulty in the construction of section 35 arises from
the use of the word "extra" before pay and of the clause
beginning ~, beyond that," etc. Either might have been
omitted and the section would have been much clearer. But
the unnecessary and confusing attempt at emphasis, by the
use of both, can not change the meaning, which, for the
reasons given, plainly is that extra pay for enlisted men
should be abolished.
The result is that the opinion of Attorney-General Devens
must be followed and that the opinion of Attorney-General
Bates must be overruled. The claim of Bronson should be
rejected as for extra pay not authorized by law.
The e:x;cuse for the length of this opinion is in the fact that
two former Attorneys-General have disagreed as to the
proper construction of this statute.
Very respectfully,
WM. H. TAFT,
Solicitor- General.
The ACTING SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

Approved:

W. H. H. MILLER.
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LIABILITY OF DISBURSING AGENTS FOR MONEY DEPOSITED
IN BANKS.
A special disbursing agent of the Board of Town-site Trustees of Oklahoma Territory who deposited moneys received by him as such agent
in two banks that suspended p ayment, with his sureties, is liable for
any loss that may a rise from the failure of these hanks, and he is
not relieved from liability by the fact that these banks were designated by the board of trustees as places of deposit. The regull!-tions of the Secretary of the Interior, providing for the designation
by the town-site board of a bank for the depositing of money in the
bands of the disbursing agent, must be construed in the light of
sections 3639 and 3620 of the Revised Statutes to limit power of designation by the board to banks which are lawful depositories of' public
money within the statutes, which these.banks were not.
The fact that some of the mon ey so deposited was collected from assessments, and never in the Treasury, is immaterial, inasmuch as it was
public money, and his bond expressly bound him to account for all
public moneys coming into his hands.
DEP ARTl\rIENT OF JUS'.I.'ICE,

February 13, 1891.
SIR: By letter of the 3d ultimo you submitted to the Attorney-General an 01)inion of the Assistant Attorney-General
as igned to your Department, together with the correspond·
ence on which the opinion bad been rendered, with the
reque t that the same be considered, and that you be advised
whether the Attorney-General concurs therein.
The question to be con idered is whether one Hay and the
sur tie on hi official bond as special disbmsing agent are
liable to the United tates for moneys received by him as
uch di bur ·in°· ageut and depo ited by him with private
banking firm~ in orman and Guthrie, Okla. Bay wa a
member and ecretary of Board o. 4 of Town- ite 'l'ru tees
of Oklahoma Territory appointed. by the Secretary of the
Int ,rior und r the act of May 14, 1 90 (26 Stat. L., 09) nnd
wa <1 • i ·nat d by th ecr tary a. pecial di,'bur ing ,1g-cnt
fi r h boar .
u h he gave bond conditioned that he
during hi holding and remaiuing in
ar fnll di char " b cluti there f, and faithfnll ' cli. · nr all publi m n y and bone. tly a onut, wi h<u francl r 1 1, • for th am an l for all publi · fund and
pr p ·r y whi ·h hall r may · m int hi band . '
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The first section of the act under wllich this board of
trustees was appointed, required that after the entry of the
town-site had been made by them, as therein directed, the
Secretary of the Interior Rhonld provide regulations for the
proper execution of the trust. Number 19 of the regulations
(10 Land Decisions, 666 et seq.), made and promulgated in
accordance with the act, defined the duties of the disbursing
agent, and, among other things, provided that he should
"deposit all the sums received by him at least once a week,
and when practicable, daily, in some bank designated by the
board," and should "pay the same out only on llis checks
countersigned by the chairman of the board of which he is
secretary, which checks, after they are honored, shall be filed
with his account as vouchers."
The town-site board of which Hay was secretary and disbursing agent designated th~ Commercial Bauk of Norman
as a place for the daily deposits of moneys in his hands as
such agent, and the Commercial Bank of Guthrie as the bank
to which he should transfer his weekly balances. Hay had
on deposit w.ith the former some $1,615, and with the latter
$3,262.83, when both banks suspended payment. The question is whether Hay and his sureties are liable for any loss
which may arise from the failure of these banks .
.A. preliminary objection is made to his liability for the loss
of a part of the smns on the ground that it was collected
from assessments made and never in the treasury. It was,
however, money properly paid into his hands as a special
disbursing agent, aud. was public money, while there, because
the United States was responsible for its proper disposition,
whatever that might ultimately be. His boud expressly
bound him to account for all public moneys coming into his
hands.
The main question is whether the designation of the banks
by the board of trustees as places of deposit relieved Hay
from the loss. This must be answered in the negative. Hay
was a disbursing officer of the United States, and was forbidden by sections 3639 and 3620, Revised Statutes to deposit
the public money in his possession in any other place than
with as i tant treasurers of the United States, or in some
place designated as a depository by the Secretary of the Treas-

26

HON. W. H. TAFT.
Sealed Cars.

ury. The regulation of the Secretary of the Interior providing for the designation by the town site board of a bank for
the deposit of moneys in the hands of their secretary and disbursing agent, must be construed in the light of the foregoing
sections. The power of designation by the board is limited,
therefore, to banks which are lawful depositories of public
moneys within the statute. It is not claimed that either the
Norman bank or the Guthrie bank was such a depository.
The result is that Hay is not exonerated from liability on
his bond for the loss arising from the failure of these banks.
The Supreme Court of the United States has frequently
decided that the contract in an official bond for the accounting of moneys is not a contract of bailment in which liability
depends on the question of reasonable aud ordinary care, but
that it is an absolute contract to pa,y the money in any event.
The conceded fact that these deposits· were made in good
faith and in the belief that they were lawful and proper has,
therefore, no bearing upon the question of Hay's liability or
that of his bondsmen.
The opinion of Assistant Attorney-General Sl1ieldsJ in
which he reaches the same conclusion after a more extended
exa1nination, is fully concurred in.
Very respectful1y,
WM. H. TA.FT,
Solicitor-General.
The SECRE'l'.A.RY OF THE INTERIOR.
Approved:
W. H. H. MILLER.
SEAL ED CARS.

An act to prevent smuggling construed.
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.The authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to make regnln,tions
which should have the obligation of a treaty betwl'en Great Britain
and this country, given by articles 29 and30oftheTreaty of Washington, was limited by the terms thereof. Those articles related only to
the examination, inspection, and exemption from duty of goods, wares,
and merchandise in one country through which they were to be carried continuously in unbroken cars and envelopes for distribution in
the other country. The treaty had no reference whatever to the manner of the inspection and examination in the country of the distribution of the goods and merchandise; that matter was who1ly within
the control of the countr.v where the goods were to be consumed and
used, and there is no obligation by force of the Treaty of Washington
which prevents a modification of the regulations referred to in so far
as they affect goods and mercbandise imported into this country for
our consnmprion.
Sections 2 and 3 of the act of 1864 probably contemplated that the sealfog of cars should 1,e performed by consular officers. The Secretary
of the Treasury bas no anthority by law and therefore is not required
to appoint new officers especially charged with the duty.
DEP AR'l'MENT OF JUSTICE,

February 13, 1891.
SIR: By letter of the 24th ultimo the Secretary of the
Treasury requested the opinion of the Atterney-General
upon certain questions therein stated. The questions relate
to the construction of section 2 of the act approved June 27,
1864, entitled "An act to prevent sm_uggling, and for other
purposes" (13 Stat., 197), which is now embodied in the Revised Statutes as sect.ion 3102. The Secretary stated that
from "the date of the passage of the act referred to it bas
been the practice to permit cars laden in Canada, and secured in the m.anner described in the section, to pass the
frontier of the trnited States if the seals found thereon have
been intact;" that "since the completion of the Canadian
Transcontinental a practice has grown up by which consular
officers in Briti, h Columbia seal cars into which merchandise
imported direct from Asiatic countries has been placed, and
such cars upon arrival at the frontier of the United St.ates
have been and are now permitted to pass without inspection
of their contents;" that "a similar practice obtains as to
goods imported at Montreal, and consigned to points in the
United States;" and that "recent investigations by the officer. of the Treasury Department have shown that European
and Asiatic merchandi e, as well as goods, the products of the
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Dominion of Canada, and dutiable under our laws, have been
imported in cars secured by consular officers without being
accounted for to customs officers at ports of destination."
The Secretary requested that he be advised,
"First, whether or not tbe law referred to is applicableto
goods imported from beyond the sea into contiguous foreign
countries, or only to goods, wares, or merchandise the products of such contiguous countries; second, whether under
the provision for the prevention of fraud upon the revenue,
the Secretary has authority, in view of the results of recent
investigation, to ignore the seals placed upon the cars by
consular officers, and to require the entry and examination
of the contents of cars so secured upon arrival at front,ier
ports; third, whether or not the law in question, or any other
law, requires that officers of the United States shall be
stationed on contiguous foreign territory for the purpose of
sealing cars into which may be placed merchandise destined
for ports within our territory."
The proper construction of sectiou ,2 of the act to prevent
smuggling, of June 27, 1864, required in answering the foregoing questions, will be aided by a consideration of the other
provisions of that act. The first section requires that from
and after the passage of tbe act all goods, wares, and merchandise, and all baggage and effects of passengers, and all
other articles imported into the United States from any contiguous foreign country or countries, except as thereafter
proviued, as well as the vessels, cars, and other vehicles and
envelopes in which the same were imported, should be
unladen in t:l).e pre:sence of and be inspected by an inspector
or other ollicer of the cu ·toms at the first port of entry or
custom-house in the United States where the ame should
arrive. The re t of the section enforces this provi. ion by
fi rfi itur and otberwi e.
' ·ti n 2 provide '' r lie
to avoid the in p ction at the first port of arrival,
r 'quir cl by th fir t ection of thi a t, tbe owner, agent
ma ·t r r · u luct r f, ny uch ve · l car, or other ehicle
r wn r a()' n , r h< r p r ou havhw ·barge of any uch
We r '.' ill fChanui' , baeyo•aey , ffi Ct , OT Other artimay apply t any ffi · r f the ....nit 1 tate duly
,luth riz l
a· iu th 1 r mi · , to
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under and according to the reg·ulations hereinafter authorized , previous to their importation into the United States;
which officer shall seal or close the same accordingly; whereupon the same may proceed to their port of destination
without further inspection: Provided, That nothing contained in tb.is section shall be construed to exempt such
vessel, car, or vehicle, or its contents, from such examination
as may be necessary and proper to prevent frauds upon the
reveuue and violations of this act: And provided further,
That every such vessel, car, or other vehicle shall proceed,
without unnecessary delay, to the port or place of its destination, as named in the manifest of its cargo, freight, or contents, and be there inspected, as provided in section one."
Section 3 provides" That the Secretary of the Treasury be, and he is hereby,
authorized and required to make such regulations, and from
time to time so to change the same as to him shall seem necessary and proper, for sealing such vessels, cars, and other
vehicles, when practicable, and for sea,ling, marking, and
identifying such goods, wares, merchandise, baggage, effects,
trunks, traveling-bags or sacks, valises, and other envelopes
and articles; and also in regard to invoices, manifests, and
other pertinent papers, and their authentication."
The other sections are no~ material to the discussi.on.
1. The first question is whether section 2 of the foregoing
act applies as well to merchandise imported into Canada and
thence imported into the United States, as to merchandise
produced in Canada and thence imported. into the United
States. No distinction is made in the first section of the act
as to the origin of the merchandise. The second section is as
wide in its application as the first. The first question must
be, therefore, answered iu the affirmative.
2. The secondquestiou is whether the Secretary has authority to ignore the seals placed upon imported cars by consular
officers, and to require the entry and examination of the contents of cars so secured upon arrival at frontier ports. In connection with this question~ the attention of the AttorneyGeneral is called to the regulations governing the transportatfon of merchandise to and from the British possessions in
North America under the laws and treaty of Washington promulgated l\larch 30, 1875. (Synopsis of Decisions of Treasury
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Department, No. 2171.) Areicles 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the regulations provide for the sealing of cars by consular officers of
the United States in Canada, and the transportation of these
cars through frontier ports of the United States when the
seals are unbroken without any examination until the port
of destination is reached. It is evident from the language
used in these regulations that they apply not only to goods
carried through this country to and from Canada for exportation out of tbe United States, but also to goods which are
imported into the United States and are subject to duty here.
The authority of the Secretary· of the Treasury to make
regulations which should have the obligation of a treaty or
a couveution between Great Britain and this country was
given by articles 29 and 30 of the treaty of Washington, and
was therefore limited by the terms thereof. (Revised Statutes
of 1873-1875, p. 365.) Those articles related only to the examination, inspection, and exemption from duty of goods, wares,
and merchandise in one country, through which they were to be
carried continuously in unbroken cars or envelopes, for destination in the other. The treaty had no reference whatever to
the manner of inspeetionandexaminationin the country of the
de tination of tbe goods and merchaudise. That was a matter
in its nature wholly within the control of the country
wherein the good were to be consumed and used. There i
no obligation, by force of the treaty of Washington, which
prevent a modification of the regulations referred to, in 'O
far a they a:ffcet goods and merchandi e imported into thi'
country for our con umption here. The second que tion to
be an wered, therefore, i not mbarrassed by the provision
of th tr ,tty of Wa hiugton or the regulation in accordance
h r with and depen 1. · only on th con tructiou of the 'ecoud
·tion of t1rn muggling act of 1 64 quoted above, now
mb di din
·tiou 310.a.1 of th R vi 'eu. Statute . Thi reuar to di cu . th que tion whether article
f \Va.'hinnton ha be n abrocrat d.
f th .· cond ct ion of tb
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of its language. .An examination of the goods at the frontier
port may be required, howe-ver, and the manifest accompanying the car will serve all the practical purposes of a formal
entry. The proviso of the second section is, that notbing
contained therein shall be construed to exempt the car or its
contents from such ex::tmination as may be necessary to prevent fraud upon the re-venues and violations of the act. This
places a large discretion in. the Secretary to direct such an
examination as he may think necessary for the purpose
stated. If the workillg of the section under the present regulations has resulted in fraud up~m the revenue; it is clearly
within both the power and the duty of the Secretary to prevent a recurreuce of such frauds by a regulation requiring
such an examination as he may deem necessary to that end.
If it be said that this is vesting in the Secretary a power to
defeat the very object of the section, it is a sufficient answer
to say that such was clearly the intention of Congress. It
is not to be presumed that Cqngress gave this privilege to
importers with the idea that it should be enforced in their
interest at the expense of the revenue. The object of the
proviso was to enable the Secretary to so modify the effect
of the section as to prevent the frauds which his investigations now disclose. It is, of course, the duty of the Secretary to make such regulations for the examination of goods
at the frontier ports as may least interfere with the objeet of
Congress in the passage of the Rect.ion. But the fraud must
be stopped in any event. The answer to the second ques. tion, therefore, is that the Secretary of the Treasury can not
require a formal entry of tlie goods sealed in a foreign contiguous country at a frontier port, but that he is not concluded by the sea.ls from requirh'1g . an examination of the
contents of the cars so secnred on arrival at the frontier
ports, and he may direct such an examination, notwithstanding tlle seals, as may seem to him best adapted to prevent
frand.
3. The third quEstion is whether or not the law referred to,
or any other, requires that officers of the United States shall
pe stationed on contiguous foreign territory for the purpose
of ea.ling cars into which may be placed merchandise destined for ports within our territory. Section 2 of the act
of 1864 evidently contemplates the presence in the contigu-
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ous country of some officers authorized to seal cars. By the
third section the Secretary is required to make regulations
for the sealing of cars by such officers. The sealing of a car
is not very different from other duties of a commercial character which have been imposed upon consular officers of the
lJnited States from the foundation of the Government. It is
reasonable, therefore, to suppose that Congress intended
that the duty here referred to should be performed by consular officers. Such has b'eeu the construction of the act since
its passage. There is therefore an implied obligation upon
the Secretary to authorize such officers to seal cars and vessels under the act in question. There is no provision of law,
however, requiring tbe Secretary of the Treasury to appoint
inspectors for the sole purpose of sealing cars and vessels in
the contiguous countries, and there js no appropriation out
of which such inspectors could be paid. The seventh section
of the smuggling act empowers the Secretary to appoint
additional inspectors in certain revenue district's of the
United States, but nothing is said of inspectors stationed in
foreign countries. Section 2999 authorizes the appointment
of special agents of the Treasury to reside in foreign conntrie ~ through which bonded good are carried from the warehou:e of one collection distrfot of the United States on the
.Atlantic coast to that of another on the Pacific coast, and
vice versa, for the purpose of snpervising the transportation
of nch good through the foreign country and preventingfraud upon the Government. This section was enacted in
1 ,14, and ,Ya evidently directed to the carriage of goods
over the I. tlnnu of Panama. It can not in any view apply
to the ca e in hand.
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law, and therefore is not required, to appoint new officers
especially charged with the duty. This result may be areason for Congressional action granting such authority, but until
it is granted consular officers must continue to do the sealing.
The only way now open to the Secretary of preventing the
evils which have proved necessarily incident to the system
of sealing cars in accordance with section 2 of the act of
1864, under the present regulations, is to modify the regulations, by directing that an examination of some kind be had
upon the frontier.
Very respectfully,
WM. H. TAFT,
Solicitor- General.
The ACTING SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

Approved:
W. H. H. MILLER.
STEAM PLATE-PRINTING PRESSES-BUREAU OF ENGRAVING
AND PRINTING.
The sundry civil act for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1890, not having
been modified by subsequent acts, prohibits the use of the steam plateprinting presses in the Bureau of Engraving and Printing for the
purpose of supplying stamps needed for immediate use under the laws
for the collection of internal revenue, unless the requirements specified in said act be complied with.
DEPARTMENT · OF JUSTICE,

February 19, 1891.
Sm: Your inquiry of the 14th instant, as to whether you
are authorized by law to employ the steam plate-printing
presses, now in charge of the Bureau of Engraving and
Printing for the purposes of supplying stamps needed for
immediate use under the laws for collecting the internal revenue, is at band.
An act entitled "An act making appropriations for sundry
civil expenses," etc., passed August 4, 1886 (24 Stat., 222,
227), contains the following provisions:
'' For wages of not more than one hundred and eighty plate
printers, at piece rates. to be fixed by the Secretary of the
Treasury, not to exceed the rates usually paid for such work,
5687-VOL 20-3
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including the wages of not more than two hundred printers'
assistants, at one dollar and t wenty-five cents a day each
when employed, and for royalty for u se of steam plate-printing machines, three hundred and seven thousand three hundred and eighty dollars, to be expended under the direction
of the Secretary of the Treasury : P r ovided, That any part
of this sum may be used for p urehasing and operating new
and improved plate-printing presses."
The act similarly entitled, passed March 3, 1887 (24 Stat.,
509, 515), contains the following provisions :
"For wages of not more than one hundred and eightyseven plate printers, at piece rates to be :fixed by the Secretary of the Treasury, not to exceed the rates usually paid
for such work, including t he wages · of not more than one
hundred and eighty-eight printers' assistants, at on e dollar
and twenty-five cents a day each, when employed, and for
wages of not more than twenty-six printers' assistants at
stearu presses, at one dollar and fifty cents a day each, when
employed, and for royalty for use of steam plate-printing
machines, three hundred and sixt y-six thousand :five hundred
dollars, to be expended under the direction of the Secretary
of the Treasury: Provided, That any part of this sum may be
used for purchasing and operating new and impr oved plateprinting presses."
Tlte eorre ponding paragraph of the similarly entitled act
of October 2, 1888 (25 Stat., 505, 511), reads as follows :
"For wages of plate printers, at piece rates to be :fixed by
the ~ecretary of the Trea ury, not to exceed the rates u ually
paid for such work, including the wages of printers' a itaut , at one dollar and twenty-five cents a day each, when
employed, and for wage of printers' a~· i tant at steam
pre
, at one dollar and fifty cent a day ach, when
em11 y d, and for royalty for u of team plate-printin"'
ma ·hine thr e hundred and niu ty-eight th u and dollar:-,
t
xpende under the lir ction of the er liary f the
: Pro ·icled Th t th re hall not be au in r a e of
in the En °TaV·
·poucliug para err~ ph f tb imilarly ntit] tl
9 (~ - t t.
, 91.5), contain tbe fi How-
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"For wages of plate printers, at piece rates to be fixed by
the Secretary of the Treasury, not to exceed the rates usually
paid for such work, including the wages of printers' assistants,
at one dollar and twenty-five cents a day each, when employed,
and for wages of printers' assistants at steam presses, at one
dollar and fifty cents a day each, when employed, and for royalty at not exceeding one cent per thousandimpressionsforuse
of steam plate-printing machines, four hundred and fifty-six
thousand dollars, to be expended under the direction of the
Secretary of the Treasury: Provided, * * * That no
part of this appropriation shall be used for the repair or
reconstruction of steam plate-printing presses: Provided
further, That there shall not be an increase of the number
of steam plate-printing machines in the Engraving and
Printing Bureau: * * * Prodded, That unless the
patentees of said steam presses shall accept the five hundred
dollars already paid as royalty on each press and the rate
per thousand sheets herein provided the said presses shall
not be used by the Government after the close of the present
fiscal year."
No legislation is found. in the "sundry civil bill" enacted
August 30, 1890, or elsewhere, to change the law as Congress
saw fit to establish it by the act of March 2, 1889.
Under that statute, considered in connection with the
related antecedent enactments, the conclusion seems to be a
necessary one that the use of the steam plate-printing
machines is prohibited except upon a compliance with the
requirements specified in said act of 1889.
Very respectfully,
W. H. TI. MILLER.
The ACTING SECRETARY

OF

THE TREASURY.

PUBLIC CARTAGE OF MERCHANDISE.
Sectibn 25 of the act of June 22, 1874, chapter 91 1 regarding the letting
out of public cartage of merchandise in the custoclv of the Government to the lowest bidcler, applies only to such cart;ge as is paid for
by the Government and not to cartage the expense of which is paitl
by the individual importer.
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DEP .A.RTMEN'I.' OF JUSTICE,

February 24, 1891.
Sm: By Jetter of January 17, 1891, you request my
opinion upon tbe proper construction of section 25 of the act
of Jnne 22, 1874 (chap. 91, U.S. Stat,. L., vol.18, p.186) .. The
section reads as follows:
"That pub lie cartage of merchandise in tbe custody of the
Government shall be let after not less than thirty days'
notice of such letting to the lowest n~sponsible bidder giving
sufficient security, and shall be subject to regulations
approved by the Secretary of the Treasury."
It appears that there. are, with respect to cartage, two
classes of merchandise. The cartage of the first class is
paid by the Government as part of the expense of collecting
the revenue, and is not charged to the importer. The cartage of the second class is charged against and paid by the
importer before the goods are delivered to him. The first
class comprises those packages, not less than one in ten of
an importation, designated by the collector for examination
and appraisement, which are taken from the steamer's wharf
to the appraisers' stores under section 2901. The expense
of the cartage of these packages is properly chargeable to
the United States. The second class includes all goods
unclaimed or entered in bond transferred from the steamers'
wharves to bonded warehouses; examined packages entered
in bond, transferred after examination and appraisement
from apprai. ers' stores to bonded warehouses; over:fl-ow
goods, including samples and personal and household effects,
transferred from one warehouse to another to make room,
and goods transferred from public stores to bonded warehou, e for sale by the Government. Every expense attending the cartage and storage of such goods is properly
chargeable to the importer under bapter 7 of Title XXXIV
of the Revi d Statute , and particularly ection 2960, 2961,
2. (L 2!163 2964 ..,963 2970, 2972, 2973, 2977, and 2fl80.
Th theory upon which cartage charges are paid by the
ll it cl tc t
on the fir ·t la. of good , and by the importer
on th · c u l. i that artage fr m thewharfto the apprai er ,
t r i fi r the c nveni n e f the overnment in examinafter that, if the import r wi he to pay the dutie
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the goods are delivered into his custody, and the Government
has no more to·do with them. If he prefers to delay payment
of duties, and to take advantage of the system of bonded
warehouses, he must pay all the extra expense to which the
Government is su~ject over and above that which would
have been incurred had he paid the duties immediately after
examination and appraisement. This extra expense, of
course, includes cartage, under sufficient inspection of the
Government, to bonded warehouses.
The section in question was passed in 1874, during Secretary Boutwell's administration of the Treasury. It was then
held to apply only to the cartage of merchandise, payment
for which was made out of the public treasury; i. e., to the
first class of goods above mentioned. The cartage of goods
of the second class was let by private contract without competition. Such continued to be the practice under Secretaries
Richardson, Bristow, Morrill, Sherman, Windom, FolgP,r,
McCulloch, and Manning. In 1887 Secretary Fairchild
adverti:sed for bids on cartage of the second-class and con- ·
tracts have since been thus let. A difficulty is encountered
in letting bids under the second-class, by competition, which
will be understood by a statement of how contracts are let
for cartage of the first class. Bids are invited on cartage
at so many cents per package, whatever the size of the package. The distances from steamers' wharves to the public
stores is easy of ascertainment and makes a fair basis for
one element of the expense. The size of the packages generally imported may be averaged, and when the same person
is charged with the carriage of all goods a fixed price per
package is measurably fair. These are the conditions existing in bidding on cartage of the first class.
When we come to cartage of the second class, however, a
very different state of affairs presents itself.
There are numerous bonded warehouses, publfo (sections
2954 to 2959) and private (section 2960, etc.), and these warehouses are at greatly varying distances from the wharves.
Of course the packages to be carted arf\ of all sizes, varying
from tons to ounces. An importer may have a single large
or small package, or he may have a variety embracing an
sizes. Manife tly it would be unfair that an importer bringing in onJy a steam engine or locomotive should be charged
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for cartage only a sum which might be a fair average for all
packages, great and small; and it is difficult to see bow tllis
hi.equality is to be avoided, under a system of letting for an
average price, where the payments are to be made by each
importer for himself. Of course there is no difficulty where
all payments for packages, great and small, and for distances
long and short, are to be made by one person, as by the Government under the first class. For the same reason, contracts for municipal work by a unit of quantity are frpquent
and feasible·; but where, as here, with reference to all goods
in the second class, it is essential not merely that there shall
be a fair average, but that each individual shall pay what is
just for himself; the public letting of ·contracts, as for an
average price, seems to be impossible. 'fhis view: harmouizes
with the use of the word "public" in the Revised Statutes
aud is greatly reenforced by that word. A different construction ignores that word entirely, and thereby violates a
cardinal rnle in the constructio!.l of statutes, which requires
· every word to be given due significance.
For one class of this cartage the Government pays; it is
therefore public. For the other class each individual owuer
pays; it is therefore private.
In view of the foregoing considerations, I can not doubt
that the contemporaneous and continued construction by the
state men and lawyer who administered the office of Secretary of the Treasury for thirteen years after this statute was
enacted was right.
I ha Ye the honor, therefore, to state that in my opinion
section No. 25 of the anti-moiety act of 1874 (18 Stat., J86),
in the worcl "public cartage of merchandise in the cu tody
of tbe Gov rnment," ha application only to such cartage a
i paicl for by the Government, and not to cartage the
xi, 11 , of which i. paid by the individual importer.
ry re p ctfully,
W. H. H. l\IILLER.
Th
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REAPPRAISAL BY GENERAL APPRAISERS.
A general appraiser, acting under a collector's direction for the reappraisement, must confine himself to the particular items of the importation on account of which a reappraisement was ordered. (Section
13 of the customs administrative act, June 1'0, 1890, chapter 407, construed.)
DEP.A.R'l'MENT OF JUSTICE,

1.ll.arch 17, 1891.
Sm: I understand your communication of December 19,
1890, to submit for opinion the question, whether when a
reappraisemept by a general appraiser is directed, his jurisdiction embraces all the merchandise included in the invoice
or importation which was the subject of the original appraisement or is limited to the particular merchandise whose
appraisement has caused dissatisfaction.
In an opinion dated September 27, 1890 (19 Opin., 666), this
Department passed upon the question whether the Board of
three General A ppraiscrs established by the customs administration act of June 10, 1890 (Pamph. Laws, 1889-'90, p.
131), could properly reappraise items of merchandise not
brought before them specially by appeal, and the conclusion
reached was that in all eases of appeal the action of the
Board of General Appraisers should be confined to the particular items on account of which the appeal in each case
was taken.
I am now asked to say whether a general appraiser, acting under a collector's direction for a reappraisement, must
confine himself to the particular items of an importation on
account of which areappraisement was ordered, or may proceed to make a new appraisement of the whole importation
where the items complained of are less than said importation.
It seems to me that the language of section 13 of the act
of June 10, 1890, requires that the general appraiser should
limit his reappraisement to the particular items of merchandise whose appraisement is the cause of dissatisfaction.
That language is, "If the collector shall deem the appraisement of any imported merchandise too low, he may order a
reappraisement which shall be made by one of the general
appraisers; or, if the importer, owner, agent or consignee of
such merchandise shall be dissatisfied with the appraisement
thereof, and shall have complied with the requirements of
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law with respect to the entry and appraisement of merchandise, he may within two days thereafter give notice to the
collector in writing of such dissatisfaction, on the receipt of
which the collector shall at -once direct a reappraisement of
such merchandise by o e of the. general appraisers."
It thus appears that when the collector or the importer
shall be dissatisfied with the appraisement "of any imported
merchandise," the collector is authorized to "direct a reappraisement of such merchandise by one of the general appraisers;" that is to say, the collector is authorized to direct a
reappraisement of the particular merchandise the original
appraisal of which has given dissatisfaction. This is the
necessary sense of the words "such merchandise," which can
have reference to nothing but the previously supposed case
of" imported merchandise" whose appraisement has dissatisfied the collector or the importer. It is such merchandise
and such only that is to be reappraised, and I am, therefore,
of opinion that the general appraiser can not reappraise an
invoice de novo unless the dissatisfaction of the party complaining of the appraisement exteuds to the whole invoice,
and not merely to certaiu items thereof.
It is true that section 12 authorizes the general appraisers
"to exercise the powers and duties devolved upon them by
this act and to exercise, under the general direction of the
Secretary of the Treasury, such other supervision over appraisements and classifications for duty of imported merchandise
as may be needful to secure lawful and uniform appraisements
and clas8ifi,cations at the several ports," but the operation of
this language must, I think, be subordinated to the expre s
terms of section 13 limiting reappraisements by general
apprai ers to the particular merchandise whose apprai al had
given di' ati faction, for it can hardly be supposed from the
gen ral word quoted froll'.1 section 12 that Congress intended
that th re trictiou impo ed by ection 13 should be re pected
or not at the option of the general apprai ers, which is as
mu ·ha to ay that th r triction imposed by ection 13 is
tri ·tion at all.
~ ery r p ctfully, yours,
W~f. H. T FT,
Acting Attorney-General.
r

h
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SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE'S AUTHORITY.
The appropriation act for the Agricultural Department for the year
ending June 30, 1892, contains specific appropriations for illustrations,
maps and charts, and photographic illustrations: Held, that section
3706 of the Revised Statutes does not include illustrations and engravings, and inasmuch as there is no other provision of law requiring the
Secretary of Agriculture to procure them from or through the Public
Printer, the presumption is that the money necessary to purchase
such illustrations is to be expended under the direction of the head
of the Department of Agriculture.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

llfarch 19, 1891.
SIR: By letter of the 13th instant you request the opinion
of the Attorney-General upon the question whether you
have the authority to procure the illustrations, engravings,
maps, and charts to accompany bulletins and special rep0rts
prepared by the 8everal divisions of your Department, or
whether you must look to the Public Printer to prepare or
procure them.
There are in the appropriation act for the Agricultural
Department for the year ending June 30, 1892, specific a,ppropriations for illustrations, maps and charts, and photographic
illustrations. Such appropriations have occnred in previous
acts. You state that it has always been the practice for the
head of your Department to procure the illustrations aud to
furnish them to the Public Printer to be bound with the
printed matter which they ,properly accompany, and that
this practice has been uniformly concurred in by the accounting officers of the Treasury Department.
The question has now arisen whether the practice is not a
violation of section 3706, which reads as follows:
"All printing, binding, and blank books for the Senate or
House of Representatives and the executive or judicial
departments shall be done at the Government Printing
Office, except in cases otherwise provided by law."
Does the word "printing" mean and include the preparation of maps, charts, and illustrations¥
It should be noted that the section requires the printing
to be done at the Government Printing Office. If it appears
that there are not now and never have been facilities for the
preparation of maps, charts; and illustrations at that office,
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and that Congress never had intended that there should be,
it would seem to be clear that section 3706 does not apply to
them.
In this connection you call attention to sections 3779 and
3780, Revised Statutes, which provide that whenever charts,
maps, diagr~ms, views, or other engravings are required to
illustrate any documents ordered printed by either House of
Congress, they shall be procured by the Public Printer: and
that the contract for the same shall be let to the lowest bidder. Here is clear evidence that Congress does not intend
maps, charts, and illustrations to be made at the Government Printing Office. This accords with the fact, as stated
by you, that they never are made there. It follows that the
printing referred to in section 3706 does not include ilJustrations and engravings, maps, or charts.
There being no other provision of law requiring the Secretary of Agriculture to procure from or through the Public
Printer the illustrations, maps, and charts for which appropriation bas been made in the Agricultural Department
appropriation act, the presumption is that the money necessary to purchase such illustrations is to be expended under
the direction of the head of that Department. I am of the
opinion, and therefore advise you that the practice in this
regard, which, as you state, has up to the present time prevailed in your Department, is fully warranted by law, and
should be continued.
Very respectfully,
WM. H. TAFT,
Acting Attorney- General.
The SECRET.A.RY OF AGRICULTURE.
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formerly occupied a station on the tract. Held, that even if the grant
to tbe Mission Board passed title, as to which quIBre, yet it was subject to the Indian right of occupancy and nothing but a naked title even
after allotment of the iand to the individual Indians under the act of
February 8, 1887, chapter 119. Whether conferring upon the allottee
the power of unlimited alienation after twenty-five years' occupation
in severalty would be au infringement of the rights of the holder of
the ultimate fee not decirled, as not now arising.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

JJfarch 21, 1891.

Sm: On January 20 last you requested the opinion of the
Attorney-General upou the question whether an allotment to
individual members of the Nez Perce tribe of Indians, uuder
the allotment act of 1887 (24 Stat., 388), of 640 acres of land
at the mouth of the Lapwai, in Idaho, now included in the
reservation of that tribe and occupied by it, would terminate
the Indian rjght of occupaucy, so as to vest the right of
immediate possession in one WiIUam G. Langford, who claims
title through a congressional graut. You accompanied the
request for an opinion with an elaborate opinion of Assistant
Attorney-General Shields upon the same question, which has
been of much assistance to me in the consideration of the
subject.
The following statement of facts, statutes, and treaties,
taken from the papers submitted, will suffice for an understanding of the precise point to be here decided: The land
in question has always been occupied by the Nez Perce tribe
of Indians, with the exception that in 1836, nuder the auspices of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign
Missions, a missfon building was established and occupied
on the tract aud was continued there until 1847, when, in
fear of an Indian uprising, the mission agent left the country,
and sjnce that time the Indians have been, with a slight
interruption to be hereafter noted, in undisturbed occupancy.
Twenty-six Indian families now have their homes on the tract
in question, and the period. of thefr occupation ranges from
five to fifty years. August 14, 1848, the organic act of the
Territory of Oregon was passed, which contained the following proviso :
"Provided, 'l:hat nothing in this act contained shall be construed to impair the rights of person 01· property now per-
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taining to the Indians in said Territory, so long as such
rights 'shall remain unexti~guished by treaty between . the
United States and such Indians, or to affect the authority
of the Government of the United States to make any regulation respecting such Indians, their lands, property, or other
rights, by treaty, la,w, or otherwise, which it would have been
competent to the Government to make if this act had never
passed: And provided also, That the title to the land, not
exceeding six hundred and forty acres, now occupied as missionary stations among the Indian tribes in said ·rerritory,
together with the improvements thereon, be confirmed and
established in the several religious societies to which said
missionary stations respectively belong." (9 Stat., 323.)
At this time, as has been said, the land in question was
not occupied as a missionary station, for it had been deserted
the year before, so that it did not come within the terms of
the grant and confirmation in the section just cited.
March 3, 1853, there was passed and approved "An act to
establish the Territorial government of Washington" (10
Stat., 172), which act contained. the following proviso:
"Provided, That nothing in this act contained shall be
construed to affect the authority of the Government of the
United States to make any regulations respecting the Indian of said Territory, their lands, property, or other rights
by treaty, law or otherwise, which it would have been competeu t to the Government to make if this act bad never been
pa sed: Provided further, That the title to the land, not
exceeding six hundred and forty acres, now occnpied as missionary stations, among the Indian tribes in said Territory,
or that may have been so occupied as missionary stations
prior to the pa sage of the act establishing the Territorial
govemment of Oregon, together with the improvement
th reon, be, and i hereby, confirmed and established to the
several r ligiou societie to which said mi sionary stations
re p ·tively b long."
Th latt r provi o undoubtedly includes the land now in
wa a . ed and approved 'An a t to
vernm 11t for the Territ ry of Idaho.'
right

a b w en the United States
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and the Indian tribes, and makes no reference to mission
lands. Each of these three :;;everal acts had reference to
territory which included within its exterior limits the Nez
Perce lands now under consideration.
By a treaty between the United States and the Nez Perce
Indians concluded June 11, 1855, and ratified by the Senate
March 8, 1859, and proclaimed by the President April 29,
1859 (12 Stat., 957), large amounts are ceded, relinquished,
and conveyed by said Nez Perce tribe to the United States;
but there is reserved from the lands so ceded, for the use
arid occupation of said tribe, and as a general reservation
for other friendly tribes and bands of Indians, a tract of
land which includes the lands at the mouth of the Lapwai,
under consideration.
And it is provided therein that no white man, excepting
those employed in the Indian Department, shall be permitted
to reside upon said reservation without the permission of the
tribe and the superintendent and agent.
The President is authorized to cause the whole or such
portions of such reservation as he may think proper to be
surveyed into lots, and assign the same to such individual
Indians as will locate on the same as permanent homes.
No reference is made in the treaty to any mission lands,
but a tract occupied by William Craig is saved to him from
the reservation.
June 9, 1863, another treaty was concluded between said
parties, which was ratified April 17, 1867, and proclaimed
by the President April 20, 1867, whereby the tribes relinquished a large portion of the lands before reserved, and
whereby" The United States agree to reserve for a home and for the
sole use and occupation of said tribe the tract of land included within the following boundaries, to wit, etc.," setting
forth a description which includes in the reservation the
lands under consideration.
White men are excluded from the reservation, as under the
former treaty. Under article 3, lots of 20 acres each maybe
allotted to certain members of the tribe for permanent homes,
and the residue is to be held in common for the sole use and
benefit of the Indians.
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No reference is made in this treaty to any mission lands,
but it is agreed that a piece of land theretofore given to
Robert Newell by the chiefs of the tribe, and included within
the reservation boundaries, shall be confirmed and patented
~hlm.

·

By the amendatory treaty concluded August 13, 1868, and
proclaimed February 24, 1869 (15 Stat., 693), further provisions for allotment are agreed upon and set forth, but no mention is made of any mission lands.
The American Board of Commissioners of Foreign Missions
sought to acquire possession of the property by action at
law, in 1868, against the United States Indian agent. Langford, attorney for the board, acquired title by deed from the
boar d in the same year, and was put in possession by order
of court, but was soon after ousted by advice of AttorneyGeneral Williams.
Langford's title has been under consideration by two
Attorneys-General-by Mr. Williams in 1875 (14 Opin., 588),
and by Mr. Brewster in 1882 (17 Opin., 306).
Mr. Williams's conclusion was stated as follows (14 Opin.,
572):
"Thus it would seem that the title imparted by the acts
1 48 and 1853 was at that period, and has ev.er since continued to be, subject to the Indian right of occupancy in
said tribe, the enjoyment of wliich right, moreover, is
a ' urecl thereto by the Government by solemn treaty stipulation ' . Such being the case, it can not be doubted that,
until thi Indian right is extinguished, the holder of said
title ha no right, merely by virtue of that title, to enter
upon ancl take po , e . ion of the premi es."
~Ir. Brew ter' opinion is ummarized in his own word ,
a: follow :
1
I am cl arly of the opinion that Langford ha no uch
p . . ry int r ·tin the land in que tion as would warrant
h lut rior D partm nt in a •cepting the propo i comproWll n tll N z erce tribe cedes the land in
nit cl tc te it would eem that they would
n fit of Lano-for land hi h irs.

e

t i th

imple.
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Surrounding circumstances would support strong·Jy the contention that by the statute it was only intended to make
lawful, as far as the United States was concerned, the occupation of this land as a mission for civilizing purposes. Such
purposes could only exist while the Indians occupied the same
country, and upon the abandonment of this land by them it
might well be presumed to have been the congressional intention that the title of the mission should end. However, it is
not necessary to consider this question at length; because
even on the theory that a fee passed by the grant to the
Board of Missions, it was subject to the Indian right of occupancy, and that right, for reasons presently to be stated, is
quite Rufficient to render the fee nothing but a baked title,
even after allotment of the land to the members of the Indian
tribes under the act of 1887. (24 Stat., 388.) Tha,t act
authorizes the President to allot in severalty to the individuals of any tribe or band of Indians, which has been or
shall hereafter be located upon any reservation created for
tlleir use by treaty, act of Congress, or executive order, the
reservation or any part thereof. Section 5 of the act provides that upon approval of the allotments, the Secretary of
the Interior shall cause patents to issue therefor in the name
of the allottees "which patents shall be of legal effect, and
declare that the United States does and will hold the land
thus allotted for the period of twenty-five years in trust for
the sole use and benefit of the Indian to whom such allot- ·
· ment shall have been made, or, in case of his decease, of his
heirs, according to the laws of the State or Territory where
such land is located, and that at the expiration of such period
the United States will convey tlle same by patent to said
Indian, or his heirs as aforesaid, in fee, discharged of said
trust and free of all charge or incumbrance whatsoever."
The section further avoids all conveyances or contracts to
convey in respect to such allotted lands made prior to the
expiration of the twenty-five years during which the allotments are held in trust by the United States.
The exact question presented is whether allotments can be
made to individual Nez Perces of the land in question ·without giving Langford the right of possession and ownership
under his deed from the Board of Missions. His title is that
of the U11ited States subject to the Indian right of occu-

48

HON. W. H. TAFT.
Allotment of Land to Individual Indians.

pancy. What is the Indian right of occupancy! It is the
right to enjoy the land forever with the right of alienation
limited to one alience, the United States, or to such persons
as the United States, in its capacity of guardian over the
Indians, may permit.
The guardianship which the United States exercises over
the Indian is an attribute of its sovereignty over the territory within its limits. Congress will not be presumed, by a mere grant of land, to have conveyed away such sovereignty.
By the confirmation of title in the act of 1853 nothing but
the proprietary interest of the Government in the mission
land passed, and that interest was entirely subject to the
Indian right of occupancy as it might develop under the
sovereign guardianship of the nation. This would be true
in the absence of any express reservation of such sovereign
guardianship, but in the present case, as we have seen, in
the very statute under which Langford's claim arises, the
organic act of Washington (10 Stat., 172) there is an express
provision that nothing in the act shall be construed to affect
the authority of the United S~ates to make any regulation
respecting the Indians of said Territory, their lands, prop~rty, or other rights by treaty, law, or otherwise, which it
would have been competent for the Government to make if the
act had never been passed. The whole policy of the Government has been directed to civilizing the Indians under its
pupilage. No greater step can be taken toward their civilization than the allotment of the soil to them in severalty, ·
whereby the independence, the sense of responsibility, and
the thrift ineident to the right of private property are an
developed with abiding results. Allotments in severalty of
Indian land are, therefore, naturally evolved from the Indian
right of o upancy, a fact which i made apparent from the
provL ion for allotment in the treaties of 1855, 1863, and
1 69, ref 1T d to above, with the every Indian . A right
t land which i ubject to the Indian right of oc upancy i
, ubj ct, th r fi r , to th po ibility and probability of the
Judi. n ' r a hing uch a , tate of civilization a to make
n · . :ary an all tment of bat right.
Th m r pc rtiti 11 of th ndiaJl rio-bt of ccupaucy amon oth m ·m r. f th • trib i n m re n injury to Lan fi rd
titl t th ultimat fi if he in fa t ha any uch title, than
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the partition of a life estate among cotenants would be an
injury to the sole reversioner. · Whether the conferring upou.
the allottee the power of unlimited alienation after twentyfive years of occupation in severalty· would b~ an infringe- .
ment of the rights of the holder of the ultimate fee, is a question which is not decided, because it does not now arise.
Suffice it to say, that a mere allotment under the .allotment
act of 1887 will not in any way strengthen· Langford's claim
to immediate possession.
Very respectfully,
WM. H. TAFT,
Solicitor- General.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE INTERIOR.
Approved:
W. H. H. MILLER·.
COSTS OF SUITS.

I

The words "costs of suits" in the appropriation act of the NavyDepartrueut passed June 30, 1890, chapter 640, relate to the ordinary taxed
costs of suHs and not to fees of counsel. Accordingly the fee of the
United States attorney for &el'vices in defending suits brought against
certain naval officers for acts done by them in obedience to the orders
of the Navy Department can not be paid out of that appropriation,
but must be fixed by the Attorney-General and paid out of the l:lppropriations for the payment of such special compensation as may be
fixed by the Attorney-General for servfces not· covered by salaries or
fees.
DEPARTMEN'.J; OF JUSTICE,

March 26, 1891.
Sm: In reply to your request, through Judge-AdvocateGenera1 Remey, for an opinion as to whether Mr. John T.
Carey, late United States attorney for the Northern District
of California, may be lawfully paid out of the appropriation
for "costs of suits" in the act of June 30, 1890 (Pamphlet
Laws, 1889-'90, p. 189), making appropriations for the naval
service for the :fiscal year ending June 30, 1891, and for
other purposes, for services rendered by direction of the
Attorney-General as counsel in defending suits brought
against certain naval officers for acts done by them in obedience to the orders of the Navy Department, I beg to say
5687-V0L 20--4
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that in my opfaion the appropriation referred to relates to
the ordinary taxed costs of suits and not to fees of counsel.
These must be fixed by the Attorney-General and paid out
of the appropriation for the payment of such special compensation as may be fixed by the Attorney-General for services not covered by salary or fees. (Pamphlet Laws, 1889'90, p. 409.)
The authority of the Attorney-General or Department of
Justice to employ and pay United States attorneys for services not covered by their salaries and fees is expressly recognized by Congress in section 3 of the act of June 30, 1874
(18 Stat., 109), and section 299 Revised Statutes, and the
annual appropriation made by Congress for that purpose.
Very respectfully, yours,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE NAVY•

.A.TTORNEY-GENER.A.L.
The Attorney-General is not authorized by law to respond by an official
opinion as to a question of law not arising in the Department from
which the inquiry is sent or as to one not shown to be pending and
of present executive consequence.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 27, 1891.
Sm: I have received your communication of the 4th
instant, calling for my opinion as to the prop·er construction
of that clau~e of the pen, ion appropriation act of March 1,
1889 (25 Stat., 782), which reads as follows:
"And the amount which may have accrued on the pension
of any pen ioner subsequent to the last quarterly payment
on account thereof, and prior to the death of such pensioner,
hall, in the ca e of a husband, be paid to his widow, or if
tllere be no widow, to his surviving children or the guardian
ther of, and in ca e of a widow to her minor children."
The reci e que tion submitted is, whether the words
"min r hil ren," as u ed, may include minor children who
ve 16 ar of age.
hown by an in lo ure tran mitted by you that March
29, 1
, the Com.mi ioner of Pensions ruled that "Minor
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children as contemplated by this act are minors recognized
as such by the lex loci," which ruling was approved by the
Secretary of the Interior.
By another inclosure it appears that the .Assistant Secretary of the Interior, in the case of the appeal of Lewis Brooks,
minor, held, October 2, 1890, that the said words '' minor
children" are used in the act of March 1, 1889, to designate
children under 16 years of age and no others.
I_t thus appears that the question you submit arose in and
bas been acted upon by the officers of the Department of the
Interior.
It becomes necessary for me to say that the law does not
authorize me to render an opini_on in such a case; the controlling enactment of the Revised Statutes is as follows:
SEC. 356. "The head of any Executive Department may
require the opinion of the .Attorney-Genera] on any questions
of law arising in the administration of his Department."
It is manifest that the question to which you call my attention arose in the Department of the Interior.
While the concluding portion of the letter from the Second
Comptroller which you inclose suggests that a decision of the
question raised may be of service to the accou~ting officers
of your Department, no actual case is stated to exist that
awaits action, or concerning which my opinion is desired.
I am not authorized by statute or precedent to respond by
an official opinion as to a q_uestion of law not arising in the
Department from which the inquiry is sent, or as to one not
shown to be pending and of present executive consequence.
Very respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

SEAL FISHERIES-RENTAL.
It is within the power of the Secretary of the Treasury under the existing lease by the United States to the North America Commercial Company of the right of taking fur-seal skins on the islands of St. Paul
and St. George, Alaska, to make a reduction of the yearly rental for
the year ending May 1, 1891, proportionate to the reduction made by
him below the limit named in the lease of the number of seals which
Raid company has been permitted to kill on these islands.
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DEPA.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 27, 189L
Sm: By letter of March 20 you ask the opinion of the
Attorney-General upon the question whether it is within the
power of the Secretary of the Treasury, under the present
existing lease by the United States to the North American
Commercial Company, of the right of taki11g· fur-seal skins
on the islands of St. Paul and St. George, Alaska, to make
a reduction of the yearly rent for the year ending May 1,
1891, proportionate to the reduction made by him, below the
limit named in the lease, of the number of seals which said
<!ompany has been permitted to kill on those islands.
The power of the Secretary of the Treasury with reference to the seal :fisheries and tb.e leasing of the same is conferred by sections 1960 to 1971 inclusive, and by an act dated
March 24, 1874 (18 Stats., 24), in which he is authorized to
designate the months in which fur seals may be taken for
their skins on the islands of St. Paul and St. George, in
Alaska, and in the waters adjacent thereto, and the number
to be taken on or about each island respectively. Section
1962 of the Revised Statutes provides that for the period of
twenty years from July 1, 1870, the number of fur seals to
be killed on the two islands leased shall be limited to 100,000,
and then continues:
''But" the Secretary of the Treasury may limit the right of
killing, if it becomes necessary for the preservation of such
seal , with such proportionate reduction of the rents reserved
to the Gov rnment as may be proper."
No question can be made but that this exception was
written into the :first lease made by the Alaska Commercial
C mpanyfor the twentyyears from July 1, 1870, and that the
ecretary of the Treasury wa given power under that lease
in reducing the number of eal kiUed to make such proporti nate reduction of rent as might eem to him just and
prop r. It wa, , though not ex pre. ed, a binding term of the
1 a e. Th ~ tion of the Revi ed Statutes to which referen · i, mad a ove are merely ~ r vi ion of the act of July
1, 1 7 (lG ~ ' tat . 1 0). The change in th Revised Statutes
in th le uguag and order of tb
e tion was made nece ' aI"
th fa t that the Re i ed tatutes were enacted after ·
T
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the first lease had been executed, while the act of 1870 was
passed to authorize 'the first lease, and before it was executed. Looking at the Revised Statutes alone, section 1963
leaves it somewhat doubtful whether the Secretary of the
Treasury is authorized to make a lease similar in all respects
to the one which expired on the 1st of July, 1890. The language is:
" When the lease heretofore made by the Secretary of the
Treasury to the Alaska Commercial Company of the right to
engage in taking fur seals in the islands of St- Paul and St.
George, pursuant to the act of July ;first, eighteen hundred
and seventy, chapter one hundred and eighty-nine, or when
any future similar lease expires, or is surrendered, forfeited,
or terminated, the Secretary 9f the Treasury shall lease to
proper and respousible parties to the best advantage of the
United Statesf' etc.
·
The section then goes on to state the interests which the
Secretary shall subserve and protect in the making of the
lease, and fixes an annual rent of not less than $50,000, to be
secured by deposit of United States bonds. It will be found,
upon a comparison of the act of July 1, 1870, w.ith section
1963, Revised Statutes et seq., that the requirements for the
lease of 1870, under the act of that year, are in all respects
similar to those expressed in the Revised Statutes for the
lease of 1890. Section 5 of the act of 1870 provides that''At the expiration of said term of twenty years (that
is, July 1, 1890), or on surrender or forfeiture of any lease,
other leases may be made in manner as aforesaid for other
terms of twenty years, "
showing conclusively that it was the intention of Congress
in the act of 1870-an intention presumably not departed
from in the reenactment of that law :in the Revised Statutes-that the Secretary of the Treasury should have power
to make a lease similar in all respects to that made on the
1st of July, 18 70. As has been said, the authority of the
Secretary of the Treasury to restrict and limit the right of
killing under section 1962, witp. the power of making a proportionate reduction of the rents reserved to the Government, was in effect a provision as to what the lease of date
July 1, 1870, should contain. The provision of section 1963,
as explained by reference to section 5 of the act of 1870,
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empowers th~ Secretary of the Treasury to enter into a similar lease July 1, 1890, and therefore implies that the term
contained in section 1962 as to the proportionate reduction
of the rents should be likewise in the same manner, either
expressly or by implication, a term in every succeeding lease.
It follows, therefore, that the question put by you to the
.Attorney-General should be answered in the a~rmative.
Very respectfully,
WM. H. TAFT,
Solicitor-General.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

Approved:

W. H. H. MILLER.
APPROPRIATION FOR PUBLIC BUILDINGS.
The clause in the sundry civil act of 1882, chapter 433, providing that
no act passed authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase a
site and erect a public building thereon shall be held and construed
to appropriate money unless the act in express language makes such
appropriation, although a proviso in an appropriation law is so general in its language as to affect all future legislation.
The act of March 3, 1891, chapter 527, providing for the erection of a.
publi c bnilding at Philadelphia, in the State of Pennsylvania, constrned in the light of the ·above statute and of its own parliamentary
history not to carry an appropriation, although its language taken
alone would probably carry an appropriation by implication.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 28, 1891.
Sm: By letter of the 7th instant you invited the attention
of the Attorney-General to an act of Congress, approved
March 3, 1 91, entitled "An act to provide for the purcha e
of a ite and the erection of a public building thereon at
hilad lphia, in the State of Penusylvania," and requested
hi piuion "wh th r or not the said bill carries the approric ti n f ~ 0
00 mentioned ther in for the purcha e of
th ' ite nau1 (l h1 th bill apd th erection of a building
th r n.
u in 1 . d a ·opy of th act, the important part
of whi h fi r thi i.- ·u ion j , a f 1low :
: 'I ha t th
r tary f th Tr a ury be, and he i hereby,
t d to acquire, by purcha e, condemna-
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tion, or otherwise, a site and cause to be erected thereon a
suitable building, including :fireproof vaults, heating and
ventilating apparatus, elevators and approaches, for the use
and accommodation of the United States Mint, in the city
of Philadelphia and State of Pennsylvania, the cost of said
site and building, including said vaults, heating and ventilating apparatus, elevators, and approaches, complete, not
to exceed the sum of two million dollars.
"So much of the appropriation as may be necessary to
defray traveling expenses and other expenses incident to
the selection of the site, and for necessary survey thereqf,
shall be immediately available.
'' So much of said appropriation as may be necessary for
the preparations of sketch-plans, drawings, specifications,
and detailed estimates for the building by the Supervising
Architect of the Treasury Department shall be available
immediately upon the selection of the site by the Secretary
of the Treasury.
"No money appropriated shall be available, except as hereinbefore provided, until a valid title to the site for said building shall be vested in the United States, nor until the State
of Pennsylvania shall have ceded to the United States
exclusive jurisdiction over the same, during the time the
United States shall be or rerµain the owner thereof, for all
purposes except the administration of the criminal laws of
said State and the service of civil process therein.
'' After the said site shall have been paid for, and the
sketch-plans and detailed drawings for the building shall
have been prepared by the Supervising i\.rchitect, and
approved by the Secretary of the Treasury and Director of
the Mint, the balance of appropriation shall be available for
the erection and completion of the building, including fireproof vaults, heating and ventilating apparatus, elevators,
and approaches, and such balance of the appropriation as
may remain available after the building shall have been completed shall be applied to and used in the purchase of apparatus for the purposes of the mint."
In my opinion no money is appropriated by this act for the
purposes therein mentioned. Its language, just quoted, if
taken alone, would probably by implication carry an appropriation; but when we consider it in connection with the rule
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of construction laid down in the section of the sundry civil
act of .August 7, 1882 (22 Stat., 305), referred · to by yon,
together with the ·parliamentary history of this act, and
others of the same· character· passed by the same Congress,
it "is impossible to escape the conclusion that Congress did
not intend, by the language above quoted, to take the sum of
money therein mentioned out of the Treasury. The section
in the sundry civil act of 1882 is as follows:
'' Provided, That no act passed authorizing the Secretary
of the Treasury to purchase a site and erect a public building thereo.n, shall be held and construed to appropriate money,
unless the act in express language makes such appropriation."
Though this is a proviso in an appropriation bill, its language is so general as to affect all future legislation. The
act under consideration, therefore, must contain an express
appropriation of money. There certai11ly is no express appropriation of $2,000,000. There is a reference in the second
paragraph of the act to an appropriation. In the third paragraph the reference is repeated, with the words "said appropriation." The word "approp.riated '' occurs in the fourth
paragraph, and "balance of the appropriation" twice in the
:fifth. It would be natural to refer these words to the express
authority conferred on the Secretary of the Trea ury in the
fir t paragraph, to acquire by purchase, condemnation, or
otherwi, e a site, and to cause to be erected thereon a suitable
building not to exceed the sum of $2,000,000, and to give to
that authority the effect of an appropriation. Such a construction, however, would. be au appropriation by implication, forbidden by the section of the sundry civil act of 1882,
quoted above.
The parliamentary history of the act will show that the
w rd "appropriation" and "appropriated," wherever they
o ur iu the act, mu t have reference to a future appropriati n to
ma e in another act, and mu t be con trued to
limi th x nditure under uch appropriation. It appears
th t u ay 2, 1 90 ( on T ·ional Record, vol. 21, part 5,
p. 1"' - ) bill (
57) t provide for the purcha e of a
th
i n of a publb uilding thei:: n, at Philatat;e of Penn ylvania, wa introduc d by
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Mr. Bingham, was read twice, and referred to the Committee
on Public Buildings and Grounds. On June 5, 1890 (Congressional Record, vol. 21, · part 6, p. 5670), Mr. Darlington,
from the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds,
reported this bill with amendments, and it was committed to
the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the
Union, and ordered to be printed. The bill as originally
introduced by Mr. Bingham was exactly like the act under
consideration, except that at the end of the :first paragraph
were .t he following words: "Which said sum of two million
dollars i~ hereby appropriated for said purpose out of any
moneys in the United States Treasury not otherwise appropriated," and that in the fourth paragraph, after the words
''no money appropliated," were the words "by·this act," and
in the fifth para·g raph, before the word '' appropriation,'' as it
occurs twice t.herein, was the word " said." The bill as
reported back by the C(?mmittee was accompanied by a report
(Report No. 2326), which recommended the passage of the
. bill with the following amendments: "In line twelve, strike
out all after the word 'dollars' down :to and · including line
fifteen, which is the appropriat·ing clause. In line twenty-six,
strike out the words 'by this act.' In line thirty-eight strike
out the word 'said.' In line forty-one, strike out the word
'said."' Nothing else was done with the bill in the :first session. On February 19, 1891, Mr. Spooner, for Mr. Cameron,
introduced in the Senate a bill exa'1tly in the words of the
qill which we have followed in the House, as amended by the
Committee on Public "2uildings. The bill was referred in the
Senate to the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds,
and on February 26, 1891, was reported back and passed.
February 28, 1891, in the House the Senate bill was read
twice and referred to the Committee on Public Buildings
and Grounds, by whom, on the same day, it was reported
with the recommendation that, as it was identical with the
House bill, it be taken as a substitute for the same and
passed (H. R. 4025). It was passed in this form, and was
approved on March 3, 1891. The Senate bill is the same bill
as the amended House bil1, and was introduced as an original
bill in the Senate merely to facilitate its passage. The
history of the House bill must, therefore, affect the construe-
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tion of the Senate bill which :finally became the law. The
amendments to the original House bill conclusively e&tablish the intention on the part of Congress to eliminate the
appropriation.
A reference to the· Congressional Record, volume 21, part
5, pages 2040 to 2049, will disclose an extended debate as to
the policy to be pursued by the House of Representatives on
bills for the erection of public buildings, and will throw light
on the purpose of the House Committee on Public Buildings
and Grounds in striking out the appropriating clause in the
bill under discussion. It will there be found that the conclusion reached was that no public-building bill should be
allowed to pass containing an appropriation; that the matter
of appropriations for the buildings whose construction was
authorized should be left to the Appropriations Committee,
to be included in the sundry civil bill. The Senate concurred in that plan, as will be found by reference to the Congressional Record, volume 21, part 5, pages 4188 and 4189,
where, in discussion over the passage of a bill authorizing
the erection of a public building at Lima, Ohio, Mr. Payne,
in support of his amendment to the bill striking out the
appropriating clause, in answer to Mr. Sherman's remark
that "the words of appropriation ought to be left in," said:
"No; the committee of conference have ageed, on the demand of the other House, to strike out all the appropriations
in public-building bills, and all the bills that go to the House
are amended in that way." Mr. Sherman: "And providing
for the appropriations in a separate general bill f"
Many of the public-building bills passed by the Fifty-first
Congre were prepared with an appropriating clause, and
when thi was stricken out, in accordance with the policy
ju t adverted to, care was not always taken to strike out
al o, in ub ·equent clan es of the same bills, refereuces to
the eliminated appropriation. These clauses usually :fixed
tb time at which part of the appropriation should become
available. The only effect which can be properly given to
u h refi rence in public-building acts is to make them
ap ly t appr priation for the purpo e of carrying out the
a t to be thereafter 'made. .
n ideration of other bills pa ed by thi same Congre for the erection of public building , in connection with
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the appropriations therefor in the sundry civil bill, leaves
no doubt of the correctness of this construction. On page
66 of the Pamphlet Laws of the first session Fifty-first
Congress is an act authorizing the construction of a public
building at Baton Rouge, La. The third clause of that bill
is:
"So much of the appropriation herein made as may be
necessary to defray the expenses of advertising for proposals,
etc., shall be immediately available."
The third clause is :
'' So much of said appropriation as may be necessary for
the preparation, etc., shall be available immediately upon
the report of .the commissioners selecting the site."
Other clauses of a similar character follow. Nevertheless,
we find on page 371 of the sundry civil act for the same year
an appropriation "for post-office at Baton Rouge, Louisiana;
for purchase of siteandcomme11ccrnentof building unde:r present limit, thirty thousand . <l.ollal's." It would be absurd to
contend that the bill authorizing the construction and fixing the limit of $100,000 contained an appropriation of that
amount, and that this appropriation of $30,000 in the sundry civil bill was in addition thereto. The two acts are only
to be reconciled, therefore, on the theory that the first was
not intended to carry an appropriation: as its parliamentary
history will show, and that the reference to the appropriation made in the original act must be given effect by applying it to the appropriation under the sundry civil bill. The
same thing is true of the acts authorizing the construction
of public buildings at Martinsburg (Pamphlet Laws, Fiftyfirst Congress, first session, 127), at Lafayette, Ind., and at
Burlington, Iowa, by the same Congress (Pamphlet Laws,
pp. 111 and 107), appropriations for which will be found in
the sundry civil act in the same volume (p. 371 et seq.) of
the Pamphlet Laws.
The conc:usion necessarily is, then, that there is no appropriation in the act now in question. The fact that Congress
failed in the sundry civil appropriation act of 1891 to make
any appropriation to which the language in this act can
apply is not material.
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. The presumption arising therefrom must be that the Fiftyfirst Congress deemed it wise to delay the time for carrying
out the act until a future Congress should make an appro,p riation therefor.
Very respectfully,
WM. H. TAFT,
Solicitor-General.

The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
Approved:

W. H. H. MILLER.
ACTUAL BONA l!""IDE RESIDENCE.
A general rule applicable to all cases can not be formulated as to what
constitutes bona :fide residence under the act making, among other
things, appropriation for expenses of Civil Service Commission, passed
July 11, 1890, chapter 667. The purpose of the proviso of that paragraph of that act was to discriminate against persons who claim the
benefit of such citizenship, and disclaim and fail to discharge any of
the obligations of such State residence and citizenship.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April l, 1891.
SIR: My opinion is asked as to the meaning of the words
"An actual and bona fide resident" as used in the proviso of
the paragraph of the act of Congress of July 11, 1890 (Pamphlet Laws, 1889-'90, p. 235), making an appropriation for the
expenses of the Civil Service Commission. The proviso is in
the following words:
"Provided, That hereafter every application for examination befo.r e the Civil Service Commission for appointment in
the departmental service in the District of Columbia shall be
accompanied by a certificate of an officer, with his official seal
attached, fth county and State of which the applicant claims
to be a citizen, that such applicant was, at the time of making uch app1i ation, an actual and bona fide resident of aid
unty, and had been uch re ident for a period of not le
than ix month next pr ceding; but this provi ion shall not
apply to p r n who may be in the ervice and eek promotion or ap in ment in other branche of the Government.
Ju t what on titu an actual bona fide residence is not
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always easy of determination. That a man may have an
actual bona fide residence in one place, and be bodily absent
therefrom for months and even years together, is certainly
true. That a Senator or Representative in Congress, or other
Government official, who leaves his home in one of the States
to live in the District of Columbia, or in a foreign country,
during his official term, and with the purpose, whenever bis
public employment ceases, of returning to his original home,
'is continuously an.actual bona fide resident at that home is
not doubted. Such a person is liable to all the burdens of
residence and citizenship at home. There he is liable to a
poll tax; there his personal property is assessed for taxation;
there he should be enrolled in the census; there in case of
war he would be liable to ~ilitary duty, and there in case of
death would be the administrati<;m of his estate-.
On the other hand, a person who leaves his home in one
of the States, and, with his family, makes a home and
engages in business, public or private, in the District of
Columbia, or elsewhere, denies his liability to enrollment for
any purpose at his former State home, is not there listed for
taiation, and recognizes no obligations of domicile there, is
certainly not an actual bona fide resident at that place within
the meaning of the statute under consideration. The fact
that such a person might still claim (a claim of very doubtful validity) the right to vote in the State from which be
came would not make him a proper applicant for the examination provided for in this section.
In my opinion it was the purpose of this act to discriminate aga,inst persons of the latter class-persons who claim
the benefit of State citizenship, and disclaim or fail to discharge any of the obligations of such State residence and
citizenship.
In brief, what constitutes actual bona fide residence under
this statute, as in other cases, is a mixed question oflaw and
fact to be determined in each instance upon its own peculiar
facts. A general rule applicable to all cases can not be formulated. The foregoing suggestions indicate the principle
to be applied.
Respectfully yours,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The PRESIDENT.
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SEAL FISHERIES-RENTAL-INTERPRETATION OF LEASE.
Where a lease to a company of the privilege of taking fur seals oncertain ii.lands contains an unconditional promise to pay $60,000 a year
rent and an express stipulation that the limit for the first year shall
be 60,000 seals, but the intention of both parties to the lease was
that 100,000 seals should remain the standard catch, and -that 60,000
named for the first year was meri>ly a reduction below the standard
catch, and it was mutually understood that the rental of $60,000 was
to be but sixth-tenths of $60,000 for the :first year, the Secretary of the
Treasury is authorized, without the intervention of the courts, to put
this construction upon the lease even if at variance with its strict legal
interpretation, and to regulate the payment of rent accordingly.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April, 1, 1891.

Srn: Y om· letter of the 28th ultimo referring to the opinion
heretofore rendered by this Department as to the proper
construction of certain portions of the law governing the
right to take fur seals on the islands of St. Paul and St.
George, in Alaska, is received. You state that, in one
respect, the question submitted by your Department was
mi 'apprehended; that you desire the opinion of the Attorney-General whetller or not it would be in violation of law to
reduce the yearly rent agreed to be paid by the North .American Commercial Company in proportion to the reduction of
the catch in any year below 100,000 seals, in view of the fact
that 100,000 has been from the beginning regarded as the
standard catch upon which all calculations have been based;
that your Department considers such reduction required by
tlle equities of the case and the understanding which prevailed wb n the lease wa made; and that the naming of
60,000 skin in the loo. e was intended only to make it clear
that, in accordance with the published call for proposals, a
full catch of 100,000 would not be permitted the fir t year.
The qne tion ubmitted involve the con truction of the
l a e with the North .American Company made July I,
1 90, a or y of which accompanied your first reque t for
an pini n. In an wer to that reque t, the pm10n was
e pr :. d that the featur of ection 1962 und r which the retary f th Trea ury wa given power to reduce the
r nt r erved under the lea e, dated July I, 1870, in pro-
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portion to. the reduction made by him in the limit of seals to
be killed below 100,000, was, by implication, a term of that
lease; and that, because under the law the subsequent lease,
dated July 1, 1800, was to be similar in its terms, the same
term was implied therein with respect to any reduction
below the limit of 60,000 seals which was named in the lease.
It was thought that as there was an unconditional promise
in the lease to pay $60,000 a year rent, and an express stipulation that the limit for the first year should be 60,000
seals, the two provisions could only be reconciled on the
theory that 60,000 was the standard catch on the basis of
which the lease was negotiated.
If, however, as you state, the intention of both parties to
the lease was that 100,000 seals should remain the standard
catch, and the 60,000 seals named for the first year's catch
was merely a reduction by the Secretary below the standard
catch, which was then mutually understood to have the effect
of reducing the rent for the first year to six-tenths of $60,000,
a court of equity would reform the lease to clearly express
these terms. You are authorized as the representative of
the United States, without the intervention of a court, to put
such construction upon the lease, even if at variance with its
strict legal interpretation, as will give effect to the common
intention of the lessor and lessee in executing the same. You
may, therefore, treat the standard catch as 100,000 seals and
regulate the payment of rent accordingly.
Very respectfully,
WM. H. TAFT,
Solicitor- General.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY •

.Approved:
W. H. H. MILLER.
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REVOCATION OF ORDER REVOKING A SELECTION FOR
APPOlNTMENT.
Where the head of a Department .revokes a selection for appointment
and advises the Civil Service Commission ol such revocation, it is not
permissible under civil service legislation and rules for him to revoke
his order revoking the selection for appointment, withdraw his notice
to the Commission of the revocation, and appoint the party previously
certified by the Commission and selected for appointment without
further certification. This is so, although through a misrepresentation a wrong has been done to the party s~lected for appointment.
Semble: There might be a remedy to the parties by the President, who
made the rules waiving them, to avoid injustice in the particular case.
DEPARTMENT OF JUS'.J.'ICE,

April 8, 1891.
Sm: You submit for an opinion the following statement
of facts with the question of law arising thereupon, sent to
you by the Civil Service Commission, namely:
"The name of Mrs. Lucie A. Brown, of North Carolina,
ha_v ing, on August 30, 1889, been entered upon the copyist
eligible register of that State as the result of an examination
taken by her, was duly certified on the 23d August, 1890,
with two other names from the same register, to the Secretary of the Treasury, in accordance with the provisions of
Departmental Rule VII, to enable him to make an appointment as a substitute clerk in Class A, at $600 per annum, in
the office of the Light-House Board. Mrs. Brown was selected
for appointment, aud a notice to this effect, requesting her
to report for duty not later than August 30, 1890, was sent
Augu t 25 to 'Miss' Lucie A. Brown, Greenville, N. C. No
re pon e being received to this notice, the Department on
September 4 notified -Mrs. Brown, by a communication
addres ed in the same manner, that, having failed to report for
duty a dire ted, her election for appointment was revoked,
and on the ame da,y ad vi ed this Commission to that effect,
tating that Miss A. S. R~ode , then erving as a substitute,
ha
en tran ferred to the place intended for 'Mis ' Brown,
.a th prin ipal for whom be, Mi
Rhodes, was serving
w ul r turn to duty. In the meantime, namely, on Augu t
30 :Mr . r wn' p riod of ligibility expired, and after that
<lat . h wa n t eligibl t b · r ifi d for any place.
' ' b c·ommnui ·ati n f th
cr tary of the Trea ury of
remailed from Gre u ville,
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N. 0., to her at '227 Indiana avenue, Washington City, D. C.,
and was received in this city, according to the postmark on
the euvelope, on November 30, 1890. The letter of September 4 was also forwarded to the same address in this city,
and probably reached here at the same time, although there
is no postmark to show the date of its arrival in Washington.
"On tlt~ 8th of December Mrs. Brown notified the Treasury
.Department by letter that she had received the uotice of
selection for appointment of August 25, and the uotice of
revocatioD; of September 4, stating that it was through no
fault of hers that she did not report for duty, as these papers
did not reach her until November 30, 1890, having been
detained somewhere, she was unable to say where, and asking for early consideration of the matter.
"Ou December 9 the Secretary of the Treasury, in making
requisition for a certification to ell'll,ble him to appoint a substitute clerk in the office of Internal Revenue, transmitted
the letter of Mrs. Brown of Decern ber 8 and the notices
referred to therein, and requested that if it could properly
be done Mrs. Brown's name be included among those to be
certified. Her name was not certified because, first, North
Carolina was not then in the order of appo.rtionment entitled
to an appointment; and, second, her period of eligibility had
expired.
"Since these occurrences took place the question has been
raised whether or not the Secretary of the Treasury may
now Jawfully revoke his order of September 4 revoking Mrs.
Brown's selection for appointment, withdraw his notice to
the Commission of this revocation, and appoint Mrs. Brown
to a place in the Treasury Department without further certification. On this question the Commission is divided in
opinion, and desires to have it submitted to the AttorneyGeneral for bis opinion therein, the facts being as stated, and
it beiug conceded that Mrs. Brown's failure to receive the
notice of her selection for appointment was not through any
fault or neglect on her part, but probably resulted from the
error of the Treasury Department in addressing the notice
to ''Miss" instead of Mrs. Lucie A. Brown, and the failure
of the postmaster at Greenville to forward the letter to Mrs.
Brown at her address in this city, which had been left with
him."
5687-V0L 20--5
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After the revocation by the Secretary of the Treasury of
his order selecting Mrs. Brown for the position to which Miss.
Rhodes was appointed, it seems clear that Mrs. Brown stood
in the same position as the other eligibles whose names were
certified with hers; like them she had been certified, but not
appointed.
The case of Mrs. Brown is a hard one, and strongly
appeals to the sympathy of the appointing power, and I
must acknowledge that I regret I can not say that, in my
opinion, the Secretary of the Treasury could repair the unintentional wrong done this lady by revoking his past action
to her prejudice, and appointing her to a position in the
classified departmental service.
But, in my judgment, there are weighty reasons why
such a course would be inadmissible under the civil-service
•
legislation and rules.
First, it might result in the appointment of a person
whose term of eligibility, under clause 10 of Departmental
Rule VI, had expired, as in fact is the case with Mrs. Brown;
secondly, it might result in giving the State to which the
appointee belonged more than its lawful quota of appointments, and such, we are informed, would be the result of
Mrs. Brown's appointment at this time; and, thirdly, it
might result in .t he appointment of a person over the heads
of others of higher standing on the same register, who e
name had been added since the appointee's name was certified and who would have been certified to the appointing
power, if the Commis ioners of the Civil Service had been
applied to for the usual certificate.
These rea._ ons are sufficient, in my judgment, to show that
Mr . Brown is not strictly eligible for appointment to the
cla 'ified departmental service without a new certification of
her name made on the application of the appointing power.
This lady has suffered through what seems to have been
the fault of the Government. It would eem that a remedy
mio-ht be furnLhed by the President, who made the rules, ·
wai ing them to avoid injustice in the particular case.
Very re pectfully yours,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The PRESIDENT.
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ROCK CREEK PARK-DUTY OF COMMISSION.
Where an act provides for the acquisition of land for a public park not
to exceed 2,000 acres, at a total cost not to exceed $1,200,000, and the
park commission appointed by the act has assessed the value of the
land proposeu to be taken at $830,000, but fears that it will be unable
to agree with all property-owners to accept its estimate of value, and
that if forced to institute condemnation proceedings the juclicial
assessment upon the lots not purchased by agreement may be so large
as to make the cost exceed the limit of the appropriation, it is still the
duty of the commission to perform its duty under the statute; and
should the judicial award and expenses of obtaining the land exceed
the limit of the appropriation, it will be in its power, exercising its
discretion, to pay for the land most to be desired, in view of the impossibility of acquiring all included in Hs map .
. DEP.A.R'rMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 10, 1891.
Sm: In obedience to your direction I beg to submit the
followfog views upon the letter of Gen. Casey, chairman of
the commission, for the purpose of establishing a public park
on Rock Creek, in the District of Columbia, under an act of
Congress passed September 17, 1890 ( Pamphlet Laws, p. 492),
in which he presents for your consideration a dilemma that
the commission anticipate as possible in the execution of the
act. Stated in brief, the difficulty is this:
The first section of the act ·directs the establishment of the
park, with the following proviso:
"Provided, That the whole tract so to be selected and
condemned under the provisions of this act shall not exceed
two thousand acres, nor the total cost thereof exceed the
amount of money herein appropriated."
The amount appropriated in the act for the payment of all
expenses, including the cost of the land, was $1,200,000.
The subsequent sections of the ~ct provide that the commission shall select the land for the park, and shall make an
accurate map of the same, with the names of the owners;
shall fix a just compensation for the various lots, to be
approved by the President; and that upon the filing of the
map in the public records of the District, the land so selected
shall be taken as condemnod for public purposes and the title
thereto vested in the United States, if the owners of the la11d
accept the compensation fixed. In the event that in thirty
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days after the filing of the map an agreement is not reached
with the owners for any of the lots in the map, it then becomes
the duty of the Uommissioners to institute proceedings in the
supreme court of the District of Columbia for an assessment
of the land selected arnl not purchased by agreement. The
land has been selected, the map prepared and filed, and the
compensation aggregates $830,000 as fixed by the Commissioners, being $350,000 below the limit fixed for the cost in
the act. The Commissioners fear that only part of the owners
of the land will agree to accept the compensation fixed by
them, with your approval; and that in order to acquire title
to the remainder they will be obliged to go into court, as in
the act provided, and that the judicial assessment upon the
lots not purchased by agreement m~y be so large as to bring
the entire cost of the land above the limit of the appropriation fixed in the act, and so violate the proviso of the first
section.
I do not see that the difficulty thus anticipated, which
may or may not be a real one when the assessment in court
is had, should prevent the commission from executing their
plain duty under the statute. So far as they are concerned,
and as far as their responsibility extends, the limit of cost
for the park by them select ed is very considerably under the
amount appropriated in the act. The third section contemplates that they shall fix a price to be approved by you on
each lot, and that if this shall be accepted by the lot owners
the purchase shall be made. There is no suggestion in the
language of the act that the purchase by agreement enjoined
upon the commission is to be conditional. The terms used
exclude any other idea than that of absolute purchase. The
provi ' O in the first section as to the acres to be purchased
i of cour e absolute. As to the payment of money it is also
al> olute, because no more than that appropriated in the act
can be paid. But it would be going too far to say that the
pr vi i such a condition precedent as to nullify all the
w rk of the comrnis ion, if it should turn out that by the
un · rtain a e · ment in the judicial proceedings the cost of
th lauu elect d houJd exceed $1,~0o,ooo. If it does, it
will require further ongre 'Siona! action. I am of the opini n that if the a e.· ·e<.l value of the land in the court proce ding ' excee s the limit, the commission may exercise its
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dis~retion to pay for that land which in their opinion is most
to be desired, in view of the impossibility of acquiring all
tbat they have included in their map. Whether the failure
to acquire all included in the map by reason of the limit of
tile appropriation would in validate the local assessments
upon adjoining lot owners, provided for in the ~ubsequent
sections of the act, is not a question mooted, and could not,
I think, affect the plain duty of the Commissioners in the
premises.
Very respectfully,
WM. H. TAFT,

Acting Attorney-General.
The PRESIDENT.
SUPERINTENDENT OF IMMIGRATION AND HIS ASSISTANTSSALARIES.
'l'he salaries of the Superintendent of Immigration and of his clerical
assistants authorized by section 7 of the act of March 3, 1891, chapter
551, may be paid by the Secretary of the Treasury out of the immigration fond created under section 1 of the act of August 3, 1882, chapter 376.
The salaries of the inspectors of immigration appointed under the second paragraph of sect.ion 8 of said act of 1891, may be paid in the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury out of the immigrant fund
or out of the immigration appropriation of the sundry civil act of 1891.
The power vested in the 5ecretary of the Treasury by section 2 of the
act of August 3, 1882, chapter 376, to contract with commissions, boards,
or other legal officers of immigration designated by the governor of any
State, is withdrawn by the provisions of said ~ct of March 3, 1891.
In so far as the later act is an amendment of the former the two acts are
to be construed together as one act, and one .Part is to be interpreted
by the other.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 15, 1891.
Sm: Your communications dated respectively March 28
and April 8, calling for my opinion upon specified questions
arising under the immigration and contract-labor laws, have
been received and considered.
The first question presented is, whether the salaries of the
Superintendent of Immigration, his chief clerk, and the two
clerk of class 1, authorized by section 7 of the act of March
3, 1891 (an act in amendment of the various acts, etc.), may
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be paid out of the '' immigration fund" created under section
1 of the act of August 3, 1882 (22 Stat., 214), entitled ''An
act to regulate immigratio11."
The second question is, as to what moneys or fund such
inspectors as may be appointed under the second paragraph
of section 8 of said act of 1891 shall be paid.
The third question is, whether the power to contract with
State cornmissfo11s, boards, or officers given by section 2 of
said act of August 3, 1882, is repealed by the provisions of
said act of 1891.
The act of August 3, 1882, provides as follows:
"There shall be levied; collected, and paid a duty of fifty
c011ts for each and every passenger not a citizen . of the
United States who shall come by steam or sail vessel from a
foreign port to any port within the U ni_ted States."
It is then enacted that"The money thus collected shall be paid into the United
State , Treasury, and sl.iall constitute a fund to be called the
immigrant fund, and shall be used, under the direction of
the Secretary of the Treasury, to defray the expense of regulating immigration under this act, and for the care of immigrants aniving in the United States, for the relief of such
as are in distress, and for the general purposes and expenses
of carrying this act into effect."
The duty imposed is made a lien, and a debt, and payment
thereof may be enforced.
Section 1 concludes with the following proviso:
'' Provided, ·That no greater sum shall be expended for the
purpose' herein before mentioned, at any port, than shall
have l>een collected at such port."
By ection 2 the Secretary of the Treasury is charged with
the duty of executing the prov1sions of the act and with
upervi ion over the business of immigration to the United
tat · :
ud for that purpose he shall have power to enter into
·ontract.· with such tate commi::,sion, board, or officers as
lllc Y be de. iguatecl for that purpose by the governor of any
tat to take charge of the local affairs of immigration in
th port. · within aid ~tate, and to provide for the support
and reli f f uch immigrants th erein landiug as may fall
or need public aid, under the rules and regula-
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tions to be prescribed by said Secretary," and such commission, board, or officers are authorized to board vessels and
examine passengers and to report any convict, lunatic, idiot,
or any person unable to take ca:re of himself or herself, to
the collector, and such person shall not be permitted to
land.
By section 3 the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized
to establish regulations and rules and issue instructions
"calculated to protect the United States and immigrants
coming into the United States from fraud and loss, and for
carrying out the provisions of this act and the immigration
laws of the United States."
Section 4 provides for the sending back of foreign convicts,
convicted of other than political offenses, at the expense of
the vessel owners.
The act of February 26, 1885 (23 Stat., 332), known as the
"Alien contract-labor act," applies to one class of immigrauts, to wit, to aliens who came under a contract made to
perform labor in the United States.
Section 1 pr-ohibits the assistance or encouragement of the
importation or immigration of aliens under any preexisting
contract or agreement, parol or special, express or implied,
to perform labor or service in this country.
Section 2 declares all such agreements with aliens hereafter made previous to their migration or importation to be
void.
Section 3 provides penalties to which those violating section 1 shall become liable.
Section 4 enacts the penalties that the master of a vessel
shall be subject to for knowingly bringing in any immigrant
who comes under contract to perform labor.
Section 5 provides saving clauses applicable in specified
cases.
The act of February 23, 1887 (24 Stat., 414), is an amendment ' to the last-mentioned act and adds several sections
thereto. By added section 6 the Secretary of the Treasury
is charged with the duty of executing the provisions of the
act, "and for that purpose he shall have power to enter into
contracts with such State commission, board, or officers as
may be designated," etc.; and such contractee shall examine
passengers arriving at any port in any vessel and report any
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passenger included in the p r ohibition in this act "to the collector of such port, and such persons shall not be permitted
to land."
By section 7 the Secret a ry of the Treasury is directed to
establish regulations and rules, and issue instructions to
carry out the provisions of th e act.
Section 8 provides fo r the return of prohibited persons to
the nations whence they ca me, which shall be done under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury.
The act of March 3, 1891 (Public-No. 152), manifestly
amends and supplements the above-mentioned laws.
The title is" An act in amendment t o the various acts relative to
immigration and the import ation of aliens under contract or
agreement to perform labor."
Section 1 excludes t he following classes from admission as
immigrants into the United States, viz:
''A.II idiots, insane persons, paupers, or persons likely to
become a public charge, per son s suffering from a loathsome
or a dangerous contagio ns <lisease, persons who have been
convicted of a felony or other infamous crime or misdemeanor
involving moral turpitude, p olygamist s, and also any person
who e ticket or passage is p aid for with the money of another
or who is assisted by oth ers to come, unless it is affirmatively and satisfactorily shown on special inquiry that such
per on does not belong to one of the foregoing excluded
cla e ~, or to the class of cont ract laborers excluded by the
act of February twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and eighty:five."

This exclusion is to be in a ccorda nce with the existing
act regnlating immigration, an d is in addition to the
Chin . e exclu ion, but is so li mited as not to prevent a pern living in the United States from sending for a relative
or friend who is n ot of the excluded classes; and it does not
ap1 ly to tbo e who are merely polit ical offenders.
cti n 3 provides, in substanceThat it hall be deemed a v iolation of s aid act of February
tw nty- i th, ighte n hundred and eio·hty-:five to assist or
b
'
nc urage th importation or migr a tion of a ny alien by
pr mi
f mploym nt through advertisements printed and
publi h l in any foreign country~ an d any alien coming to

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

73

Superintenclent of Immigration and his Assistants-Salaries .

this country in consequence of such an advertisement shall
be treated as coming under a contract as contemplated by
such act."
Section 4 restricts the solicitation and encouragement of
immigration by transportation companies and applies penalties therefor.
The seventh section of the act of 1891 is as follows:
"SEO. 7. That the office of Superintendent'of Immigration
is hereby created and established, and the President, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, is authorized and
directed to appoint such officer, whose salary shall be four
thousand dollars per annum, payable monthly. The Superintendent of Immigration shall be an officer in the Treasury
Department, under the control and supervision of the Secretary of the Treasury, to whom he shall make annual reports
in writing of the transactions of his office, together with such
special reports, in writing, as the Secretary of the Treasury
shall require. The Secretary shall provide the Snperintend-'
ent with a suitably furnished office in the city of Washington, and with such books of record and facilities for the
discharge of the duties of his office as may be necessary. He
shall have a chief clerk, at a salary of two thousand dollars
per annum, and two first-class clerks."
Section 8 provides for the reporting and examination of all
immigrants coming by water, before they are landed; during inspection they may be cared for by the Superintendent
and an adverse report by the inspection officers, as to the
right to land, "shall be final unless appeal be taken to the
Superintendent of Immigration, whose action shall be subject to review by the Secretary of the Treasury."
It is further enacted : ·
" That the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe rules
for inspection along the borders of Canada, British Columbia,
and Mexico, so as not to obstruct or unnecessarily delay,
impede, or annoy passengers in ordinary travel between
said countries: Provided, That not exceeding one inspector
shall be appointed for each customs district, and whose salary
shall not exceed twelve hundred dollars per year."
And said section concludes with the following paragraph:
'' All duties imposed and powers conferred by the second
section of the act of August third, eighteen hundred and
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eighty-two, upon State commissioners, boards, or officers
acting under contract with the Secretary of the Treasury
shall be performed and exercised, as occasion may arise, by
the inspection officers ·of the United States."
Sections 10 and 11 provide for the return of aliens unlawfully coming to the United States, at the expense of those
who brought them,' if that can be done; and if it can not be
so done, then at the expense of the United States.
It is established law that the United States has, in common with all independent nations, the right to exclude from
all territory within. the national boundaries such aliens and
foreigners as the law-making power sees fit, by proper enactment, to exclude.
An examination of the foregoing epitomes of the laws
under consideration leads to the conclusion that Congress
intended to exclude from this country certain specified
classes of immigrant s, and has enacted a system of laws
pre~cribing a procedure of exclusion.
These acts are to be considered together and, unless some
fatal defect be found, they are to be so construed as to
secure the result intended by their enactment and in the
manner that Congress intended.
In response to a communication received from your predecessor in office I had the honor of expressing my views upon
certain sections of the act of August 3, 1882 (19 Opin., 486),
and then held that the Secretary of the Treasury is not, confined to the agencies mentioned in sections 2 and 4 of that
act, and that he might adopt other appropriate means for
carrying out the objects of the statute.
It is also held in that opinion that the act places the primary responsibility for the execution of its provisions upon
the Secretary of tlie Treasury, and that the propriety of the
u e or employment of State commissions or boards is to be
determined by the Secretary as a matter of discretion only;
and, in conclusion, it is determined "that the Secretary is
not restricted in the carrying out of the provisions of this
act to the agencies mentioned in the second and fourth section ; that it is within his discretion whether he will use
th m or not."
By the act of February 23, 1887 (which amends the act of
18 5), the Secretary of the Treasury is charged with a similar
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duty as to the enforcement of the'' alien contract-labor"law,
and is given similar authority to contract with State commissions, boards, and officers, as appears in the act of 1882,
in relation to the immigr~nts there designated; and the same
primary responsibility and discretionary power must be held
to be his.
The capitation tax directed by the act of 1882 provides the
immigrant fund which goes into the Treasury and is to be
used under the direction of the Secretary. One use specified
is to defray the expense of regula.ting immigration under the
act; another use is for the general purposes and expenses of
carrying the act into effect. One of the specified purposes
of the act is to exclude every convict, lunatic, idiot, or person unable to take care of himself or herself. The act of
1885 excludes an additional class of immigrants. Tl.le act of
1887 amplifies the powers of the Secretary of the Treasury
and assimilates them to those given him under the act of
1882. 'rhe act of October 19, 1888 (25 Stat., 567), gives him
still further powers.
The sundry civil appropriation act of 1889 (25 Stat., 957)
indicates a Congressional const,ruction which links the immigration acts toge tu er, appropriating as follows:
"For the purpose of carrying i11to effect the provisions of
the alien contract-labor law approved February 26; 1885, as
amended by the acts approved February 23, 1887, and October 19, 1888, and to defray the expenses which the Secretary
of the Treasury is authorized to incur by the provisioi1s of
the last-named act, .fifty thousand dollars, or so much thereof
as may be neeessary, to be paid out of the 'immigrant fund'
provided for in the act of August second, i882, entitled 'An
act to regulate immigration.'"
Then follows the act of March 3, 1891, amending and
extending the acts which preceded it. In determining the
present state of the law it is necessary to consider the acts
together.
In so far as the later act is an amendment of the former,
they are to be construed together as one act, and one part is
to be interpreted by another. ( United States v. Central
Pacific R.R. Co., 118 U. S., 239, and cases cited.)
The enactment of 1882 provides the fund, subsequent legislation and executive application have recognized its gen-
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eral uses; the amending act of 1891 creates the office of
Superintendent of Immigration, authorizes an appointment
of the officer, fixes his salary, and provides three clerical
assistants.
The duties of the superintendent are not very clearly
defined, but he is constituted an officer of the Treasury
Department and is placed under the control and supervision
of the Secretary of the Treasury. The inference is ~10t only
fair but necessary that he is to aid and assist, under the
direction of the Secretary, in carrying the act of August 3,
1882, and the connected laws into effect.
The proviso in the act of 1882 "that no greater sum shall
be expended for the purposes hereinbefore mentioned, at any
port, than shall have been collected at such port," is a limitation upon the amount that may be expended at any port,
but does not constitute the fund a mere aggregation of local
funds or prohibit the expenditure of its moneys for other or
general purposes of carrying the act into effect. While the
act of 1891 (as well as the provision under which the present
immigrant inspectors have been appointed) lacks definiteness as to the appointment, yet, as the Secretary of the
Treasury is charged with the execution of the immigration
laws, and is required to enforce them, he is authorized to
employ the requisite means provided by Congress for so
doing, and it does not appear that he is restrained from
using either the moneys of the ''immigration fund" or those
of the $90,000 appropriated for immigration purposes by the
sunury civil act of 1891.
In my opinion the Superintendent of Immigration and his
clerical assistants may be p~id out of the "immigrant fuud"
created under section 1 of the act of August 3, 1882.
It is my opinion, also, that such inspectors as you may find
it neces ary to appoint to carry these laws into effect may be
paid, in your discretion, out of the immigrant fuud, or out of
the immigration appropriation of the sundry civil act of 1891.
I answer your third question by saying that, in my opinion,
the power to enter into new contracts with State commissions,
boards, or officers is withdrawn. It is evident that Congress
iutended to provide for the employment of immigration official who will be under the direct control of the Secreta,ry of
the Treasury. but their immediate employment is not required.
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It does not appear that the necessary inspection officers are
directly provided for by law, excepting in districts adjacent
to foreign contiguous territory, and I am advised that in those
districts no State contracts have been made.
Very respectfully,

W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

DUTY ON REFINED SUGAR IMPORTED SINCE APRIL 1, 1891.
Where ,refined sugar manufactured in this country from raw sugar imported under the tariff act of 1883 was exported before April 1, 1891,
with a drawback of the duties collected on the importation, and was
imported after April 1, 1891, the importation is subject to duty to the
full amount of the drawback allowed on the sugar on its exportatiem.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 17, 1891.
Sm: I have considered your request for an opinion as to
the rate of duty leviable on a certain importation since April
1, instant, of refined sugar manufactured in this country from
raw sugar imported under the tariff of 1883, and exported before April 1, 1891, with a drawback of the duties assessed and
collected on the importation.
It seems to me that there is no way of avoiding the conclusion that the said importation of sugar must pay duty to
the full amount of the drawback allowed on this sugar on its
exportation.
The first proviso of paragraph 493 (T. I.) of the act of October 1, 1890, declares '' that this paragraph shall not apply
to any article upon which an allowance of drawback has been
made, the reimportation of which is hereby prohibited, except
upon payment of duties equal to the drawbacks allowed, or
to any article manufactured in bonded warehouse and exported under any provision of law."
I do not see how it is possible, on any known rule of interpretation, to say that the drawback referred to in this proviso
means duties levied under the act of October 1, 1890, only,
and bas no reference to duties levied under the tariff act of
March 3, 1883. In my view, the language of the proviso is
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as applicable to duties levied under the one act as under the
other.
To restrict the proviso to duties levied under the act of
October 1, 1800, upon a supposed ground of inconvenience
or hal'dship, and thus deny the language of the proviso its
natural sense, would be, in my judgment, to introduce a
principle which would require the courts, in interpreting tariff
laws, to consider questions of expediency and political economy that are proper to be considered by Congress alone.
Because Congress bas, by the present tariff; admitted
refined sugar manufactured abroad at a half a cent per
pound, the inference is by no means a necessary one that it
was intended that refined sugar made in this country from
raw material imported under the tariff of 1883 and exported
with drawback and imported since April 1, 1891, should be
admitted at the same rate of duty. The conditions are not
the same in the two cases, and how can it be said, with certainty, that Congress must have intended to apply the same
rule to both cases~ The only safe course seems to be to
refrain from speculation as to possible legislative intent and
give the words of the law their ordinary meaning.
It is, furthermore, hardly reasonable to suppose that it
would have been left for the courts to restrict the meaning
of the proviso if Congress had intended that the language
used should not be taken as applicable to all exportations
with drawback. On the other hand, as several months were
to intervene between the enactment of this statute and the
date of its full effect, on the 1st of April, it may well have
seemed to Congress proper, by this proviso, to prevent the
manipulation of the market by exportations for drawback
with the purpose of reimportation after April 1. At any
rate, it i sufficient to say ita lex scripta est.
·
Respectfully, yours,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SEORET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

79

Insane Alien Immigrant,

INSANE ALIEN IMMIGRANT.
The Secretary of the Treai,mry is authorized to permit an insane alien
immigrant to land in this country upon receiving a satisfactory bond
that the immigrant will not become a public charge and that the
country shall be protecte<l. against loss by reason of her coming here.
(18 Opinions, 500, followed.)
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 29, 1891.

SIR: Your inquiry of yesterday calls for my opinion as to
whether Fannie Schinkin, an insane alien immigrant, aged
17 years, who arrived from a European port the 27th instant,
accompanied by her parents and brothers and sisters, may
be permitted to land.
You state that the relatives of the lunatic claim to be ahle
and willing to furnish a satisfactory bond as security that
the said lunatic shall never become a public charge. .
You ask whether you are authorized bylaw to accept such
a bond and permit the insane person to land.
By section 2 of "An act to regulate immigration," passed
August 3, 1882 (22 Stat., 214), it is provided -that alien passengers arriving at ports of the United States shall be examined.
"And if, on such examination, there shall be found among
such passengers any convict, lunatic, idiot, or any person
unable to take care of himself or herself without becoming
a public charge, they shall' report the same in writing to the
collector of the port, and such persons shall not be permitted to land."
Section 3 of said act is as follows:
"SEC. 3. That tlrn Secretary of the Treasury shall establish
such regulations and rules and issue from time to time such
instructions, not inconsistent with law, as be shall deem best
calculated to protect the United States aud immigrants into
the United States from fraud and loss, and for carrying out
the provisions of this act and the immigration laws of the
United States; and he shall prescribe all forms of bonds,
entries, and other papers to be used under and in the enforcement of the various provisions of this act."
The act of March 3, 1891, adds additional classes to the
excluded list, but provides that the exclusiou shall be "in

80

HON. W. H. H. MILLER.
Duties based upon Weight.

accordance with the existing acts regulating immigration,
other than those concerning Chinese immigration." It therefore follows that section 3 of the act of 1882 remains in force.
Under date of November 6, 1886, Mr. Attorney-General
Garland communicated to the Secretary of the Treasury his
opinion upon a case substantially similar to the one now
under consideration (18 Opin., 500). He there decides that
an alien residing in Brooklyn, N. Y., can be permitted t-0
bring his lunatic son from a foreign country upon engaging
in a satisfactory manner that the lunatic shall not become a.
public charge. It must be held that Congress was aware of
this construction put upon the law of l 882 when it enacted
that of 1891, and that it assented to that construction.
As the case submitted to me is presented, Fannie Schinkin is an insane person of tender years, who comes to this
country with her family, who come in good faith as immigrants.
I infer that all of the members of the family except this
unfortunate child are unobjectionable under the laws.
Under the existing circumstances, and until further Congressional legislation, I do not think that this person is
absolutely excluded from coming into the country.
Upon receiving a satisfactory bond that this person shall
not become a public charge, and that the country shal). be
protected against loss by reason of her coming here, and
upon a compliance with such rules and regulations as you
may make in the premises, you will, in my opinion, be authorized to permit her to land.
Very respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

DUTIES BASED UPON WEIGHT.
The second proviso in section 50 of the t ariff act of October 1, 1890, providing that when duties are based upon the weight of merchandise
depo ited in any public or bonded warehouse, said duties shall be
levied and coll!lctecl upon the weight of said merchandise at the time
of its withdrawal, applies to importations under the act generally
upon which duties are levied by law, and not merely to importatione
made prior to the taking effect of the act.
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While there is a general rule of construction to the effect that a proviso
is to be construed as limiting legislation to the subject-matter with
which it is immediately connected, this rule is by no means of universal application.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 4, 1891.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of the 28th ultimo, asking a construction of the second
proviso in section 50 of tbe tariff act of October 1, 1890.
That section reads as follows:
"That, on and after the day when this act shall go into
effect, all goods, wares, and merchandise previously imported
for which no entry has been made, and all goods, wares, and
merchandise previously entered without payment of duty,
and under bond for warehousing, transportation, or any
other purpose, for which no permit of delivery to the
importer or his agent has been issued, shall be subjected to
no other duty upon the entry or the withdrawal thereof than
if the same were imported respectively after that day:
Provided, That any imported merchandise deposited in bond
in any public or private bonded warehouse having been so
deposited prior to the first day of October, ejghteen hundred
and ninety, may be withdrawn for consumption at any time
prior to February first, eighteen hundred and ninety-one,
upon the payment of duties at the rates in force prior to the
passage of this act: Provided, further, That when duties are ·
based upon the weight of merchandise deposited in any
public or private bonded warehouse, said duties shall be
levied and collected upon the weight of such merchandise at
the time of its withdrawal."
The question submitted is whether the second proviso is
confined in its application to the subject-matter of the section
in which it is found, namely, importations made prior to the
taking effect of this act, or whether it applies to importations under the act generally, upon which duties are levied
according to weight. In my opinion the latter is the correct
construction. The language of the proviso is ge.ieral, and,
independently of the fact that it is found in section 50, a construction limiting it to the subject-matter of that section
would have no support. It is true there is a general rule of
construction to the effect that a proviso is to be construed
as limiting legislation to the subject matter with which it is
5687-VOL 20--6
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immediately connected; but this rule is by no means of uniyersal application. The enactment of general legislation by
Congress in provisos to acts relating to particular subjects
is not uncommon.
Thus, in the sundry civil act of August 7, 1882 (22 Stat,
L., 305), after a number of appropriations for the purchase
of sites for public buildings, we find the following:
"Provided, That no act passed authorizing the Secretary of
the Treasury to purchase a site and erect a public building
thereon shall be held and construed to appropriate money,
unless the act in express language makes such appropriation."
It is clear that this proviso is general, and not limited t.o
the appropriations in the act in which it is found. Other
provisos with similar effect might be cited. I am aware that
under former tariff acts the rule has been to levy duties upon
weighable merchandise according to the weight at the date
of importation, but this proviso seems to be intended to
change that rule, and there seems to be sufficient reason for
such change. To limit the effect of this proviso to the subject matter of section 50 would be to discriminate in favor of
importations made prior to the taking effect of this act as
against importations under the act. Such construction would
not only put prior importation~ upon an equality with importations under the act as to rate, but would give them _an
advantage in the matter of weight. Such intention is not to
be presumed.
Moreover~ there seems to be no reason why the duty should
not be levied according to the weight when the importation
is actually consummated by taking the goods out of bond
for consumption. During all the time the goods are held in
bond they are at the expense of the . importer; the interest
on the investment, the charges fo~ warehousing and insurance
are all paid by him, and no reason is apparent why he should
not b~ve the corresponding benefit, if there be a benefit,
~esultmg from the delay within the limits prescribed by law
m the final act of importation. At least legislation to that
end seem reasonable, and such appears to me to be the effect
of this proviso.
Re pectfully, yours,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.
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ARTIFICIAL LIMBS-COMMUTATION INTO MONEY.
An amendment of March 3, 1891, to section 4787 of the Revised Statutes

having provided that soldiers and seamen wounded in the rebellion,
who had been entitled to receive artificial limbs every five years, shall
now receive the same every three years, and a question having arisen
as to whether selltions 4788 and 4790 of the Revised Statutes providing
for a money commutation in place of said limb stood in the same
relation to the amended section 4787 as to the original section and
whether now such money commutation can be had every three years,
it is decided that it can be had.
The word "thereafter," now appearing in section 4787 of the ·Revised
Statutes refers not to July 17, 1870, but to the time when the artificial
limb shall have been furnished after that date; consequently the
periods of three years run from the time when such limb was furnished, and not from July 17, 1870.
DEP .A.R'l'MEN'l' OF JUS'.I.'ICE,

.
May 4, 1891.
Sm: Section 4787 of the Revised Statutes provides as follows:
"Every officer, soldier, seaman, and marine who was disabled during the war for the suppression of the rebellion, in
the military or naval service, and in the line of duty, or in
consequence of wounds received or disease contracted therein, and who was fu~nished by the War Department, since the
seventeenth day of June, eighteen hundred and seventy, with
an artificial limb or apparatus for resection, or who was entitled to receive such limb or apparatus since said date, shaJl
be entitled to receive a new limb or apparatus at the expiration of every five years thereafter, under such regulations as
have been or may be prescribed by the Surgeon-General of
the Army. (The provisions of this section shall apply to all
officers, noncommissioned officers, enlisted and hired men of
the land and naval forces of the United States who, in the
line of their duty as such, shall have lost limbs or sustained
bodily injuries depriving them of the use of any of their limbs,
to be determined by the Surgeon-General of the Army; and
tbe term of five years herein specified shall be held to commence in each case with the filing of the application for the
benefits of this section.)"
On March 3, 1891, Congress passed the following act,
amending section 4787, to wit:
'' Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of .America in Congress assembled, That
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section forty-seven hundred and eighty-seven of the Revi e.d
Statutes of the United States be amended by striking out
the word 'five' where it occurs therein, and inserting in
lieu thereof the word ' three,' so that when amended aid
sectfon will read as follows: Every officer, soldier, seaman,
and marine who was disabled during the war for the suppression of the rebellion in the military or naval service, and
in ~he line of duty, or in consequence of wourids received or
disease contracted therein, and who was furnished by the
War Department since the seventeenth day of June, eighteen
hundred and seventy, with an artificial limb or apparatus
for resection, who was entitled to receive such limb or apparatus since that date, shall be entitled to receive a new limb
or apparatus at the expiration of every three years thereafter
under such regulations as have been or may be prescribed
by the Surgeon-General of the .Army."
Section 4788 of the Revised Statutes provides as follow :
"Every person entitled to the benefits of the preceding
saction may, if he so elects, receive, instead of such limb or
apparatus, the money value thereof, at the following rat
namely: For artificial legs, seventy-five dollars; for arm ~,
fifty <lolk rs; for feet, fifty dollars; for apparatus for re ection, fifty dollars."
Section 4790 of the Revised Statutes provides as follow :
'' Every person in the military or naval service who lo 't a
limb during the war of the rebellion (or is entitled to the
benefits of section forty-seven hundred and eighty-seven)
but from the nature of his injury is not able to use an artificial limb, shall be eutitled to the benefits of section fortyseven hundred and eighty-eight, and shall receive mon
commutation as therein provided."
The following que tions, arising upon this legislation, hav
been ·ubmitted by you for an opinion, namely:
First. Whether sections 4788 and 4790 tand in the me
relation to section 4787, as amended, as they stood to tb
ection before the amendment. In other words, the que ti
is whether the commutation in money for an artificial limb
or apparatu can be claimed now every three years in t
of every five f
It em to me quite clear that ections 4788 and 4790 °'iv
the right to the commutation for artificial limbs or apparat
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upon the same terms as the right to artificial limbs or apparatus themselves is given by section 4787, as that section may
stan.d, at the time any application for commutation money is
made.
If this view be sound, it follows that, as an artificial limb
or apparatus is demandable under section 4787, as amended,
every thnee years, instead of every five, the money commutation for such limb or apparatus is also demandable every
three years.
The language of section 4788 compels this interpretation.
It declares that "every person entitled to the benefits of the
preceding section may, if he so elects, receive, instea.d of
suc.h limb or apparatus, the money value thereof, at the following rates," etc., by which it clearly appears that the
money value of the limb is demandable at whatever time the
limb itself is demandable. It can not be that Congress
intended that the limb should be demandable every three
years, but "the money value thereof'" every jive. years only.
·The words of the law will bear no such construction.
Second. The next question is, whether the said act of
March 3, 1891, is retrospective in its operation. In other
words, whether persons who have been drawing money commutation under section 4787 every five years are entitled,
under the section as amended, to have their commutation
computed for every three years since June 17, 1870, and to
demand the difference between the result of the calculation
on a basis of five years and that on a basis of three years.
This question grows out of a doubt as to the meaning of
the word "thereafter" in section 4787. The context in which
this word is found is as follows: "Every officer, soldier, seaman, and marine who was disabled * * * and who was
furnished by the War Department since the seventeenth day
of June, eighteen hundred and seventy, with an artificial
limb or apparatus for resection, * * * shall be entitled
to receive a new limb or apparatus at the expiration of every
three yea.r s thereafter, under such regulations," etc.
To my mind the wor.d "thereafter" has no :reference to
June 17, 1870, but refers to the time since that date when
any artificial limb or apparatus should have been furnished,
which time is to be the point from which are to be reckoned
the periods of three years. There is no ground in the la.w
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for the pretension that June 17, 1870, is the point from which
the periods of three years are to be reckoned. The law was
not intended to have a retrospective operation, for it says that
a new limb or apparatus shall be given " at the expiration of
every three years thereafter," which shows the legislative
purpose to have been to provide for periods of three years,
in the future, and not in the pa,st.
In my opinion every person who received an artificial limb
or apparatus three years ago is entitled to receive another
one now. Such is the necessary effect of substituting
''three" for "five" in the law amending section 4787.
This, I believe, disposes of the questions submitted.
Very respectfully, yours,
W. H. H. MILLER.

The

SECRE'.I.'ARY OF THE TREASURY.

SEALED CARS-REGULATIONS.
Section 3102 of the Revised Statutes gives to the Secretary of the Treasury power to impose similar regulations as to invoices for ca,rs sealed
in a contiguous foreign country as are imposed by the immediatetransportu.tion act of 1880, and an entry such as is required under the
immediate-transportation act may be required by regulation under
the anti-smuggling act.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

1lfay 4, 1 91.

Sm: Upon the 9th of March, 1891, Acting Secretary Nettleton ackno,Yledged receipt of an opinion of tbi. Department of the 13th of February, conceming the treatment of
m r ·ha,ndi e imported from contiguou ·ountries unrler con ular eal , wherein it wa held that the formal entry of uch
goot1 could not be requir d by the Secretary of the Trea ury in vi w of the provi. ion of the law relatiug to con ular
ealing. It wa . u 0 ·g . t d in that opinion that an examiuati n of the ood a t h fro11tier port mi rht be r .quired, howr 0 • lati n to that en l might be made and enforced
r tary.
ou n w u mi to th
th r gul i
eem n c ., ary to pre ent a re ur1' nc
of th frc u : ari in · un
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governing the importation of goods from Canada under consular seals. You say :
, "The danger to the revenue under the consular-sealing
system as at present enforced lies not only in the loose and
irresponsible manner of sealing ~ars and the preparation of
the manifests on foreign territory, but also in the mode of
transportation from ports on the frontier to points of destination in the United States by transportation companies
who are not required to give bonds by which proper responsibility to the United States can be secured. The immediatetransportation act of 1880, under which merchandise arriving from 'foreign countries is transported by bonded common
carriers from the port of first arrival to the port of destination without examination or appraisement, provides that an
entry, to which an oath is not required, shall be made at the
port of first arrival, with which shall be :filed the invoice
and the bill of lading, which entry must show the marks,
numbers, description of the paclrnges and contents, dutiable
value of each package and the estimated duty, upon the
filing of which the merchandise is allowed to be transferred
from the importing vessel to the cars without examination
or appraisement of the contents, each package being marked
with a label specially provided for the purpose· and which
shows the port of arrival, the importing vessel, the date of
arrival, the carrier, the date of shipment, and the name of
the inspector who supervises the transfer. The value of
the merchandise thus shipped is charged against the bond
of the common carrier. Separate manifests in .t riplicate
fully describing the goods are required for each car or other
vehicle, one copy to be sent by mail to the collector at port
of destination, one copy to accompany the car, and the third
copy to be retained on file in the custom-house at port of
departure. The cars must be locked with customs locks.
On arrival at the port of destination the conductor of the car
reports the fact that the goods have arrived to the chief customs officer and delivers the manifest to him. The collector
is required to compare this manifest with the entry and manifest received by mail and directs an inspector to take charge
of the car or vehicle, who reports the condition of the fastenin~, etc. Regular entry of the goods for warehouse or consumption, as in ordinary importations, may then be made by
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the consignee at the port of destination. Collectors are
required to report to the accounting officers of the Treasury
the goods shipped and received by them under the immediatetransportation act, and a comparison of these reports insures
proper accountability for the merchandise.
"~hese formalities are deemed necessary for the safety of
the reveuue with regard to merchandise shipped without
appraisement between ports in the United States, and proceedings of a similar character should, in my judgment, be
enforced as to merchandise arriving at frontier ports under
consular seal, if the Secretary of the Treasury has autl10rity
under the _proviso to section 3102, Revised Statutes, to prescribe such regulations.
"Your opinion on this point is respectfuliy requested."
I think that the regulations which you propose in the foregoing will be within your power, under · the proviso fo the
second section of the act to prevent smuggling. (Sec. 3102,
R. S.)
.A.s was stated in the opinion of the Department on this
subject, of February 13, 1891, already referred to, the proviso
of the second section "That nothing contaiued in this section sha,l l be construed to exempt such vessel, car, or vehicle,
or its contents, from such examination as may be necessary
and proper to prevent frauds upon the revenue and violation of this act," together with· the third section, which
provides"That the Secretary of the Treasury be, and he is hereby,
authorized and required to make such regulations, and from
time to time so to change the same as to him shall seem necesary and proper, for sealing such vessels, cars, and other
v hi ·le , when practicable, and for sea.ling, marking, and
id ntifying uch goods, ware , * * * and al o in regard
to invoice , ruanife t , and other pertinent papers, and their
aut.hentication," give to the. ecretaryoftheTreasuryplenary
p wer to make regulation to prevent fraud under the eali
y tern, having in view alway , of cour e, the intention
f , n r
that car an vehicl , eaI d a provided in the
a t hall
ubj t to a little detention a i con i tent with
uri fr m fraud .
nt in th fi rmer pinion that no formal entry
r tb act, had application only to uch
1

TO THE SECRETARY OF srATE.

89

World's Columbiltn Exposition-Contract-Lallor La,vs-SkiJled Foreign Experts.

entry as is made at the place of final importation for consumption or warehouse, and it was not thereby intended to
express the opinion that an entry such as is required under
the immediate transportation law might not be required by
regulation under the anti-smuggling act.
In my opinion, therefore, the regn lations suggested by. the
Acting Secretary in the letter to which this is an answer are
within your power to make and enforce.
Very respectfully,
W. R. H. MILLER.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

WORLD'S COLUMBIAN EXPOSITION-CON'l'RACT-LABOR
LAWS-SKILLED PO REIGN EXPERTS.
SkHled employes of foreign exhibitors at the World's Columbian Exposition, who come in good faith for the purpose of setting up and operating
the machinery of such exhibitors, are outside of and not subject to the
contract-labor laws of the United States.
A statute must not be construed so as to lead to an absurd conclusion.
DEP .A.R'l'MENT OF JUSTICE,

May 5, 1891.
SIR: In your communication of March 27 I am asked for
an official opinion as to the application of the contract-labor
laws to skilled experts who ma,y come from foreign countries
to aid foreign exhibitors in setting up and operating machinery to be brought to the United States and exhibited at the
World's Columbian Exposition.
The question to be considered is whether the act of February 26, 1885 (23 Stat., 332), or the acts of February 23, 1887
(24 Stat., 414), and October 19, 188!) (25 Stat., 566), amending
the same, prohibit foreign exhibitors from bringing their
experienced employes to set up and operate such machinery
for the purposes of such exhibition.
The intent of the contract-labor legislation is to protect the
laborers, mechanics, and artisans of the United States against
the competition of aliens brought or induced to come into
this country under contracts to perform labor or service.
It is sought to exclude hired alien competitors of American workmen, and to protect in their natural rights those
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who are, or who in the nature of things will become, citizens
of the United States.
The purpose plainly is to prevent a stimulated and unnatural rivalry against our own citizens in the fields of .American labor.
'.Chere is no wish to harm or discommode the immigrant or
the foreigner, but there is a purpose to save to citizens of the
United States that which belongs to them.
Thus viewing the law, I am at liberty to say that a construction of it which carries annoyance and injury to the
foreigner and accomplishes nothing in checking the rivalry
aimed at, while it subjects our own people to inconveniences
and losses, is not a necessary or proper construction.
The saving clauses of section 5 of the act of 1885, which
except from the rule of exclusion private secretaries,
servants, or domestics of a foreigner temporarily residing
here, and also skilled alien.workmen coming under contract
to perform labor upon any new industry as therein set forth,
suggest the extent and the limitations of the enactment.
In order to render the law effectnal, and also, it is believed,
to avoid consequences that might be both harsh and unreasonable, it is provided by section 7 of the amendatory act of
1887 that the Secretary of the Treasury shall establish regulations and rules and issue instructions for carrying out the
provisions of the act, and shall prescribe all forms of bonds,
etc., to be used under and in the enforcement thereof.
Under this section there is, undoubtedly, ample provision
to guard the interests covered by the contract-labor laws
should occasion require.
The enactment providing for the exposition is the act of
April 25, 1 90 (26 Stat., 62).
The title peaks of the exhibition as being international,
and the preamble declares that it should be of a national
an l international character, o that people of all nations can
participate therein.
By ction 5 the exhibition is de -ignated the "World's
C lumbian Exp iti n.'
y e tion 10th
re ident i authorized to make pro lam, tion tlir u 0 ·h he Department f tate, of the e tabli bm nt and rgauization of th exp ·ition, ettiug forth the
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time at which it will open and close and the place at which
it will be held; and it is further provided that,, He shall communicate to the diplomatic representatives
of foreign nations copies of the same, together with such
regulations as may .be adopted by the c~mmission, for publication in their respective countries, and he shall, in behalf
of the Government and people, invite for~ign nations to take
part in the said exposition and appoint _representatives
thereto."
Considering the acts of Congress relating to contract labor
in a just and liberal spirit, and in connection with the exposition enactment, it would, in my judgment, be an extravagant and an unauthorized conclusion to bold that foreign
workmen coming in good faith to take their places in the.
exposition may be excluded from the country under the
authority of said contract-labor laws.
'rhe court (10 Saw., 225) says that the rule that "a statute
must not be so construed as to lead to an absurd conclusion"
is one of the most venerable canons of statutory construction.
The Supreme Coul't, in United States v. Kirby (7 Wall., 486),
says: "All laws should receive a sensible construction; general terms should be so limited in their application as not to
lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It
will always, therefore, be presumed that the legislature
intended exceptions to its language, which would avoid
results of this character. The reason of the law in such
cases should prevail over its letter."
It is another venerable canon of construction, frequently
applied, that "The intent of the lawmaker is the law."
To hold that the skilled assistants, the trained experts of
foreign exhibitors who come here upon the invitation of the
nation, bringing their complicated and expensive machinery
to illustrate the manufacture of valuable products, and t0 aid
us in showing the world's progress in the creation of things
useful and desirable-are barred and excluded by our contract-labor laws-would be to carry those laws beyond the
purpose or intent of those who made them, and would lead
to an unreasonable and an absurd conclusion.
I am, therefore, of the opinion that skilled employes of
foreign exhibitors at the World's Columbian Exposition, who
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come, in goocl faith, for the purpose of setting up and operating the machinery of such exhibitors, are outside of and
not subject to the contract-labor laws of the United States.
Very respectfully,

W. H. H. MILLER.

The SECRE'l'.A.RY OF ST.A.TE.

PERSONS IN CHARGE OF CONSULAR OFFICES •
.A. person placed in charge of a consular office by the incumbent of the
consulate, but without appointment and qualification as prescribed
by the Constitution and laws of the United States, can not lawfully
perform the regular official duties of the post, nor should he be permitted to perform those other unofficial services, such as notarial services, which a consul is not required by law to perform, but the chief
value of which depends entirely on the fact that the person Tendering
them is a consular officer.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 1, 1891.
SIR: Your communication of January 15, ultimo, earlier
attention to which has been unavoidably delayed, requests an
opinion u-pon the question whether a person placed in charge
of a con ular office by the incumbent of the consulate to which
the office belongs, but "without appointment and qualification.as prescribed by the Con titution and laws of the United
States" can perform (1) the regular official duties of the post,
and (2) notarial and other unofficial services."
I am unable to see how a per on can lawfully execute the
dutie of a public office of the United States who has not
be n clothed with authority to do o by the appointing power
of the United States.
uch a person can not possibly have
an y irtue in him as a public officer. This disposes of the
:fir t bran h of your qu tion.
·
Th . con l branch r fer to that cla
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acknowledgments abroad of conveyances of land· in such
State, or it may be that the efficacy of the act is due to the
faith generally reposed in consular officers. However that
may be, the. United States would seem to be in duty bound
to protect the public, ~s far as it may be reasonably expected
to do so, against the exercise of even merely voluntary consular functions by persons not regularly appointed consuls.
It, therefore, clearly concerns the United States that no person shall be permitted to exercise the office of consul of the
United States in any way who has not been authorized by
Congress to do so. This disposes of the second branch.
Very respectfully, yours,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRETARY OF STATE.

GOVERNMENT PROPERTY.
A. proposed recommendation of the Cbief of Engineers considered; permitting a railroad to be built by the United States to be turned over
to the State of Oregon for operation, on certain conditions, and decided
to give that State a vested right to operate the railway and derive
revenue therefrom, and consequently to be beyond the power of the
Secretary of War to grant, not having been authorized by act of Congres1:1.
The arrangements hitherto made by the Secretary of War ·a nd President,
allowing private individuals to enter military reservations and prosecute undertakings for the common benefit of themselves and the United
States distinguished from this proposed recommendation as ·h aving no
contractual feature -and being revocable at the pleasure of the Government.

DEPARTMENT

JUSTICE,
May 8, 1891.
Sm: For the purpose of facilitating trade on the Columbia
River the legislature of Oregon passed an act, approved
February 16, 1891, which established a board of portage commissioners with power "to build, construct, equip, and maintain" portage railways at the Cascades and between The
Dalles and Celilo on the said river. Among other powers
vested in this board is the power to fix and collect freights
and fares on said roads, and apply the same to the expenses
of operating the roads, and, in case of a surplus after paying
such expenses, the board is required to pay it into the State
treasury.
OF
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To carry out the purposes of the act the sum of $60,000 is
appropriated.
· It is to be remarked that, at each of the above-mentioned
points where these portage rail ways are to be constructed,
the United States is building a canal at great expense.
When these canals are completed there will be no use at
these points for land carriage of any kind, Ro that the projected railways a~e merely to serve a temporary purpose.
On March 3, 1891. Congress passed a joint resolution
"authorizing the State of Oregon to construct, maintain,
and operate a portage railroad on the property of the United
States at tbe Cascades of the Columbia River, Oregon,"
which is as follows:
"Resoz,ved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, 7'hat the
State of Oregon is bereqy authorized to construct, maintain,
and operate a portage railroad over the lands belonging to
the United StateR at the Cascades of the Columbia River, in
the State of Oregon, and to use in the construction of the
same and in the operation thereof the Government roads
upon said lands: Provided, That such occupation and use
shall not interfere with the Government works at said Cascade , and shall be under sucL. restrictions and regulations
a' the Secretary of War shall prescribe." (Laws 2d ses ion
51 t Congres , p. 1116.)
It ee~ed advi 'ctble, however, to the Chief of Engineer
that the projected portage railway should be built by the
United States as a mean for carrying on the work of contructing the canal at the Ca cade , and then turned over to
the authoritie of the State of Oregon to be operated for the
ne:fit of th United tates and the public generally. In
r turn for whi h the State wa to construct certain works

:ffi

r in charg- of the work at
truct a -foot gaug rail-
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road from the easterly limit of Government grounds at the
Cascades locks, OregonJ to the lower bulkhead of the canal
on these grounds, at such time as it may be made evident
that this railroad will be needed by the State of Oregon for
por:tage purposes acrosR these grounds, and that the application of the board of portage comrnjssioBers of the State of
Oregon be granted under the following conditions:
1. "That the State of Oregon, through its board of portage commissioners, be permitted to enter these grounds
below thPi lower bulkhead and erec"t thereon such temporary
structures as may be necessary to facilitate these portage
operations.
2. ~, That said board be permitted to operate this railroad
with such engines, cars, and other rolling stock as may be
found necessary, on condition that the passage of the cars or
trains over the road be so arranged as not to interfere with
the Government work in hand, and that the State transport
over this road free of charge such material, supplies, etc., ~s
niay be necessary for the public improvements being made
at that point under control of the War Department."
The question submitted for opinion is whether this recommendation of the Chief of Engineers may be lawfully carried
out.
It will be observed that the proposition is not to give the
board of portage commissioners a license to use the contemplated railway which shall be revocable at the pleasure
of the United States. The State is to render a valuable consideration for the use of the railway, and it is not reasonable
to Ruppose that it was intended that the State should hold
its rights at the mere sufferance of the United States. The
effect, then, of the anangement would be to give the State a
vested right to operate the rail way, and with it the right to
derive revenue by taking fees and tolls for the transportation of persons and merchandise.
Looking at the proposed arrangement from the standpoint
of the State of Oregon, it seems to me extremely doubtful,
to say the least, whether the board of portage commissioners
would have the power, under the State statute (supra), to
make such an agreement with the United States. Their
authority is to build and operate a podage railway, not to
contract for the use of one already built, and to enable them
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to execute the work the State legislature has, as we have
seen, appropriated a considerable sum of money.
The State law requires the board to charge tolls and fares
for transportation over the railway, and it may be doubted
whether the board could lawfully authorize free transportation for the Government, however reasonable and proper it
might be to do so. The question is one of power and not of
expediency. The State law provides that "all property, or
prisoners, or troops belonging to or under the control of the
State of Oregon, shall be transported over said road free of
charge," and that is all that is said about free transportation, and it would seem to be the extent of the board's power
in that particular.
But, however that may be, I am very clearly of opinion
that you have no power. to turn over Government property
to States or individuals, to be used for any purpose not
authorized by some act of Congress, any more than you have
power to give such property away absolutely. The property,
real and personal, of the United States is dedicated by law
to the uses and purposes of the United States, and nothing
short of an act of Congress can authorize its application to
any other u ' es and purposes.
I do not mean to say whether you have authority or not to
build a portage railway as a proper means for the construction of the canal, because that question is not before me, but
as urning that you have such power I do not think you have
any right to allow a railway, built for that purpose, to be
used by the State of Oregon as a highway of commerce,
wh ther the tate pays a consideration for the use of it or
not. The que tion is one of power, and that must come from
-Oongre., , and jg not to be jnferred from the fact that what is
recommended would be highly beneficial to the United
State . Wh ther the proposed application of Government
i advi able or not is a qu tion
1 ro erty to State purp
for the legi lative and uot the executi e, department of the
Governm nt. Thi con lu ion is, I think, upported by the
·a of Ste le v. United tates (113. U. S., 12 ). In that ca e
it wa held that the di o ition of a lot of crap material by
an fficer f th
avy
par m nt oth rwi e than by ale, a
dir c ed by ction 15±1 of the He i 'ed tatutes, could have
1
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no validity. In the same way it may 9e said that if the law
in virtue of which the canal at the Cascades is being constructed authorizes the building of a portage railway, it
authorizes it as a proper means and appliance for constructing that improvemeut, and for no other purpose whatever,
and it could be used for no other purpose without a violation
of law. This must be the case so long as it remains true that
"we have no officers in this Government, from the President
down to the most subordinate agent, who does not hold office
under the law, with prescribed duties and limited authorityP
(The Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall., 676.)
I am aware that it has been for many years usual for the
Secretary of War, and occa:sionally the President, to allow
private individuals to enter military reservations and prosecute undertakings for the comm.on benefit of themselves and
the United States. But arrangements of this character have
had no contractual feature, and, so far as I am informed, have
been always made revocable at the pleasure of the United
States (16 Opin., 206; 19 Id., 628), and are essentially different from the arrangement which it is proposed to you to
make with the State of Oregon.
These anomalies, however, so far from encouraging departures from the principle that this is a government oflaw and
not of men, serve to emphasize that principle, because they'
are sustained on the ground that, like other instances of
public authority, they rest on the consent of Congress, tacit
though that consent be.
It seems impossible, therefore, to find any warrant of law
for carrying out the arrangement with the board of portage
commissioners which has been recommended to you for
adoption.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, yours,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRE'.l'ARY OF W AB.
6687-V0L 20-'l
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The word "mile," as used in section 5 of the act to provide for ocean
mail service between the United States and foreign ports, and to promote commerce, approved March 3, 1891, chapter 519, means mile of
5,280 feet, and not a geographical mile.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 9, 1891.
Srn: By your letter of April 13 you ask my opinion as t.-0
the meaning of the word "mile," as used in section 5 of" .An
act to provide for ocean mail service bet.ween the United
States and foreign ports, and to promote commerce," approved
March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. L., 830). The purpose of the act is
to promote the carriage of the ocean mails in ships of American register, and thereby to promote ocean commerce in
American bottoms. By its first section this act authorizes
the Postmaster-General to make "contracts, for a term not
less than five nor more than ten years in duration, with
American citizens," for the carrying of the ocean mails in
American steamships. Section 2 provides for the manner of
advertising and letting of said contracts. Section 3 requires
that the steamships shall be of American build, and officered
by American citizens, and manned in certa,in proportions by
American crews. Section 3 also divides such steamships into
four classes, and specifies the manner and material of their
build, their tonnage, and rate of speed. The language as to
the e items is as follows:
'They shall be divided into four classes. The first class
hall be iron or teel screw steam hips, capable· of maintaining a peed of twenty knot an hour at sea in ordinary weather,
and of a gro 'S registered tonnage of not le than eight
thousand tons. * * * The second class shall be iron or
te 1 team hip , capable of maintaining a speed of sixteen
knot an hour at ea in ordinary weather, and of a gro s regi t red tonnage of not le than five thou and tons. The
third la
he 11 be ir n or teel team hip , capable of maint· ini O" a p ed of fourteen knot an hour at ea in ordinary
w atb r aud of a O'f , r gi tered tonnage f uot le than
, o thou nd fl e hundr d ton . The fourth cla
ball be
ir n r t el or wooden team hip , capable of maintaining a.
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speed of twelve knots an hour at sea in ordinary weather,
and of a gross registered tonnag~ of not less than fifteen
hundred tons." ·
·
Section 4 provides that these ships shall be constructed
according to plans and specifications approved by the Secret~ry of the Navy, and of sufficient strength to be readily
convertible iuto cruisers. Section 5 provides for a compensation for such ocean mail Rervice by way of bounty or sub_
sidy, said provision being as follows:
"That the rate of compensation to be paid for .such ocean
mail service of the said first class ships shall not exceed the
sum of four dollars a mile, and for the second-class ships two
dollars a mile, by the shortest practicable route, for each
outward voyage; for the third-class ships shall not exceed
one dollar a mile, and for the fourth-class ships two-thirds
of a dollar a mile for the actual number of miles required by
the Post-Office Department to be traveled on each outward
bound voyage."
The remaining pro-visions of. the statute are immaterial to
the question under consideration. That question is whether
the word "mile," as used in section 5, means a geographical
or a statute mile. It will be observed that in section 3,
where provision is being made for the rate of speed, the
nautical word "knot" is used, which is practically synonymous with "geographical mile;" but in section 5, where provision is made for compensation, the word "mile" is used.
It is a general rule that in construing statutes words are •
to be taken in their ordinary, usual meaning, unlcs_s the language indicates a different intent. · Webster defines "mile"
as "a certain measure of distance, being equivafant in England and the United States to 320 poles or rods, or 51280 feet.' 1
Worcester gives substantially the same definition, and this
in each case is the first definition given. Each afterwards
gives the "geographical or nautic&l mile." In other words,
each treats the statute mile as the mile, and then gives the
definition of the other mile with the accompanying adjective.
The fact that in section 3 the word "knot" is used, and
that in section 5 the word •' mile" is used, seems to me to
indicate a different legislative meaning in one case than in
the other. If it had been the purpose of Congress that the
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subsidy should be paid by geographical mile, it would have
been natural, following tlw language of the third section, to
have also used the word "knot" in the fifth section.
Moreover, in so far as any statute of the United States
touches the definition of the word "mile" it indicates the
statute mile. Section 3570, Revfaed Statutes, defining .the
relation between the French metric system and our system of
weights and measures, provides:
"The tables in the schedule hereto annexed shall be recognized in the construction of contracts, and in all legal proceedings, as establishing, in terms of the weights and measures now in use in the United States, the equivalents of the
weights and measures expressed therein in terms of the
metric system; and the tables may lawfully be used for computing, determining, and expressing in customary weights
and measures the weights and measures of the metric system."
Iu this table the statute and not the geographical mile is
used.
Again, I am advised that in construing all Federal statutes
allowing mileage for travel, as well upon the ocean as upon
the land, the uniform practice of the accounting officers has
been to estimate and allow such mileage upon the basis of
the tatute mile of 5,280 feet. This rule has been applied to
officer of the Navy, to members of Congress, and in short to
all person traveling upon duty upon the ocean under stat. ute providing for mileage.
Another thing, not perhaps entirely unworthy of consideration, i the fact that geographical miles are not of uniform
length, but vary in different latitudes to such an extent as
would make an item of some significance where large amounts
are involved.
In two cases in which the question of allowance of mileage
to naval offi er wa under con icleration, although the difference b tw en tatute and geo raphi ·al mile wn not mooted
th upr m ourt, in cl terminiug whether mileage or actual
. p n e i to be allow d, ha h Id that no di tin tion i to
b tc k n b tw n travel up n the o an and travel upon the
la d. ( e
nit d tate v. Teniple, 105 U.S., 97, and United
tates v. Graham, 110 U. S., 219.)
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It may not be improper, in conclusion, to say that this
statute, designed to promote foreign commerce, is entitled to
a liberal construction, with a view'to carrying out the purpose of its enactment.
My conclusion is that the term "mUe," as used in the fifth
section of the statute, means a mile of 5,~80 feet.
Very respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL.

N.A.VIG.ABLE W .A.TERS-POWER OF A STATE AND OF THE
UNITED ST.A.TES-BRIDGES.
All waters are navigaule waters of the United States within the mea.ning of the acts of Congress, in contradistinction from _the navigable
waters of the States where they form in their ordinary condition by
themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continuous highway,
over which commerce is or may be carried on with other States or
foreign countries in the customary moq.es in which such commerce is
conducted by water. The Chicago River and its branches mnst,
therefore, be deemed navigable waters of the United States, over
which the commercial power of Congress may be exercised to tbe
extent necessary to protect their free navigation, and it is immaterial
that the stream was originally non-navigable or artificially constructed, or wholly within one State, or practically controlled by one
State or city.
The power of the State to legislate in regard to navigable waters is subject to the paramount power in Congress to regulate commerce among
the several States. Until Congress acts directly in the matter the
power of tbe State is plenary, but when Congress has acted with reference to bridges in the State its will must control so far as may be
necessary to secure free navigation. In section 4 of the river and
harbor act of September 19, 1890, chapter 907, Congress has acted1 anu
under that act it is the duty of the Secretary of vVar to ascertain
whether the Canal street bridge across the South Branch of the
Chicago River is an unreasonable obstruction to the free navigation
·of said river, and if he comes to the conclusion that it is such an
obstruction, it is his duty to proceed as required by ~hat statute.
Inasmuch as the plans for the proposed excavation in said river have
not as yet been submitted to the Secretary of War for his approval
and authorization, he is not now required by law to give the proceedings consideration.
The cases illustrating the extension of the doctrine of navigable waters
of the United States and the extension of the authority of the United
States over said waters reviewed and discussed.
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 11, 1891.
Sm: Your communication of March 10 in relation to the
bridge now in proce~s of construction across the Routh
branch of the Chicago River at Canal street, and that of
May 1 relative to certain excavations and alterations proposed to be made in said river under the direction of the
board of trustees of the sanitary district of Chicago, bave
received that careful consideration which the importance of
the interests that may be affected rightfully demands.
The first question submitted for my opinion is, whether,
under section 4 of the river and harbor act of September 19,
1890 (Stat., 453), it is incumbent upon yon to con ider
whether said bridge, as constructed, is "an unreasonable
obstruction to the free navigation" of said river; and
whether you are required, und~r said enactment, to take
official action in relation to such bridge.
This inquiry seems to be, whether the enactment referred
to iR one that may lawfully require your action in relation t-0
an obstructive bridge built across the south branch of this
waterway under the authority of the State of Illinois, and
by the direction of the local government.
The second question I understand to be, in substance,
whether any action is required on the part of the Secretary
of War relative to tbe contemplated proceedings of the board
of tru tee~ of the sanitary di trict of Chicago whereby aid
board propo e to enter upon, use, widen, deepen, and improve
the Chicago River and its outh branch.and the forks thereof,
to form a upply channel for the main channel heretofore
surveyed from Chicago to Joliet, as indicated in the resolution of aid board pas ed April 21, 1891.
The. que;;tions are o related that I will, as you reque, t,
an wer a to both in thi communication.
It i hown that the outh Branch of the Chicago River
wa rig-inally only naviga le for mall craft of light draft;
that i a o narrow r ok d and hallow a to be value le s
mm re · that larg
of money have b en
d d y th ci y a11 l y own r of a utting land to
xi ting n. Yig l>ili y, whi hi mainly artificial in
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The stream lies wholly within the State of Illinois, and the
portion under consideration within the city of Chicago, and
expensive docks, wharves, and slips have been constructed.
It is shown that a vast and valuable commerce passes along
this waterway, and an immense passenger and freight movement goes over it.
The Canal street bridge site is stated to be more than 3
miles from the lake, and more than 2 m'iles from the junction
of the branches.
This south branch extends through the heart of the city,
and is now spanned by 22 bridges for street travel, which are
lighted, policed, and controlled by the city, and is also crossed
by 5 railroad bridges.
The National Government removed the bar originally exist.ing at the river's mouth, in Lake.Michigan, and deepened the
channel there, but it has neither performed any act nor
expended any money above the mouth or within this stream
to develop or aid its navigation. The city and the riparian
owners have expended in improving the navigation, and in
do~king, over $1,250,000, and the annual expe:pse of keeping
this branch navigable amounts to about $80,000.
No public docks, slips, or landing places exist there, but
the contiguous property belongs to private parties and is
used for business purposes. The waterway is, however,
practically dedicated to public use.
While the waterway remains navigably connected with the
lake, its current has been reversed by artificial means, and,
from being an affluent to Lake Michigan, it has been made
to flow away from it. This channe] as it exists, it is stated,
is a navigable sewer and ·an interior harbor of the city of
Chicago.
At the same time, it is a channel navigated, in part, by
vessels which bring from, and carry to, other States and
foreign territory the commodities of commerce.
Beyond this bridge-site are located nine "regular" elevators possessing a capacity of 14,000,000 bushels of grairi, 12
great coal yards, distributing largely outside of Illinois,
lumber yards that handle 1,000,000 feet per year, ·and the
stock yards and packing houses of Chicago.
It is stated that of the 22,000 vessels entering at and
departing from the port during the season of navigation,
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about 7,000 pass the site of this bridge, many of them being
large craft which llavjgate the Oreat Lakes.
The :first question is whether this south branch of the Ohr
cago River is to be classed amon g the navigable waters of
the United States.
If it may be held that this channel is a private water, or
exclusively under the control of the city or the State, little
further consideration is necessary.
But if this waterway is, in its condition and uses, a portion of what has been denominated in decisions and statutes
"navigable waters of tlle United States," then it will remain
to be determined whether the Secretary of War may interfere as to the construction of a bridge which unreasonably
obstructs the navigation.
The States granted to Congress the power ''to regulate
commerce with foreign nations and among the several
States." · It was long since determined that the power to
regulate commerce includes that of establishing rules for
navigation in the navigable waters of the United State~.
It follows tha~ Congress may supervise the cllannels of this
navigation, so as to keep them reasonably free from obstruction.
The docu·ments which accompany your communication of
March 10 show a wide difference in views as to tbis commercial chaunel. In one view this south branch is a local , ewer
and ludge basin; in another, it is a crowded waterway
thronged with interstate commerce. It must be said, however tbat whatever view is taken by parties diversely intere ted, the navigable status of the river can not now be fairly
que tioned.
A hort review of the course of the General ·Government
a to the waters of the country may not be uupro:fitable in
thi onn ction.
Th d v I pmentofthejuri dictionoftheNatfonal Governm nt o er h water. of the ountry has be n mark dly along
th line of the admiral y juri diction of the Unit d tate
curt.
1
.A it wa d cid cl in the a e of the team boat Thoma
J: 'ff' r on (I
heat. 42 ) that the di tric
urt of b
nited
· t · Ila no juri di tion in a a e of amau swag , xcept
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where the service was performed upon the sea, or upon waters
within the ebb and fl.ow of the tide.
In 1833 it was held in Peyroux v. Howard (7 Pet., 324) that
the court of admiralty had jurisdiction becam;;e the tide ebbed
and flowed at New Orleans, where the cause of action arose:iand that the jurisdiction depended upon tliat fact.
In United States v. Coombs (1838) (12 Pet., 77) it is held
that this jurisdiction so far as it depends upon locality is
limited to the sea and to tide waters as far as the tide flows.
By the act of February 26, 1845 (5 Stat., 726), the admiralty jurisdiction of tlie district courts was extended to matters of tort and contract arising as to v<.'ssels of 20 to11s burden .naviga,ting the lakeR and waters connecting them.
Warring v. Clarke (5 How., 441), decided in 1848, illustrated the · unreasonableness of adhering in America to the
tide-water rule.
In 1851 t.he decision of the case of the propeller Genesee
(12 How., 443), arising out of a collision on Lake Ontario,
overruled the previous decisions and abolislrnd the tide-water
rule as applicable to American waters, and held that the
lakes and the navigable rivers. connecting them were within
the scope of admiralty jurisdiction as understood in the
United States when the Constitution was adopted.
This case practically holds that the admiralty jurisdiction
of the United States is coextensive with its public navigable
waters.
Although this decision is rested upon the admiralty and
maritime clause of the Constitution, an equally comprehensive construction of the clause authorizing the regulation of
commerce was developed, and the couclusion is now reached
that all our waters are navigable waters of the United States,
within the meaning of the acts of Congress, in contradistinction from the navigable waters of the States, where tbey form
in their ordinary condition by themselves, or by uniting with
other waters, a continued highway over which commrrce is
or may be carried on with other States or foreign cou11tries _in
the customary modes in which such commerce is conducted
by water. The Daniel Ball (10 Wall., 557); the Montello (11
Wall., 411 and 20, id., 430); Cardwell v. American Bridge Compa.n y (113 U. S., 205).
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In Ex parte Boyer(109 U.S., 629) the same rule is extended
over canals and waterways that are wholly artificial, but
which connect navigably with waters of. other States.
In the direct line of the development of national authority
in relation to our waters navigable in fact and not State
locked, we reach the decision in Escanaba Go. v. Chicago (107
U. S., 678), where the court of last resort declares that"The Chicago River and its branches must, therefore, be
deemed navigable waters of the United States, over which
Congress, under its commercial power, may exercise control
to the extent necessary to protect, preserve, and improve
their free navigation."
It is not of consequence that the stream was originally
non-navigable, or that it was artificially constructed, or that it
is wholly within one State, or that it bas always 'been practicaily controlled by the State or city. The use now actually
made of the waterway, its practical dedication to the public,
the importance, amount, and nature of its commerce, and the
source and destination of the commodities borne upon it,
establish the character of the navigation,
Therefore it must necessarily be held under the Constitution, the statutes, and the decisions that the Ohicigo River
is as unquestionably a portion of the navigable watera of the
United States as is the Strait of Mackinac.
The second question ·is, when does a stream which is
wholly within a State, and which is a part of the navigable
waters of the United States, remain under State control, and
when does it become suhject to national requirements f
It is true that the power to authorize the construction of a
bridge over the river in question, as well as the enactment
of the great mass of legislation which may affect its commerce, remain~ in the State; but it is also true that the
power vested in Congress to regulate commerce authorize
national legislation which will render void conflicting State
laws. As Congress has, in the judgment of many, by its
recent enactments made important and radical changes in
the relations between the nation and the States as to navigable waters, a review of decisions made upon cases previou ly arising will better than in any other way pre, ent the
character and suggest the effect of tli.is recent legislation.
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In the case of Gibbons v. Ogden (9 Wheat.), Chief Justice
Marshall, in announcing the opinion of the court, says that
all experience shows that the same measures, or measures
scarcely distinguishable from each other, may flow from the
distinct powers of the State and of the General Government;
but that this does not prove that the powers themselves are
identical.
He also says that the States may sometimes enact laws
the validity of which depends on th•Jir interfering with and
being contrary to an act ot Congress passed in pursuance of
the Constitution, and points out that if this act came into
collision with an act of Congress, the act of the State must
yield to the law of Congress.
He also speaks of acts of the State legislatures which do
not transcend their powers, but, though enacted in the execution of acknowledged State powers, interfere with or are
contrary to the laws of Congress made in pursuance of the
Constitution of the United States.
He declares the subjection of such a State law to the act
of Uongress.
In the Cuyahoga Bridge Case (3 McLean's Reports, 226)
the court says of the respective powers of the State and of
Congress in relation to legislation in regard to navigable
waters tbat '' a State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may exercise certain rights over its navigable waters, subject, however, to the paramount power in Congress to regulate commerce among the several States. These powers are not
concurrent, but are separate and independent of each other.
And in regard to the e.x ercise of thjs power by a State, there
is no other limit than the boundaries of the Federal power."
In Gilman v. Philadelphia (3 Wall., 713) the 'court holds
that the States may exercise concurrent or independent
power in relation to bridges across streams which lie wholly
within the State. In relation to these powers the court says:
"It is not possible to fix definitely their respective boundarles. In some instances their action becomes blended; in
some the action of the State limits or displaces the action of
tbe nation; in others the action of the State is void because
it seeks to reach objects beyond the limits of State aut~10rity."
In this case the court also says: "Uutil the dormant power
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of the Constitution is awakened and made effective by appropriate legislation, the reserved power of the States is plenary and its exercise in good faith can not be made the sub' review b Y this
. court."
ject of
In the Blackbird Creek Case (2 Pet., 105) it is held that a
small ·navigable stream lying wholly within a State, and in
which the tide Pbbs and flows, may be closed to navigation
by an enactmeut of the State, and that any injury arising
from said act is an affair between the government of the
State and its citizens, of which the Supreme Court can take ·
no cognizance. But it is stated: "If Cougress had passed
any act which bore upon the case; any act in executfon of
the power to regulate commerce, the object of which was to
control State legislation over these small navigable creeks
into wbich the tide flows: and which abound throughout the
lower country of the Midd-le and Southern States,-we should
feel not much difficulty in saying that a State law coming in
conflict with imcb act would · be void. But Congress bas
pa:. ed no such act."
The act of the State of Delaware in closing the creek was
allowed to stand, because it was not in "conflict with any
law 1 assed ou the su~ject."
In Kellogg v. The Union O01npan.lJ (12 Conn., 24) the Blackbird. Creek Case is referred to, and the court says tllat the
deci ion strougly fotimates the opinion that in order that
tlle power ve ted in Congress should be so exercised as to
affect the que tion, ome act mu t have been passed, the
object of which was to control State legislation.
The court refer, to evera1 deci ion involving State power and navigation ri 0 ·hts, auu add : "The e ca es all proceed upon the gronnd that there i re. rved to the State a
pow r to adopt their own municipal r ulations in regard
t navicral>le water within tlleir territorial limit ; and in
ev ry ca 'e the q u tion will b , whether the act of the State
cl
in fa t
nfli •t with thfl law of ongre ·, within the
n ,miug f th
'011.- itution.
tate law in order to be
,L by a law of 'ongre
mu t come into conflict with
n ·h law.
In Thmne
(tnk v. Lo ell (l
nu. ~ ) the c urt ays
(p. -11): ' In p aking h r of n igable riv r , we peak

TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

109

Navigable Waters-Power ot a State and of the United States-Bridges.

of them as public highways only, without reference to the
flow of the tides; for to all rivers navigable in fact, the power
of Congress to regulate commerce may extend without distinction. .And we suppose, therefore, that the several States;
legi-s latures have the same power to improve the navigation
of the tide-water rivers as any other." And the court q notes
with approval, "That a grant of power by Congress probably does not prevent the States from continuing to act on
subjects within the grant, till Congress legislate fully. con. cerning it, and so as to conflict with the doings of the State
unless there is an express prohibition on the States to act
furtper in the matter, or it is strongly implied from the nature
of the case."
In Pound v. Turclc (95 U. S., 459) Mr. Justice Miller, in
stating the opinion of the court, says (p. 462) that the principle established by the decisions is, that some powers conferred by the commerce clause of the Constitution are exclusive in Congress, while there are others which from their
nature may be exercised by the States until Congress shall
see proper to cover the same grounrl by such legislation as
tha_t body may deem appropriate to the subject.
In the case of Escanabci Go. v. Gh-icago (107 U. S., 678)
the court declares (p. 683) that "The Chicago River and its
branches must therefore be deemed navigable waters of the
United States, over which Congress under its commercial
power may exercise control to the extent necessary to protect, preserve, and improve their free navigation."
But the court recognizes the propriety of leaving the control of the bridges crossing said river to the municipal
authorities, and says (p. 690): "To render the action of the
State invalid in constructing or authorizing the construction
of bridges over one of its navigable streams, the General
Government must _directly interfere so as to supersede its
authority and annul what has been done in th~ matter."
In Cardwell v. The .American Bridge Go. ( 113 U. S., 205)
the court says (p. 209) that;as to authorizing the construction of bridges over navigable streams, the power of the
State is subordinate to that of Congress, and adds: ,, That
until Congress acts on the subject the power of the State is
plenary. When Congress acts directly with reference to the
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bridges authorized by the State, its will must control so far
as may be necessary to secure the free navigation of the
streams."
In Huse v. Glover (119 U. S.) the court says of the State
action (p. 548), that "it is only when, in the judgment of
Congress, its action is deemed to encroach upon the navigation of the river as a means of interstate and foreign commerce that that body may interfere and control or supersede it."
·
rn· reference to the bridge authorized by the State of
Oregon to be built across the Willamette River, it is said
(1~5 U. S., 8) that "there mm~t be a direct statute of the
United States in order to bring within the scope of its laws,
a administered by the courts of law and equity, obstructions and nuisances in navigable streams within the States."
In 1885 Mr. Attorney-General Garland construes the laws
upon this point as follows (18 Opin., 164):
"As the Mississippi River above, at, and for some distance
below the city of St. Paul is wholly within the State of Minne ota;the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Wilson v. The Blackbird Creelc Marsh Oompany (2 Pet., 250) _; Gilman v. Philadelphia (3 Wall., 713);
Pound':· Turclc (95 U. S., 459), and Escanaba Company v.
Chicago (107 U. S., 678), applies to this case, namely; that
until Oongre act , and by appropriate legislation a .. surnes
control of the ubject, the power of a State over bridges across
navigable strea1ns within its limits is plenary; but that when
this power is exerci ed so as to unneces arily obstruct navigation, Congre · may interfere and remove the ob truction.
Th pow r of Oongre to regulate bridges over navigable
water i. paramount, and where it comes in conflict with that
of the t:.ite the latter neces arily become iueffective."
It i e tabli hed beyon l qu tion that previous to 1 4 no
nati nalle 0 ·i lation xi 't d hich inter£ red with the g u rai
, ntl1 rity f tlte tat , acting witbin the limit of law a
, lmini t r
by th · tut to control wi hin their re p cti e
undarie th nL vi 0 ·, I ,,ater. of the nited tat .
:\.- now r a h tb bird que tion to be con id red which
th , e cited aro e~ the dormant pow r
< u · itu i n h '
n waken d by ougr i nal
nfli t with exi ting para-
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mount law all State or local authority to build or to continue
bridges over navigable waters of the United States which
are, or which shall become, unreasonable obstructions to free
navigation.
.And incidentally, under your inquiry of May 1, the question is raised whether, under the enactment of 1890, States
and local authorities are not only prohibited from hereafter
commencing the construction of any bridge or other works
not heretofore authorized by law over navigable waters of
the United States without the approval of the Secretary of
War, but are also forbidden hereafter to excavate or fill or
alter the course, condition, or capacity of the channel of any
such navigable waters except upon the approval and authorization of the Secretary of War.
The legislation to be· considered consists of the following
enactments:
In the general legislation enacted by the river and harbor
act of 1884 (23 Stat., 147) the Secretary of War is directed
to" Report whether any bridges, causeways, or structures
now erected or in process of erection do or will iuterfere with
free and safe navigation; and if they do or will so interfere,
to report the best mode of altering or constructing such
bridges or causeways so as to prevent any such obstructions."
By section 8 of the same act (p. 148) it is provided"That whenever the Secretary of War shall have good
reason to believe that any railroad or other bridge now or
hereafter to be constructed over any of the navigable waters
of the United States, under authority of the United States
or of any State or Territory, is an obstruction to the free
navigation of such waters, by reason of difficulty in passing
the draw opening or the raft span of said bri<lge," * ~· *
it shall be his duty to require the owners of the bridge, by
booms, piers, or otherwise, to guide water craft safely through
the opeuing; and if the owner fails so to do, the Secretary
shall make the change at the expense nf tlie United States,
and the owner is made liable to pay therefor.
By section 4 of the river and harbor act of 1886 (24 Stat.,
330) the se·c retary of War is directed to report as to the use
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or injury of public works by private partie~; and it is also
directed that" He shall report, at the same time, whether any bridges,
causeways, or structures now erected or in process of erection do or will interfere with free and safe navigation."
By section 9 of the river and harbor act of 1888 (25 Stat.,
424) it is provided, "That whenever the Secretary of War
shall have good reason to believe that any railroad or other
bridge now constructed, or which may hereafter be constructed, ~ver any of the navigable waterways of the United
States, is an obstruction to the free navigation of such waters,
by reason of insufficient height, width of span, or otherwise,"
the Secretary shall require the owners to "so alter the same
as to render navigation through or under it free, easy, and
unobstructed."
Provision is made for enforcing the requirements.
By section 4 of the river and harbor act of 1890 (Stat.,
454) said section 9 is amended so as to enact:
"That whenever the Secretary of War shall have good
reason to believe that any railroad or other bridge now constructed, or which may hereafter be constructed, over any
of the navigable waterways of the United States is an
unrea. onable obstruction to the free navigation of such
waters on acconut of insufficient height, width of pan, or
otherwise," * * ""' it sha11 be the duty of the Secretary
to give notice to those owning or controlling the bridge" o
to alter the ame a to render navigation through or under
it rea onably free, easy, and unob tructed;" and he is
required. to specify the changes to be made and the time in
which to make them.
By ection 10, if those owning or controlling the bridge
sha1l willfully fail or refu e to comply, they shall be deemed
guilty of a mi demeanor, and shall be subject to puni hment.
By ection 7 of thi act (p. 454), it i. provid d that "It
hall not be lawful hereafter to comrnen e the con , truction
f any brid
r oth r work. over or in any p .uJ.·i.,
bar or navigabl riv r, or navicrable wat r of
th
nit <i tc t
und r the act of any 1 .gi lative a mbly
until th l ati n an i plan of uch brid · or
1) n ubmi t d to and appr v d by the
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Secretary of War, or to excavate or fill, or in any manuer to
alter or modify the course, condition, or . capacity of the
ch~nnel of said navigable waters of the United States,
unless approved aud authorized by the Secretary of War."
It is provided that this section shall uot apply to a bridge
heretofore duly authorized by law; "or be so construed as
to authorize the construction of any bridge, * * * or
other works, under an act of the legislature of any State,
over or in any stream, * · * * or harbor, or other navigaable water not wholly within the limits of such State."
The scope of this new development of national supervision
and control will be readily apprehended.
Some may question whether Congress has by a general
law directly placed the obstructive bridges in conflict with
its requirement; but it is said in Gilman v. Philadelphia (3
Wall., 731) that "Congress may interpose, whenever it shall
be deemed necessary, by general or special laws. It may
regulate all bridges over navigable waters, remove offending
bridges, and punish those who shall thereafter erect them.
Within the sphere of their authority both the legislative and
judicial power of the nation are supreme. A different doctrine finds no warrant in the Constitlltion, and is abnormal
and revolutionary."
It has been objected that authorizing the head of a Department to require the alteration or removal of a construction
mad,e by State authority is arbitrary and unjustifiable; that
property rights are involved, and that the parties interested
have a right to a judicial determination whether their
obstructions are "unreasonable."
The rendering of an enactment effectual upon the ascertainment of a fact or contingency by the head of a Department is not uncommon. .As it is stated in Miller v. Mayor
(109 u. s., 394):
"The execution of a vast number of measures authorized
by Congress arnl carried out under the direction of heads of
Departments would be defeated if such were not the case.
The efficiency of an act as a declaration of legislative will
must of course come from Congress, but the ascertainment
of the contingency upon which the act shall take effect may
be left to such agencies as it may designate. (South Oarolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S., 13.)"
5687-VOL 20-8
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The doctrine as announced by Chief Justice Marshall in
McCulloch v. Maryland (4 Wheat., 409) that "the Government which has a right to do an act, ~nd has imposed on it
the duty of performing that act, must, according to the dictates of reason, be allowed to select the means," has never
been seriously questioned.
Some of the communications received by you and inclosed
to me suggest that supervision by the Secretary of War, if
effected by the statute, will obligate the General Government to assn me the management, control, and expense of the
waterway, but this does not follow.
The statute is revisory and defensive in its nature; it
clear the way for interstate and foreign commerce, but does
not assume police powers or local control.
Some objections to the application of the law appear to be
based up.on an inference that the Secretary of War is called
upon to consider only the needs of water transportation and
obstruction thereto; but it should be recognized that in
deciding whether any given bridge is an "unreasonable"
obstruction, he mu t necessarily take into account not only
the interests of navigation, but also those of intersecting locomotion and transportation.
In an opinion submitted by me to you on the 23d of October last (19 Opin. A. G., 676) attention is called to the ignificant in ertion of the word "unreasonable" before the
word "obstruction" as u ed in the amended act, thereby
"cl arly presenting a question of fact which can not be determined by this Department, which can and mu t be determined
in the first instance by you, but in regard to which your determination is probably ubject to review in the courts."
It i further said in that opinion that to determine the
que tion of "unrea onable ob truction" involve an examination of all the fact , ircumstance , and equities urrounding
the ca e which are by no means all on the side of the Government.'
Th right to cro the river i as unque tionable a the
ri htt navigat it; then eofbridge isasnece aryanda
rightfol a th u of th
r am.
b nu b rl · · and interw v n inter t of a great city
can n be
off fr 1 ach oth r, nor au the mov m nt of
milli n p
l be unnece arily impeded, by an inter e ,ting
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The rights of intersecting lines of freight and of travel,
the needs and the convenience of residents, and the business
movements of all who come and all who go are elements which
help to constitute the reasonableness or the unreasonableness of an interfering structure built for their use, but to
some extent obstructive to the waterway.
In conclusion, permit me to say that it i~ my opinion that
the statute of 1890 under consideration is one that may not
properly be disregarded, and is an enactment that renders
it necessary for you under the representations made to consider whether the Canal Street bridge is an unreasonable
obstruction to the free navigation of the south branch of the
Chicago River, and in case you decide that the same is such
an obstruction it will be incumbent upon you to proceed in
relation thereto in accordance with the requirements of that
.statute.
In relation to your inquiry of May 1, it is my opinion that
as the board of trustees of the sanitary district of Chicago
have not as yet submitted the plans of their proposed works
for your approval and authorization, but have merely given
notice in general terms of what they contemplate doing at
some future time, you are not now required by law to give
their proceedings consideration.
Very respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.

PAYMENT OF CLAIMS.

A proper construction of the last clause of an act for the allowance of
certain claims for stores and supplies taken and used by the United
States Army as reported by the Court of Claims under the provision
of the act of March 3, 1883, known as the Bowman Act, does not warrant the making of a Treasury draft payable or deliverable to any other
parties than those named in the act or to their executors or administra.tors.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 15, 1891.
SIR: Your letter of May 13, in which you ask my opinion
as to the proper construction of the last clause of an act "for
the allowance of certain claims for stores and supplies taken
and used hy the United States Army as reported by the
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Court of Claims under provision o·f the act·of March 3, 1883,
known as the Bowman .Act," is received.
The clause in question is as follows:
'' .All Treasury drafts in payment of claims appropriated
for in this act shall be made payable to and delivered to the
parties named respectively; or, in case of death of the party,
to his or her executor or administrator."
The first section of the act authorizes the payment to the
several persons in the act named the several sums of money
therein mentioned for each, but provides that before such
paymentg shall be made certain steps for the verification of
the correctness of the claim shall be taken ·by the AttorneyGeneral and the Court of Claims. Then follows a list of
names, with amounts appropriated for each, covering about
eleven pages. The form in which these names and amounts
are given is as follows:
"To Thomas N . .A1lison, administrator of James L . .Allison,
deceased, of Jackson County, .Ala., nine hundred and twenty
dollars.
" To Saint Cecelia's Academy of Nashville, Tenn., nine
hundred and thirty dollars.
"To William W. Anderson, of Harrison County, Ky., four
hundred and twenty-five dollars."
These claims are nearly three hundred in number.
After the enacting clause, the act commences as follows:
" That the Secretary of the Treasury be, and is hereby,
authorized and required to pay, out of any money in the
Treasury not otherwise appropriated, except as hereinafter
provided, to the everal persons in this act named the several sums mentioned herein, the same being in full accord,
and the receipt of the same to be taken and accepted in each
ca e as a full and final discharge of, the everal claim examined, investigated, and reported favorably by the Court of
Claim of the United State under the provi ion of the act
of March 3, 1 8
ntitled 'An act to afford as ·i 'iauce and
reli f to Congr
and the -i x cutive D partments in the inve ti ation of •laim and d mand again t the overnment:
Provided, hoi e er,'" tc.
Then fi 11 w the re nirement for the investigation by the
tt rney- eneral and Court of laim , a above tated.
Tile language thu quoted from the first section would
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have indicated a legislative purpose that these claims should
be paid, as ordinary claims against the Government are paid,
to the party or his attorney, under the restrictions there~ofore existing in section 3477, and perhaps in other sections.
But this provision was not permitted to stand by itself.
As the last expression of Congress in the act, the provision
above quoted and of which you ask a construction was
enacted. This provision adds something to the meaning of
the act, or it is useless. If the act is to be construed as
authorizing a payment to assigns or attorneys, then this last
provision is given no effect. It is evident to my mind that,
for a reason deemed sufficient, Congress meant that these
claims should be paid to the parties themselves, or, in case
of death, to their several personal representatives; that it
did not mean that they should be paid to anyone else, or
that the officers of the Treasury should be required to investigate the validity of assignments or powers of attorney as
preliminary to such payment. If required to suggest the
reason which moved the enactment of this last clause of the ,
statute, I should say that it was probably the same which
caused the enactment of the statute of 1853, now known as
section 3477, R. S., as expounded by Mr. AttorRey-General
Black in Ninth Opinions, 188.
Whatever the reason, the language seems to me too specific to leave room for doubt or construction. First, it
requires that the draft shall be made payable to the party
named; second, that the draft be delivered to the party
named; and third, in case of the death of the party, the draft
is to be delivered to his or her executor or administrator.
The intent seems to me to be no less plain than that manifested in sections 4764, 4765, 4766, requiring the payment of a
pension to the pensioner himself, and not to any third party.
Answering your question, then, I say:
In my opinions, a proper construction of the act does not
warrant the making of the Treasury draft payable or deliverable to any other parties than those named in the act or to
their executors or administrators.
The second question i~ covered by the answer to the first.
Very respectfully,
. W. H. H. MILLER~
The SECRETARY OF '.!'HE TREASURY.
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PINKERTON LAND CL.AIM-EXP.ATRI.ATION-TRE.A'l'Y OF
GUADALUPE HIDALGO.
A citizen of the United States in 1889 who expatriates himself in that
year and becomes a citizen of Mexico can not invoke .Article XX.I of
the treaty of Guadalupe Hi<l.algo for an arbitration as against an act
of this Government done while he was a citizen thereof.
.A claim of one Pinkerton to certain lands in the Territory of New Mexico considered, and his remedy, if he has any, decided to be under the
act of March 3, 1891, chapter 539, establishing a court of private land
claims in certain States and Territories.
DEP.ARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 16, 1891.
Sm: Your communication of March 26 requesting an
investigation of the subject-matter of an inclosed letter and
statement made by William Pinkertou and dated March 23,
18Vl, was duly received.
It appears that said Pinkerton makes claim to a large
tract of land lying in the Territory of New Mexico, a11d a. . k '
that such claim and the question of his right to said land be
made the subject of an arbitration with the Government of
Mexico under article 21 of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
Passing by the question whether said article was intended
to cover the case of a claim of this character, I beg to present a brief history of the Pinkerton claim.
In 1843 the Mexican authorities granted certain lands now
in Colorado to a man, Canadian born, named Gervacio Nolan.
In N oveml>er, 1845, they grant~d other land lying in ew
Mexico to Nolan, Aragon, and Lucero. Neither grant wa '
limited a" to quantity. No boundaries were et up, and no
· gr gation wa' made. Under the Mexican colonizatiou
law of l 24 grants to individuals were limited to eleven
qua,r league .
After the acqui ition by the United States of the territory
which iucluded the 'e land ·, and July 22, 1854, an act wa
pa ed (10 tat., 30 ) pro iding (among other thing ) for an
in e ·ti c ti u of ·laim mad t laud under pani. h and
fe ican -rant an it wa made the du y of the ur eyor"' u ral t
·certain the ori ·i11 nature, chara ·t r, and xtent
fall 1 im t l u uu l r the law , u air , and cu ~t m of
ain an
xi ·o, nd t r p rt her on; and it wa by
fur h r n ct d a -£ 11 w :
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"Such report to be made according to the form which may
be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior; which report
shall be laid before Congress for such action thereon as may
_be deemed just and proper, with a view to confirm bona :fide
grants, and give full effect to the treaty of eighteen huudred
and forcy--eight between the United States and Mexico; and,
until the final action of Congress on such claims, all lands
covered thereby shall be reserved from sale or other disposal
by the Government, and shall not be subject to the donations
granted by the previous provisions of this act."
Nolan died about 1857, and in 1860 his widow and heirsat-law filed with the surveyor-general of the Territory of
New Mexico a claim covering the tract claimed under said
grant of 1815, claiming that Nolan died intestate, and that
he had purchased all interests of Aragon and Lucero. This
claim became known as No. 39.
During said year 1860 said widow and heirs also :filed with
the surveyor-general a claim to the lands claimed under the
grant of 1843. This land is situated in the State of Colorado,
and the claim became known as No. 48.
· The claims were both investigated by the surveyor-general and were approved by him, and he recommended their
confirmation by Congress.
In 1868 these claims, with others, were referred by Congress to the Committee on Private Land Claims of the
·House, with direction to report by bi1I or otherwise. In July
of that year the committee recommended that certain of the
claims be confirmed; but as claims Nos. 39 and 48 were
subsequent to the Mexican limiting law of 1824, and were
under::;tood to cover much more than eleven square leagues,
these two claims were "withheld for further investigation.''
In April, 1870, the Private Land Claims Committee of the
House reported in favor of the confirmation of claim No. 48
to the extent of eleven square leagues. After further legislative proceedh~.gs in the premises, the act of July 1, 1870
(16 Stat., 046), was passed confirming to the heirs of Gervacio Nolan, under claim No. 48, lands in Colorado to the
extent of eleven square leagues. The act provides for the
locating of the lands, and for adjusting with actual settlers,
and for the costs of surveys. Section 4 enacts that the surveyor-general shall furnish properly approved plats to said
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heirs of Gervacio Nolan, or -their legal repre~eutatives,
which shall be evidence of title; and the following proviso
is appended: "Provided, however, Thati when said lands are
so confirmed, surveyed and patented, they shall be held and
taken to be in full satisfaction of all further claims or demands
cigai'.nst the United Stcites." The lands were surveyed and
patented to the heirs of said Nolan, who received the same.
No action was ever taken by Congress in relation to claim
No. 39 after it was "withheld" in 1868.
It will be noticed that the claim of Nolan's widow alld
heirs, filed in February, 1860, alleges that Nolan had purchased all the interest of Aragon and Lucero in the lands
covered by claim No. 39.
In a letter dated in 1885 and filed in the Interior Department, Mr. Pinkerton alleges that he holds the interest of
Lucero. In the statement before ine, submitted by you, Mr.
pjnkerton says (p. 2), "When Gervacio Nolan (one of the
original grantees in the Nolan grant) died in 1857, it became
necessary to sell his property for the purpose of dividing it
amongst a large family. I paid a fair price for it, receiving
in exchange a conveyance of all his rigltt, title, and interest
in the same; as his legal assignee I claimed to own a clear
Mexican title to his share in the Nolan grant, made to him
and two associates, one ..A,ntonio .Aragon, and .Antonio :Maria
Lucero." On page 4 of this statement Mr. Pinkerton .
de cribes himself "as legal assignee of all the rights, title,
and interest of Gervacio Nolan to a one-third interest in
the Nolan grant."
The origin of Mr. Pinkerton's connection with this claim
No. 39, the elate of that origin, and the amount of con ideration paid are all left very ob cure.
It appear that a survey of the land covered by claim No.
39 wa made upon a depo it of the co t thereof, and plat: of
the land w r :filed in the local office at Santa Fe; but in
October, 1 81, the plat· were withdrawn in con ideratiou of
th a ·t f 1 54 and of the action of the surveyor-general
th r nu er.
Tb 1 nd remain d therefore, in re ervation until January
9, 1
when fr. ecr tary Lamar re tored the land to the
n lied main. (4 Land eci ions, 311.)
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This restoration of the land covered by claim No. 39 is the
act that Mr. Pinkerton complains of in this communication
of March 23, 1891. This decision of the Secretary of the
Interior is upon the ground that Congress in making the
confirmation to the heirs of Nolan by the act of 1870, took
final action as to claim 'No. 39, and that the condition attached to section 4 by the proviso quoted, upon acceptance
by the heirs of Nolan, determined all further rights under
claims Nos. 39 and 48 outside of the lands confirmed by the
act of 1870. Mr. ..Attorney-General Garland, under date of
April 23, 1887 (19 Opin., 8), reviews the question a11d holds,
in effect, that as the surveyor-general reported iu favor of
the confirmation of claim No. 39, therefore section 8 of the
act of 1854 requires that the land be held in reservation nntil
final action by Congress on the claim; and holds that the
confirmation of a portion of the claim No. 48 was not final
action upon claim No. 39.
It is stated in Mr. Secretary Lamar's decision (p. 313) that
Mr. District Attorney Mills, of New Mexico, states that hundreds of suits have been instituted against settlers located
upon lands within claim No. 39 1 and that one of them (Pinkerton v. Ledoux) has been appealed to the Supreme Court. It
is found that said case was decided in 1889 and is reported
(129 U. S., 346). It appears that the action is ejectment,
whereby Pinkerton seeks possession of a quarter section
within the Nolan grant (No. 39). The case as a whole is not
of much consequence in this investigation, but certain outcroppings are of interest. It appears that no plat is shown
to have been annexed to the act of juridical possession; that
under the claim of plaintiff the whole tract would embrace
nearly 1,000 square miles, "whilst if it is confined to one
league west of the Red River, as would seem to be the meaning of the original petition and grant, the quantity would
still be over 100 square miles." The proof of title seems to
have been remarkably simple.
The plaintiff gave in evidence the original Nolan grant,
consisting of petition~ grant, and juridical possession; the
report of the surveyor-general was received without objection, and "the defendant's counsel admitted that the plaintiff had acquired all the title of the original grantees in and
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heirs of Gervacio Nolan, or -their legal repreEieutatives,
.which sball be evidence of title; and the following proviso
is appended: "Provided, however, That when said lands are
so con.firmed, surveyed and patented, they shall be held and
taken to be in full satisfaction of all further claims or demands
against the United States." The lands were surveyed aud
patented to the heirs of said Nolan, who received the same.
No action was ever taken by Congress in relation to claim
No. 39 after it was "withheld" in 1868.
It will be noticed that the claim of Nolan's widow aud
heirs, filed in February, 1860, alleges that Nolan had purchased all the interest of Aragon and Lucero in the lauds
covered by claim No. 39.
In a letter dated in 1885 and filed in the Interior Department, Mr. Pinkerton alleges that he holds the interest of
Lucero. In the statement before ine, submitted by you, Mr.
Pinkerton says (p. 2), "When Gervacio Nolan (one of the
original grantees in the Nolan grant) died in 1857, it became
neeessa.ry to sell his property for the purpose of dividing it
amongst a large family. I paid a fair price for it, receiving
in exchange a conveyance of all his right, title, and interest
in the same; as his legal assignee I claimed to own a clear
Mexican title to his share in the Nolan grant, made to him
and two associates, one .A.ntonio Aragon, and Antonio :Maria
Lucero." On page 4 of this statement Mr. Pinkerton .
describes himself "as legal assignee of all the rights, title,
and interest of Gervacio Nolan to a one-third interest in
the .r olan grant."
The origin of Mr. Pinkerton's connection with this claim
No. 39, the date of that origin, and the amount of consideration paid are all left very obscure.
It appear that a survey of the land covered by claim No.
39 wa made upon a depo it of the cost thereof, and plat. · of
the land were filed in the local office at Santa Fe; but in
October, 1 81, the plat · were withdrawn in con ideratiou of
th act of 1 54 and of the action of the urveyor-general
th r under.
Tb land remained th refore, in re ervation until January
9,
when Mr. ecretary Lamar re tored the land to the
pu lie domain. (4 Land Deci ions, 311.)
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This restoration of the land covered by claim No. 39 is the
act that Mr. Pinkerton complains of in this communication
of March 23, 1891.. Tb.is decision of the Secretary of the
Interior is upon the ground that Congress in making the
confirmation to the heirs of Nolau by the act of 1870, took
final action as to claim 'No. 39, and that the condition attached to section 4 by the proviso quoted, upon acceptance
by the heirs of Nolan, determined all further rights under
claims Nos. 39 and 48 outside of the lands confirmed by the
act of 1870. Mr. Attorney-General Garland, under date of
April 23, 1887 (19 Opin., 8), reviews the question aud 1oldsr
in effect, that as the surveyor-general reported iu favor of
the confirmation of claim No. 39, therefore section 8 of the
act of 1854 requires that the land be held in reservation nntil
final action by Congress on the claim; and holds that the
confirmation of a portion of the claim No. 48 was not final
action upon claim No. 39.
It is stated in Mr. Secretary Lamar's decision (p. 313) that
Mr. District .Attorney Mills, of New Mexico, states that hundreds of suits have been instituted against settlers located
upon lands within claim No. 39, and that one of them (Pinkerton v. Ledoux) has been appealed to the Supreme Court. It
is found that said case was decided in 1889 and is reported
(129 U. S., 346). It appears that the action is ejectmentr
whereby Pinkerton seeks possession of a quarter section
within the Nolan grant (No. 39). The case as a whole is not
of much consequence in this investigation, but certain outcroppings are of interest. It appears that no plat is shown
to have been annexed to the act of juridical possession; that
under the claim of plaintiff the whole tract would embrace
nearly 1,000 square miles, "whilst if it is confined to one
league west of the Red River, as would seem to be the meaning of the original petition and grant, the quantity would
still be over 100 square miles." The proof of title seems to
have been remarkably simple.
The plaintiff gave in evidence the original Nolan grant,
consisting of petition~ grant, and juridical possession; the
report of the surveyor-general was received without objection, and "the defendant's counsel admitted that the plaintiff had acquired all the title of the original grantees in and
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to the western half of the grant to the north of the Santa
Clara hills," covering, as plaintiff claimed, the land then in
controversy.
The jury rendered a verdict for defendant.
.
The opinion upon the review is by Mr. Justice Bradley,
and concludes as follows:
"We see nothing in ·the charge of which the plaintiff can
properly complain.
"This case seems to have been very perfunctorily tried
and discussed. There is a question which may be entitled
to much consideration, whether the Nolan title has any validity at all without confirmation by Congress. The act of
July 22, 1854, before referred to, seems to imply that this
was necessary. There is also another act of Congress which
may have a bearing on the case. We refer to the act of July
1, 1870 (16 Stat., 646, c. 202), by which another grant to
Nolan was confirmed to the extent of 11 leagues. After
various provisions with regard to the exterior lines of those
11 leagues, the fourth section declares 'that upon the adjustment of said claim of the heirs of Gervacio Nolan, according
to the provisions of this act, it shall be the duty of the surveyor-general of the district to furnish properly approved
plats to said claimants, etc.: Provided, That when said lands
are o confirmed, surveyed and patented, they shall be held
and taken to be in full satisfaction of all further claims or
demands against the United States.'
"Whether this provision was not intended to affect the
entire claim of Nolan for any grant of lands in New Mexico
may be a serious question. Without expres ing any opinion
on the .·u bject, it uffice to ay that we see no error in the
jud 0 ·ment of the supreme court of New Mexico, and it i
th r for affirmed."
Ir. Pinkerton tate his age to be 80 year , and that he
bad been a citizen of th
nited States for twenty-three
y ar, previous to the deci ion made by Mr. Secretary Lamar
in 1 6.
I ap ear that at ome time within or since 1889 be
e m a ·itizen of th
public of fexico, and then throu 0 ·h
th r pr nt ti e of that overnment, ought to have hi
claim mHl r laim .r o. 39 confirm d or ecur d to him a a
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Thus Mr. Pinkerton's claim became the subject of an international correspondence. In connnection with that correspondence the Secretary of the Interior transmitted to the
Secretary of State an elaborate history of the Pinkerton case,
accompanied with many documents. This letter of Mr. Secretary Noble bears date November 26, 1890. Itis understood
that the Secretary of State declined to accede to the request
presented.in Mr. Pinkerton's behalf, holding that as Pinkerton expatriated himself subsequently to the decision of Mr.
Secretary Lamar, made in 1886, he is not in position to invoke
the aid of Mexico as against an act of this Goverment done
while Pinkerton was a subject thereof.
And, in effect, that Mr. Pinkerton has no standing as a
Mexican to demand from this Government an arbitration
under the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo as to an act, or as to
the effect of an act, performed by this Government while he
was a citizen of the United States.
Of the correctness of this position there can be no question.
Therefore, in any view of the case, Mr. Pinkerton is not
entitled to the arbitration which he solicits. n; however, he
believes that he is entitled to further consideration in relation to his claims under No. 39, he is undoubtedly entitled to
seek a remedy under the act of March 3, 1891 (Public, 140),
being '' An act to establish a court of private land claims in
certain States and Territories." This act is especially provided for a just and final determination of Spanish and
Mexican grants.
In conclusion, I beg to say: That if the action of the
Secretary of the Interior, taken January 9, 1886, is approved,
Mr. Pinkerton is without ground of complaint.
If that action is not approved, and the opinion announced
by the Attorney-General April 23, 1887, that "final action of
Congress on such claim" had not then been had is sustained,
then the subsequent enactment of March 3, 1891, provides
such final action, and Mr. Pinkerton has no continuing cause
for complaint.
It is my opinion that Mr. Pinkerton's communication is not
entitled to further Executive consideration.
Very respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The PRESIDENT.
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SILVER-BULLION ACT-TREASURY NOTES-SEIGNIORAGE .
Under the act of July 14, 1890, chapter 708, directing the purchase of
silver bullion ancl the issue of Treasury notes, other Treasury notes
can not be issued on the gain or seigniorage arit:!ing from the coinage
provided for in the act and paid into the Treasury.
The Secretary of the Treasury has power to issue silver certificates in
exchange for all standard silver dollars which have been properly
coined and put into circulation and are offered at the Treasury for
exchange in sums not leli!s than $10; whether such silver represents
profit or seigniorage is immaterial.
The law mut1t ue construed in c9nnection with the act of February 28,
1878, chapter 20.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 21, 1891.
Srn: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of the 14th instant, iu which you ask three question
with relation to the construction of the act of July 14, 1890
(26 Stat., 289), directing the purchase of silver bullion and
the issue of 'l'reasury notes thereon.
The que ·tio11s are as follows:
Fir t. Whether Treasury notes of the character authorizecl
by the act may be issued on 'the gain or seigniorage arising
from the coinage provided for in the act and paid into the
Treasury.
Second. Whether silver certificates may be issued again t
silver dollars paid into the Treasury as such gain or seign-
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purpose of purchasing bullion and bringing it into the Treasury, and, of course, must be limited by the amount necessary for such purcllase. This view is confirmed, if confirmation be ne<;iessary, by the provision in the second section that
"no greater or less amount of such notes shall be outstanding at any time than the cost of the silver bullion, and (of)
the standard silver dollars coined therefrom then held in the
Treasury purchased by such notes."
The Treasury notes must always just equal the cost of the
silver bullion purchased.
Your first question, therefore, is answered in the negativ~.
Touching the second question-whether silver certificates
may be issued against silver dollars paid into the Treasury
as such gain or seigniorage-the act under consideration
makes no provision in reference to silver certificates. The
law as to the issue and use of such certificates must be found
by construing this act in connection with the act of February
28, 1878, (20 Stat. L., p. 25.) The only provision in the1atter
act touching silver certificates is in the third section, which
reads as follows:
·
" That any holder of the coin authorized by this act may
deposit the same with the Treasurer or any assistant
treasurer of the United States, in s~ms not less than ten
dollars, and receive therefor certificates of not less than ten
dol1ars each, corresponding with the denominations of the
United States notes. The coin deposited for or representing
the certificates shall be retained in the Treasury for the
payment of the same on demand. Said certificates sha11 be
receivable for customs, taxes, and all public dues, and, when
so received, may be reissued.''
This section provides for the issue of silver certificates to
the "holder" of the silver standard dollars when presented
in sums not less than $10. It does not authorize the issue
of certificates against dollars in the Treasury, but in
exchange for dollars offered at the Treasury. The act of
1878 required the Secretary to purchase and coin not less
than $2,000,000 or more than $4,00U,000 worth of silver
bullion per month, and provided tlmt "any gain or seigniorage arising from this coinage shall be accounted for and
paid into the Treasury as provided under existing laws
relative to the suusi<liary coinage."
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The law as to the disposition of the profit on subsWiary
coinage is found in section 3526, Revised Statutes, aud is
substantially that the balance to the credit of this profit
fund shall, at least twice a year, be paid into the Trea ury
of the United States. Section 3 of the act of 1890 in like
manner requires that "any gain or seignforage arising from
such coinage shall be acconuted for and paid into the
Treasury."
This profit becomes a part of the general fund in the
Treasury, and is subject to the same uses as the balance of
such funds.
It will be noticed that section 3 of the act of 1878 provides
for the issuing of silver certificates to any "holder" of the
coin authorized by the act. The act of 1890, being in pari
niateria with the act of 1878, the same provision would be
applicable to the issue of certificates for dollars coined under
the later act. It is entirely clear to my mind that the word
'ho]<ler, " as used in the third section of the act of 1878,
does not include the Director of _the Mint~ or any other officer of the United States who brings the coin to the Treasury,
and is credited therewith on the charge against him for the
bullion, but the word '' holder" means a person, other than
an officer of the United States, who ha come into the pos esion of the silver <lo'.I.lars. In other words, as stated with
refer uce to the Trea ury note, issued under the first section
of the act of 1890, the silver certificates are not i ued upon
coin in the Treasury, but, theoretically at least, in exchange
for standard il ver dollar ' offered at the Trea ·ury; and I
have no douut as to your authority to i sue ilver certificates
in exchauge for all tandard silver dollar which have bern
properly oined and put into circulation, and are offered at
th Tr ,a ury for uch change, in um not le s than 10.
Wh th r u •h ilver repre eats profit or igniorage I think
i wb lly immat rial. The only limitation ' C m to b that,
:£ r e ery 10 f ilv r ertificat i ' u d, a like amount of
in d ·tandar<l ilv r ollar · hall g into the Trea nry.
Th :£ r o- ino- au wer your third que tion a well a the
·ond.
ery re
·tfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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NOTICE OF PAYMENT OF BONDS.
In answer to a question by the Secretary of the Treasury, whether in
the event of the public unconditional announcement that interest on
the 4-½ per cent bonds issued under the act of July 14, 1870, chapter
256, would cease after a certain specified day, the Secretnry of the
'I'reasury would be precluded from negotiating with the holders of
bonds for a continuance thereof at a lower rate of interest, a reply was
given that the language of section 3 of the act r6quired the Secretary
to pay all the bonds designated for payment in any notice. A suggestion was giYen that a similar course be taken to that pursued in
the case of the 5 per cent bonds, and that to the notice be appended
a statement that if within defined limits some holders of the bonds
requested to have them continued during the pleasure of the Government at 3-½ per cent interest, such request would be granted. provided
they were deposited before a certain day. It was stated that that
arrangement, although criticised, stood as a precedent for the guidance of the Secretary of the Treasury.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 29, 1891.
SIR: Your letter of even date herewith submits for opinion
the question "whether in the event of the publication by this
Department of an unconditional announcem.e.nt tLat interest
on the bonds of the 4½ per cent loan will cease on a certain
specified day after September 1, 1891, and -that the bonds
will be paid on that day, the Department would, by such
publication, be cut off from the dght it now has of negotiating with the holders of the bonds for a continuance thereof
at a lower rate of interest."
The bonds in question were issued by authority of the act
of July 14, 1870, entitled ".An act, to authorize the refunding
of the national debt" (16 Stat., 272), which authorizes (sec. 1)
the Secretary of the Treasury to issue 5 per cent bonds to
an amount not to exceed $200,000,000, and 4½ per cent bonds
to an amount not to exceed $300,000,000, and 4 per cent
bonds to an amount not to exceed $1,000,ooo,ooo, the 5 per
cents to be payable ten years from the date of issue "at the
pleasiire of the United States," the 4½ per cents fifteen years
from the date of issue ''at the pleasure of the United
States," and the 4 per cents thirty years from the date of
issue "at the pleasure of the United States."
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The provision of this act which bears on the question
before me is section 3, which is in the following words:
"And be it further enacted, That the payment of any of the
bonds hereby authorized after the expiration of the said several terms of ten, :fifteen, and thirty years shall be made in
amounts to be determined from time to time by the Secretary
of the Treasury at his discretion, the bonds so to be paid to
be distinguished and described by the dates and numbers,
beginning for each successive payment with the bonds of
each class last dated and numbered, of the time of wbich
intended payment or redemption the Secretary of the Treas.
ury shall give public notice; and the interest on the partic.
ular bonds so selected at any time to be paid shall cease at
the expiration of three months from the date of such notice."
This language, by taking away all authority to pay interest three months "aHer the date of such notice," would seem
to make it imperative on the Secretary of the Treasury to
pay all the bonds designated for payment in any notice to
be given.
If less than the bonds designated in such notice should be
paid, those left unpaid would cease to bear interest, a result
which i , of course, to be avoided.
It would seem, however, that some such course might be
taken with reference to these 4½ per cents as was taken with
. reference to the 5 per cent bonds issued under the act of
.July 14, 1 70, which were redeemable at the pleasure of the
United tates after ten years from the date of their issue.
On May 12, 1881, the Secretary of the Treasury called for
-certain of these bonds and to the call was appended a clause
that in any case any of the holder ' of such bonds (within
defined limits) "shall reque.st to have their bonds continued
-during the pleasure of the Government, with interest at the
rate f 3½ per cent per annum in lieu of their payment at the
-date 'pecifi d, uch regue t will be granted if the bonds are
r eiv d by the ecretary of the Trea ury on or before the
1 t day of July, 1 1."
Certain b ndholder availed them elves of the privilege of
-0 ntinuing their bond at the reduced interest rate of 3½ per
nt ( ·e 17 Opin. 349).
It i true the arrangem nt thu made omewhat out 'ide
tb 1 t r f th 1, w wa riti ·i · d in Congre s, but it to d,
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and may be referred to as a precedent for your guidance in
the case of the 4½ per cents should you be willing to continue any of them at a reduced rate of interest beyond the
time named for redemption in the contemplated call.
I am, sir, your most obedient servant,
WM. .A. MAURY,
Acting Attorney-General.

The
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ROCK CREEK PARK-PURCHASE OF LAND.
The mere fact that the law authorizing the acquisition of land for Rock
Creek Park, of date September 27, 1890, chapter 1001, requires the
commission , if unable to agree with the owner of the land selected
within thirty days' time, to apply for an assessment of the value of
such land as it has been unable to purchase at its assessed price, does
not preclude the commission from later purchasing by agreement the
land of certain property-owners, although judicial proceedings have
been commenced for the assesRment of the value of the land.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTIOE,

June ·5, 1891.
SIR: By the act of Congress of September 27, 1890, entitled "An act authorizing the establishing of a public park
in the District of Columbia" (Laws 1889-1890, p. 492), it
:is directed (section 1) that a tract of land, not exceeding
2,000 acres, sba11 be set aside for the purpose stated in the
title, and shall be known by the name of "Rock Creek Park;''
and, to carry out the purposes of the act, it is provided (section 2) that a commission shall be appointed.
Section 3 of the act then declares as follows:
"That the said cornrni~sion shall cause to be made an ac,curate map of said Rock Creek Park, showing the location,
'l_uantity, and character of each parcel of private property to
l>e taken for such purpose, with the names of the respective
owners inscribed thereon, which map shall be .filed and recorded in the public records of the District of Columbia, and
from and after the <late of .filing said map the several tracts
and parcels of land embraced i.n said Rock Creek Park shall
be held as condemned for public uses, and the title thereof
vested in the United States, subject to the payment of just
5687-V0L 20--9
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compensation, to be determined by said commission, and approved by the President of the United States: Provided,
That such compensation be accepted by the owner or owners
of the several parcels of land.
·
"That if the said commission shall be unable by agreement with the respective owners to purchase all of the land
so selected and condemned within thirty days after such condernuation, at the price approved by the President of the
United States, it shall, at the expiration of such period of
thirty days, make application to the supreme court of the
District of Columbia, by petition at a general or special term,
for an assessment of the value of such land ~s it has been
unable to purchase.
"Said petition shall contain a particular description of the
property selected and condemned, with the uame of the owner
or owners thereof, if known, and their residences, as far as the
same may be ascertained, together with a copy of the recorded map of the park, and the said court is hereby authorized and required, upon such application, without delay, to
notify the owners and occupants of the land, if known, by
personal service, and if unknown, by service by publication,
and to ascertain and assess the value of the land so selected
and condemned, by appointing three competent and disint rested commissioners to appraise the value and values
thereof, and to return the appraisement to the court; and
when the value or values of such land are thus ascertained,
and the Pre ident of the United States shall decide the ~ame
to be reasonable, said value or values shall be paid to the
owner or owners, and the United States shall be deemed to
have a valid title to said land; and if in any case the owner
or owner of any portion of said land shall refuse or ne 1ect,
after tbe apprai ement of the ca h value of said lands and
im rovement ,tod mandorrec ivethe amefrom aidcourt,
upon d po iting the apprai, ed value in aid court to the
er Ht of uch owner or owner , re pectively, the fee- 'imple,
hall in lik manner be ve t d in the United tate ."
Th
ion tbu con titut d, selected the land necesrk au pr p r cl, filed, and recorded a map
a r quir by the.Jaw.
mmi, i n h ving e n un ble, within thirty days
aft r tb dat of cond mu tion t
r ea t comp u. a ion
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with the owners of the larger part of the land condemned
applied to the supreme court of the District to assess the
value of the said land.
But since the application to the court was made, the commission and the owners of some of the land em braced in the
application have agreed on what would be just compensation for their land, but a doubt has been started as to
whether the commission has authority to make such an
agreement, now that judicial proceedings have been commenced for the purpose of assessing the value of the said
land. Upon this question an opinion is requested.
It is true that the law requires (section 3) the commission
to apply to the supreme court of the District at the expiration of thirty days after condemnation "for an assessmeut
of the value of such land as it has been unable to purchase,''
and that the words just quoted refer to land remaining
unpurchased at the expiration of the period mentioned and
at the commencement of the judicial proceedings required to
be then taken.
But I am unable to bring myself to the conclusion that
tb.e commencement of judicial proceedings, after the expiration of the thirty days, puts an end to the power of the
commission and the landowners to come to an agreement of
purchase, subject to the approval of the President, at any
time before such proceedings are complete. The right of
eminent domain is, at best, a harsh one, and it would require very explicit language to authorize me to hold that
Congress intended that the mere pendency of proceedings
for the enforcement of that right should supersede the
power of the commission to acqnire by purchase. Certainly
the direction of the statute that the commission shall apply
to the court to assess the value of all land not purchas~d
within thirty days after condemnation is, in my judgment,
not sufficient to warrant such a conclusion.
I think that the opinion in f~vor of a continuing power in
the commission is strengthened by the consideration that
Congress has not given the quality of finality to valuations
made by the court any more than to those made by the commission. In both instances a valuation, to have validity,
must be approved by the President, and it is fair to say that
Congress does not seem to indicate any preference between
these two modes of proceeding.
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Again, as the appropriation made by the act is to cover
the expenses of "inquiry, survey, assessment, cost of lands
taken, and all other necessary expenses incidental thereto,"
it is hardly supposable that Congress contemplated that the
amount of the appropriation applicable to the main object of
the act should be reduced by the costs of continuing the proceedings in court after a landowner has agreed to accept the
compensation offered by the commission and approved by the
President.
The fact that the commission has, with the approval of
the President, heretofore valued the particular land now in
question is, in my opinion, no obstacle whatever to its making a new valuation.
•
It results, therefore, that, in my opinion, the commission
may, with the approval of the President, carry out the said
agreement with certain of the landowners.
Very respectful1y, yours,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The PRESIDENT.
BUREAU OF ENGRAVING AND PRINTING.
Section 2 of the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 123, reqniringthe Cbiefofthe
Bureau of Engraving and Printing to submit estimates of the cost of
executing certain work for tbe Post-Office Department and to per form the work if bis estimates be lower than the proposals of the
other bidders, is mandatory in its provisions; if, however, by rea on
of aubseqnent legisla,tion or inadequate facilities, the tatute ha become impossible of execution, such facts may properly be considered
in i,ubmitting the bids and also may properly be considered by the
Postmaster-General in making the awards.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

J1lne 8, 1 91.
Sm: Under date of June 5 instant the .Acting Secretary
of the Tr a ury write me a follows:
' I hav the honor to tran mit herewith a copy of a letter
hi f of tl1 Bureaa of Engraving and Printing,
dat d th 4th in tant, recommending that your opiui n be
r qn t a t th ffi ·t of ,'ecti n of the act of l\Iarch 3
1
( tat.
1 2..., p. 5"" ) whi ·h provid , that the 'hief of
he 11 U mit timat Of h CO t Of X uting
t- f6 e
partm nt and ball per,.J
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fom1 such work if bis estimate be lower than the pr\)posals
of other reasonable bidders. The act referred to provides
that the supplies desired shall be obtained under advertise. men ts calling for proposals to furnish the same for 'a period
of four years.'
"In pursuance of the statute the Chief of the Bureau submitted estimates in ·1883 and in 1887 for certain classes of
printed and engraved matter, butthecontracts were awarded
to other establishments whose proposals were lower. At
the time those estimates were submitted certain steam
presses owned by the Government were in operation, and
others might lawfully have been obtained and employed; but
legislation since enacted has imposed conditions which have
compelled the Bureau to discontinue the use of the presses~
and its facilities have thereby been so hampered that it is
unable promptly to execute the <1rders of this Department,
and would of course find it impossible to accomplish the
additional task of fulfilling a contract with the Post-Office
Department.
"Please advise me whether, in view of these facts, the
statute is still mandatory upon the Chief of the Bureau of
Engraving and Printing."
In answer I have to say that there is nothing in the form
or substance of the statute referred to to indicate that it was
not intended by Congress to be mandatory. If by reason
of subsequent legislation the statute has become impossible
of execution, the facts which make it so may be very properly
stated in connection with the bid submitted. Or, if tb,e
force or facilities at command in the Bureau of Engraving
and Printing are inadequate to the work, or to make them
adequate thereto would involve a large outlay, such facts
may well be considered in submitting the bid, and all of these
facts may very properly be considered by the PostmasterGeneral in making the award of the contract.
I have the honor to be, respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
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DIRECT TAX-PAYMENT TO STATES.
The amount of the direct tax coming to the State of Vermont as repayment under the act of March 2, 1891, chapter 496, is $179,4-07.80; but ·
the question arises as to whether the Secretary of the Treasury should
withhold any or all of this money from the State of Vermont in pursuance of the requirements of the act of March 3, 1875, chapter 149,
inasmuch as the State of Vermont is charged on the books of the
Department in the sum of $543,780.23, the amount alleged to have
been overdrawn by that State for arms under section 1661, Revised
Statutes.
It appeari that these arms consisted entirely of ordnance and ordnance
stores and di<l. not include any clothing or quartermasters' stores, and
were delivered within the State in December, 1864, for the purpose of
repelling a threatened invasion from Canada. The facts oftb(I invasion reviewed historically and shown to have been really an invasion
of the United States by the Confederates, and that the defense of Vermont against incursion from Canada was a defense of the United
States against Confederate insurgents: Held that the act of March 3,
1875, does not apply to an unliquiclated claim in favor of a State,
arising out of a particular charge which is subject to equitable recoupments in an unadjusted transaction, and that statute has no application
in this case, and the Secretary of thll Treasury is justified in paying
to the State of Vermont the amount of its share of the refund oftbe
direct tax, leaving the other accounts in controversy between the
United States and that State to be adjusted by an accounting afterwards by the Treasury Department and the legal officers of the Government.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June ll, 1891.
SIR: I am in receipt of your Jetter of the 5th u1t.imo, submitting inquiries in relation to payments to be made under
the act of March 2, 1891, entitled "An act to credit and pay
to the everal State "mnneys collected under the direct tax
a t of .August 5, 1861, with inclosures.
A th e inquiries relate mainly to the case of the State of
Vermont I will an were pecially a to that cas .
The aid act of l\Iarch 2, 1891 (Stat., 822) i intended to
r turn to the tate the money taken from them under ection 8 of the act of ugu t 5, l 61 (12 Stat., 292).
It require the Se r t ry of the Trea"' ury to credit to each
tate a um qual t
11 Ile tion made under that act,
and ap r priat all um n · ary to reimbur e the State
for the money found due to such State under this act and
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directs the Treasurer of the United States to pay the same to
the governors of the States.
The amount of the direct tax going to the State of Vermont under this act of 1891 is stated to be $179,407.80.
Unless it shall appear that some debt exists on behalf of
the United States against the State of Vermont which ought,
legally and properly, to be set off against the moneys of the
direct tax, then unquestionably there should be paid to the
said State under said act of 1891 the sum of $179,407.80.
This case comes to me for my opinion under the following
circumstances :
It appears that while preparing for the refnnd required
by said act of March 2, and under date of March 28, 1891,
the First Comptroller made inquiry of the War Department
whether any State stands indebted in any bureau of such
Department, and if so, the amount and on what account.
Under date of March 31, answer is made from the Ordnance Office that" The following States and Territories are charged on the
books of this office with the following amounts, being for
arms, etc., overdrawn by them under section 1661, Revised
Statutes, prior to February 12, 1887, viz: * * :11&· Vermont,
$54:1, 780.23."
.
Thereupon it was, upon the suggestion of the First Comptroller, submitted to the Second Comptroller of the Treasury
for his opinion a,s to whether the amounts charged against
the States named constitute such claims as may be withheld
by the Secretary of the Treasury under act of March 3, 1875
(18 Stat., 481).
The Second Comptroller makes answer April 9, and therein
states with reference to the State of Vermont that, "It
appears that the indebtedness arose from the fact that the
U. S. Government loaned to the State in October, 1864,
ordnance stores for the purpose of enabling it to arm
its militia in order to be in readiness to defend the State
against any invasion acroHs the Canaq.a border in aid of the .
rebellion. It is alleged that the State sold a large portion
of these stores, and that the money received from the sales
wa paid into the State Treasury, and has ever since been
retained by the State.
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"It also appears that the State has an unadjusted claim
against the United States a1nounting to $66,890.16, for
money expended under the act of July 27, 1861, inequippingtroops for the Federal service in the war of the rebellion.
* * * The State also claims that it is entitled to be allowed
the expenses incurred by it in arming and equipping the
State militia in 1864 to prevent the threatened raid from
Canada, amounting to about $200,000."
The Second Comptroller further says that negotiations for
settlement were had, but without effect; and he suggests
that, as the accounts between the United States and theStates and Territories have not been audited and settled
under the Revised Statutes, the Secretary might not be justified in deducting them, yet he thinks that a sufficient sum
to cover the alleged indebtedness should be withlield until
the determination of the question.
Under date of April 27, the Second Comptroller addresses
a further communication to the Secretary of the Treasury, in
--:vhich he refers to that of .April 9, and says that, upon further con i<leration. of the subject in connection with the
charge against Vermont, "I feel by no means satisfied of
the legality of the charge reported by the War Department,
but think there is a reasonable doubt as to whether the
advance to said State of the large quantities of a.rms and
ordnance tores did, under the then existing circum tances,
con titute ~ uch an indebtedness on the part of the tate to
the General Government as to bring it within the operation
of the act of March 3, 1 75."
Ile then recommends "that the whole matter be referred
to the Attom y- General * * * with the reque t for
• • * hi opinion, ' etc. He then proc eds to give important hi tori al tatement bearing upon the que tion under
consideration.
our letter of May 5 tran mit the. e communication
with ther inclo ur
and call for my pinion upon the
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These arms and stores consisted of field batteries of artillery, with their carriages and ammunition; infantry muskets
and rifles, with their accouterments and ammuuition; cavalry
equipments, and so forth, and consisted wholly of ordnance
and ordnance stores, and did not include any clothing or
quartermaster stores.
The stores charged were ordered to be delivered in December, 1864, and were delivered within the State in said month,
or soon thereafter, at the cost of the General Government.
It has been said that there is no precedent for the case
now under consideration. Granting the truth of this, it may
be added that no similar question exists between the United
States and any other State; therefore the decision made
relates exclusively to the case of Vermont.
The Confederate attack on St. Albans, a Vermont village
located about twelve miles from the Canadian line, occurred
October 19, 1864.
Lieut.BennettH. Young, with twentyormore Confederates,
appeared in that village and made an attack upon it in the
nature of a raid. The attacking party robbed three banks
of about $200,000, killed one man, wounded others, seized
and took away horses, took armed possession of a portion of
the village, held many of the citizens prisoners for awhile,
and shot at groups of people and individuals wherever seen.
They claimed to be Confederate soldiers; that they came
to retaliate for acts done in the South, and that they represented the Confederate Sta,tes. In some instances they
administered what they called a Confederate oath; and their
leader produced "a proclamatiou" to the people declaring
their purpose to be retaliation, but circumHtances prevented
the reading thereof. The band were excellently armed, and
acted under the orders of their commanding officer as a military organization.
After seizing horses they were well mounted, and they
then moved off toward Canada with their captures in military array, discharging their navy revolvers at citizens
indiscriminately. They threatened and attempted to burn
the town, applying "Greek fire," which could only be extinguished by being hewed out of the wood.
It must be remembered that at this time there were from
15,000 to 20,000 or more rebellious citizens of the United
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States domiciled or commorant in Canada, including distinguished accredited agents of the Confederate organization.
It will also be noted that only one month previous to the
St. Albans raid a party of Confederate soldiers organized
an expedition with intent to liberate the Confederate prisoners confined on J ohnsons Island, seized the Philo Parsons
on Lake Erie, and by her aid seized, scuttled, and grounded
the Island Queen, aud then, raising the Confederate flag,
sailed to Canada, where the captors scuttled and cast off the
Parsons, and escaped with their booty to the sheltering
Dominion.
It was also well known that. during the year 1864 there
were parties of insurgents drilling at Marysburg, and that
concentrations were made at Windsor and at other places in
Canada.
.A. project for sending into the Northern States clothing
infected with malignant diseases was generally believed to
exist, and a purpose to burn Northern cities was well establi hed.
Under date of November 3, 1864, Mr. Seward wrote to Lord
Lyons: "While the Government has been engaged in considerhig Earl Monk's request, our requisitions for the offenders whose crimes wer~ committed on Lake Erie and for the
burglars and murderers who invaded Vermont remain unanswered. We hear of a new border assault at Castine, in the
State of Maine, and we are warned that plots are formed at
fontreal to fire the principal cities of the Union."
It is familiar history that during this period the whole
nergy and power of the national administration and Government were employed in su taining and strengthening the
armie then active in the Southern States against the rebelIi n.
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lieutenant June 16, 1864, ~nd ordered to report to Messrs.
Thompson a.nd Olay in the British Provinces for instructions;
and October 6 his suggestion "for a raid upon accessible
towns in Vermont, commencing with St. .Albans," was approved .
. The attack was known to and authorized by those in high
Confederate standing.
The letters captured by Gen . .Augur and reported N ovember 12, 1864 (P. 1, Dip. Cor., 1865, p. 13), supply the connecting details.
The military management of the affair on the part of the
United States was at once assumed by Maj. Gen. Dix, com
mantling the Department of the East, and his somewhat
hasty order directing pursuit of the attacking party into
Canada was modified by the President, who thus recognized
the national relations of the transaction.
The final judidal act of the proceeding against the raiders in the courts of Canada, as reported by Mr. Robert S.
Hale, agent and counsel · for the United States before the
.American-British Claims Commission, was upon warrants
issued by Judge Smith, one of Her Majesty's justices for
the superior court for the province of Canada East, and five
of the persons charged were brought before him upon an
applicatiou of the United State~ for their extradition .
.After much delay Justice Smith decided that the persons
were not the subject of extradition under the treaty, but were
belligerents against the United States in committing the acts
complained of. He said: '' I am therefore constrained to
hold that the attack on St. .Albans was a hostile expedition
authorized both expressly and impliedly by the Confederate
States, and carrietl out by a commissioned officer of their
army in command of a party of their soldiers. .And, therefore, that no act committed in the course of or as incident
to that attack can be made the ground of extradition under
the .A.shburton treaty."
The diplomatic correspondence between this country and
Great Britain from the date of the St. .Albans raid until the
close of the war abounds in references to this raid and to the
attacks made and threatened by insurgents then in Canada.
Mr. Secretary Seward, under date of October 21, 1864
writes to Mr. Burnley concerning this raid: "It is not to b~
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doubted that the object of these depredations is the same
with tb.at of the piratical operations which recently occurred
on Lake Erie, namely, to embroil the governments of the
United States and Great Britain in a border war."
Under date of November 23, 1864, Mr. Adams writes to
Earl Russell, complaining of "the manner in which the territories in America under the authority of Great Britain, both
continental and insular, are systematically used by the insur~
gents against the United States as bases for hostile proceedings of every description/'
He refers to their use of Nova Scotia, New Bruns wick, and
Bermuda, and to the cases of the Philo Parsons and Island
Queen and to the foray upon St ...A..lbans, and says: "Inroads
by marauding ruffiaus upon the population of the United
States on that border can not be tolerated."
He refers to insurgents domiciled in Canada, and gives
notice of the purpose of the United States to increase its
naval armament upon the lakes. He adds: "In taking this
step t am ad vised to assure your lordship that it is resorted
to only as an indispensable measure to the national defense."
Under these proceedings and declarations it must be
admitted that the assa,ults from Canada were attacks upon
the Uuited States, and that the defense of Vermont was an
act of the National Government in preservation of the Union.
That the State aided in carrying out this national defense
was a natural procedure under our system of goverrnnent.
At the date of the attack at St. Albans the legislature of
Vermont was in e ·sion. In his message, deUvered October
14, Governor Smith commented upon the threats of attack
and the lack of mean , of defense, and stated that the Secn~tary f \Var bad ignified his willingness to furnish arms,
accouterment , and ordnance stores, and he added: "I also
receiv d per 011al a urauce from the Secretary tha.t camp
equipm nt , uch a lllight be required for drill and instruction iu camp, w uld be freely furni hed by the Department
t th extent need cl on proper requi ition."
ov m r .:.12 public a ·t o. 1 was pas ed, practically
Ir vidin · fi r th eur llmeut f the arms-bearing men of
th
tat a cl ivi i1w the tate into twelve military distri ·t ' with luly con ti ut d and officered military organizati n in •ach.
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Under this act twelve regiments of infantry, one regiment
of cava,lry, and three batteries of artillery were organized.
All were uniformed, armed, and equipped, and made ready for
efficient service.
Sma11 amounts of arms weTe furnished by the Secretary_of
War immediately after the attack of October 19, 1864, but
these do not appear to be of consequence in this investigation.
After the legislative action above specified, and in December, 1864, the governor and quirtermaster-general of the
State came to Washington, and consulted with the President
and Secretary of War about supplying the authorized military organizations.
Governor Ormsbee, in his message of November 5, 1886,
refers to these negotiations, and states that Governor Smith
'• went to Washington to confer with the President and Secretary of War as to measures and means of national defense
against anticipated raids and invasions," and further states
that:
"A conference was had, and President Lincoln and Secretary Stanton were very solicitous that the State of Vermont should organize a force of militia sufficient to meet the
emergency, so that the national forces at the front might not
be weakened by calling from that source. It will be remembered that this was a period of great importance and solicitude as to national affairs, and I have the authority of
Governor Smith for saying tll at both President Lincoln and
Secretary Stanton persona.Uy besought him to make every
proper effort to have such a force of militia organized, at the
same time giving most unqualified assurance that the General Government would furnish the necessary arms and
ammunition to put such a force on war footing."
It does not appear that this statement, or that one previously quoted from Governor Smith's message, has ever been
questioned.
State Quartermaster Pitkin, in his report to Governor
Smith, dated October 1, 1865, says:
"On the 11th day of December last I accompanied you to
Washington, D. C., for the purpose of procuring from the
War Department arms, accouterments, clothing, camp
equipage, etc., for the use of the militia. I succeeded in
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obtaining from the Ordnance Department, upon requisitions
approved by you, all ordnance stores required. Camp
equipage and, clothing could not then be procured from the
United States, and, in compliance with your order, I purchased such quantities as were considered necessary for
immediate use."
December 7, 1864, Governor Smith requested the War
Department to furnish the State arms, accouterments, ordnance stores, ammunition, equipments, camp and garrison
equipage, complete, and aiso "uniforms, consisting of caps,
coats, and pants" sufficient for arming, equipping, and uniforming 12 regiments of infantry, 1 of cavalry, and 3 batteties of artillery.
The records of the War Department show the following
action upon this request:
Referred to Chief of Ordnance to report whether the ordnance supplies can be furnished.
E. M. STANTON.
ORDNANCE OFFICE, December 12, 1864.
Respectfully returned. All the ordnance stores asked for
can be furnished.
A.B. DYER,
Brigadier- General, Chief of Ordnance.

Returned to the Chief of Ordnance with directions to furni h the stores required. By order of the Secretary of War.
C.A.DAN.A,
.Assistant Secretary of War.
WAR DEPARTMENT,

January 30, 1865.

(Received 0. 0. December 12, 1864.)

Under date of December 12, the Secretary of War write :
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Uniforms and camp and garrison equipage can not be furnished in the present state of the supplies of the Quartermaster's Department.
Yours truly,
EDWIN M. ST.ANTON,
Secreta:ry of War.
To his Excellency J. GREGORY SMITH,
Governor .of Vermont.
December 14, Secretary Stanton sent to Governor Smith:
"Your telegram received. I regret not having an opportunity to see you again before your departure. The military
supplies will be forwarded without delay. Instructions to
meet emergencies as they arrive will be given to Gen. Dix,
with whom you will please communicate."
Under the proceedings detailed, the militia of the State
were organtzed pursuant to legislative enactment, were furnished with arms, ordnance, and ordnance stores by the Gen-'
eral Government, and .were supplied with clothing, rubber
blankets, etc., at the expense of the State, as the Secretary
of War had then stated the War Department to be unable
to furnish them "in the present state of the supplies of the
Quartermaster's Department."
The item of $543,780.23 charged upon the books of the
Ordnance Office against the State of Vermont, as stated in
the aforesaid report of March 31, 1891, is a portion of the
property delivered to tbe State under the foregoing negotiations and orders.
The property which was delivered in 1864-'65 was valued
at about $640~000 and was charged on the books of the Ordnance Office to the State in the account of arms, etc., furnished to the militia of the United States under the act of
April 23, 1808.
In the State quartermaster's report before cited he says:
"In compliance with the orders of the commander-in-chief,
I have furnished the militia with uniforms, arms, accouterments and ammunition."
It appears that the State expended, in connection with the
arming and equipment of the men of said orgauizations, for
uniforms, c.Jothing, rubber ponchos and tent blankets, knap-

•
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sacks, canteeus, and other supplies of like nature, the sum
of $162,831, no part of which has been repaid tc the State.
Said State also expended in connection with said troops
other considerable sums of money, which remain unadjusted.
It also appears that in the year 1870 the State sold a por
tion of said arms and ammunition for the sum of $143,469.66,
which was turned into the State treasury, and soon after
exchanged another portion for other equipments, at a valuation of $4,099.
It is claimed on behalf of the State that these arms, etc.,
Lad remained on hand for about :five years after the close of
the war; that no national law existed authorizing the return
of the arms to the General Government; that the arms were
-charged to the State upon a continuing account; that the
annual allotment of arms, etc., under the statute of 1808
was withheld from the State and was charged against tlle
property so charged to the State; that the property required
expense in care and protection, and was deteriorating in
value, and that, being offered a liberal price for a portion of
the property, the State properly and justifiably disposed
of the same.
It is not my duty to determine the correctness or validity
of these claims; but the que tion ubmitted to me is, in
substance, whether the law requires that tlle proceed of
the ale of those arms (to wit, the $147,568.66, or the
143,469.66,) should be set off again tor deducted from the
179,407. 0 to which Vermont is stated to be entitled under
the 'direct tax act" of March 2, 1891.
The que tions ari ing as to the remaining $400,000, or
thereabout , are left jn such obscurity from complications of
fact, and, perhap , from deficiences of legi lation, that they
can only e reached by the accounting or the law-making
e artment f the Government.
•
It i un r tood that the property wa charged again t
th
tate wh n the ame wa deli ered and that the b, lauce
ha
a arried along from year to year, under the a count
f th a t of 1 . until the law of February 12, 1 7, was
na ·t d h, nging the
licy of the i uance of arm for tbe
militi, t nd · n qu ntly, the ov rnm nt ha lrnd oniuuin kn , l dge of the existeuce and condition of the
r u. a ·tion.
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The law of 1808 required an annual issue of arms to each
State, with the view of keeping up a constant supply.
No State bad any interest in the arms supplied to any
other State, nor was there any provision for national control
or State responsibility to the General Government after the
arms were delivered. Here were delivered to one State,
under one order, more arms than the law allowed to be
issued to the whole United States in three years.
It is plain that the arms were delivered to Vermont to
meet, or to prevent threatened attacks, in such a manner as
should avoid withdrawing men from the armies then active
in the s·outh; and the charges were placed under the
account of the aet of 1808 as a matter of bookkeeping and
without the direction of any law.
By act of July 27, 1861 (12 Stat., 276), the Secretary of the
Treasury is directed to pay to the governor of any State the
expenses properly incurred by such State, for enro11i11g, subsisting, paying, clothing, equipping, and so forth, its troops
employed in aiding to suppress the~, insurrection against the .
United States, to be settled upon proper vouchers, to be filed
and passed upon by the proper accounting officers of the
Treasury."
·
Vermont makes claim for about $66,890 under this statute.
By the act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat., 455), it is provided
that all issues of arms and other ordnance stores made by
the War Department to States between January 1, 1861, and
April 9, 1865, under the aforesaid act of 1808, and charged
·to the States, having been made for the maintenance and
preservation of the Union, and properly chargeable to the
United States, the Secretary of Wat is authorized, upon a
proper showing by such States of the faithful disposition of
such arms and stores, to credit to the States the sums so
charged to them.
Provided, that if he shall find that any of such arms or
stores have been sold or otherwise misapplied, he shall refuse
credit for such portion thereof, and the amount thereof shall
remain a charge against the State, the same as if this act
hacl. not been passed.
If it be held that the arms charged, which were sold and
disposed of, were improperly sold and were misapplied. then
5687-V0L 20-10
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this act has no application as to those, and no adjustment
can be made under it.
It is true that the expression of Congress implies that the
selling of arms without the authority of the Government is
a misapplication, but the act declares that the issue was made
for the maintenance and preservation of the Union, and was
properly chargeable to the United States.
A reasonable deduction is that the act of 1875 is without
effect as to the question now under consideration.
It may properly be said, also, that the act of March 3, 1875
(18 Stat., 481), does not apply to an unliquidated claim in
favor of a State arising out of a property charge which is
subject to equitable recoupments, in an unadjusted transaction; and that statute bas no application in this case.
It is manifest that if the action which placed Vermont in
condition for defense should be treated as a movement
intended to defeat or ward off attacks made upon the United
State by a belligerent enemy, then the claim that the General Government should furnish, and that it expected to pay
for the war supplies for such defense, is not an unreasonable
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the phraseology used by the Secretary is strongly corroborative of the terms of the agreement as understood by the representatives of the SL.Lte.
At the date of the issue of the arms the State was entitled, upon the books of the War Department, under the act
of 1808, to $3,541.28; its quota in the field was then considerably in excess of all calls previously made; it neither
sought nor needed assistance in its State affairs or in furnishing its proportionate force for the suppression of the
rebellion. At tlle same time the General Government was
exerting its whole physical power to break up the opposing
armjes, and was exercising its diplomatic skill in preventing
attacks from Canada and a collision with Great Britain.
Under these circumstances the National Government, as a
war measure, in the performance of its duty to preserve the
Union, and under the pressure of a necessity for which it
was nowise responsible, made tbe State of Vermont its
instrument in the general service of the national defense,
and attempted to furnish it with arms and supplies.
'fhe State, as such, was not recognized as the party at war
with the r~bellion, no r with the insurgents commorant in
Canada. The purpose of those who created and controlled
the Northern disturbances was, as stated by Mr. Seward,
''to embroil the governments of the United States and Great
Britain in a border war."
Therefore, while Vermont occupied an exposed po.sition,
and from local interest was prompt to prepare to repel an
invasion, yet the aggression was against the nation, and the
defense was that "common defense" for which the people
provided in establishing the Coustitution.
In this view of the case it does not appear that there
exists such a debt ag:.1iust the State and in favor of the
United States arising out of the occurreuces and circumstances detailed, as either law or equity requires should be
set off against or deducted from the sum standing in the
State's favor under the direct tax acts of August 5, 1861, and
March 2, 18!)1.
If the cost of supplying the extraordinary organizations
of the State with uniforms, garrison arnl camp equipage
and like upplies, amounting to the $162,831, specified, or
over, i to be paid by the General Government, the claim
0
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for arms sold disappears, and the bala.nce claimed by the
State together with its claim made under the act of July
27, 1861, and such accounting by the State as the law may
authorize for all arms and stores received, will remain for
adjustment.
It does not seem to be equitable, or to be required by any
law, that the transaction of furnishing the arms, stores, etc.,
charged, the use and disposition thereof, and such legal or
equitable rights of counterclaim, or of recoupment as may
exist, should be forcibly severed and separately s·ettled.
It is shown that, November 17, 1886, the State, after
r eferring .by preamble to the condition of affairs during the
closing period of the war, and alleging the expenditure of
moneys for which "the State is justly entitled to be reimbursed by the United States," enacted a statute empowering
the governor and the auditor of accounts of the State to
adjust and settle all accounts and claims between the United
States and the State.
It is further enacted that any sums found due the State
may be received and paid into its treasury by said officers;
~nd they. are, by said law, authoriz.ed to draw upon the
trea ury of the State for any sum that may be found due to
the United State .
Therefore it appears that the State is not wanting in
preparation in the premises, but awaits the action of the
General Government.
In concln ion, permit me to say that the specified sum of
179,407. o, proceed of the "direct tax", i not shown to be
anywi e connected with, . or affected by, the arms and ordnance i sue of December, 1864, and, in my opinion, you are
authorized to pay the same to the State under the act of
March 2, 1 01.
Very re pectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SEORET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.
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APPOINTMENTS TO CAVALRY OR INFANTRY.
The words" such arm or corps" in the act of May 17, 1886, chapter 338,
refer to the arm the duties of which the graduate has been adjudged
competent to perform, and the word "vacancy" used in the act contemplates a vacancy in the arm of the service in which the additional
second lieutenant is then commissioned. A cadet found competent at
graduation to serve in one branch of the service, and commissioned to
serve there, is while he remains there out of the way to seek appointments authorized by statute in other branches of the service; consequently t~e Secretary of War is authorized to assign recent graduates,
non-commissioned officers, and civilians to the cavalry or infantry,
although "additional" second lieutenants remain in the engineers and
artillery, and no vacancies exist in the last--named branches.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 15, 1891.
Sm: I am in receipt of your communication bearing date
this day, requesting my opinion whether under the acts of
June 11, 1878 (20 Stat., 108), June 18, 1878 (20 Stat., 145), and
May 17, 1886 (24 Stat., 50), you are authorized to assign
recent graduates, non-commissioned officers, and civilians to
the cavalry or infantry, whi1e "additional" second lieutenants remain in the engineers and in the artillery, and no
vacancies exist in the two last-named branches, while many
vacancies exist in the cavalry and infantry branches.
From your communication it appears that there are now
9 additional second lieutenants commissioned in the engineer
and artillery branches of the service.
The act of June 11, 1878, prohibits in time of peace the
appointment of civilians not graduated at the Military
Academy to be second lieutenants unless more vacancies
exist in the Army than will be required by the then next
graduating class. It limits the appointees after July, 1882,
to the number of vacancies existing on the 1st day of July
of each year; and prohibits the future attaching of supernumerary officers to any company or corps of the Army, and
directs that all graduates of the Military Academy, not
appointed under this act, be discharged upon graduation.
The act of June 18, 1878, enacts that "all vacancies in the
grade of second lieutenant shall be filled by appoint~ent
from the graduates of the Military Academy so long as any
such remain in service unassigned; and any vacancies there-
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after remaining shall be filled," first, by promotion of meritorious non-commissioned officers, and in the absence of these
by appointment of persons in civil life.
Under the act of 1886! the graduate may be promoted and
commissioned as "second lieutenant in any arm or corps of
the Army in which there may be a vacancy, and the duties
of which he may have been judged competent to perform,''
and in case there be no vacancy "in such arm or corps" he
may be commissioned -" as an additional second lieutenant,"
"until a vacancy shall happen."
The words "such a.rm or corps," although somewhat
obscure in their relation, manifestly refer to the arm, the
duties of which the graduate has been judged competent to
perform.
It must be understood that the vacancy, the happening of
which is contemplated, is a vacancy in the arm of the service in which the additional second lieutenant is then commissioned.
A cadet having been found competent upon graduation to
perform the duties of a designated arm of the service, upon
being promoted and commissioned as an additional second
lieutenant therein, is entitled to remain in that branch unle s
tran ferred by order of the President or at his own request;
therefore, while an "additional" second lieutenant, he is not
in uch a position as to interfere with the assignment of subsequent graduates to other arms of the service.
Being a signed to and commissioned to serve in a specified arm, he must be held while he so remains to be out of
the way of appointments authorized by statute to be made
in other bran ·hes of the ervice.
In my opinion you are authorized to assign recent graduat , non- ommi sioned officers, and civilians to the cavalry
or infantry to fill vacancies exi ting in such branches, while
the "additional ' referred to remain attached to the arm of
s rvice in which tbey are commi ioned to serve.
Very re pe tfully,
WM . .A. MAURY,
Acting Attorney- General.
The SEORETA.RY OF W.A.B.
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CONTRACT-LABOR LAWS-WORLD'S COLUMBIAN EXPOSITION.
Clerks, storekeepers, and other persons coming to this countr.v for the
sole purpose of aiding the exhibitor to take part in the exposition
are outside of and not subject to contract-labor laws of the United
States.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 17, 1891.
SIR: Your communication of the 6th instant, inclosing a
copy of a note received from the British minister bearing
date June 1, and 0alling for a further construction of the
contract-labor law of the United States as applicable to certail'l classes of persons whose services may be required by
foreign exhibitors at the World's Columbian Exposition, was
duly received.
The question submitted is, wheth~r "clerks, stall keepers,
and other persons employe<l. by exhibitors" are within the
excluding provisions of the law.
In the official opinion transmitted to you under date of
May 5, 1891, the conclusion is state~ "that . the skilled
employes of foreign exhibitors at the World's Columbian
Exposition, who come in good faith for the purpose of setting
up audoperating themachineryof such exhibitors, are outside
of and not subject to the contract-labor laws of the United
States."
The laws providing for the Exposition were enacted after
the passage of those relating to the importation of aliens
under contract to perform labor.
The invitation extended by the United States to other
nations in the exposition law implies a consent to the bringing of necessary assistants by foreigners intending to make
exhibitions.
I deem it to be in accordance with the intent of Congress
that our contract-labor laws shall be construed in their application to exhibitors and their necessary assistants in harmony with the purposes and spirit of the VVorld's Exposition
legi lation.
.
,
It will be understood, of course, that none of those classes
or persons that are excluded from the country upon grounds
other than the ground that they come under a contract to
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perform labor, will be admitted as expert assistants of foreign exhibitors.
Tim question, then, comes to this: May foreign exhibitors,
coming under the invitat.ion of American legislation enacted
for the creation and management of the World's Exposition,
bring with them such of their trusted and skilled assistants
as are persons who might themselves come at will, as immigrants, to this country and be entitled to land under the laws
of the United States~
Incorporating herein the opinion of May 5, so far as the
same is applicable, I add, in response to your further inquiry,
that clerks and stall keepers and other persons coming to
this country for the sole purpose of aiding the exliibitor to
take part in the Exposition, are, iu my opinion, persons outside of, and not subject to, the contract-labor laws of the
United States.
Very respectfully,
WM. A. MAURY,
Acting Attorney-General.
The SECRET.A.RY OF ST.A.TE.

LOST HORSES.
The act of March 2, 1861, entitled ".An act to provide for the payment
of exp n es incurred by the Territories of Washington and Oregon
in the suppression of Indian hostilities therein in the year 1856" is
not an am ndment of the act of March 3, 184-9, but special, independent leO'islation, and none the less so because it adopts by reference
c rtain provisions of the act of 1849.
DnrinO' the year 1890 three claims for horses lost in the Indian war of
18-5 and 1856 were fil d in the office of the Third Auditor of the
Trea ury and allowed as meritorious. Held, that they were barred
by the i.Jroad language of the provision of the appropriation act of
March 3, 1873, not having been presented by the end of the fiscal
year 1874.
DEP .A.RTl\IENT OF JUSTICE,

June 19, 1 91.
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fifty-six," provision is made (section 1) for compensating certain Oregon and Washington regiments and companies of
volunteers which had been engaged in suppre8sing the said
Indian hostilities, under specified conditions and r~strictions.
It also provides for the payment of claims '' for services, supplies, transportation, and so forth, incurred in the maintenance of said volunteers," also under specified conditions and
restrictions.
Section 2 of this act provides: "That all claims/or horses
or other property lost or destroyed in said service shall be
settled according to the act approved the third of March, eighteen hundred and forty-nine, providing- for payment for horses
or other property lost or des_troyed in the military service of
the United States."
During the year 1890 six claims under this act for the
value of horses lost in the Indian war of 1855 and 1856 in
the military service of the Territory of Oregon were filed in
the office of the Third Auditor of the Treasury, and have
been allowed by him as meritorious under the act, and that
action of the Auditor is now before 'the Second Comptroller
of the Treasury for revision.
The questions arising in these cases and submitted for
opinion are as follows:
1. '' Whether the act of March 3, 1873, bars the said claims."
2. "Whether, in case it is decided that these claims are
not affected by the act of March 3, 1873 (or in case of other
like claims filed prior to June 30, 1874), they must be
required to come strictly within the term~ of the act of
1840."
As there are acts of limitation which affect the claims in
question if they are to be treated as arising under the act
of 1849, but which do not play any part in this discussion
if the act of 1861 is to be taken as an independent law, it is
important to consider in the first place how these two statute' stand toward eaeh other; in other words, whether the
latter is amendatory of the former, as has been claimed.
The act of 1849 (9 Stat., 414) entitled "An act to provide
for the payment of horses and other property lost or destroyed in the military service of the United States'' declares
( ec. 1) that compensation shall be made, under certain
conditions, for horses lost by persons engaged in the service

154

HON. WM. A. MAURY.
Lost Horses.

of the United States in battle, or wounded in battle and
afterwards dying, or being wounded are abandoned by
orders and lost, and so forth, and with the same particularity
(Rec. 2) declares in what cases compensation shall be
made for certain kinds of property captured or destroyed
by the enemy.
The act then goes on to provide (sec. 3) that the claims
provided for shall be adjusted by the Third Auditor "under
such rules as shall be prescribed by the Secretary of War,
under the direction or with the assent of tlle President of
the United States, as well in regard to the receipt of applications of claimants as the species and degree of evidence,
the m'anner in which such evidence shall be taken and authenticated, which rules shall' be such as in the opinion of
th President shall be best calculated to obtain the object of
this act, paying a due regard as ~ell to the claims of individual justice as to the. interest of the United States; which
rule and regulations shall be published," etc. The next
ection ( ec. 4) provides that the Auditor shall keep a record
of his adjudications and for the payment of the same when
favorable to the claimants.
Other provisions ( 'ecs. 5. and 6) declare that parents,
guardian', and other persons furnishing horses, equipments,
aud accouterment may have compensation in certain ca es,
and ( ec. 7) that condemned hor es and their equipage may
b paid £ 1· in particular in tances.
But the act of 1861 dispense. with the particularity of the
a t of 184:9 touchiug property lo~t or destroyed, by imply
roviding ( ec. 2) "That all claims for horses or other proprty l t r de troyed in the aid service slrnll be ttled
r lin to the a t approved the third of Mar ,b., eighteen
hundr d and forty-nin , providing for payment for bor e or
otll r 1 r perty lo t r d troyetl in the military ervi · of
1i,cuitd tat .
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to be met with in the statute books of the United States
and the several States.
There are several considerations from which the true relation between these two statutes may be inferred, namely:
the act of 1849 is complete in itself, but the act of 1861, so
far as claims for horses aud other property lost or destroyed
are concerned, is entirely dependent on the provisions of the
act of 1849, which it adopts. The act of 1849 is general and
perrnanent in character; while the act of 1861 i~ temporary,
applyiug only to property lost or destroyed during a specified
period-in suppressing an Indian outbreak in two of the Territories. It does not seem probable that Congress ameuded
the general and permanent statute of 1849 by grafting on
it the transitory statute of 1861; whereas it was far from
unusual to provide in the act of 1861 that claims for horses
and other property lost or destroyed should be settled according to the provisions of the act of 1849 relating to claims of
the same description. There is no express declaration in the
act of 1861 that it is amendatory of the act of 1849, as would
probably have been the case if that act had been intended
to have that effect, according to the long-established practice of Congress, examples of which are furnished by the
acts of March 3, 1863 (12 S~at., 743); June 25, 1864 (13 Stat.,
182); July 28, 1866 (14 Stat., 327), and June 22, 1874 (18 Stat.,
193), each of which is expressly declared to be amendatory
of the said act of 1849.
For these reasons I have reached the conclusion that the
act of 1861 is not an amendment of ·the act of 1849, but that
it is special, independent legislation, and none the less so
because, as we have seen, it adopts by reference certain provisions of the act of 181.19, These provisions must be considered to be written in the act adopting them, and to be
operative, as thus written, by virtue of tlJat act alone.
Having now established the relation which it seems to
me the acts of 1849 and 1861 hold to each other, I am
brought to the immediate consiueration of the first question
submitted for an opinion, namely, whether .the said claims
arising under the act of 1861 and filed at some date or dates
not given during the year 1890 in the office of the Third
Auditor, are barred by the following provision in the legis-
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lative, executive, and judicial appropriation act of March 3,
1873 (17 Stat., 500), namely: "and an claims for horses lost
prior to January first, eighteen hundred and seventy-two,
shall be presented by the end of said fiscal year" 1874.
This provision occurs in the following context:
'' To enable the Secretary of War to have the rebel archives
examined, and copies furnished from time to time for the use
of the Government, six thom;and dollars: Provided, That
no claims against the United ;-s;tates for collecting, drilling,
or organizfog volunteers for the war of the rebellion shall
be audited or paid unless presented_before the end of the
fiscal year ending June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and
seventy-four; and all claims for horses lost prior to January
first, eighteen hundred and seventy-two, shall be presented
by the end of said fiscal year."
The limitation prescribed by this proviso is as comprehen sive as lanrruage could make it, and I am at a loss to see
how I can refuse to give to its words their full natural sense
by applying them to horse claims of every description
which had al'i en prior to January 1, 1872.
I do not incline to the theory that because the limitation of the act of 1873 a to horse claims is associated in
the ~ame proviso with a limitation for the presentation of
claim "for collecting, drilling, or organizing volunteers for
tbe war of the rebellion," it mu t be inferred that Congress
inteud d the former limitation to apply only to claim for
hor. , lo t or de troyed during that particular war. That
theory, however, can not stand against the fact that the limitation in que tion appli to all horse claims prior to January 1,1872 thu , .covering claim that originated between the
clo e of the rebellion and the ilate above mentioned, Congre
having in mind, no doubt, claims for hor es lost in the ervie
y unavoidable accid nt in time of peace, which .A ttorn ral lack bad held were proper claim under the act
n ~
of 1 49. Thi opini 11 Congres afterwards placed beyond
d u t by an m ndment of that tatute (18 Stat., 193).
h n th l gi lati e
cutive, and judicial appropriati n ill fi r th y r n ling Jun 3 1 74, wa und r con, i l rati n by h II n e in ommittee, a colloquy took place
1 w n Ir. ar.fi 11 bairman f th Appropriation
mrnitt
f the bill, and fr. Ritchi , which
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throws so much light on the subject · under consideration
that I give it entire as reported:
"Mr. Ritchie. The last part of that paragraph is as follows:
"'And all claims for horses lost prior to January 1, 1872,
shall be presented by the end of sa,id fiscal year.'
"I am at a loss to understand exactly in what connection claims of that description are contemplated, whether it
means horses lost in Gollecting, drilling-, or organizing-volunteers or not, or whether loss of horses occurring generally
during the period of our late war.
''Mr. Garfield, of Ohio. The gentleman is correct, with this
exception: The committee wanted to have· a limit beyond
which these old claims should not be filed. And the law,
as it stood, applied to all horses Jost in the regular Army
since the rebellion as well as those lost during it. We
therefore fixed t h e 1st of January last as the limit, and
have said t hat all claims for horses in the regular Army or
the volunteer army prior to January last, in order to be paid,
must be present ed by the end of the present :fiscal year; so
that we may not have any more of these old horse claims coming, as some of them do, from the Mexican war.
"Mr. Ritchie. You refer to the property of the soldiers
only'
"Mr. Garfield, of Ohio·. That only." (Cong. Globe, 3d
sess., 42d Congress, Part r, p. 416.)
The remarks of the eminent chairman of the Appropriations Committee seem to leave no room for doubt that the
intention was to cover horse claims of every kind and
description existing prior to January 1, 1872.
If ever there existed a description of claims that called
for a statute of limitations or the liberal interpretation of
one already existing, it is these Oregon and Washington
horse claims, which are easily fabricated, and against which
the Government is in most cases powerless to defend itself
after the lap se of so many years and in the absence of that
documentary evidence which is provided in the regular service, but which I suppose was hardly thought of by the Territorial authorities, suddenly thrown on their own resources
to repress an Indian uprising.
The right to present horse claims under the act of 1849
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and the acts amendatory thereof bas been several times
enlarged to a greater or less extent by Co~gress (see Acts
June 22, 1874, 18 Stat., 193; January 9, 1883, 22 Stat., 401;
August 13, 1888, 25 Stat., 437), but no such liberality has
been shown toward horse claims under the act of 1861. A.11
such claims, therefore, as were not filed "before the end of
the fiscal year- ending June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and
seventy-four," are in my opinion barred. As a consequence,
the claims in question, which were not filed until some time
during the year 1890, can not be allowed under the law.
This answer to the first question makes it unnecessary to
answer th6 second, as I apprehend.
I have the honor to be, your most obedient servant,
WM. A. MA. URY,
Acting Attorney- General.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL-CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION.
Where the Civil Service Commission has decided that a person is not
entitled to reinstatement for a clerkship in the Pension Office, and it
do snot appear that any action in the matter is pending in the Interior Department, the Attorney-General declines to give an opinion as
to the question whether or not the CommiAsion interpreted the law
correctly, on the ground that no statute exists which authorizes the
Secretary of the Interior, or the Attorney-General at his suggestion, to
reverse or review the action of the Commission.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTIOE,

June 25, 1891.
Sm: Your communication dated the 13th in. tant concern-
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It appea~·s that said .Evans on the 15th of January, 1884,
resigned his clerkship in the Pensiou Office, and early in the
year 1891 made application to the Civil Service Commission
for certification for reinstatement under said Rule X.
In July, 1863, Mr. Evans served sixteen days in Company
C of the One hundred and fourteenth Regiment of Indiana
'' Minute Men,'' at the time of the insurgent foray known as
" Morgan's raid," and at the end of such service was discharged. He claims that he is entitled to the certification
asked for upon the ground that the service arid discharge
specified constitute him a "person who served in the military
or naval service of the United States in the late war of the .
rebeUion and was honorably discharged therofrom" under
said Rule X.
Rule X is as follows:
"Upon requisition of the head of a Department the Commission shall certify for reinstatement in said Department,
in a grade requiring no higher examination than the one in
which he was formerly employed, any person who within one
year next preceding the date of the requisition has, through
no delinquency or misconduct, been separated from the classified service of that Department: Provided, That certification
may be made, subject to the other conditions of this rule, for
the reinstatement of any person who served in the military or
naval service of the United States in the late war of the
rebellion, and was honorably discharged therefrom, without
regard to the length of time he has been separated from the
service."
The requisition of the head of the Department is not before
me, but notice of the "adverse opinion" of the Commission is
given as follows:
"UNITED ST.A.TES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,

"Washington, D. 0., April 3, 1891.
Sm: In response to request No. 1087 for the reinstatement
of William H. Evans in the Bureau of Pensions, stating that
he 'resigned January 15, 1884, and that he served in Company C, One hundred and fourteenth Indiana Minute Men,
you are respectfully informed tli.at in a report frow the vVar
D partment it is -tated that tli.e records do not show that
such an organization as One hundred and fourteenth Indi-
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ana Minute Men was in the service of the United States, and
therefore Mr. Evans does not seem to be entitled to the benefit of the proviso of departmental Rule X.
"Very respectfully,
(Signed)
"CHAS. LYM.AN,

"President.

"The SEURETARY

OF THE INTERIOR."

While the service performed by Mr. Evans may have been
important and valuable, the Commission, upon investigatiou
and deliberation, has decided that it does not constitute him
-0ne who served in the military service of the United States
under Rule X, and the Secretary of the Interior was duly
informed of this decision. As, under the rule, the certification rests with the Commission, it is not apparent that any
question connected with the matter is now pending in the
Interior Department.
, If the Commission determined the question in accordance
with law, no further proceedings in the premises are authorized.
Even if the Commission erred in its judgment of the law,
it does not appear that the question is pend.i ng in the Interior
Department.
No statute is found which authorizes the Secretary of the
Interior, or the Attorney-General upon the sugge tion of the
Seer tary, to reverse or review this action of the 0ommi ion.
It is provided by statute that "the bead of any Executive
Department may require the opinion of the .Attorney-General
on any que tions of law ari iug in the administration of his
Department." (R. ., ec. 356.)
It i pr perly held by Mr. Attorney-General Bates (10
Opin., 220) tllat "when the olution of the que tion is not
ry to the di cllarge of any duty prop rly belonging
epartmeut it i not th duty of the ttorney-Genral t ive an opini nth re n and u b or inion would conn utly be -tr -offi •ial and uuauthoriz ,d.''
Tlli d, ·i iou i
ppro d by fr. tt rney-General Garu l l19 Opin. ) ; nd th priu iple that there mu t b . a
f rr · ut
utiv
u 'l.U u p ndino- in he
artm nt fr m , hi ·h tl.J r qu t ·ome in r i r to authorize an
b n ffirm d m ny tiru •
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As the Civil Service Commission is not included in the
Interior Department, and as the rule formulated pursuant to
the law vests the Commission with author.ty to give or to
withhold certification, in accordance with its judgment, and
as it has exercised that aut,hority, it is not apparent that
any question in the premises remains with the Interior
Department upon which the statute permits me to· act.
I am compelled, therefore, to say, without considering t~e
position occupied by Mr. Evans, or such opinions as may be
entertained as to his eligibility for reappointment by those
not authorized to determine the question-that the limitations of the statutes and the precedents established by
learned predecessors preclude me from now reviewing the
decision made by the Civil Service Commission.
All in closures reeei ved are returned herewith.
Very res pee tfully,
WM. A. MAURY,
Acting Attorney- General.
The SECRETARY OF THE lN'l'ERIOR.

OCEAN MAIL-SERVICE ACT CONSTRUED-MOD:I;PICA'fION OF
CONTRACT-CORPORATION.
The act of March 3, 1891, chapter 519, is to be so construed as to lead to
certainty and definiteness in the contracts provided for in the act, and
it should be interpreted strictly and differently from the statutes providing for a:p. inland mail service. There is no authority in the act
for insertion in the contracts of a condition by which the PostmasterGeneral and the contractor may subsequently vary the terms of the
contract, both as to the class of ships and rate of compensation, without submitting the rate to the effect of competition, nor are its provisions sufficient to authorize ~he Postmaster-General at any time
after the commencement of service on any ocean mail route to increase
the number of trips thereof and make proportionate payment for the
same.
A corporation organized under the laws of any State in the United
Sates is an American citizen within the meaning of the act.
Whenever the service begins under the contract, no matter what its char_
acter, the term has begun, and no power exists to make that term
longer than ten years. The mere fact that a change is to be made in
the character of the service before the end of the term is not material
if that change is defined and fixed when bids are made. No vessels
except of the first class can be accepted for said mail service, under
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the provisions of the act, between the United States and Great Britain;
consequently it is not permissible to insert in a contract for service to
the Continent of Europe a proviso for the delivery of mails on the way
at Southampton, England.
DEP AR'.l'MENT OF JUSTICE,

,Tune 27, 1891.
SIR: In a letter of the 6th instant the assistant attorneygeneral for the Post-Office Department, by your direction
and on your behalf, submitted to the .Attorney-General a
request for his construction of the act of Congress entitled
"An act to provide for ocean mail service between the United
States and foreign ports, and to promote commerce," approved
March 3, 1891, by answering certain questions now ari8ing
in the inauguration of the service therein provided for.
Before an wering the questions it may be well to run
through the act and to tate shortly the provisions of it. It
is entitled "An act to provide for ocean mail service between
the United States and foreign ports, and to promote commerce." The first section empowers the Postmaster-General
'' to enter into contracts, for a term not less than five nor
more than ten years in duration, with American citizen,, for
the carrying of mail on .American steamships" between the
United State and such ports of foreign countries (Canada
excepted) a in his judgment will best subser-ve and promote
the po. ta,l and commercial i11tere ts of the United States,
th e contract to be made with the lowest responsible bidder
for the performance of the ervice on each route. The second
ction directs that before a contract is made weekly adverti ement , ball be in erted for three months in a new. paper
in each of a number of named citie , describing the route,
th time when u h contract will be made, the duration of
the am , the ize of the ' teamers t be used, the number of
trip. a year, the tim of sailin()', and the time when the ervi
hall ommence, which i not to be more than three year
aft r the on ra ti l t. Th detail of the mode of adverletting , uch c ntra t are to be conducted in the
of Title
L VI, Revi ed
r ri ed in chapter
for th I t ing f inland ail contract . o far a
ap1 Ii , I t o · an 1 ail ervice.
e ·tion 3 provid~s that the
v : ' I. t b
1 d in thi
rvice hall be m ri ·anr l by American citizen ·
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directs how the crew shall be made up and how the vessels
shall be constructed, and divides them into four classes,
according to tonnage and speed. The first class must have
a tonnage of not less than 8,000 tons and a speed of not less
than 20 knots an hour, and only vessels of this class are to
be accepted for service between this country and Great
Britain. The seoond, third, and fourth classes are to have a
tonnage of not less than 5,000, 2,500, and 1,500 tons, respectively, and a speed of not less than 16, 14, and 12 knots an
hour, respectively. It is to be stipulated in the contracts
that the vessels may carry passengers and their baggage in
addition to the mails, and may do all ordinary business done
by steamships. Section 4 provides that steamships of the
first three classes employed under the act and thereafter
built shall be constructed so as to permit their conversion
into naval cruisers under supervision of the naval authorities.
Section 5 fixes the maximum limit of compensation for firstclass vessels at $4, of the second class at $2, of the third class
at $1, and of the fourth class at 66tr cents per mile for the number of miles in the outward-bound voyage. On failure from
any cause to perform voyages stipulated for in the contra.ct
a pro rata reduction is to be made from the agreed compensation, and power is given the Postmaster-General to impose
suitable fines for delays and irregularities in the service.
Section 6 provides for free carriage of a mail messenger of
the United States. Section 7 authorizes employment of
United States officers in this merchant service. Section 8
requires employment of a certain number of American-born
boys as cadets or apprentices in the service; and the ninth
and last section gives to the United States the right to take
the steamers employed under the act on payment of a fair
price, to be fixed, in the absence of agreement, by appraisers.
The ultimate purposes of the act are to provide an ocean
mail service, to promote commerce, and to secure a permanent naval reserve of ships and men. The means to be used
is American-built and American-manned ships of certain
clas es. It is common knowledge that the number of such
hips now in exi tence is very small. The chief purpose of
the act, therefore, is to encourage and induce American
citizens to build, equip, man, and navigate vessels of the
kinds de cribed in the act for the service therein provided
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for. The period, not exceeding three years, which may under
the second section elapse between the execution of the
contract and the beginning of the service, is, of cour e,
intended to enable contractors to build their ships after the
contracts of service are entered into. A similar intent may
be gathered from ' the fourth section. With the purpo e
clearly defined, the construction of the terms of the act must
be made to conform thereto. The greatest inducement which
Congress could offer to contractors to make the enormous
outlay necessary to build the ships required by the act was
certai~ty in the rate and duration of compensation, and in
the other conditions of the service. By requiring the contract to be made with the lowest responsible bidder the act
gives, and was intended to give, to every American citizen
an equal opportunity to bid and compete for the benefits
accruing under the act to contractors, and to enable him in
making his bid to know exactly what his liability and
reward under the contract he bids for should be. In
furtherance of this plan, the advertisement is required to
state the route to be traversed, the date of the contract, the
duratiou of it, the size of the steamers to be used, the number of trips a year, the times of sailing, and the time of
commencing the service. Everything which makes for
certainty of liability and benefit under the contracts to be let
aid and
rve the chief purpose of the act. That
cou truction of it terms, therefore, which leads to certainty
and definitene s in the contracts is to be favored. It follow
that no power 'hould be implied in the Postmaster-General
to vary at hi di cretion the operation of the contracts wh n
once nt red into, and that any uch power , if any, which
ar expres ly given in the act bould be trictly con trued.
The ta ut under di cu ion i to be viewed. in this re pect
di:ffi rently from su ·h tatute as provide for inland
rvi . The latter are not intended for any purpo e
afford po tal fa ilitie . It is not their obj ct to fo ter
the r, ilr a , th teamboat , or th tar-route coach u d
in h . rvi . It i. n t within th purview of uch law t
in lu e • p rm. n nt u lay of capital in the inland carryincr
tr,
f the
untry. n id ntally mail contract may
a· 1111 li b
m thino- in that dir ti n but u h an bje t
pl y. n p rt in arriving t th prop r n truction of th e
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acts. By express provisions, the largest discretion is generally given the Postmaster-General to vary, increase, and
reduce the mail service on any route at any time, and thereby
to meet the changing demands for postal facilities in all parts
of the country. But in the statute under discussion the
purpose of the act which dwarfs all others is to encourage
the building and operation ·of a merchant marine. This
accomplished, then postal facilities and commerce will be
increased, and a national naval reserve maintained. If it be
said that a discretionary power to vary the mail contracts is
an aid to efficient ocean mail service, it is enough to answer
that the uncertainty of liability and benefit accompanying
such discretion would so interfere with the outlay of capital
for building the ships as to prevent the attainment of the
primary object of the act, without which all the other
purposes of the act must fail.
Having said so much of the general purpose of the act and
the rule of construction it naturally suggests, we come to the
questions propounded. The questions will be discussed in
rather a different order from that in which they appear in
the letter of your Department. The first to be considered is
stated as follows:
"Would a condition in any contract, permitting the Postmaster-General to discontinue, during the contract term, the
service performed in a ship of the lower class, and to transfer
it to a ship of the higher class, when the contractors offer the
latter, and when, in his judgment, the better service was
required, be repugnant to the actP
If by this question it is meant to ask whether a condition
may be inserted under which by agreement between the Postmaster-General and the contractor ships of a higher class
may be furnished at the rate of compensation fixed in the
contract for the lower class, then there could be no objection
to such a condition, though it should be added that there
would be no significance in it, for such a variation of the contract might be permitted without any condition. It would
on]y result in the contractor rendering a better service than
he agreed to render at the contract price. If, however, it is
intended to ask whet.her a condition may be inserted by which
the Postmaster-General and the contractor may subsequently
vary the terms of the contract, both as to class of ships and
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rate of compensation, without submitting the rate to the
effect of competition, the answer must be that there is no
authority in the act for the insertion in the contract of such
a condition. It would indirectly empower the PostmasterGeneral to make a contract without inviting bids, because
it would leave with him and the contractor full power to contract again after the original contract had been entered into.
The second question to be answered is stated as follows:
"Section 2 of the act provides that 'the details of tbe mode
of advertising and letting such contracts shall be conducted
in the manner prescribed in chapter 8 of title 46 of the
Revised Statutes for the letting of inland mail contracts, o
far as the same shall be applicable to the ocean mail service.'
Section 3960, Revised Statutes (a part of said chapter and
title), provides the method of increasing the service after
execution of contract and fixes the standard of payment for
the additional service. Under this section the PostmasterGeneral ha always added to the schedule of any route any
number of trips required to meet the necessities of the route.
Are the provision of section 2 of the act under consideration,
in the requirement that 'the mode of adverti ing and letting
* * * hall be conducted in the mauner prescribed by
cbapter ,' etc., sufficient to authori~e the Postma ter-General, at any time after the commencement of service on any
o · an mail route, to increa e the number of trip thereon,
and mak proportionate payment for the ame f"
Th que ti n mu t be answered in the negative. The languag u u hows conclu ively that it was not intend d by
the referen •e to chapter of title 46 of the evised Statutes
to ularge th power of the Po tma ter-G neral, but only
t mak m re definite the procedure in accompli hing what
h, d
n pr vided for. The words are "the detail.i; of the
1node of adverti ing and letting uch contracts shall be condu
in the manner et . Certainly the unlimit d power
t in r , e r r uce th amount f servic under th contr t ul n t
in lud din th cl tails in th mode of ad erti,·ing and l tting c ntract,.
fi ren e i had by thi clau e
u h
.i n
f he l t r
f
nly
1 (-' · i n
-) r th
, ny f tb pr limi
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the course of selecting the successful bidder and the making
of the contract, if they are properly applicable to the ocean
mail service. To give it the wider construction suggested
by incorporating section 3960 in the act would not ·only be
at variance with the ordinary significance of the language
used in the clause of reference, but it would be contrary to th~
general purposes of the act, to which allusion has already
been made.
The next question is as follows:
"Is it competent for the Postmaster-General to insert a
condition in any contract for service under this act which forbids the annulment of it except with the mutual consent of
the parties during the contract term!"
Such a condition might be inserted, but it is not clear what
good it would accomplish. It could hardly be intended
thereby to prevent the Government or the contractor from
avoiding the contract for a breach of its terms if it or he
wished to do so. In the absence of a breach the contract
could not be annulled, save by mutual consent, whether the
condition proposed was inserted or not.
The next question is as follows:
'' The act requires the service to be performed in 'American-built steamships own.ed and officered by .American citizens.' Is a corporation organized under the laws of any
State in the United States an 'American citizen' within the
meaning of the act!"
The answer must be in the affirmative. To hold otherwise
would be to practically destroy the operation of the act.
The capital required to run a foreign. steamship line is so
great as to preclude individuals from undertaking such an
enterprise. It is not to be supposed that Congress intended
to hamper the construction of a new merchant marine by
withholding all inducement for the use of aggregated and
organized capital in attaining that end. Nor are we without
direct authority upon this point. In McKinley v. Wheeler (130
U. S., 630) it was held that a corporation created under the
laws of one of the States of the Union all of whose members
were citizens of the United States was a citizen of the
United States within the meaning of section 2319, declaring
valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the United
States open to exploration and purchase by citizens of the
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United States. A strong EngUsh ease on the same point,
and even more directly applicable, is The Queen, on the prosecution of the Pacific Steam Naviga,tion Company, v.Arnaud
(25 Law Journal, N. S., Part II, Com. Law, 50}. Section 5
of the statute 8 and 9 Victoria, chapter 89, provided that no
vessel should be registered under it unless the vessel wholly
belonged to Her Majesty's subjects. It was held by the Court
of Queen's Bench, Lord Denman delivering judgment, that
a vessel owned by a British corporation some of whose members were foreigners was owned by a British subject within
the meaning of the act.
The next question is as follows:
"Can the Postmaster-Gen~ral advertise for service-say
for ten years, to begin in three years from the date of awarding the contract-on any route (as, for instance, from New
York to Southampton, England) for a complete service, to
be de jgnated as triweekly, on condition that a different
ervice, to be known as a limited service, and specially de ignat d a a weekly service, may be commenced thereunder at
any time within three years from the date of awarding the
contract j To make the inquiry more specific, suppose a contract be executed on the condition that within one year the
w kly ervice shall be commenced and continued for two
year , at which time a triweekly service shall begin and be
onti11u d, would the contract term begin with the inauguration of the limited ervice and extend ten years from that
date, or would it begin at the completion of the service and
·ontinue ten years thereafter¥"
The t rm of the contra ·t to be let is to be not le s than five
than t n. The term of the contra ·t i the

el in
x er t in the pertat aud Great
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Britain. Can the Postmaster-General advertise for a service
between New York and the continent of Europe-to Havre,
.Antwerp, Bremen, or Hamburg-for a full term of ten years,
to be conducted in ships of either the first or second class,
conditioned for the commencement of the service in ships of
the lower grade and the substitution of ships of a higher
grade, at any time within a specified date included within
the contract term, the compensation at the date of changing
the service from the lower to the higher grade to be changed
from the scale of price for the lower to that of the higher
grade¥ The question may be otherwise stated thus: Is it
competent, under the law, to include in a contract of ten
years for service on said route the condition· that it may be
performed for the first five years in vessels of the second
class, at a rate of compensation stated in the bid and accepted, and for the remaining portion of the -contract term
in vessels of the first class, at a rate of compensation also
stated in the bid¥ This, of course, involves the authority to
arrange for two kinds of service to be performed in two
classes of vessels at different rates of pay in the same contract."
There is nothing in the act forbidding such a condition.
The route is fixed in the bid, the size of the steamers, the
rate of compensation, and all the other elements going to
make certain the liability and benefit of the contractor.
They are known to the competitive bidders when the contract
is let. The mere fact that a change is made in the character
of the service before the end of the term is not material if
that change is defined and fixed when bids are made. There
is no inhibition against such a change of service. On the
contrary, it would seem to be quite in accordance with the
spirit of the act.
The next question is as follows:
"The act provides that the service between the United
States and Great Britaip. shall be performed in. steamships
of the first class. Query: Would an advertisement, inviting
propo als for the service between New York and Liverpool,
England, via Queenstown, Ireland; also, inviting a separate
proposal_from New York to Southampton, England (one contract only 'to be made for the service to Great Britain), be
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permissible f If bids were made for both routes, can the
Postmaster-General decide which he will accept, and reject
the other, in vfew of the fact that the law provides that the
'notice shall describe the route,'"
If deemed best, there would se~m to be no objection to
inviting proposals of the kind suggested, in the alternative,
providing that each alternative contained every specification
required by the second section of the act, and the PostmasterGeneral might then accept a bid on either alternative and
reject the other. We may well assume that Congress did
not intend to deprive the Postmaster-General of the very
accurate means of information as to cost of service, so useful
in the making of contracts and selection of routes, which is
afforded by the system of alternative bidding.
The last question is as follows:
''In a contract for service to the continent of Europe in
vessels of the second class, can a provision be made for the
delivery of mails at Southampton, England, as an intermediate point, in view of the fact that service between the
United States and Great Britain is limited to vessels of the
first cla s,"
The que tion must be answered in the negative. Section
3 of the act provides that, "No vessel, except of said :first
cla , ball l>e accepted for said mail service under the provi ion of thi act between the United States aud Great
Britain." The delivery of mails between the United State
and outhampton is mail service b tween the United tate
and Gr at Britain. The fact that the stea,mer delivering
uch mail may continue on her voyage to another de tinati n, an not affe t the an wer to the questfon.
Very r ·pectfully,
W.M. H. TAFT,
Acting .Attorney-Gf/neral.

Th POSTMA TER-GENERAL.
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CHINESE DEPORTATION.
Chinese persons found to be unlawfully in this country may be removed
directly to China unless they show that they are not subjects of China.
and are the subjects of some other foreign country. If a person of the
Chinese race is found unlawfully within this country, and claims to be
entitled to be returned to a foreign country other than China, the burden of proof is upon him to establish the conclusion that he is a subject of such foreign country.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 30, 1891.
Sm: Your letter of the 26th instant is at hand, calling my
attention to the enactments of Congress which constitute
the legislation relating to the exclusion of Chinese laborers,
and requesting my opinion as to whether authority is given
to return directly to Ohina Chinese persons who are found
to be in this country in violation of said laws, and who may
have come into it through foreigu contiguous territory.
It is evident that the purpose of the laws referred to is not
so much to prevent these persons from coming into the
United States by some specified method of transportation,
or from some contemplated direction or country, as it is to
prevent them from coming into this country in any manner.
I will first consider the law without regarding the related
paragraphs of the" sundry civil" acts of 1890 and 1891.
Section 1 of the act of 1882 declared it to be unlawful for
the Chinese laborer to come "or, having so come * * *
to remain within the United States." The act of 1884
declares that "it shall not be lawful for any Chinese laborer
to come from any foreign port or place, having so come
• * * to remain within the United States."
Here is a recognition that the persons sought to be
excluded came not only from China, but from other foreign
ports and places.
By section 15, as amended in 1884, it is enacted that "the
provisions of this act shall apply to all subjects of China
and Chinese, whether subjects of China or of any other
power."
Here are two clas es designated: First, Chinese who are
subjects of China; second, Chinese who have become subjects
of some other power.
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Section 12 declares ''that no Chinese person shall be permitted to enter the United States by land without producing the certificate required by those who come by vessels,"
This section further enacts: "And any Chinese person
found unlawfully within the United States shall be caused to
be removed therefrom to the country from whence he came,"
at the cost of the United States.
These statutes must be construed not only in accordance
with reason, but with reference to each other.
If a Chinese laborer has become a subject of Great Britain,
or is actually, under section 15, a subject of the Dominion or
Canada, and thereafter forms the intention of coming and
does come into the United States, the law may properly be
construed to declare that, upon being discovered, he may be
returned to Canada; but if he leaves China, intending to
reach San Francisco or New York, and lands north of the
national boundary and proceeds to carry out his intent by
reaching the United States as best he may, and when be
finds himself safely able to do so, it is manifest that China,
not Canada, is the '' country from whence he came," and
therefore China is the country to which he is to be removed.
It would be a strained construction of legislative intent to
hold that Congress meant to declare that the country through
which one comes shall be deemed the country whence he
comes.
It would seem to be trifling to enact, or to judicially declare,
that when the obnoxious individual comes by ship, although
he sails around the Horn, or breaks the voyage by crossing
South .America, he may be transported back to Asia; but
that if he comes by way of Mexico, or the British possessions, he may cross at any point of our extended border line
and can, upon discovery, only be placed back upon the soil
of the contiguous territory to repeat his experiment until it
shall be attended by success.
I understan~ that a construction of section 12 is urged
that subject. the second paragraph thereof to the first one,
and that implies that the removal of the person '' to the
country from whence he came," relates especially to those
entering the United States by land, or from contiguous territory.
This construction is not a necessary or a natural one.
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The context shows that Congress regarded the two classes
of Chinamen recognized in section 15, viz, those Chinese
who are subjects of China and those Chinese persons who
may have become subj,'.\cts of any other foreign power, and
. intended to enact that "any Chinese person" (of either
c1ass) "found unlawfully within the United States shall .be
removed therefrom to the countri from whence he came;"
that is, that those of one class shall be removed to China,
and those of the other class may be returned to the country
of tha.t foreign power whose subjects they had become.
If three Chinese laborers determine to leave their homes
in China and domicile at Washington, and one enters the
United States at El Paso, another at Suspension Bridge,
while the third comes into the port of San Francisco, and
all are "found unlawfully within the United States" at
Washington, the law does not require that these persons shall
be deported to the different countries through which they
made their way, and that one shall be placed in Mexico and
another in Canada, and that the third shall be shipped back
to CMna; but, on the contrary, China is the country from
which all came, and it is in accordance with law that the
three shall be returned there.
·
Neither is it seen that any different conclusion should be
reached, although those coming by way of contiguous foreign
countries shall delay from point to point and employ a long
time in coming, or shall complicate their movements and
obscure their purposes by connivance with those who may be
willing to aid them.
It will be seen that Chinese laborers claiming the right to
be returned to contiguous territory under the act of 1884
must show that they are subjects of the power governing
the country thereof.
It is said in The Pizarri (2 Wheat., 245) that the words
" ubjects," '' people," and " inhabitants" are practically
synonymous; it is also stated that " a person domiciled in a
country, and enjoying the protection of its sovereign, is
deemed a subject of that country." He owes allegiance to
the country, while he resides in it, temporary, indeed~ if he
bas not by birth or naturalization co,ntracted a permanent
allegiance, bnt so fixed that as to all other nations he follows the character of that country in war as well as in peace.
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Such difficulties as have arisen from the coming from Canada
of Chinese persons have not been occasioned by those subject to the sovereign of that country, but by those who have
availed themselves of the location and laws of Uanada to
make their way from China to the United States.
The residence and domicile of the Chinaman remains in
China until he acquires a new one with intent to remain in
it. Until a domicile by residence and in tent is acquired
the domicile of origin remains.
The distinction between "the actually domiciled and the
merely commorant foreigner" must be kept in mind.
Mr. Justice Swayne, voicing the opinion of the court in
Mitchell v. United States (21 Wall., 350), says:
" When a change of domicile is alleged the burden of
proving it rests upon the person making the allegation. To
constitute the new domicile two things are indispensable:
First, re idence in the new locality; and second, the intention to remain there. The change can not be made except
facto et animo. Both are alike necessary. Either without
the other is insufficient. Mere absence from a fixed home,
however long continued, can not work the change. There
mu t be the animus to change the prior domicile for another.
"Until the new one is acquired the old one remain .
The prin iple are axiomatic in the law upon the ubject."
It i manifest that the Chinese persou must hav terminat d the domicile of origin whtch arises from birth and
conn ction , and mu t have become domiciled in Canada,
according to the law cited, prior to hi coming to the United
tate , and mu t continue to remain so domicil cl, to be in
po ition, wh n arre t d for being u lawful1y in thi country,
t laim th pri vil ge of bein · r turned to Canada. It will
not d th, t un r our legi lation the rule a to Ohine e
.x ·lu ion; the xc ption, admi , ion.
1 Ill ntal a t of Octob r 1, 1
(-"5 Stat. 504),
d ·lar it
b unlawful for any hine e labor r wh hall,
u
u nt t th I · age of the a t, be ut ·ide f or who
h, II tb r , f r d I art fr m th
nited tate , to r turn to
11 rtificate f id ntity r vided
r r m in th r in· u
fi r
· t fi urth and fifth e ·tion of the act of 1 4: are
d •l r d V id,
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Therefore, all persons of the class designated are prohibited from entering the United States.
The act of 1884, by section 6, commented upon by the Supreme Court in Wan Shing v. The United States (decided
May 11, 1891), provides for the permission to be obtained
from the Chinese Government, or that other foreign government of which at the time the Chinese person shall be a subject, which shall, before he goes on board any vessel to proceed to the United States, be vised by the representative of
this country.
After considering the law of 1882.as amended by that of
1884, and as supplemented by that of 1888, the court concludes its opinion in the case of Wan Shing as follows:
"The result of the legislation respecting the Chinese would
seem to be this: That no laborers of that race shall hereafter
be permitted to enter the United States, or even to return
after having departed from the country, though they may
have previously resided therein and have left with a view of
returning; and that all other persons of that race, except
those connected with the diplomatic service, must produce
a certificate from the authorities of the Chinese Government,
or of such other foreign government as they may at the time
be subjects of, showing that they are not laborers, and have
the permission of that government to enter the United States,
which certificate is to be vised by a representative of the
Government of the United States."
It is plain that all foreign-born laborers of this race are
prohibited from entering this country.
Chinese officials and persons connected with the diplomatic service are admitted upon their credentials, and all
other admissible persons of that race must produce the governmental certificate vised by the representative of the
United States.
It is manifest that until the Chinaman shall by statutory
evidence overcome the prima facie rule of exclusion which
exists against him, he can not be permitted to enter the
United States. Hence the burden of proof rests upon him
and he must establish hi right to enter.
Decisions made prior to tbe suplemental legislation illustrate the application of the rule.
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In the case in re Ho King (14 Fed. Rep., 724) the court
says:·
"Indeed, the fact of being compelled to make proof of his
condition or character a( all is a burden and inconvenience
upon the Chinese coming to the United States which is not
required by any other immigrant or visitor coming to this
country."
And the court also says that in the absence of the certificat e of the Chinese Government, " a Chinese claiming the
right to enter and reside in the United States must establish
the fact that he is not a laborer by evidence, as in ordinary
cases of ex parte proof of fact."
In this case those Chinese who have the right under the
treaty and the laws to come into the country are designated
-''privileged classes," who are entitled to certificates, and nonproduction of certificates is considered presumptive evidence
-o f the fa~t that the person is prohibited.
In in re Tung Yeong (19 Fed. Rep., 184) the onus resting
upon the Chinese person to establish his right to enter the
cotmtry is distinctly recognized. Referring to the law as it
then existed, the court says:
"The right of laborers who can prove they were in the
-country at the date of the treaty and had left before the
law went into effect, to be allowed to land without the production of a custom-house certificate, being thus recognized,
the court held that the burden of proof was on them, and
that satisfactory evidence of the facts would be vigorously
-exacted."
It is also stated that "in no case has a person been
.allowed to land on the plea of previous residence on unsupported Chinese oral testimony."
When a person of the Chinese race unlawfully enters thL
country, or is found unlawfully within it, and claims to be
-entitled to be returned to a foreign country other than China,
it must likewise be held that the burden of proof is upon him
to establish the conclusion that he is a subject of such foreign country.
I have presented the statutes as they existed prior to and
until the passage of the act "making appropriations for
sundry civil expenses," etc., passed August 30, 1890 (Stat. S .
.371), by which is enacfod the following provision (p. 387):
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"Enforcement of the Chinese exc·lusion act: To prevent
unlawful entry of Chinese into the United States, by the
appointment of suitable officers to enforce the laws in relation thereto, and for expenses of returning to China all
Chinese persons found to be unlawfully within the United
States, fifty thousand dollars."
The same provision is reenacted in the similar act of 1891
(Stat., 968), except the amount appropriated is increased to
$60,000.
This legislation is last in the order of time. It recognizes
the existing laws by providing for their enforcement, and
supplements them by appropriating money '' for expense of
returning to China all Chinese persons found to be unlaufully
within the United States."
This last expression of the lawmaker, which may be said
to comprise both an appropriation for and an amendment
to the Chinese exclusion laws, be~rs with great force against
sending any of the prohibited persons to foreig11 contiguous
<~ountries unless they are in position to be considered as
actual ''subjects" of those countries~
Further than this I do not deem myself now called upon
to express an opinion as to the enactments of 1890 and 1891.
Recognizing the importance of the due and efficient execution of the laws, I deem it my duty to say, in view of the
important questions presented by the papers submitted to
my examination, that not only is exclusion the rule and
admission the exception, and not only is the burden of proof
upon the Chinese applicant for admission, but the evidence
must be convincing.
It has been officially recognized and set forth in reports of
committees of our national legislature and in decisions of our
court of last resort that much of the evidence offered on
behalf of Chinese laborers seeking admission into this country
has been unreliable and untrustworthy in its character and
not entitled to credit.
This necessary conclusion has a general application and is
distinctly declared and acted upon in The Chinese Exclusion
Case (130 U. S., 598, 599), and'is illustrated further in Quock
Ting v. The United States (May 11, 1891).
In these and many other cases the rule of law that must
5687-V0L 20--12
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be applied is plainly written. It is ob~igatory upon all concerned.
In conclusion, I have the honor to answer your inquiry by
saying that, in my opinion, under our laws Chinese persons
found to be unlawfully in · this country may be removed
directly to China, unless they shall show, in the manner :md
under the rules herein before indicated, that they are not subjects of China, and that they are the subjects of some other
foreign power. Whether under the language of the acts of
Congress of 18~0 and 1891 natives of China naturalized in
a foreign country would be subject to a different rule is not
decided.
Very respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SEORETARY OF THE TREASURY.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL-COMMISSIONER OF PENSIONS.
The Attorney-General is not authorized to give his opinion to the Secretary of the Treasury as to the proper construction of a pension appropriation act, inasmuch as it appears that the Treasury Department is
bound by the rulings of the Department of the Interior in construing
that law, and, therefore, no question is pending in the Treasury Department arising in the administration of that Department. 17 Opinions, 339, followed.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 1, 1891.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of the 9th ultimo, inclo ing- certain paper in
reference to the construction · of the pension appropriation
act, March 1, 1 9 (25 Stat. L., 782), and requestiug an opinion
upon two point :
Fir t. Doe ' the term "minor" children, a used in the peni n appropriation act of M r h 1, 1 9 refer to tho e children only wbo are. und r 16 year of age, or doe it re-£ r to
all minor re ·ogniz d a , u ·h by the lex loci
nd. I th provi ion f he act of farch 1 1 89 con1· ti n r
uthority upon the Secretary f the
p y th a ·ru d p n i n t the le c 1 r pre ntac· - d p u ·i n r PJ>li able to a wid w p nj n r to a m h r
n i n or i it applicc ble nly to the
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case of a male pensioner who dies leaving no widow and no
surviving children¥
So much of the above act as relates to the questions at
issue is found in these words:
"That a check or checks drawn by a pension agent, in
payment of pension due, and m·a iled by hiin. to the address
of the pensioner, shall constitute payment within the meaning of section 4765, Revised Statutes, in the event of the
<l.eath of the pensioner subsequent to the mailing and before
tlte receipt of the check; and the amount which may have
accrued qn the pension of any pensioner subsequent to the
la~t quarterly payment on account thereof, a~d prior to the
Lieath of such pensioner, shall in the case of a husband be
paid to his widow, or, if there be no widow, to his surviving
minor children or the guardian thereof, and in the case of a
widow to her minor children : Provided, That hereafter
whenever a pension certificate shall have been issued and
the pensioner mentioned thereiu dies before paymeut shall
have been made, leaving no widow and no surviving minor
children, the accrued pension due on said certificate to the
date of the death of such pensioner may, in the discretion
of the Secretary of the Interior, be paid to the legal representative of such pensioner."
Accompanying your communication is a copy of a letter
to you from Hon. B. F. Gilkerson, Second Comptroller.
From this letter it appears that a difference of opiuion exists
between the officers of the Interior Department and those
of the Treasury Department "as to the proper construction of
the several clauses of the pension appropriation act (March
1, 1889, 25 Stat. L., 782), providing for the payment, .in cer·
tain cases, of the accrued pension to the minor children, or
to the legal representatives of pensioners who die without
receiving their pensions; also as to the authority of the
accounting officers of the Treasury to adjust certain pending
claims, or others of a like chara,c ter involving the same or
similar questions of law." The Comptroller suggests the
questions specifically stated in your letter and accompanies
the communication with a printed copy of the opinion of
Hon. James Tauner, late Commissioner of Pensions, under
date of March 29, 18S9, in which the rule is promulgated to
the Bure,au of Pensions that "minor children as contem-
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plated by this act (March 1, 1889) are minors recognized as
such by the lex loci."
Also an opinion of the honorable .Assistant Secretary
Cyrus Bussr~·, under date of October 2, 1890, overruling the
opinion of Commissioner Tanner, supra, and holding that
"the term 'minor' children, under a proper construction of
the pension laws, refers to those children only who are under
16 years of age," and that "this construction applies to the
act of March 1, 1889;'' and that " under the pension laws,
minority is held to cease at the age of 16."
Also an opinion of Assistant Secretary Oyruf! Bu. ey,
December 3, 1890, holding that "'the act of March 1, 18 9,
conferring discretionary authority upon the Secretary to pay
'accrued pension to a legal pem,ioner's legal representative '
is not applicable to a widow's pension, nor to a mother's penion, but only to a pensioner who dies leaving no widow and
no minor children."
The two opinions of the honorable Assistant Secretary
mu t be considered the official rulings of the Department of
the Interior upon the matters stated. It is upon these two
que tions that the difference of opinion has arisen between
the officers of the Department of the Interior and the Treasury Department.
Section 356 of the Revised Statutes points out the condi·
tion under which the head of any Executive Department can
can for an opinion from the .Attorney-General. It is in thee
word:
''The head of any Executive Department may require the
opini n f the .Attorney-General on any question of law arising in the admini tration of his Department."
It i. upon thi ground that th honorable Second Comp·
troll r tat that the questions asked arise "in the ad.mini tratiou of tbe bu ine of thi Department, the same being
-0f pr nt executiv con equence in the adju tm nt of a cla
of ca. . at thL time pending before the Department. 1
Th pr 1 l'i y f k pi11g
el'y branch of the executive
Y rnrnent within it 1 gal pbere j clear. The confu ion
whi ·h w uld unay idably ari , if one branch wa permitted
t u ur th fun ti u of an ther, would ue di a tr u to
th
r w rking of th wh le.
h refi r , a "di:ff:erence of opinion" ari e between
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several Executive Departments as to thA construction of the
law, the primary question is as to which is vested with the
determination and responsibility of the question. That one
only can have jurisdiction over the subject-matter is plain.
Before giving· an opinion, it is the duty of the AttorneyGeneral to determine whether the question presented by the
Treasury Department is one within i.ts power to propound
and whether or not that Department is not bound by the
rulings of the Interior D'epar.tment ill the premises. If the
Treasury Department is so bound, then no question is pending" arising in the administration" of that Department.
Upon this preliminary question, the Department of Justice
has already expressed its opinion by the Hon. Benjamin
Harris Brewster, Attorney-General, in which I concur.
(17 Opin., 339.)
The opinion so far as it relates to the question at issue is
as follows:
"The Acting Secretary inquires further, whether pension
ageuts should receive instructions as to the meaning of the
pension laws from the Commissioner of Pensions or from the
accounting officers of the Treasury.
'' I understand that chapter 5, under the bead of '' Department of the Interior," in the Revised Statutes, places the
entire admiuistration of the pension laws in the control of
that Department, and that section 471 designates the Commissioner of Pensions as the officer whose special duty it is,
under the direction of the Secretary, to administer and carry
into execution these laws. 'He shall perform, to use the language of the statute, "such duties in tbe execution of the
various pension and bounty land laws as may be prescribed
by the President." By which I understand that the Commissioner of Pensions is the officer provided by law in whose
hands the President, as the executive head of the nation,
shall p_lace this part of the administration-to wit, the execution of the pension and bounty-land laws.
"Moreover, there are scattered through the title' pensions'
many sections pointing out in detail the duties of the Commis iouer, and showing his authority to apply and construe
these laws.
'' Sections 4746 and 4748 speak of the payment of pensions
a.~ being within his 'jurisdiction.' He is required to furnish
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instructions and forms to applicants, to issue certificate. of
pensions, and notify the claimant or his attorney of the
allowance made and the amount thereof.
"By section 4768 the Commissioner is required to forward
the certificate to the pension agent who is to pay the same.
"Pension agents are officers of the Department of the
Interior, and take their instructions from the Commissioner
of Pensions (secti<;>ns 4779, 4,84, 4785). There is no allusion in
any of thepensiqnlaws to the accounting officers of'the Trea ury as having any authority to construe those laws, or to direct
t.he pension agents as to the amouut that shall be paid to
any class of pensioners, or to whom pensions sha11 be paid.
This is matter for the supervision and instruction of the
Commissioner. The certificate and his orders as to its payment are binding upon the Comptroller and Auditor.
"If a payment has the authority of the Commi sioner of
Pensions, and especially if it has the sauctiou of the Secretary of the Interior, the decision is final; for the jurisdiction
of the whole matter i in tlrn e officers.
•'The duty of the accounting officers in respect to pen iou
is to audit the accounts relating to them and to certify the
balance . (See sec. 277, Rev. Stats.) But this doe not
require that they shall take from the Commi sioner of Pension the jurisdiction with which the law clothes him to construe and administer the pension laws, or interfere with
his in tructions to pen ion agents. On the contrary, they
are bound to conform to his decisions.
Whatever opinion, therefore, I may entertain re pecting
the que tion propounded, a ab tract que tion' of law, I
am not at liberty to give the ame in an wer to your request.
I, th re£ re, re pectfully decline its further an w r.
ery re pectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATIVE A.CT-PROTEST.
An entry of goods at the custom-house was liquidated ~eptember 8, 1890.

A. protest against the decision of the collector as to the rate and amount
of duties assessed was filed September 17, 1890; but the duties were
not fully paid until Septembflr 19, 1890, more than ten days after the
entry was liquidated: Held, that section 14: of the customs administrative act of June 10, 1890, requires the importer, if he desires to
make a contest, to protest and pay the duties and charges in full
within ten <lays after liquidation where the merchandise is entered for
consumptfon, or to protest within ten days where the merchandise
is entered in bond only.
Statutes, like other writings, containing language admitting of doubt,
should be read in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July ·6, 1891.
SIR: Your letter of the 4th _o f June, 1891, brings to my
atte11tion for an opinion a question which has arisen under
section 14 of tbe customs administrative act of June 10,
1890, in consequence of a recent decision of the Board of
General Appraisers at the port of New York of November
26, 1890. (S. S. 10,500, G. A. 150.)
An examination of tbe decision of the Board of General
Appraisers will make tbe question presented perfectly clear.
The merchandise in the case decided by the board was
returned as refin~d glycerine (specific gravity 1.239), and
duty was assessed at the rate of 5 cents per pound, under
the provisions of paragraph 3 of the act of March 3, 1883.
The entry was Uquidated September 8, 1890. The protest
was filed September 17, and the duties were paid September
19, 1890, more than ten days after the entry was liquidated.
Tbe protest was against the decision of the collector " as
to the rate and amount of duties" assessed, and was filed
within ten days after the ascertainment and liquidation of
of sucb duties, but the' duties were not fully paid until more
than ten days after such ascertainment and liquidation, and
the board ruled that the act prescribed no time within which
payment of duties and charges should be made, and, consequently, that the importer, in making his protest, bad
complied with section 14 of the act, and was therefore
entitled to have "the col1ector, in conjunction with the
naval officer, if there be one," review his action on the entry
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under article 43 of the new Treasury Regulations, and it
was so ordered accordingly.
This decision expressly overrules a previous decision of
the Board of General Appraisers at New York of September
16, 1890 (S. S. 10, 255 G. A. 33), in which it was laid down
that, "in the case of merchandise entered for consumption
payment of the duties and charges ascertained to be due
thereon is a condition precedent to the right of protest."
In overruling that decision the board say t,h at the passage
above quoted was a dicturn ."unnecessary to the determinatiou of that case, and was inadvertently used." But according to the case, as reported, the ruling appears to have been
made upon a point directly involved. in the proeeeding,
naruely, whether the protest, unaccompanied by a paymeut
of the liquidated duties in full, was properly taken un<ler
section 14 of the act of June 10, 1890. Indeed, the ruling eem
to have been directly on the only point of which the board
could have properly taken cognizance, the point of jurisdictiou, tlle board having reached the conclusion that it bad no
juriHclictioll over the appeal. Having determined that it had
no juri, di •tiou, the board would not seem to have had
authority under the law to look into the merit" of the question-rai ed by the prote t. It may be, however, that the ca e
i " not pr ._,ented in the report as it appeared to the Board of
neral p prai ' r .
To under.·tand the practice which ha grown up under the
d ·Lion of the Board of General Appraiser of ovember
2 , 1 9 (su,p ra), and which i con idered as a
ri u obstructi n to the collection of the revenu , it is proper to make
me gen ral ref6ren e to the cour, e of bu ine. in collectcu:tom
utie . In th fir t pla e, the c u ni u e of
v rnment, owing to th limited ·apacity f the public
t re n th conveni n · f tlrn imp rt r who hould have
lay a p ibl
hi o d with a lit 1
that 11
fi r the ur
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ment of any additional amount that may be found to be dne
by the importer, on liquidation, but to deliver such packages
to him upon personal security for the payment of any further
amount of duties which may have been found to be due on
liquidating the entry. This practice, under which the Government loses the security of the retained packages for the
payment of such further liability, has arisen from the urgency
of importers to get possession of their goods without the delay
of waiting for the liquidation of the duties with which they
are chargeable.
It thus appears that, according to the course of administration mentioned, the Government is without any custody
of the goods imported at the time the duties chargeable on
them are duly liquidated and ascertained, so that the effect
of the decision of the Board of General Appraisers of November 26, 1800, that it is not necessary for the importer t()
pay the duties in full with which he is chargeable within ten
days after liquidation in order to make his protest valid and
operative, and that the statute prescribes no time within
which such payment shall be ruade, is to put it in the power
of the importer to defay indefinitely the payment of duties
in full for his own convenience and to the detriment of the
Government.
The abuses which were to be apprehended and have actually resulted from this interpretation of the law-an interpretation which, I may s~y, does not seem to have been
regarded. as possible by the author of article 43 of the new
Treasury Regulations-are set forth in the following extract
from your letter:
"The practical result of this ruling is an accumulation
in the custom-houses of large numbers of protests, which
may be made for speculative purposes, and which are not
promptly transmitted to the Board of General Appraisers
because of the failnre of the importers to pay the increased
<lutie against the exaction of which they file their protest.
The importers are thus enabled to tak13 the initiatory step in
suit for recovery of duties, full payment of which has not
been made, and delay indefinitely the decision by the General Appraisers of the question raised by the protest, with a
view of taking advantage of decisions which may hereafter
be made in other cases, thereby defeating one of the chief
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purpo es of the administrative act, which was to secure the
prompt disposition of questions arising under the tariff laws
and discourage the filing of mere speculative protests."
This brings me to the scTious and important question for
consideration, namely, whether the abuses thus stated can
not be corrected by an instruction from the Secretary of the
Treasury to the collectors of customs t,o decline to recognize
a protest as valid in any case in which all duties have not
beeu paid by the importer within ten days after liquidation.
The question presented is to be determined by an examination of section 14 of the customs administrative act of
June 10, 1890, namely:
'' That the decision of the collector as to the rate and
amount of duties chargeable upon imported merchandise,
including all dutiable co t., and charges, and as to all fees and
exactions of whatever character (except duties on tonnage),
ball be final and conclu ive against all persons interested
therein, unles the owner, importer, consignee, or agent of
uch merchandise, or the person paying such fees, charge ,
and e actions other than duties, shall within ten day after
'but not before' such ascertainment and liquidation of
dutie ', a well in cases of merchandise entered in bond as
for con umption, or within ten days after the payment of
such fe s, charge , and exactions, if di satisfied with such
d i ion, give notice in writing to the collector, settiug forth
th rein di 'tinctly and pecifically, and in re pect to each
entry or payment, the reason for his objection' thereto,
and if the m rchandi ' e is entered for con umption ha1l
pay h full amount of the dutie and charge a certained
t be due thereon. Upon uch notice and p· ymeut the c 11 ·tor . ball tran mit the invoice and all the pap r and
xhibit conne ted th r with to the board of thr

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

187

Customs A..dminlstrathe Act-Protest.

an application shall be :filed in the circuit court within th~
time and in the manner provided for in section fifteen of
this act."
It thus appears that the collector's liquidation and ascertainment of duties is conclusive unless within ten days after
such liquidation and ascertainment, "as well in cases of
merchandise entered in bond as for cousumption," the dissatisfied importer shall protest, "and if the merchandise is
entered. for consumption shall pay the full amount ·of the
duties and charges ascertained to be due thereon."
It is upon the words just quoted that the question turns,
whether the payment of duties thereby required. must, like
the protest, be made within ten days after l1quidation, or,
to state, the question differently, whether Congress intended
to favor the importer, by permitting him not only to have
possession of his goods, but to keep the Government out of
its revenu~ at pleasure, or, certainly, until judgment could
be recovered against him in a plenary suit outside the statute of June 10, 1890; for it is precisely this advantage that
is given the importer by the decision of the Board of General Appraisers of November 26, 1890, as the obstructive
practice complained of shows.
It would be remarkable, indeed, that such a result should
flow from a statute that was enacted for the purpose of expediting the collection of the revenue by removing the impediiments of the old law.
What those impediment-: were is matter of common knowledge, but it may not be out of place to make a quotation on
the subject from the report of the Committee of Ways and
Means of the House that accompanied the act of June 10,
1890, on its introduction as a bill. The report says with
regard to sections 14 and 15 as follows:
"These sections are substituted for sections 2931 and 2932,
Revised Statutes, and are in substance the same as were
contained in the bill familiarly 'known as the 'under valuation bill,' which passed the Senate at the first session of
the Fiftieth Cougress, after a full discussion and practically
without division. The Senate committee having the bill in
charge reported as follow with respect to these two sections:
"' It will be seen that the proposed sections are a, radical
departure from the existing law. They substitute for the
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decision of the Secretary of the Treasury, in all cases of
appeal upon questions of classification and rate of duty, and
upon questions a~ to fees, charges, and exactions, the decision of the board of appraisers provided for in the preceding
section, and confer upon said board in the first instance
exclusive jurisdiction of all said questions. They confer
upon the several circuit courts of the United States appellate jurisdiction upon all questions of law as respects classification and rate of duty, with a final determination by the
Supreme Court of the United States in difficult cases, or in
eases where the Attorney-General shall be of opinion that
the matter in controversy should be appealed thereto.
"'Tl.Je intent and purpose of these two sections are to afford
the importer and the Government a speedy decision upou
every que tion oflaw and fact that can arise as respects the
proper cla sift.cation of merchandise and the rate of duty to
be charged thereon. It is believed that these two sections
together will render substantial justice to the importer and
to the Government.'

*

*

*

*

*

..

•

"The Secretary of the Treasury, in his last annual report,
<'alls e pecial attention to this condition of affairs, and says:
"' The calendar of customs suits iu the southern district of
~ ew York ha grown so large that there is no reasonable
pro pect of disposing of them in this generation. A. mer\hant who ha suffered au illegal exaction of duties can not
hope for a peedy trial of his cause, and justice is practically
denied him. The laws which were ostensibly enacted to
prevent fraud by undervaluation promote rather than suppr , thi evil.'
"It should be aid that ome of these suit were begun as
•arly a 1 5 . It i impo ible to compute the amount
involved o that the overnment i menaced with unknown
ligation amounting to many millions of dollars and always
increa ing. In a dition to the e suit there are more than
:) 00 pr t ,. t and ~ll)IJ al~ p ncling in the Treasury Depart·
m nt and iu he
w York cu tom-hou e dependent on thi'
Ii igati n.
' It i b li
will afford
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selected with a view to their peculiar fitness and qualifications for the duties devolving upon them. Their time and
attention will b e given exclusively to .a study of the tariff
laws and t o t heir practical application, and they could
readily hear and dispose of the cases as they might arise in
an intelligent an d satisfactory mauner; but if they shall
make a mistake as respects the true construction of the
statutes r elating to classification and rate of duty, a speedy
and efficacious remedy is provided for a review of tb eir
decis_ion as respects the law of the case, their finding of
facts being conclusive upon the Government and the
importer."
,
This ext raneous matter, thus authoritatively presented, it
is my duty to consider, because statutes, like other writings
containing language admitting of doubt, should be read in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
that we may put ourselves in the place of the legislature and
view the subj ect-matter, from its standpoint. Said Mr. Justice Bradley, in delivering the opinion of the court in Siemens
v. Sellers (123 U. S., 276, 285), "no doubt the words of a law
are generally t o have a controlling effect upon its construe-_
tion; but t he interpretation of those words is often to be
sought from the surrounding circu ..nstances and preceding
history." The same court said in Platt v. Union Pacific
Railroad Company (99 U.S., 48, 64):
"But in endeavoring to ascertain what the Congress of
1862 intended, we must, as far as possible, place ourselves in
the light that Congress enjoyed, look at things as they
appeared to it, and discover its purpose from the language
used in connection with the attending circumstances. Guided
by this rule of construction, as well as by others universally
recognized, we have been led unhesitatingly to the conclusion
that the deed of trust or mortgage executed by this company
in 1867 was a disposition of the lands granted by the third
section of t he act of 1862, within the meaning of that act."
See also, to tbe same effect, Smythe v. Fisk (23 Wall., 374,
380).
Guided now by this safe and sensible rule of interpretation, all doubt seems to be removed as to the intention of
Congress to require duties to be paid in full within ten days
after liquidation, to make the importer's protest available
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by entitling him to a.ppeal to the Board of General Appraisers.
Payment of duties in full by the importer protesting being:
a condition-precedent to the collector's power to transmit the
invofoe and other papers in the case to the Board of General
Appraisers, if tbe importer has the right to withhold such
payment at pleasure, the right to protest may be used for
obstructions and speculative purposes, and thus the evil of
the old law of a vast and unmanageable accumulation of disputed questions under the customs laws will be coutinued.
Already, and as a consequence of the decision of the Boar<l
of General .Appraisers of November 26, 1890, there is a large
accumulation of protests which are kept in sm~pense by the
importers witholding payment of duties, and so preventing
their transmission by the collector to the Board of General
Appraiser', for the mere chance of profiting by the ruliugs of
the board or the courts in other similar cases, prosecuted in
good faith.
·
The contest between these importers and the Government
is a very unequal one. Before it begins they have received
th ir goods and sold them, with the duties, a liquidated,
in •ludecl in the price, and they are of course content to wait
indefinitely for a possible refund of duties, in which they
have really no longer an intere t, because the consumer ha
already paid th m. This hoped-for refund, if realized, is, as
xperience in icate , sometimes liberally divided with third
parti , who may be said, with truth, to be more intere ted
in the conte t with the Government than the importer
them, el e , who must often be at a loss to under tand on
what ground they are entitled to a recovery from the Govmm nt. But th real party in interest in nch case , the
fax l c n umer, th remedy of the law, unfortunately, doe
n t ud perhap. could not pra tically reach.
On tb oth r band the Government, if the deci ion of the
r f
n .ral pprai er in que tion i ound i comp 11 d to W< i fi r it r v nu until it hall pl a e the e
rt r. t
ring th ir . rnrti e an l vexation-: inaction
t , ·I : . , n i: forth rmor3, mpell d t r main ind fl.nit ly iO'n r, nt f th . t ut fit. Iiahiliti
in thi r . p t
· ith h
i ilitJ f
. ud<lenly all d on t r fund
nt d
h
umulation of unmeri-

t .

191

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
Customs Administrative Act-Protest.

.,,-i

The danger of embarrassing· the National Treasury by
sudden demands of this kind is too manifest to require a,
labored argument, in the light of_what has been stated', to
prove that one of the primary o~jects of the act of June 10,
. 1890, was to provide the machinery for an expeditious disposition of questions growing out of the customs laws.
But it may be said tbat section 14 does not name any
time for the payment of the charges on dutiable merchandise, but only requires the protest against them to be made
within ten days after payment, and that payment in full of
such charges is as much a condition precedent to the collector's power to transmit protests, etc., to the Board of General Appraisers as payment of the duties themselves, and
that, therefore, as the importer may put off indefinitely a
hearing before the board by withholding payment of such
charges alone, it could not have been the intention of the
act to require the prompt payment of duties in full within
ten days after liquidation, since, as stated, such payment,
without the payment of the charges also, would not expedite the hearing before the board contemplated by the protest.
It must be admitted that there is a difference in the language of the act as to protests against the collector's ascertainment of duties and his decision as to these non-dutiable
charges. In the first case, the protest must be ma.de within
ten days after liquida,tion of duties, and in the second, within
ten days after payment of charges.
But, in reality, the difference is only apparent, because,
when we have reference to the established course of business
as to the payment of these charges, we :find that the importer
is required to secure their payment by depositing with tbe
collector beforehand a sum sufficient to cover them. It
is plain, therefore, that the real time when payment of
charges may be properly said to be made is when the liquidation is completed, for it is not until then that the collector has officially determined precisely how much of the
deposit he has retained for their payment. The provision of
section 14, therefore, declaring that the protest against nondutiable charges must be made within ten days aft. r payment of them, is the same as though it had required such
payment within ten days after liquidation, for we are bound
0
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to presume that Congress legislated with full knowledge of
this well-established course- ·of business. Indeed, this dif.
ference of phraseology may, perhaps, be satisfactorily
accounted for on the theory that Congress did not consider
the term "liqiiidation" as properly appl:cable to charges
ascertained and :fixed by law, and therefore requiring no
calculation or liq1tidation to determine ·their amount; and it
must be conceded that to have employ~d that term to indicate the process by which the amount of charges was to be
arrived at would appear to be unauthorized by any recognized previous use of the term.
But however that may be, there is so essential a difference
between non-dutiable charges and duties, the latter being the
Hfeblood of the Government and the former in no way affecting its vitality, that an argument based on a provision of law
relating to such clrnrges can not be safely relied on as a guide
to the meaning of another provision of the s~me law relating
to duties. Because revenue law is indulgent to the taxpayer as to the costs and charges involved in collecting his
taxes, it by no means follows that the same indulgence is extended to the taxes themselves. On the contrary, we know
that it is the universal policy of governments to require
prompt payment of taxes, and to provide also procedure to
recover back afterwards any part of the amount so paid that
is decided to have been illegally exacted.
The previous law, namely, section 2931, Revised Statutes,
provided a limitation of ninety days within which duties were
to be paid and suit brought, and nothing is more unreasonable than to say that the act of June 10, 1890, repealing that
law intended to sub titute for that limitation of ninety day
the uncertain period of the importer's pleasure or the alrno t
equally uncertain p riod within which the Government might
colle t the tax by a suit at law,. uppo ing the delinquent importer hould be olvent when judo·ment bould be recovered.
In view of the. foregoing cou idemtion it would eem
m, uiC t that ction 14 mu t be under" tood to mean that
tlJe ·oll ·t r· liquida, ion of duti s hall be fiual and oncln iv unl . he imp rt r on io-n e, or ag nt hall, witl1iu
t n la aft r n h li uidati n, a. w ll in a
f m r bandi e ent r
in b nd a fi r
n um tion make prot . tin
ritiug aud in a· s of merchandi e entered for con ump-

a

1

,

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

193

Custom & Adm ini strati re Act-Protest.

tion, shall, within said ten days, pay the full amount of
duties and charges ascertaiued to be due thereon. In other
words, if the dissatisfied importer desires to make a contest
as to the action of the collector, he must protest and pay the
duties and charges in full within ten days after liquidation,
where the merchandise is entered for consumption, or he
must protest within said ten days, where the merchandise is
entered in bond only. The statute contemplates two classes
of cases, namely, entries in bond and entries for consumption, and the language used must be taken distributively,
reddendo sing'Ula singulis. Otherwise, the next provision of
section 14~ that '' upon such notice and payment the collector
shall transmit the invoice and all the papers," etc., to the
Board of General Appraisers, must be interpreted to mean
that, where the protest relates to duties on merchandise
entered in bond only, the duties must be paid before the
case can be sent to the board, which would plainly make
nonsense of the law by confounding two classes of cases
which Congress intended to keep distinct from one another.
This view of the statute does no violence whatever to the
language of the Htatute,, while that adopted by the Board of
General Appraisers bas this effect, and makes the statute
mean what its history shows could not have been in the
contemplation of Congress.
The inconvenience which embarrasses you has arisen frorri
a misinterpretation, as I think, of section 14 by the Board of
General Appraisers and the collectors, who are all officers of
your Department, and more or less subject to your authority and control by virtue of sections 249 and 251, Revised
Statutes of the United States.
Under these sections you have full power to instruct collectors to decline to recognize as valid any protest against
an assessment of duties on merchandise entered for consumption where the duties and charges were not paid in full
within ten days after their liquidation. I say nothing as to
whether you have any power in the premises over the Board
of General Appraisers, or as to whether that board has any
authority to decide the question under consideration, because
that subject is not covered by the question submitted for
opimon.
In conclusion, I hope I may be pardoned for going out5687-V0L 20--13
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side the question presented for consideration and making
the suggestion that perhaps it would go far toward correcting
the evil in question if the packages sent to the appraiser's
stores for examination and valuation should be held also as
security for any additional amonnt found to be due by the
importer on liquidating the entry. You of course are much
better able than I to say whether the suggested departure
from the present practice of delivering such packages to
the importer before liquidation would be too serious an inconvenience to persons engaged in the importing business.
Very respectfully, yours,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

IMPORTATION-MACHINERY FOR DISABLED FOREIGN VESSEL.

A crank shaft and steamer's shafts brought to this country from a
foreign country to repair a vessel of that country lying disabled in
our ports are articles imported into the country within the meaning
of section 2503 of the Revised Statutes and section 2502 of the tariff
act of 1883.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 7, 1891.
Srn: By letter of May 13, 1891, you submitted for the consideration of the Attorney-General "the claim of the North
German Lloyd Steamship Company for a refund of the duty
levied on two shafts and other machinery imported by them
in 1 81 aud 1885 to replace broken and disabled shafts
in ves, 1 belonging to them." You add that "the claim ,
that uch shafts and other machin ry were not properly ubject to duty wa duly con idered by this Department on the
app al of the consignees in each ca e, and decided ad ver ely '
but that "in iew of the favorable report thereon of the
Committ e on Claims of the Hou of Repre entatives and
of b enate" whi h you iuclo e you a k tlle .Attorney-Genral to
vi , you whether in hi opinion articl brought
t
nit
t t und r uch ircum tance are imporurview of the tariff law .
On .April 23, 18 1 the
erman Lloyd Company,
rb ven.
n tbe
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customary examination of her machinery after arrival in port
it was discovered that the crank shaft contained several
cracks which prevented the vessel from completing her voyage
until the defective shaft could be replaced. By reason of the
. peculiar construction of the Strassburg, the company kept on
hand at Bremerhaven, the home port, a duplicate crank shaft
for immediate use in cas~ of accident. The duplicate shaft
was shipped from Germany by another steamer of the same
line, landed and transferred to the Strassburg at Baltimore,
and tbere was put in place. The collector of the port of Baltimore assessed the duplicate shaft as imported merchandise,
subject to duty at 45 per cent ad valorem, and collected
$2,422.55, which the company paid under protest. The deci-·
sion of the collector was affirmed by the Secretary of the
Treasury.
The second case is as follows:
The steamship Werra, while on her way from Germany to
the United States, in August, 1885, met with an accident to
her machinery in midocean, breaking her shaft and losing
part of her propeller. In this helpless condition· she was
found and towed by the British steamship Venetia into the
port o·f Boston. The broken parts of her machinery could
only be replaced by the original build_e rs in England, who
forwarded a new shaft by another vessel of the Ba,me line.
This was landed at New York and carried to Boston by rail,
where it was put in place of the broken shaft. Tlie new
shaft was assessed for duty by the collector at New York at
3:¼ cents per pound, or $1,006.30, which the company paid to
the collector at Boston, having duly protested on the same
after the liquidation by the collector at New York. The
agents of the company at Boston offered the collector a
warehouse and withdrawal entry for immediate exportation,
which the latter refused to accept and proceeded to cqllect
the duties.
·
The shaft brought in for the Strassburg in 1881 was
a sessed under the metal schedule contained in the Revised
Statutes as a manufacture of steel at 45 per cent ad
valorem. The shaft brought in for the Werra in 1885 was
assessed at 3¼ cents per pound under the metal schedule (C)
in the tariff act of 1883 (par. 177) as a '' steamer shaft"
valued at more than 10 cents per pound. If these shafts
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were·" imported" into this country, it is not denied that th
were correctly classified under the tariff acts of 1874: a
1883, respectively, and even if they were not, the prot
were not so framed as to permit any other classification on
reliq uidation.
Section 2503, Revised Statutes (tariff of 1874), provide
that "there shall be levied, collected, and paid upon all
articles mentioned in the schedules contained in the n x
section ·imported. from foreign countries, the rates of du y
which are by the schedules respectively prescribed." Th
Strassburg shaft was assessed under section 2503.
Section 2502 of the tariff act of 1883 (22 Stat., 488) reqmr ~
that "there shall be levied, colleeted, and paid upon all a ·.
cles imported from foreign countries" the rates of dut, p ,.
scribed by the succeeding schedules, among which is Sche ule C imposing a duty on steamer shafts. .
The only question for answer here is whether these ha
were "articles imported'' within the meaning of the foregoing sections. To import an article into -this country i
bring it into the country. The shafts here iuvolved w
brought, the one from Germany, the other from England
and were both landed in this country: oue at Baltimore, an
the other at New York. They were, therefore, "article
imported" from foreign countries. As it is admitted tha
they were not upon the free list and were not exempted by
any express provision of law, they are liable to the du
imposed. This answers the question you have put to th
Attorney-General. You have referred in your letter, ho ever, to the reports of two Congressional committee up
the validity of the claim of the steamship company, and hav
also inclosed a brief of counsel for the company upon t
same subject. As it was these documents which indu e
you to seek a reconsideration of the action of your p re
cessors in rejecting the claims and refusing a refund h
grounds therein stated require examination.
The Congressional committee which reported upon the
claim, that of the Strassburg shaft, admitted that the c lector and Secretary were right under the law in a ~e ~ · t:,
the haft for duty, but thought the circumstance~ of
ca e commended it as one entitled to special Congre
relief. That report, therefore, calls for no comment.
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The Senate Committee of Claims in the second case, that
of the Werra shaft, reported that the shaft was not subject
to duty under the law. The grounds upon which this report
proceeds may be considered in eonnection with those stated
in the brief of counsel for claimant as they are substantially
similar.
The first ground upon which it is contended that the
shafts were not "articles imported" within the meaning of
the customs law is that they were not voluntarily brought
into this country. Lord Chief Justice Hale is cited to sustain the proposition that the word import does not include
an article brought into the country involuntarily. The citation is taken from Hargrave's Tracts, Part rrr, "Concerning
the custom of goods," cap. 20, and is as follows:
" .T he goods ought to be imported by way of merchandize,
for if they come in by reason of foul weather, or to escape
pirates, or to take fa fresh water; yea, though they unlade
part of their lading or all of it upon such an extremity; yea,
yet farther, though they sell within the port some of their
lading for the defray of their casualties, as the mending
their ship and buying of victuals, even by the common law
they were to pay no custome or subsidy for any more than
what was so actually sold. And this appears by divers precedents, as well before as since the statute of 28 E. 3, cap.
13 * * * And accordingly if they were wrecked upon
the English coast, no custome by law is due for more than
is sold."
The language shows that Sir Matthew is here speaking of
dutiable and nondutiable articles. He is not defining tbe
meaning of the word "imported." He says the articles to
pay duty must be imported by way of merchaudise, which is
as much as-to say that an article imported in any other way
or for any other purpose, as to escape storm or pirates, is not
to pay duty. But concede that the bringing of an article
into the couutry is not an importation within the purview of
the revenue laws unless it be voluntary, which is certainly
all that can be claimed from the foregoing passage or the
decisions which are . cited (Schooner Mary, 1 Gall., 206;
Schooner Boston and Cargo, 1 Gall., 239,245), the importations
of the shafts here were entirely voluntary. The owners of
tlie new shafts and the ves els in which they werP. brought
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intended the vessels to arrive in the United States and the
shafts to be landed here. No stress of weather brought them
here. The common-law rule as stated by Lord Hale exempt
from duty only those articles upon which the forces of the foul
weather or the pirates are directly exerted as a necessity for
their being brought into port. It certainly can not include
such articles as are subsequently and intentionaUy imported
to a,id the distressed vessel. The common-law rule has been
embodied in the customs laws of this country, and is to be
found in sections 2891, 2892, and 2894, Revised Statutes,
It appeared as section 60 of the :first permanent customs act
of March 2, 1799 (1 Stat. L. 672, which provided:
" That if any ship or vessel from any foreign port or place,
compelled by distress of weather, or other necessity, should
put into any port or place of the United States, not being
destined for the same, the master might, by form of oath
prescribed, set forth the circumstances of the di t1w or
nece sity to the collector, and if there was a nece sity for
unlading the vessel the collector hould grant a permit for
that purpose; and if it was nebessary either to preserve the
('argo or to defray the expen es attending such ves el and
cargo to sell part of the cargo, then that part sold was to pay
duty ; that th~ rest of the cargo might be re]aden upon the
ve el under the superintendence of the revenue officer . and
the ves el might proceed with the same to her place of de tination free from any other charge than for toring and afekeeping of the merchandise and fees to the officers of the
·u tom a in other case ."
This provision must be regarded as an authoritative
xpr . ion of the common-law exemption, with uch additional guarantie again t fraud a were deemed uece. ary by
th I ·i lature. It eff ct i not to be extend d b yond the
natural meaning of its language by argument. ba. ed on
:ni ty, harity or humanity. It me y be ob erved in pa ·
in that trictly peakino- neither article upon the Werra
n r tho" upon the tra, burg w re utitl d to the xempt i n f h , ti n b cau e the tra burg wa d tined for
t ltim r , , h re ·h arriv d and th n rcrra thougu not
l •. in fi r tli 1 rt f
t 11 wa de tin d fir ..?e York
wh r , h , ·a .-u d t th :am re enu law. But waiv.in th t th
cti n i. , p li a 1 only to th
argo of the
(T
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vessel at the time of the distress and not to articles which
the owner or captain of the vessel is obliged subsequently to
buy or procure in order to enable her to continue her voyage.
The sixteenth article of our treaty with Germany (17 Stat.
L., 931) in dealing with the same subject-matter does not
differ in this respect from the statute. No rebate is provided on imported articles bought in this country by the
shipowner to repair foreign vessels in our ports. Why,
then, should an exemption be permitted on articles bought
or procured abroad by the owner and by him brought here
for that purpose, If Congress had intended any exemption
of the kind, it would have made it express. Instead of doing
that, however, it has made an express exemption which
plainly implies that articles imported to repair foreign ships
are dutiable. By section 2514, Revised Statutes, all articles
of foreign production neetled for the repair of American ve~sels engaged exclusively in foreign trade may be withdrawn
from bonded warebonses free of duty under such regulations
as the Secretary may prescribe. The privilege here extended
to American vessels would seem to exclude the existence of
any power in the Secretary of the Treasury to extend a similar privilege to foreign vessels repairing in this country.
Again, by section 2983 the privilege of purchasing supplies
from the public warehouses free from duty may be extended
under regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury to the
vessels of war of any country in ports of the United States if
such nation reciprocate such regulation to war vessels of the
United States in its ports. This only illustrates the general
proposition, that when Congress intends the exemption of
any articles from duty by reason of comity it makes express
provision for it. No such power is given the Secretary of
the Treasury in the absence of special statute.
The second ground upon which it is contended that the
shafts are not '' articles imported" is, that they were not
either sold or consumed in this country. The argument is
ba ed on Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Brown v. Maryland (12 Wheaton, 419). The court there held that the levy
by the State of a tax upon the sales of imports as such was
a tax upon imports and invalid. This rested on the proposition that the privilege of importing- given upon payment of
duty by the General Government included ~,nd ~onferred the
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right to sell the goods when imported. The Chief Ju tice
said (p. 442) :
"The practice of the most commercial nations conforms to
this idea. Duties, according to that practice, are charged
on those articles only which are intended for sale or consumption in the. country. Thus, sea stores, goods imported
and reexported in the same vessel, goods landed and carried
overland for the purpose of being exported from some other
port, goods forced in by stress of weather and landed but
not for sale, are exempted· from the payment of duties. The
whole course of legislation on the subject shows that in the
opinion of the legislature the right to sell is connected with
the payment of duties."
The exceptions which he mentions in the passage above
quoted are exceptions expreRsly made in the law of 1799. (See
section 32 as to reexport of goods brought in; section 33 as
to transfer from one port of the United States to another;
section 45 as to exemption of sea stores; section 60 as to
exemption of cargoes of vessels arriving in distress at ports
to wbch they are not bound, already referred to; section 75
a to a drawback on imported goods exported in the same
packarres.) These exemptions exist under the pre ent law.
Under no one of them, however, are the shafts in the present
ca e included. The Chief Justice is not here defining the
m aning of the word "imports," but he i demon trating that
the general policy of the law as shown by its express proviion ex mi t imports which are not either old or consumed
in thi country. Re can not be understood a aying that,
without expre statutory exception, an article brought into
thi~ ountry i not an import because it i neither sold nor
on urned her~. Among the very exemptions be point out
ar go l i?"nported and ree ported in the ame ve el, showing that, uch goods are imported, though they are immediat ly ~ p rted.
But v n if it be admitt d that an article must be ither
, 1<l r
n nm d here to e an import within the purvi w of
th t w h
f the ·laimant i not aided. The haft. in

V
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enters into consumption when it is put in place on her, as
much as does the nail which is driven into her deck or "the
paint which is put on her sides. ~he Werra and the Strassburg were both in the United States when the shafts were.
put into their machinery. It is true that by force. of a treaty
with Germany (17 Stat., 921) a German. merchant ship
moored in the ports of the United States is, for the purpose
of enforcing discipline in her crew and certain sailors' contracts, within the jurisdiction of German judicial tribunals
and pro tan to out of the jurisdiction of our courts. But in
all other respects the vessel is subject to the local law of
this country (Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S., 1). It will hardly
be contended that articles sold on the deck of a foreign vessel moored to the dock in Boston or Baltimore are not sold
in the United States. What distinction can be made between
the place of such a sale and the place of consumption of an
article which, in the same vessel and in the same port, ceases
to be an independent shaft and becomes a component part
of the vessel's machinery. It is said that the shaft might
have been taken on board and been put in place when the
vessel was towed beyond the limits of the United States.
Tllat would make a different case, and does not assist a conclu ·ion here.
It is of significance in this connection that by sections 2795,
2796, and 2797 the sea stores of a vessel brought into port
are exempt from duty when the master shall particularly
specify the articles by sworn manifest, but if there appears
to be an excess, it is liable to duty.
This provision shows, first, that the excess of sea stores,
though not landed, is ''imported" merchandise; and, second,
that it was deemed necessary to especially exempt articles
which are neither to be landed nor consumed here.
The same remark may be made with respect to section 2798,
which permits a steam vessel arriving at any port in the
United States with coal on board to retain the same without
landing it, and to proceed to a foreign port without paying
duty upon it.
The fact that these shafts were made for these particular
vessels is said to constitute them a part of the permanent
equipment of the vessel, and it is argued that constructively
they were always in the vessels anr1. ought not to be treated
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as a separate importation. There is no authority or ju~ tification for a fiction of this kind to evade the plain letter of the
statute. It might be conceded that if it were possible to carry
two shafts on the vessel, the one to be used in case of accident as a substitute for the other, the unused shaft so carried
would be part of the equipment of the vessel and exempt
from duty, just as her boats or other detached parts of her
equipment would be. But the fact that the shaft was not
carried is an evidence that such substitute shafts do not
make apart of the ordinary equipment of a vessel. And, however this may be, the fact is that this shaft was not part of
the equipment of the vessel when she came in, and had to be
brought in as a separate importation by another steamer.
Another circumstance referred to by the Senate committee
and by counsel for claimant as of significance in this di.en ion is that the shafts could not be procured in this country.
It is not denied that steam.er shafts are within the tariff law
anu have imposed upon them a specific duty. It does not
take a particular shaft out of the law that jt is of a manufacture and in a form not procurable here. In case of doubtful construction under the tariff laws it may be that such a
motive as the m~ntion of this circumstance ugge t for not
impo 'ing a duty would control the meaning of an ambiguous
tatute, but here the duty is plainly laid on steamer shaft ,
an<l. the que. tion whether a particular steamer haft can be
made in this country is wholly irrelevant in considering its
dutiability.
C rtain rulings of your predecessors are cited a governing the question. One is the case of the yacht 1lfndge,
whi •h wa brought into this country on the deck of a
·teamer. It wa a plea ure yacht, and it wa held that. uch
a ya ht wa not good., wares, and merchan i e within the
rn ,ani11g of the tariff law.
By ~e ·tiou 4216 Reli ed
1 'ta tu te. ·, yacht
belonging to a regularly orgauiz cl yacht
Jul, of a11y for io·ll uation which shall extend like privilege
of ,ut ring or leaving any port of the Unit d State withon
ut ring or clearing at the cu tom-bou e thereof, or
paying tonnage ax. The holding of the Se retary may b
upp rt cl on he theory that th bringing of the yacht in on
, ·k f be t am r was not different from her ondition if
h ha
n brought in in tow of the steamer, or bad aile
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in herself, and that therefore she was still a pleasure yacht,
entitled to the privileges of the section quoted. The pther
cases were where the racing rigging of yachts, which could
not be used in crossing the ocean, was brought in on a
steamer and was admitted duty free. These cases must be
conceded to be nearer the one under consideration. But
even if they are applicable here, I must decline to yield to
them as authority for the reasons heretofore given.
I have the honor to advise you that the action of your
predecessors in office in declining to make the refunds which
the claimant company seeks should not be disturbed or
modified.
Very respectfully,
WM. H. TAFT,
Acting Attorney- General.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

UNMAILABLE MATTER-LOTTERY NOTICE .
.A. pamphlet and papers accompanying it considered, and determined to
be matter that should be excluded from the mails, as containing an
advertisement of a, lottery, in violation of sectio:µ 3894 of the Revised
Statutes.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTIOE,

July 9, 1891.
SIR: Your communication of June 22, 1891, submits for
opinion the question whethe1; certain matter, next hereinafter
described, is unmailable under the act of September 19, 1890
(Pamph. Laws, 1889, 1890, p. 465), amending section 3894 of
the Revised Statutes of the United States.
The matter referred to, which you inform me is being
introduced into the mails at the New Orleans post-office by
thousands, consists of a printed pamphlet, bearing the following title:
"Full and Revised Report of the State Supreme Courton
the Lottery Revenue Case. -Concurring and Dissenting
Opinions.-Syllabus and Decree."
· On the first page of this pamphlet is the following heading:
"The Great Cause-Why and How the People Won-The
Able, Learned and Exhaustive Opinions in Favor of the Lottery Revenue Amendment-A Unanimous Court on the Main
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points Raised-The Dissenting Views of Justices Fenner and
Breaux."
The heading is followed by what is termed " The Syllacns,"
and the deeision of the court and certain concurring opinions
and the opinions of the dissenting judges.
Accompanying this pamphlet, and enveloped by one and
the same wrapper, is an empty unsealed envelope, on the face
of which is printed the following superscription:
"No. 72. Use this envelope only for money remittance by
the Southern Express Company. Said to contain $ For New Orleans National Bank, New Orleans, La., from
- - - , ---189-."

The back of the envelope contains the following directions,
etc., also in print:
''Consignee will please open this package on the end, soas
to preserve the seals.
" [SEAL.] (Stitch here.)
(Stitch here.) [SEAL.]
"Tie and seal over knot (here).
"Counted and sealed by - - - - - - , in presence of
- - - - - - . Berlin & Jones Envelope Co., N. Y."
Section 3804, Revised Statutes, as amended by the said
act of September .19, 1890 (supra), is as follows:
'' No letter, postal card, or circular concerning any lottery,
so-called gift concert, or other similar enterprise offering
prizes depe11dent upon lot or chance, or concerning schemes
devi ed for the purpose of obtaining money or property under
fal ·e pretenses, and no list of the drawings at any lottery or
similar cheme, and no lottery ticket or part thereof, and no
check, draft, bill, money postal note, or money order for the
purcha e of any ticket, tickets, or part thereof, or of any
share or any chance in any such lottery or gift enterprise,
hall be carried in the mail or delivered at or through any
po t-office, or branch thereof, or by any letter-carrier; nor
shall any newspaper, circular, pamphlet, or publication of any
kind containing uny advertisement of any lottery or gift enterprise of any kind o_ffering prizes dependent upon lot or chance,
or containing any l·ist of prizes awarded at the drawings of any
·uch lottery o;· gijt enterprise, whether said list is of any part
or of all of the drawing, be carried in the ma,il or delive·red by
cmy po tniaster or letter-carrier. Any person who shall knowingly d p it o~ cause to be deposited, or who hall know-
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ingly send or cause to be sent, anything to be conveyed or
delivered by mail in violation of this section; or who shall
knowingly cause to be delivered by mail anything herein
forbidden to be carried by mail, shall be .deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor, and on conviction shall be punished by a fine
of not more than five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment
for not more than one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment for each offense. Any person violating 3'.ny of tbe
provisions of this section may be proceeded against by information or indictment, and tried and punished, either in the
district at which the unlawful publication was mailed or to
which it is carried by mail for delivery according to the
direction thereon, or at which it is caused to be delivered by
mail to the person to whom it is addressed."
If the matter above described is unmailable it would seem
to be because it falls within the following prohibition of
section 3894, as amended, '' * * * nor shall any newspaper, circular, pamphlet, or publication of any kind containing any advertisement of any lottery or gift enterprise of
any 'kind offering prizes dependent upon lot or chance, or
containing any list of prizes awarded at the drawing of any
such lottery or gift enterprise, whether said list is of any
part or of all of the drawing, be carried in the mail or delivered
by any postmaster or letter-carrier."
Looking now at the form in which the opinions of the
judges of "the supreme court of the State" are presented,
I have no doubt that it is a pamphlet, which is defined by
the Century Dictionary to be: "A printed work consisting
of a few sheets of paper stitched together but not bound."
Nor have I any doubt that this pamphlet, which you inform
me is being sent through the mails by thousands, is also a
pnblication, which is defined by the same authority to be:
"The act of publishing, or bringing to public notice, notification to l?eople at large, by speech, writing, or printing,"
etc., "The act of offering a book, map, print, piece of music,
or the like to the public by sale or by gratuitous distribu- .
tion." The e definitions are, substantially, no doubt, what
will be found in other dictionaries, but I deem it unnecessary
to quote from them.
I am equally clear that Congress used the terms "pamphlet" and "publication" in the law in the above senses.
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Coming now to the envelope, which is the accompaniment
of the pamphlet or publication, we are next to inquire
whether it, too, is a publication.
The language of the law is very comprehensive, namely,
"any * * * pnblication of any kind," and following, as
it does, t,h e words "newspaper, circular, pamphlet," would
seem to indicate that Congress intended that it should be
taken in its most comprehensive sense-that is, asembracing
things not covered by "newspaper, circular, pamphlet."
This we are bound to assume, otherwise the words "any
* * * publication of any kind" would be allowed no
meaning at all, in violation of the well-known rule that
nothing in a statute is to be rejected if it can possibly have
any effect.
That the purpose of the envelope is to bring something t,o
public notice or to give notification of something to people
at large the matter printed on it does not permit me to
doubt, when talten in connection with the fact that thou,
sands of envelopes similar to the one now before me are
being mailed at the post-office at New Orleans.
On its face it notifies its recipient to "use this envelope
only for money remittance by the Southern Express Company," to send the money inclosed to "the National Bank of
New Orleans, La.," to write on its face his name and the
date of the remittance; and on the back are direction
looking to the safety and security of money remitted in the
envelope.
Bearing in mind, now, that thousands of these envelopes
are b ing deposited in the mails, addressed, as I must iufer,
to many persons and places, I do not comprehend how there
i ro m for doubt that each envelope o sent is a ''publication,' in the en e of the law. If each of these envelopes
i not a publication, I am at loss to under tand how anycircu]ar di minat d through the mails in the same way can
b arn 1i ation.
It b i11g thu e tabli hed that the pamphlet and the envelo are b th publication , the next inquiry is, whether they
r itl1 r f th m, contain ''any adverti ement of any lottery
r ·if nt r ri. e of any kind off ring prize dep ndent upon
l t r ·b, 1 , wi hout whi ·h neither of them can be excluded
fr m the mail under the law in quc tion.

TO THE POSTMASTER-GENERAL.

207

Unmailable Matter-Lottery Notice.

An advertisement is generaJiy defined by the Century Dictionary to be: "A notice or an announcement made public
by handbill, placard, or similar means." Of course the word
bas two or three special restricted senses that are familiar,
and which are also given by that authority. The "Imperial
Dictionary" gives this definition of advertisement: "A written or printed notice intended to make something known to
the public, especially a printed and paid notice in a newspaper or other public print."
The fact that the pamphlet and envelope are invariably
mailed together, in the same wrapper, is a circumstance to
show that the sender recognizes some connection or relation
between the two, while the directions on the envelope plainly
indicate that the sender's purpose is to find customers rather
than readers.
It may be that neither the pamphlet nor the envelope is
an advertisement, by itself, but there is nothing to prevent
them from being taken together, as it was no doubt intended they should be, and read as one publication. This is
constantly done where the evidence of ordinary business
transactions is to be found in· several papers, and I can see
no reason whatever why the same principle sbould not be
applied to the documents in question. (Bailey v. Railroad
Company, 17 Wall., 96, 107, 108; Anderson v. Harvey, 10
Gratt., 386, 396.)
But, in order to get the full meaning of the two documents,
when taken together, it is important to advert to certain
well-known facts, that the documents may be read in their
light.
It may be doubted whether anything is better known to
all classes throughout the country than the existence in the
city of New Orleans, of the Louisiana Lottery Company, as a
company, extensively engaged in selling lottery tickets all
over the United States. It is equally well known that the
use of the mails, for the purposes of that business, bas been
forbidden by Congress, and that, to evade the law in this
particular, the lottery company has been instructi:Illg its corre, pondents to address mail matter intended for .it to a bank
at New Orleans. It is also notorious that the ch~rter under
which the lottery company is doing business is about to expire, and that the company is making strenuous efforts for
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its renewal, and to that end has been engaged in a contest
in the courts with the authorities of the State of Louisiana,
from which it has recently come off victorious, as the pre s
everywhere has announced with a conspicuousness which i
only given to news likely to interest many readers.
These facts, involved as they are with a question of public
morals, form part of the hjstory of the times in which we live,
and excite no little attention and discussion, in the newspapers and elsewhere, and it would be a strauge spectacle,
indeed, if those whose duty it is to exclude lottery matter
from the mails, should be compelled to perform that duty
with their eyes shut to facts known to everybody else.
The law is guilty of no such absurdity. In Hoare v. Sil-verloclc (12 A. B. Ell., N. S., 624), the question was whether
.a count in a declaration, in an action for libel, stating that
the friends of the plaintiff' "had realized the fable of the
Frozen Snake" was sufficient witbout an innuendo or explanatory averment, and the court held that it was, Lord Coleridge remarking, in relation to the necessity for an innueudo,
that, "the jury and court in such a case as this are in an odd
predicame11t, if they alone of all persons are not to understand
the allusion complained of. Suppose the libel had said the
plaintiff acted like a Judas; must the history of Judas have
been given, and referred to by innuendof'' This case wa
dted with approbation, by the Supreme Court of the United
States inBrownetalv.Piper (91 U.S., 37,42), whereitislaid
down, that "Courts will take notice of whatever is generally
known within the limits of their jurisdiction." • • • To
the same effect i the case of Ohio Life Insurance and Tru t
Company v. Debolt (16 How., 416, 435), where the court said
that it was a matter of public history of w:ti.ich they could
not refuse to take notice that almost every bill for the incororation of banking, in uran0e, tru t, and other like companie , i drawn originally by the ·p artie intere ted in obtaining the chart r. In Bailey v. Kalamazoo Publishing Go. (40
icb., 251, ""''37) jt i , aid that "courts have no right to b
i norant of the meaning of current phra e which everybody
1 und r taud ." In Lohman v. The State (81 Ind., 15 17)
ju li ·ial n ti e wa taken of what i meant by "A gfft ent rpri , and in alomon v. The tate, and Boullemetv. The fate
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(28 Ala., 83, 88), the court took notice of the peculiar nature
of lotteries and the mode in which they are carried on.
. In addition to the facts above stated, and in connection
with them, I would remark that the pamphlet itself furnishes
evideuce that it is uot printed and mailed in good faith, but
with an ulterior purpose. In its title the supreme court of
Louisiana is designated "The State Supreme Court," which
we feel at liberty to say would not have been the case if the
apparent object of the pamphlet had been its real one. No
doubt it was t,h ought that to place the word Louisiana in
immediate connection with the words'' Lottery Revenite Gase"
migllt excite the suspicions of the post-office officials and
lead to the rejection of the pamphlet from the mails.
Again, the words of the heading of the first page, "The
Great Cause- Why and How the People Won," furnish a
strong indication of an ulterior object in issuing the pamphlet. Reading this beading, one would suppose that the
suit referred to involved the decision of some question vital
to popular liberty, instead of one menacing public morality.
On looking into the pamphlet we discover that the State
of Louisiana passed a law, directing it to be submitted to
the people of the State to determine whether the charte~ of
tbe Louisiana Lottery Company should bereuewed fortwenty.five years, from January 1, 1894, for an enormous consideration, and containing a provision renewing the said charter if
the vote of the people sllould be in favor of it, and the
"Great Cause" referred to was a suit to compel the Secretary of the State of Louisiana to submit that matter to the
vote of the 11eople, he having refused to do so. It thus
appears, that the only party benefited by the decision of the
''Great Cause" is the Louisiana Lottery Company.
Taking now the pamphlet and the envelope together and
reading them in the light of the above facts what do we find~
A pampb let about the Louisiana Lottery Company and
nothing else, bringiug that company to the public attention
in a striking way.
The recipient of 'the pamphlet is not allowed to remain at a
loss to understand why a publication about a matter not
interesting him was sent, because on opening it he discovers
the envelope, and at a glance almost sees that it rneans busi56 7-VOL 20--14
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ness of some sort. Familiar as he is with the facts to which
we have referred, he is not so simple as to suppose that the
bank to which the envelope is directed is inviting him to
some enigmatical transaction. He knows well enough that
banks do not approach. the public in that way, but he intuitively connects the envelope with the Louisiana Lottery Company and completely understands, from what is before him
and from what he knows besides, that if he will send money
to the bank its worth in lottery tickets will be returned to
him by the Louisiana Lottery Oompany. What are these
documents, then, thus read, but publications containing an
advertisement of the Louisiana Lottery Company; that is to
say, publications bringing that company to the notice of the
public and soliciting the public to purchase tickets in its
lotteries f
If the statute can be evaded by so transparQnt a device,
it seems to me it was almost a waste of time to pass it, for
all the good it will do.
You have no power to try questions of this kind by judicial methods. You can not summon parties or witnesses
before you, and can not therefore be expected to have a better foundation for your action in excluding matter from the
mails than a magistrate is required to have for issuing a
warrant for the arrest of a supposed criminal. You can not,
it i true, proceed upon suspicion any more than the magistrate can, but you are safe in acting on rea onable and probable ground . That such grounds exist in the case before
me seem not to admit of doubt.
Very respectfully,

W. H. H. MILLER.
The POS'.l.'MASTER-GENERAL.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL-SEIZURE OF PICTURES OF COINS.
The ques ion whether or not certain pictures of coins constitute a violation of section 3 of the act of February 10, 1891, chapter 127, is one
for the d termination <>f the courts, not for the Executive Department ; consequently the Attorney-General declines to expre an
opinion thereon .
The 'ecretary of the Treasury is not authorized by law to seize the
article described.
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTIOE,

July 15, 1891.
Srn: By your letter of June 19, last, you ask my opinion
as to the construction to be placed upon section 3 of the act
of February 10, 1891 (26 Stat., 742), being "An act further
to prevent counterfeiting or manufacture of dies, tools, or
other instruments used in counterfeiting and providing penalties therefor, and providing for the issue of search warrants in certain cases."
Section 3 reads as follow~:
"That every person who shall make, or who causes or
procures to be -made, or who brings into the United States
from any foreign country, or who shall have in possession
with intent to sell, give away, or in any other manner use
the same, any business or professional card, notice, placard,
token, device, print, or impression, or any other thing whatsoever, whether of metal or its compound, or of any other
substance whatsoever, in likeness or similitude, as to design,
color, or the inscription thereon, of any of the coins of the
United States or of any foreign government, that have been
or hereafter may be issued as money, either under the
authority of the United States, or under the authority of
any foreign government, shall, upon conviction thereof, be
punished by a fine not to exceed one hundred dollars."
Your letter asks an answer to two questions:
First, whether pictures of coins, printed or lithographed
upon advertising cards and labels, or upon playing-cards,
more or less accurately representing one of the faces, the
color, and the inscription, on the various coins of the United
States, are obnoxious to the provisions of section 3 above
quoted.
This is not a question of law, arising in the administration
of the Treasury Department, within-the meaning of section
356, Revised Statutes, which reads as follows:
"The head of any Executive Department may require
the opinion of the Attorney-General on any questions of law
arising in the administration of his Department."
Whether any given acts or practices constitute a crime is
a question for the determination of the courts, not of the
Executive Departments, except where some executive action
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is dependent upon that determination. This is not such
exceptional case.
You will therefore excuse me from giving an answer to
this first question.
The second question is, whether your subordinates in the
Secret Service are authorized to seize the articles described
and proscribed in section 3, or the instruments by which
they are made.
To this the answer must be in the negative, and that
entirely independent of the answer to the first question.
The power to make such seizure 'i s in derogation of common
right, is conferred only by statute, and the statute conferring the same must be strictly construed. There is nothing
in this act, or in any other statute within my knowledge,
authorizing such seizure.
Section 4 of this act authorizes the seizure of "all counterfeits of any of the obligations or other securities of the
United States or of any foreign government, or couuterf'eit
of any of the coins of the United States or of any foreign
government, and all material or apparatus fitted or intended
to be used, or that shall have been used, in the making of
any such counterfeit obligations or other ecurities or coin
herein before mentioned, that shall be found in t4e pos es ion
of any person without authority from the Secretary of the
Treasury or other proper officer to have the same."
The articles brought under the ban in section 3 do not fall
within the classification of counterfeits, as is evidenced not
only by their description but by the trifl.i11g penalty impo ed,
a compared with the penalties imposed for ordinary counterfeiting.
I return herewith the papers.
e pectfully, your ,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

MA TER

LI EN E.

ection 14 of Rule 5 of en ral Rul and Regulations adopted by the
Board of up rvi ing En,riue r , and approved by th ecretary of the
Tr a ury, wa witlJin th authority conferr d by ection 4405 Revi ed
, ·t , tnte , an l the same now ha th force of law.
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DEP.A.R'l'MENT OF JUSTICE,

July 15, 1891.
SIR: Your letter of the 3d instant, relating to the appeal
of Robert H. McCoy, is received with inclosures.
It appears tlia.t Mr. McCoy applied to the local inspectors
at Cincinnati, Ohio, in June last to be licensed as master of
steam vessels running on Western rivers; whereupon his case
was examined and the application refused on the ground
that applicant had "not been licensed and served at least
one year as first-class pilot, or chief mate, on lake, bay, or
river steamers, as provided by section 14, rule 5, .General
Rules and Regulations."
Said McCoy then appealed to the supervising inspector of
the Seventh district, asking that the decision of the local
inspectors be set aside and that a license to act as such master be issued to him.
The supervising inspector only examined the case and
sustained the decision of the local inspectors.
Thereupon, said McCoy appealed to the Secretary of the
Treasury to set aside the findings or decisions of said
inspectors and to direct the issuance of a master's license to
McCoy in accordance with his original application.
Hepresentatives and owners of important steamboat and
transportation lines also represented the hardship of the
rule adopted as applied to Western rivers and requested
that the license should be granted to McCoy.
The inquiry submitted to me is whether said section 14
of rule 5 is so far in conflict with section 4439 of the Revised
Statutes, or is to such an extent iu derogation of the rights
of McCoy in the premises that said section 14 should be
held to be without effect as applied in the case under consideration.
The statute is as follows:
"SEC. 4439. Whenever any person applies to be lic~nsed
as master of a steam vessel, the inspector shall make diligent inquiry as to his character, and shall carefully examine
the applicant, as well as the proofs which be presents in
support of his claim, and if they are satisfied that his
capacity, experience, habits of life, and character are such
as to warrant the belief that he can be safely intrusted with
t,he duties and responsibilities of the station for which he
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makes application, they shall grant him a license nutborizing him to discharge such duties on any such vessel for the
term of one year." * * *
Section 14 of rule 5 provides as follows:
''That no original master's license on lake, bay, and river
steamers shall be issued herea,fter to any person who has not
been licensed and served at least one year as .first-clas pilot
or chief mate on such steamers, such service as pilot or chief
mate to have been within three years preceding the application for license: Provided, however, That the foregoing clau ·e
sha,11 not apply to persons who have served at least three
years as master, mate, or pilot on sailing vessels on waters
for which the applicant desires to obtain a license." * *' •
The rule referred to was adopted by the Board of Supervising Inspectors, January 25, 1888, and was approved by
the Secretary of the Treasury the 7th of the month following.
Sa.id rule was e. tablisbed under the authority of section
4405, Revised Statutes, which provides that," The board shall
establi h all necessary regulations required to carry out in
the most effective manner the provisions of this title (LII),
and such regulations when approved by the Secretary of the
Treasury shall have the force of law." ·
Upon this case my opinion is as follows:
Section 14 of rule 5 is in compliance with section 4405,
Revi ed Statutes, as a regulation "to carry out in the mot
effective manner" the provisions of Title LII; and i a carrying out of the requirement of section 4439, Revi ed Statute ,
that the applicant shall have such capacity, experience, and
habits of life that he can be safely intru ted with the duties
and respon ibilities of th po. ition for wbich ,he applies.
Therefore the board wa authoriz d toe tabli ' hand declare
aid , ection 14, and the sam uow ha the force of law.
the deci ion of the loral in" pector,' and upervising
in:p tor ar in accordance with , ection 14, tbey are in accordan e wi h the law and mu t tand.
ery r p tfu1ly
W. H. H. MILLER.
The EORET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.
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PUEBLO INDIANS.
Section 5 of the act of August 15, 1876, chapter 289, and the act of
July 31, 1882, chapter 360, are not applicable to the Pueblos of New
Mexico.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 28, 1891.
Sm: Your communication of the 25th instant, wherein,
by reference to a letter of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, you request ·my opinion upon the question "whether
section 5 of the act of .August 15, 1876 (19 Stat., .200), and
the act of July 31, 1882 (22 Stat., 179), are applicable to
the Pueblos of New Mexico," is received and has had due
consideration.
Section 5, above referred to, reads as follows:
"And hereafter the Commissioner of Indian .Affairs shall
have the sole power and authority to appoint traders to the
Indian tribes, and to make such rules and regulations as he
may deem just and proper, specifying the kind and quantity
of goods, and the prices at which such goods shall be sold to
the Indians."
.And the act of July 31, 1882, so far as pertinent here,
reads as follows:
"Any person other than an Indian of the foll blood who
shall attempt to reside in the Indian country, or on any
Indian reservation, as a trader, or to introduce goods, or to
trade therein, without such license, shall forfeit all merchandise offered for sale to the Indians or found in his possession, and shall moreover be liable to a penalty of five
hundred dollars."
It is, of course, well known that the Territory of New
Mexico was acquired by the United States from Mexico by
the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, in 1848.
The status of the Pueblo Indians has frequently been adjudicated by the courts of New Mexico and the Supreme Court
of the United States. In The United States v. Ritchie (17
How., 531) it was held that, as the result of the plans of government adopted by the Mexicans after throwing off the
Spanish yoke, these Indians within the Mexican borders
became citizens. The court says:
"But as a race, we think it impossible to deny that under
the const.mction of the laws of the country no distinction
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was made as to the rights of citizenship, and the privilege
belonging to it between this (Pueblo Indian) and the European or Spanish blood. Equality between them, as we have
seen, has been repeatedly affirmed in the most solemn act
of the Government."
In The Unitecl States v. Lucero, decided in 1869 by t~rn
supreme court of New Mexico (1 N. M., 422-458), the same
conclusion is reaclled, and it is held that the Pueblos, not
being tribal Indian~, were not within t,he provisions of the
intercourse act of 1834, and not subject to the jurisdiction
of .the Indian Department of the United States Government.
Other decisionR of the supreme court of New Mexico reiterate these conclusions.
In the United States v. Joseph (94 U. S. 614), it is announced that the question whether the Pueblo Indians and
their lands were subject to the provisfons of the intercour e
act of 1834, exte11ded to New Mexico by the act of July 27,
1851 (9 Stat., 587), must be determined by the answers to
two questions; namely:
1. Are the people who constitute the Pueblo, or village of
Taos, an Indian tribe within the mea11ing of ~be statutei
2. Do they hold the land on which the settlement meutioned in the petition was made by a tenure which bring.'
them within its terms , that is, by the ordinary Iudian title.
Both que tions are answered in the negative. The court,
after referring to the fact that there were wild, uomadic
tribe , uch as the Apaches, Navajoes, etc., iu New Mexico,
to which the statute could apply, say :
,:The Pueblo Indian , if indeed they can be called Indian
had nothing in common with tllis clas . The degree of civilization whi h they had a,tta,inecl centuries before, their willing
ubmi 'i n to all the laws of the Mexican Government the
full r cognition by that overnrnent of all their rights, in luding tha of voting and holding office, and their ab orption
into the eneral ma, of the population (ex ept they ba<l their
Jan
in ommou ), all forbid tlrn idea that they ·hould be
l ,, ith the Indian tribe fi r whom the intercom· ' a ·t
made, r hat iu th intent of the act of 1 -1 it prou · w r aPI Ii able to th m. Th tribe :£ r whom the
f 1 : , a mad w r h
mi-indep ndent tri
whom
· o·n iz tl a exempt fr m our
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laws, whether within or without the limits of an organized
State or Territory, and, in regard to their domestic government, left to their own rules and traditions; in whom we have
recognized the capacity to make treaties, and with whom the
Governments, State and National, deal, with few exceptions
only, in their national or tribal character and not as individuals.
The court declined to expressly rule that the Pueblos were
citizens of the United States and of New Mexico, but did
state that "We have no hesitation in saying that their status
is not, in the face of the facts we have stated, to be determined solely by the circumstance that some officer of the
Government Las appointed for them an agent, even if we
coul<l. take judicial notice of the existence of that fact 1 suggested to us in argument," and that, "If the defendant is on
the lands of the Pueblos without the consent of the inhabitants, he may be ejected, or punished civilly by a suit for
trespass, according to the laws regulating such matters in
the Territories."
In view of these adjudications, my conclusion is that the
sections of the statutes referred to are not applicable to the
Pueblos of New Mexico.
The papers are herewith returned.
Respectfully, yours,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRET.A.RY OF '.l.'HE INTETIIOR.

IMMIGRANTS-FERRY SERVICE.
The act of August 3, 1882, chapter 376, and sections 7 and 8 of the immigration act of March 3, 1891, chapter 551, fully authorize the Secretary
of the Treasury to provide subsistence for Government employes and
immigrants on Ellis Island and to procure the transportation facilities
necessary and pay snch proper expenses as may be necessary to carry the
immigration laws into effect. He is authorized to do this in any
manner not prohibited by law that he shall deem best and for Huch
reasonable term as shall best subserve the interests of the Government
subject to the rights of the officers and agents of the Government ancl
to such legislation as Congress may see fit to enact, and to such rules
as he himself may from time to time adopt, and preserving to him control over the wharves and the power to prevent the coming of improper
persons and the departure of those who should be detained. The coo-
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tract for transportation may lawfully confer to the contractor an
exclusive right to carry immigrants to and from the island and the
right to collect a reasonable compensation therefor.
DEP AR 'l'MENT OF

J US'.l'ICE,

July 28, 1891.
Sm: Your Jetter of the 14th instant, calling for my opinion as to the authority possessed by you ·to contract for ferry
service to and from Ellis Island, and also for the furnishing
of subsistence to immigrants and othei;s upon said island,
has been duly considered.
The questions involved may be formulated as follows:
1. Is the Secretary authorized to contract for ferry service
to and from Ellis Island for a term of more than one year?
2. May the ferriage contract provide for the exercise by
the contractor of an exclusive right of carrying immigrants
and other persons to and from said island, with permission
to collect a reasonable compen ation therefor¥
3. Is the Secretary authorized to contract for a term of'
more than one year for subsi tence for Government employes
on the island and for immigrants there while in charge of
the Government,
Under the act of August 3, 1882 (22 Stat., 214), the immigrant fund is placed under the control of the Secretary of
th Trea ury, to be used for the care of immigrants and for
the purposes and expenses of carrying the act into effect;
and he is charged with the duty of executing the provi ions
of the act and with supervi ion over the bu ines of immiration; and is authorized to establish uch reo·ulation and
rule and is ue uch in tructions not incon isteut with law
a he hall eem be t calculated to protect the United tates
and immi 0 Tants from fraud and lo s and for carrying out
the pr i ions of the act and the immigration laws of the
nit d tate .
y ction 7 of the act of Mar h 3, 1891, relative to immirati n (...6 tat., 10 5), the Sup rintendent of Immigration
i ' made ubj ct to the control and upervi ion of aid Secreby ection the uperintendent mu t au e the
be roperly hou d, £ , and cared for during
ti n aft r t mp r ry r mov I.
r anti n are dire t
to prevent the landing of
ex ept at a time an place de ignated.
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The due execution of the law requires provision for the
subsistence of immjgrants and employes. The '' sundry
civil" act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 949), contains an enactment providing means ''for completing the building and
other improvements on Ellis Island, and for procuring the
necessary transportation facilities to and from said island."
It therefore appears that the Secretary of the Treasury is
fully authorized by law to ·provide subsistence on Ellis Island
and to pay such proper expenses as may be required to carry
the immigration laws into effect; and is also authorized to
procure transportation facilities necessary in the premises.
It is evident that, under the law, all ferriage communication with Ellis Island may be under such regulations as the
Secretary shall prescribe; and also, .that the subsistence contemplated, of immigrants and employes, is a necessary
expenditure in the enforcement of the immigration law.
In my opinion the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized
to procure the transportation facilities in question, and to
provide for the subsistence under consideration in any manner not prollibited by law that he shall deem best. Sections
3679 and 3732 (R. S.) do not interfere with this freedom of
action, because no appropriation will be required to be made
by Congress on account of either of the contemplated contracts.
It is my opinion, also, that the inhibition contained in sec- _
tion 3735 (R. S.) is inapplicable to the ferriage and subsistence contracts under consideration.
It is my opinion that you are authorized to contract as to
both ferriage and subsistence for such reasonable term as
will, in the respective cases, be most for the interest of the
Government and for the due, economical, and efficient administration of the immigration laws.
It will be understood that the service under the respective
contracts must be subject to the rights of the officers and
agents of the Government and to any legislation that Congress may see fit to enaet, and to such rules and regulations
as the Secretary of the Treasury shall adopt from time to
time.
It is essential that the Secretary shall retain full control of
the wharves and Iandiugs of the island and that he shall
be enabled to prevent the · coming of improper persons,
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and the departure of such as ought, under the law, to be
detained; it is also necessary that officers and agents of the
United States, and all persons coming or going upon Government vessels, shall be free from restrictions as to ferry transportation; and the continuing right of Congress to legislate
in the premises, and of the Secretary to control, by regulations and otherwise, will be urn:lerstood. Subject to these
rights, privileges, and reservations, it is my opinion that the
contract providing for procuring transportation facilities
may lawfully confer upon the contractor the exclusive right
to carry immigrants and other persons to and from said island,
and tile right to collect from those so carried a reasonable
compensation therefor.
Very respectfully,.
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
·where a reque t for an opinion contains no statement of fact and preent no questions of law, the Attorney-General declines to give an
opinion.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Jitly 28, 1801.

Commis ioner of Indian Affairs left at this
partmeut a few day ince an opinion, prepared by Mr.
A i,'taut Attorney-General Shields, touching the question of
th rule of individual distribution among the Choctaw and
Chicka aw Indian of th appropriation made by the la t
n °Te (2G Stat., 1025), with an oral request for an opinion
fr m thi Der artment touching that ubject-matter.
'Ih a t of Congre , after makiug the appropriation pro ·
vid Th, t thr e-fourth
ucb
th

r
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saw Nation to receive the same, at such times and in such
sums as directed and required by the legislative authority
of said Chickasaw N atiou."
This language plainly bas reference to the payment of
these moneys in bulk to the representatives of the Choctaw
and Chickasaw nations, and imposes no duty upon the Secretary of the Interior with reference to the individual distribution of the same. The persons entitled to such distribution, the evideucenecessary to estabfo:,h their claims, and the
manner of such distribution are all matters t,o be regulated
by the laws of the Choctaw and Chickasaw nations, respectively, subject, doubtless, to the rule that such laws must not
be in conflict with the Constitution and laws of the United
States.
It is not apparent, therefore, that any question is presented to the honorable Secretary of the Interior for decision requiring an opinion from the Attorney-General under
section 356 of the Revised Statutes. Any decision by the
Secretary, or opinion by the Attorney-General, as to who are
the proper distributees of this fund, would be wholly inconclusive, and, as I conceive, outside of duties imposed by lawscarcely less so than if we should attempt to determine what
should be done with the moneys paid to the several States
under the act providing for the refunding of direct taxes, or
fix the rule for the distribution of decedent's estates in one
of the Territories.
At any rate, this request contains no statement of facts,
and formulates no question of law for my consideration.
Under the circumstances, therefore, the papers are returned
without the opinion asked.
Very respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE INTERIOR.

EXTRA COMPENSATION.
The act of March 3, 1891, chapter 540, appropriating money for a new
edition of the Postal Laws and Regulations, does not authorize the
Postmaster-General to mA.ke an allowance to an officer of his Department whom he may designate for that purpose.
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DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

.August 3, 1891.
Sm: The act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 880), entitled" An
act making appropriations for the fiscal year ending June
30, 1891, and for former years, and for other purposes," con.
tains the following provisions:
"POSTAL LAws .A.ND REGULATIONS: For printing and
publishing a new edition of the Postal Laws and Regula·
tions, consisting of eighty-five thousand copies; such edition
to be prepared under the direction of the Postmaster-Gen·
eral, and printed at the Government Printing Office. And
the Postmaster-General may authorize the sale of copies of
such edition not needed for the use of the Department, to
individuals, at the cost thereof, with ten per centum added;
the proceeds of such sales to be deposited in the Treasury,
as part of the postal revenues, forty thousand three hundred
and sixty-five dollars."
On this provision you base the question whether you are
"authorized to designate an officer of this Department to
prepa,r e tbe proposed volume of laws and regulations and
make an allowance to pay him out of the appropriation," as
al)ove provided.
I am of opinion that you have no authority to make an
allowance out of the said appropriation for the preparation
of a new edition of the Postal Laws and Regulations to any
officer of your Department whom you may designate for that
work, whether a duty ~f that_kiud appertains to his office
or uot. The law on that subject seems entirely clear.
ection 1765, Revised Statute , provides as follows:
' o fficer in any branch of the public service, or any
other p r on who e alary, pay, or emoluments are fixed by
law or regulation , hall r c ive any additional pay, extra
allowance, or comp n ation, in any form whatever, for the
di bur
nt of public money, or for any other ervice or
duty, hat er, 11nle the same i authorized by law, and
the ap r riation tber for explicitly tates that it is for uch
additi n l pay, extra allowance, or compen ation."
T mak thi inhibition more explicit it i declared b ecf h
ct of June 2 1 74 (1
tat. 1 9), "That no
r f the ov rnm nt ball b r aft r receive any
tion or per ui it , dir ctly r indirectly, from the
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-Treasury or property of the United States beyond his salary
or compensation allowed by law."
As I understand this legislation, it prohibits an officer of
any branch of the Government from receiving additional or
extra compensation for any service ren<lered by him, if the
service so rendered have any affinity or connection with the
duties of his office, unless such compensation is "authorized
by law and the appropriation therefor explicitly states that it
is for such additional pay, extra allowance, or compensation."
It is true there is an appropriation of $40,365 for defraying
the expenses of preparing the new edition of these laws and
regulations, but that appropriation does not "explicitly
state" that any part of it is for "additional pay, extra allowance, or compensation" to any officer of the Post-Office Department who may be designated for that work, and I need
not add that this appropriation is to be treated as in subordination to section 1765 and section 3 of the act of June 20,
1874 (supra).
In Converse v. United Sta,tes (21 How., 463, 471) the Supreme Court had occasion to interpret the acts of Congress
now embodied in section 1765. In that case the collector for
the port of Boston had been selected by the Treasury Department as agent to purchase supplies for the light-house service
throughout the United States and to make the disbursements
for that purpose, and it was held that he could receive the compensation allowed by law for that service, because the laws
prohibiting additional or extra pay "can by no fair interpretation be held to embrace an employment which h'as no affinity
or connection, either in its character or by law or usage, with
the line of his official duty, and where the service to be performed is of a different character and for a different place,
and the amount of compensation regulated by law." There
was, however, a strong dissent from the opfoion of the court
by Justices Catron, Grier, and Campbell.
On precisely the same ground additional pay was allowed
in United States v. Saunders (120 U.S., 126); in United Stcites
v. Brindle (110 U. S., 688); in Meigs v. United States (19 Ct.
Cl ., 497); and in Pierce's Gase (15 Opin., 608).
But how can it be said in this case that the preparation
of the new edition of the Postal Laws and Regulations has no
affinity or connection with the duties of any officer in the Post-
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Office Department, or that it "is of a, different character and
for a different place 1" If the claim of compensation for the
preparation of that work by an officer of that Department
would not be covered by section 1765 and the act of 1874, it
is not easy to imagine a case that would be.
The act of March 3, 1879 (20 Stat., 356), referred to in your
letter, furnishes a good example of the legislation necessary
to take a case such as your question supposes out of the
-0peration of section 1765 and the act of 187 4, and seems to
warrant the inference that Congress did not intend by the
act of March 3, 1891, to authorize you to employ an officer of
your Department at an additional or extra compensation to
prepare the contemplated edition of the postal laws and regulations, or it would have said so, as in the act of 1879.
The act of March 3, 1873 (17 Stat., 542), to which you also
-call my attention, appropriating additional compen ation to
Messr . Ireland and McGrew, officers of the Post-Office
Department, for having prei,iou~ly prepared an edition of the
Postal Laws and Regulatiorni, was a mere gratuity on the part
-of Congre s, it being very clear that no action against the
United States for such compensation could have been maintained in the Court of Claims.
Very respectfully, yours,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The POSTMASTER-GENER.AL.

CERTIFICATION OF LAND-DUTY OF THE UNITED STATES.
·Certification of land already covered by a homestead or preemption
ntry i erroneous and without authority of law. The act of March
3, 1 7, chapter 556, is mandatory, and makes it the duty of the United
tat to hrino- a suit to re tore title to the United tates if the party
to whom th land wa rroneously c rtifi dafter a prior certification
does not give or procure a r linqui bment or reconveyauce.
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As my opinion rests upon the case now presented, I will
note the controlling circumstances thereof, which are as follows:
About August 1, 1856, Boyd W. Jfandall settled upon the
S. ¼of the NE. ¼ of sec. 29, T. 111 N., R. 25 W., (Tracy),
Minnesota.
He filed the proper declaratory statement October 4, 1856,
and improved and resided upon the land, and entered the
same April 28, 1856, at the land office at St. Peters, and
received receiver's and register's certificate No. 6179.
Randall continued to reside upon the tract until March 27,
1882, when he was forcibly ejected upon proceedings instituted by one Washington Boright, who was grantee of the
St. Paul and Sioux City Railway Company.
The land was certified to the said railway company before
its sale to Boright, and Randall's entry was canceled at the
local land office in consequence of such certification. This
-cancellation was without the consent of Randall, and the
fees paid by him were not returned.
The Commissioner of the General Land Office assents to
tbe substantial correctness of these istatements, and says
(March 12, 1891): "The land was erroneously certified for
railroad purposes. This office recommended proceedings
under act of March 3, 1887 (24 Stat., 556), for the recovery
,of the titJe."
The inference is a necessary one that Randall, in compliance with the laws and in response to the invitation of the
United States, settled and resided upon a previously unoccupied portion of the public domain, and duly proceeded by
declaratory statement and other prescribed acts to obtain
title to the same.
After the initiation of these proceedings and before their
completion the Government erroneously certifies this land
occupied by him to the railway company under an existing .
land-grant law. This company conveys its rights to Boright
by a quitclaim deed, and this grantee of the company carries the erroneous certification to its practical consequences
by forcibly ejecting Randall from the land.
Since this ejectment Boright has con_veyed the land to
others.
5687-V0L 20--15
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Under these circumstances is the Government called upon
to take action,
It may be regarded as settled law that the certification of
land already covered by a homestead or preemption entry
is erroneous_and without authority of law.
The question now arises as to the act of March 3, 1887.
By section 1 the Secretary of the Interior is directed to
adjust, in accordance with the decisions of the Supreme
Court, existing land grants made to railroads.
By section 2, if it shall appear that lands have been tbei-etofore erroneously certified to any company, the Secretary
of the Interior shall demand a relinquishment or reconveyance thereof, and upon failure for ninety days after the
demand "it shall thereupon be the duty of the A.ttorneyGeoeral to commence and prosecute in the proper courts the
necessary proceedings to cancel an patents, certification, or
other evidence of title heretofore issued for such lands, and
to re tore the title to the United States."
By section 3, if the entry of a settler has been erroneou Jy
canceled, he shall upon application be reinstated in all his
rights and allowed to perfect his entry.
Section 4 covers cases where a homesteader or preemptioner does not take uuder section 3, and where the company
has old the land to a person de cribed in section 4.
In uch case the purchaser becomes entitled to receive the
land, and the company is obligated to pay the Government
th r for; " and in case of neglect or refusal of the company
t make payment, "" "" * the Attorney-General ,'hall
au e uit or uits to be brought against such company for
tbe aid amount."
nder the deci ions of the court no special enactment wa
nece ary to authorize the bringing of a uit to recover land
rti l erroneou. ly or convey d by mi take.
In United tate v. Stone (2 Wall., 535) Mr. Justice Grier.
p · king for the court, ay :
'Pat nt are m time i ued unadvi dly or by mi take
wher the :ffi er ha ~ no autl;l rity in law to grant th m r
wh r
noth r arty ha a higher equity and houl h Y
r · ived th patent. In u h ca e court of law will pr un th m void. The patent i but evi Jen e f a rant
and the officer who i ue it act mini terially and not judi-
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cially. If he issues a patent for land reserved from sale by
law, such patent is void for want of authority. But one officer
of the Land Office is not competent to cancel or annul the
act of his predecessor. That is a judicial act, and requires .
the judgment of a court."
It is true that the United States is not justified in bringing a suit to set aside its own patent or certification, when it
has no interest in the subject of litigation, and where the
purpose of the action is to transfer the title from one claimant to another; but it must be held that where the Govern- ment is under obligation to a party who will be benefited by
its action, it may bring its suit for his benefit.
·
It is the doctrine of tlle cases that where the United
States is under obligation to a party, where the duty rests
upon the Government to protect an individual or the public
against a certification erroneously made or a patent granted
by mistake, the United States has su·c h an interest as justifies its suit under the guidance of its .Attorney-General.
( United States v. Stone, supra; Id. v. Hughes, 11 How.,
552; Id., 4 Wall., 232; Moore v. Robbins, 96 U. S., 530;
Mo.ffat v. United States, 112 U .. S., 24; United State.<s v.
Minor, 114 U. S., 233; Col. 0. and I. Go. v. United States,
123 U.S., 307; San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U. S., 273; United
States v. Beebe, 127 U. S., 3:38; Bell Telephone Go. Gase, 128
U. S., 315; Williams v. United States, 138 U.S., 517.)
This being the law without special statutory instructions,
we may next consider the construction to be placed upon the
act of 1887, which contains ~xplicit directions as to designated
cases which fall under the general doctrine enunciated in
the decisions above cited .
.Applying the enactment to Randall's case, it now appears
upon the present presentation of facts, it must be said that
his land was erroneously certified to the railway company;
and that upon demand of relinquishment or reconveyance,
it becomes the duty of the company to procure reconveyance,
and upon its failure so to do, prosecution should follow
therefor and to restore the title to the United States.
This brings us to section 3, and the rights of the settler
under that section are very clearly pointed out by Mr .
.Attorney-General Garland (19 Opin., 69), as follows:
"The question submitted under this section is: 'What
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cla s of purchasers is referred to by the expression bona :fide
purchasers of said unclaimed lands 1'
"Three cfa,sses of persons are provided for under tbi.
section:
"First.· Bona fide settlers whose homestead or preemption
entries have been erroneously canceled on account of a railroad grant or withdrawal.
" Second. Bona fide purchasers of such unclaimed lands.
"Third. Bona fide settlers residing thereon.
"The rights of the several classes to the lands referred to
in the section are successive, in the order stated in the er-tion. The first in right is the homestead or preemption settler whose entryhas been wrongfully canceled. If be elects
to assert bis right, anrl bas not been disqualified by locating
another claim, or making another entry in lieu of the entry
erroneously canceled, llis right is absolute, a,nd the successive rights of tbe remaining- two classes can not attach if
he Jawfnlly asserts bis claim."
The facts and circumstances being admitted or a sumed
which place the case within the statute, it is my opinion that
the law is mandatory as to subsequent action, and the fact
that the land is now held by one who. purcha eel from the
grantee of Boright is not to be taken as a sufficient grouncl
for omitting to bring suit .
.A. to the question which you submit relative to bringing a
uit under ection 4 again t a company for an amount equal
to the G vernment price of similar land , in the ca e tated
in said ection, permit me to ay, that a. it cloe not app ar
that auy uch case is now pending, or und r con ideration,
I do not d em my elf authorized to answer in relation thereto.
Very re pectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The EORET.A.RY OF THE INTERIOR.
E TRAC

IPEN ATI

-

I TRICT ATTORNEY .

for their
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DEP AR'fMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 7, 1891.
SIR: The questions presented for opinion in your note of

,June 20, ultimo, are" 1. Whether a U. S. attorney, appearing in behalf of the
Government in proceedings which may be instituted by
importers under the provisions of section 15 of the act of
June 10, 1890, is entitled to compensation for such services
under section 827 of the Revised Statutes, which prescribes
a compensation to be certified by the court 'when a djstrict
attorney appears by direction of the Secretary or a solicitor
of the Treasury, on behalf of any officer of 'the revenue, in
any suit against such officer, for any act done by hirn, or for
the recovery of any money received by him, and paid into
the Treasury, in the performance of his official duty,' or" 2. Whether his compensation is restricted to such as is
allowed by section 824 of the Revised Statutes."
The provisions of the act of June 10, 18~0 (26 Stat., 131),
which appear to have any bearing on the :first question, are
contained in sections 15 and 25, though the act is silent on
the subject of compensation of district attorneys for services
rendered under section 15. That matter is left to be regulated by preexisting legislation.
Section 15 provides that" If the owner, importer, etc., or the collector or the Secretary of the Treasury shall be dissatisfied with the decision of
the Board of General Appraisers they, or either of thern, may
have a review of ~he q_uestions of law and fact involved in
the circuit court; that such review shall be obtained by
:filing in the office of the clerk a concise statement of the
errors complained of, a copy of said statement to be
served on the collector or 011 the importer, owner, etc., as the
case may be; th.at thereupon all papers and evidence are to
be brought into the court, and on the application of the Secretary, the collector, importer, etc., the case may be referred to
one of the appraisers to take further evidence offered by the
Secretary, collector, importer, etc.; that a hearing shall be bad
and the liq nidation made according to the decision on such
hearing, unless an appeal is allowed to the Supreme Court,
and such appeal shall be allowed on the part of the United
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States whenever the Attorney-General shall apply, etc.; and
on such appeal security for damages and costs shall be gi\'en
as in other cases in which the United States is a party; and
aJl final judgments in favor of the importer shall be paid by
the Secretary of the Treasury," etc. ·
Section 25 provides that".A.i ter the taking effect of this act no collector or other
officer of the customs shall be in any way liable to any
owner, importer, etc., for any ruling or decision or for the
collection of dues, duties, or charges, or on account of any
matter for which an appeal is allowed under this act."
In my opinion, this proceeding is a suit, which, as defined
by Chief Justice Marshall, is "any proceeding in a court of
justice by which an individual pursues that remedy which
the law affords him" ( Weston v. City Council of Cha,rleston, 2
Pet., 449; ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall., 2, 112, 113; Kohl et al. v.
United States, 91 U. S., 367, 368); it is a suit between parties
as appears by the requirement of section 15, that notice of
the institution of the proceeding shall be served on the party
adverse in interest. Is the United States or the collector
the party defendant1 The readiest way to solve that question is to let the statute interpret itself.
If it had been the intention to make the importer's suit one
against the collector, it is hard to understand why it was
provided (section 15) that an appeal from the decision of the
circuit court should be allowed "on the part of the United
States whenever the Attorney-General shall apply for it within
thirty days," etc.; or that in appeals from the judgments of
the circuit courts" security for damages and costs shall be
given as in the case of other appeals in cases in which the
United States is a party;" or that the Secretary of the Treasury , hould pay all final judgments in favor of importers,
without any certificate by the court that the collector acted
und r the directions of the Secretary of the Treasury, or that
that th re was probable cau e for his action.
Looking at the"e provi ion , in connection with ection 25
of he ame act exemptin th ·collector from uit by r a on
f, ny matt r r hin°· a to whi •h he importer might be
e titJe l to a pe, 1 fr m h coll tor deci ion, or that
of any b ard of ap rai er , the conclusion seem irre i t-
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ible that it is the United States, and not the collector,
that is the defendant, and the sole defendant, in suits by
.
importers under section 15.
Upon this theory alone the provision (sec. 15) giving the
Secretary of the Treaimry equal authority with the collector
to apply to the court to be allowed to take additional testimony, and to produce such testimony, is intelligible, for it
is unlikely that Congress would have given the Secretary of
the Treasury such authority over a suit against a collector.
Again, it is not probable that Congress would have
authorized a judgment binding on the United States in a proceeding against a collector, thereby preserving, as an empty
form, a feature of the old system which was superseded by
the act of June 10, 1890.
It may be said, however, that when the importer begins
proceedings in the circuit court he is required (sec. 15) to
serve notice on the collector alone, and that this makes the
collector a defendant in the suit. On the contrary, it is
through some one of its officers alone that the United States
can receive notice or be served with process of any kind;
and there was an obvious appropriateness in requiring that
this collector, as being the officer best acquainted with the
facts necessary to the defense of the suit. Indeed, it seems
to me, there would have been a decided unfitness in making
the collector the party defendant in such a proceeding, inasmuch as its sole object is to establish the invalidity of the
decision of the Board of General .A.p praisers, and not that of
the collector.
But supposing the importer's suit is against the collector,
it is against him in his official character, for section 25
exempts him in his individual character from the liability to
suit to which he was subject under the old law. It follows,
then, that a suit against him in his official character iR necessarily a suit against the United States. It must be the latter, or nothing at all. There is no middle ground.
That this is the effect of a suit against the collector, qua
collector, is too well established to be controverted. In
Governor of Georgia v. Nadrazo (l Pet., 110, 123) it was
objected that the suit, which was brought originally in a
district court of the United States, was a suit against the
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State of Georgia, and therefore could not be maintained.
In disposing of the question of jurisdiction, Chief Justice
Marshall said:
"The claim upon the governor is as a governor; he is
sued, not by his name, but by his title. The demand made
upon him is not made person.any, but officially.
"The decree is pronounced, not against the person, but
the officer, and appeared to have been pronounced again. t
the successor of the original defendant, as the appeal bond
was executed by a different governor from him who filed
the information. In such a ca:se, where the chief magistrate
of a State is sued, not by his name, but by his style of office,
and the claim made upon him is entirely in his official cbarac.
ter, we think the State itself may be considered as a party on
the record. If the State i not a party, there is no party
· against whom a decree can be made. No person, in his
natural capacity, is brought before the court as defendant.
This not being a proceeding against the thing, but again t
the person, a person capable of appearing as defendant,
against whom a decree can be pronounced, must be a party
to the cause before a decree can be regularly pronounced."
The same doctrine ba been repeatedly laid down by the
Supreme Court in later case ( Oomrn. of Kentiwlcy v. Dennison
Governor, 24 How., 97; Ha,qood v. Southern, 117 U. S.. 52; In
re Ayre , 123 U. S., 443, 48 , where all the cases are cited.
ea.I. o the analogou ca.:es of Brown v. trode, 5 Cr., 303;
McNutt v. Blrind, 2 How., 1; Irvine v. Lowry, 14 Pet., 293·
Ooril Oo. v. Blatchford, 11 Wall., 172, 176).
The contra ·t between the situation of the collector under
tbe old law and the new i in tructive and confirmatory of
th vi w taken of ecti n 15.
nd r the Id law th collector wa personally liabl t
th a o-ri ved imp rter for the illegal exaction of duty and
might be compell d by uit to indemnify the import r out of
hi own tat . True he might be prot cte l by. b win that
h , t d under h
rd r f the
r tary of th Tr ,1 nry
(
, . )· r
rtifi ate f pro a 1
fr rn b
y th
npr m
ur i Uni tell
. - >·> .- 7)
h n the c rtifi at i
pl intiff in
clait , o-, in t the
e
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also Cox v. Barney, 14 Blatch., 289, and White et al. v.
Arthur, 10 Fed. Rep., 80.)
The collector was necessarily, therefore, the party defendant in such a suit. Under the new law, the Government
alollf~ is responsible to the injured importer, whether the
collector who assessed and exacted the duty ~wted with
probable cause or under the direction of the Se,c retary of
the Treasury or not. Why, then, should the collector be the
party defendant in a suit growing out of a decision not made
by him and for which he is not responsible 1 If this law
contemplated individual liability of auy sort, it should be
that of the members of the Board of General Appraisers.
The answer to the :first question, therefore, is, that district attorneys are not eutitled to be compensated under
section 827 (R. S.) for services in defending suits by importers under section 15 of the act of June 10, 1890.
2. Are district attorneys restricted to the fees allowed by
section 824 (R. S.) as compensation for such services.
Section 767 (R. S.) provides that "There shall be appointed
in each district * · * * a person learned in the law, to act
as an attorney for the United States in such district."
This section, and so much of section 771, Revised Statutes, as makes it the "duty of every district attorney to prosecute in bis district all delinquents for crimes and offenses
cognizable under the authority of the United States, and all
civil actions in which the United States are concerned," are
taken from section 35 of the act of September 24, 1789 (1
Stat., p. 92).
When Congress enacted section 767 did it intend to impose
on the officer so appointed tbe duty to represent the. Government in every suit in that district in which it was interested 1 It is urged that because section 771, Revised Statutes, declares that certain duties shall belong to the office of
district attorney, such designation must be taken to exclude
all duties not designated.
The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, says Mr.
Broom, should be applied with '' great caution" (Max., 506).
Mr.Ju tice Story says this maxim is often misapplied( ex parte
Christy, 3 How., 313 ), and in his dissenting opinion in Brown
v. United States (8 Cran ch, 153) he remarks that "it is by no
mean iufrequent in the Constitution to add clauses of a
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special nature to general powers which embrace them, and
to provide affirmatively for certain powers, without meaning
thereby to negativetbe existence of powers of a more general
nature. * * * The affi.rmati ve power ' to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas' has
never been supposed to negative the right to punish other
offenses on the high seas; and Congress has actually legislated
to a more enlarged extent."
The application of the maxim to sections 767 and 771,
looking at them as having belonged to one and the same
section of the act of 1789, and as still holding the same relation to each other, notwithstanding their new arrangement
in the Revised Statutes, would defeat what appears to be
the plain intention of Congress.
From the nature of things, Congress could not forecast all
the needs for the services of district attorneys that would
from time to time exist, and it is not reasonable to infer an
intent to confine the official duties of those officers to the
cases specifically designated in order to give to them additional or exceptional compensation.
If the construction were otherwise, then, in cases not
enumerated in the law, and in which the Government is a
party defendant, district attorneys could not be required to
repre ent the Government, no matter what might be the
emergency or inadequacy of the Attorney-General's ability
to provide for the protection of the public intere. ts under
the authority conferred by section 367, Revised Statute_. I
hould be reluctant to conclude that Oongres had left the
or 0 ·anization of the Government in so defective a condition.
By ection 15 of the act of 1890 Congres has for the fir, t
time authorized a direct uit again t the United State, a
w have en, by an import r claimin o- a refund of money a
having e n megally exacted by a colJector of cu tom c nd
it would b r markable, incl ed if the state of the law were
u ·h that it wa not the official duty of the prop r district
att rney to d i nd the inter t of the Government in such
a uit. Cert inly Congres
uppo d that such a duty
e i t
r it w uld have cured the defect by a provi ion in
tb
f
wa any doubt ri<Tinally on this ubject, I
ur that jt i r mov d y ction 299, enacted in
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1836, which may be regarded as a legislative interpretation
of the antecedent law. That section is as· follows:
".All accounts of the United States district attorneys for
services rendered in cases instituted in the courts of the
United States, or of any State, when the United States is
interested but is not a party of record, or in cases instituted
aga.inst the officers of the United States or their deputies,
or duly appointed agents, for acts committed or omitted or
suffered by them in the lawful discharge of their duties shall
be audited and allowed as in other cases, assimilating the
fees, as near as may be, to those provided by law for similar
services in cases in which the United States is a party."
This Drovision does not profess to add to the duties of district attorneys, but presupposes an already existing authori~y
to require t hem to attend to litigation in which the Govern ·
ment is concerned, although not a party, but which is not
covered by section 771, Revised Statutes, or any other, unless
it be section 767, Revised Statutes, which authorizes the
appointm ent of district attorneys to act as attorne.ys for the
United States.
It is true that section 827, Revised Statutes (see alRo sec.
771, Rev. Stat.) makes it the duty of district attorneys to defend
suits against revenue officers when requested to do so by the
Secretary or the Solicitor of the Treasury, but that section
does not cover suits against officers unconnected with the
revenue. .As to t his lat ter class of suits, the law is silent, and
yet it is every day's practice for district attorneys to defend
them; and t he same may be said in reference to cases in which
the United States is interested but not a party to the record.
If such cases do not fall within the authority conferred by
section 767, Revised Statutes, there is no law applicable to
them, unless, as has been several times ruled in the First
Comptroller's office (5 Lawrence's Decisions, p. 38, Bliss's
Case; 6 ib., p. 36, McCulloch's Case; ib., p. 55, Emolument Case), t he proviso of section 3 of the act of June 20,
1874 (18 Stat. , 109), that is to say, "Provided, That this shall
not be con strued to prevent the employment and payment by
the Department of Justice of district attorneys as now allowed
by law for the performance of services not covered by their
salaries or fees," can be said to extend the authority of the
Department of Justice over them, a point upon which I am

236

HON. W. H. H. MILLER.
Extra Compensation-District Attorneys.

not now ca1led to express an opinion, although I will remark
in passing that the Court of Claims, in a very recent ca e,
deuied the soundness of the First Comptrol11~r's interpretation
of that proviso. ( Thomas Smith v. United States, decided
J u;ne 8, 1891.)
Section 823, Revised Statutes, referring to section 824,
Revised Statutes, declares that'' the following aud no other
compensation shall be taxed and allowed to * * * district
attorneys * * * except in cases otherwise expressly provided by law," and section 1765 provides as follows:
" No officer in a11y branch of the public service, or any other
person whose salary, pay, or emoluments are fixed by law
and regulations, shall receive any additional pay, extra allowance, or compensation, in any form whatever, for the disbur ement of public money, or for any other serdce or duty whatever, unless the same is authorized by law, and the appropriation therefor explicitly states that it is for such additional
pay, extra allowance, 6r compensation." (See United States
v. Saunders, 120 U. S., 126.)
Section 3 of the act of June 20, 1874 (18 Stat., 109),
declare : "That no civil officer of the Government shall
hereaft r receive any compensation or perquisites, directly
or indirectly, from the Treasury or property of the United
States beyond his salary or compensation allowed by law."
Section 834 makes it the duty of di trict attorneys to
include in their anuual returns all fees and emolument to
which they may be entitled '' in any casein which the United
States will be bouud by the judgment renuered therein,'
and which are not included in section 825 and 827, Revi ed
tatute .
It i my opinion, tbPrefor , that uit' again t tbe United
tat . und r ·aid
tion 15 are directly in the lin of duty
of h di tri t attorney and fall within ection 824, Revi: d
t tut , · and that the omp n ation of di trict attorn y for
tll ir
in defendin o- uit an-ain t th
nited ta
·ti
i tri ·t , brou ·ht by importer under
a ·t f 1 0 i limited to the fee pre cribed by
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SECRETARY OF BOARD OF LADY MANAGERS OF WORLD'S
COL UM:BIAN EXPOSITION.
It is competent for the Secretary of the Treasury to make payment to
Mrs. Susan Gale Cooke for her services as secretary pro tempore of the
Ladies' Bureau of Managers of t~e World's Columbian Exposition.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

_A.,ugust 7, 1891.
SIR: Your letter of July 30, in relation to making payment
to Mrs. Susan Gale Cooke for her services as secretary pro
tempore of' the Board of Lady Managers of the World's Columbian Commission, with accompanying voucher and .other
papers, is at band.
By section 6 of the act of April 25, 1890 (26 Stat., 62), the
1,3oar<l of Lady Managers ma,y appoint one or more members
of all committees authorized to award prizes for exhibits
which may be produced in whole or in part by woman's
labor, and, beyond this, the board is to perform such duties
as may be prescribed by the Commission.
The sundry civil act of March 3, 18.91 (26 Stat., 965), gives
recognition to the Board of Lady Managers and directs that
$36,000 of the appropriation there made shall be used for
said board.
On or about November 20, 1890, the Board of . Lady
Managers, after meeting and organizing, selected a president
and a secretary.
It appears that the Commission, April 3, 1891, by its
"fifth" rm;olution then unanimously adopted, prescribed
that the executive committee of the Board of Lady Managers, or a subcommittee of said executive committee, "is
hereby authorized and empowered, in the absence of the
board, to exercise any and all powers which said board
might exercise in session.'~
It further appears that on the 15th of said April the exec>
utive committee of the Board of Lady Managers removed the
then secretary of said board, and thereafter appointed Mrs.
Susan Gale Cooke to act as secretary pro ternpore; and that
thereupon MrH. Cooke assumed the duties of such secretary,
and has ~ince duly performed them. It also appears that
the vali<l.i t,v of the removal of the former secret.al'y Las been
aftirme<l. i11 the circuit court of the United States for the
northern di trict of Illinois.
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Since this decision by the court the World's Columbian
Commission has, by its Board of Reference and Control,
directed the ~ecretary of the commission to certify a voucher
to ·p rocure payment to ~rs. Cooke for her services rendered
as secretary pro tempore, as aforesaid, which voucher is presented duly certified.
It is my opinion, in view of the legislation referred to, the
several acts performed, and the circumstances shown to exit,
that there is no law, or regulation having the force of law,
that prohibits you from making payment to Mrs. Cooke for
the performance of the services designated in the voucher
submitted.
Very respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER,
Attorney- General.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

INTEREST-REFUNDS.

No authority exists for the payment of interest upon refunds made in
conformity with judgments contained in cases of appeal under section
15 of the customs administrative act of June 10, 1890.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 7, 1891.
Sm: By your letter of July 31 you submit for opinion:
"Whether or not any authority now exists in law for the
payment of interest upon refunds made in conformity with
judgments obtained in cases of appeal under section 15 of
the act of June 10, 1890 (26 Stat., 131), from decisions of the
Board of United State General Apprai ers."
Section 15 provides that if the owner, importer, assignee,
or agent of imported merchandi e is di ati fled with the
deci ion of the Board of General Appraiser he may, by
complying with c rtain condition in the section pre cribed
have a r vi w of uch de i i n, in the nature of an appeal,
in the ir ui ourt, " aid c urt to hear and determine the
q . ti n flaw and f: t inv lved in u b deci ion re 'pectin tb I ifi ati n f . n h m r ·bandi. and the rate of
duty irnn,l\Ql:ln th r
the
tor
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or person acting as such shall liquidate the entry accordingly," unless a further appeal and trial shall be had in the
Supreme Court as therein provided. It fur~her provides
that "all final judgments, when in favor of the importer,
sbaH be satisfied and paid by the Secretary of the Treasury
from the permanent indefinite appropriation provided for in
section 23 (24) of this act."
_
It will be seen from the foregoing that the statute is silent
in relation to interest. The proceeding is in the nature of a
suit against the United States. (See opinion of this date to
the Secretary of the Treasury in reference to fees of dist-i'ict
attorneys, under this section.)
"The general rule is that interest is not allowable on claims
against the Government. The exceptions to this rule are
found only in cases where the demands are madeunder special
contracts, or special laws, expressly or by very clear implication providing for the payment of interest. · (7 Opin., 523; 9
Opin., 57.) - 'An obligation to pay it,' observes AttorneyGeneral Black in the opinion last cited, 'is not to be implied
against the Government as it is against a private party,
from the mere fact that the principal was detained from the
creditor after his right to receive it had accrued."' (17 Opin.,
318.)

This proposition finds abundant support in the decisions
of the Supreme Court. In Tillson v. The United States (100
u. s.,·43) it is said:
"Interest, however, would have been recoverable against
a citizen if the payments were unreasonably delayed, but
with the Government the rule is different, for in addition to
the practice which has long prevailed in the Departments
of not allowing interest on claims presented, except it is in
some way specially provided for, the statute under which
the Court of Claims is organized expressly declares that no
interest shall be allowed upon any claim up to the time of
rend~tion of judgment therein in the Court 9f Claims, unless
upon a contract expressly stipulating for interest."
So, in United States v. Sherman (98 U. S., 565), it is said:
"Before that time (certificate of probable cause) the
Government is under no obligation, and the Secretary of
the Treasury is not at liberty to pay. When the obligation
arises, it is an obligation to pay the amount recovered; that
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is, the amount for which judgment has been given. The
act of Congress says not a word about interest. Judgments, it is true, are by t.hc law of South Carolina, as well
as by Federal legislation, declared to bear interest. Such
legislation, however, has no application to the Government.
Aud the interest is no part of the amount recovered. It
accrues only a.fter the recovery has been had. Moreover,
whenever interest is allowed, either by statute or by common law, except in cases where there has been a contract to
pay interest, it is allowed for delay or default of the debtor.
But delay or default can not be attributed to the Government. It is presumed to be always ready to pay what it
owes." (See Harvey v. The United States, 243.)
So, in Angarica v. Bayard, (127 U. S., 251), this doctrine
i~ forcibly reiterated. The court says:
" The case, therefore, falls within the well-settled principle
t hat the United States are not liable to pay interest on
daims again st them, in the absence of express statutory provision to tha t effect. It has been established, as a general
rule, in the practice of the Government, that interest is not
.alJowed on claims against it, whether such claims originate
in contract or in tort, or whether they arise in the ordinary
business of administration, or under private acts of relief,
pa ed by Congre s on special application. The only recognized exceptions are where the Government stipulates to
pay interest and where interest is given expre sly by an act
of Congres , either by the name of interest or by that of
d am age ."
Your que tion i , therefore, answered in the negative.
Very re pectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The S ECRET.A.RY OF TilE TREASURY.

REFUND OF DIRECT '!'AXE, - ET-OFF OF INDE BTEDNES
TATES.

OF

vi ed tatutes make it the duty of t he ecretary
of th Tr •a nr to in i t upon the right of et-off aga in t the d -mand.
of th 'tat
f W . t Vir 0 -inia for r fund of th lirect tax to the
xt ntofth quit, l • prop rtionofthedebtofVirginiatotheUnited
tat for which, e t Virginia is liable.
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 12, 1891.
SIR: By your letter of April 13 last you ask whether
under the law the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized
and required to retain the whole or any part of the amount
due to the State of West Virginia on account of the refund
of direct taxes unrler the act approved March 2, 1891, by
reason of the alleged liability of the State of West Virg'inia
for a part of the indebtedness of Virginia prior to the separation and erection of West Virginia into a new State.
1'he constitution of West Virginia, which went into effect
in 1863, declared that "An equitable proportion of the public debt of the Commonwealth of Virginia prior to the first
day of January, eighteen hundred and sixty-one, shall be
assumed by this State; and the legislature shall ascertain
the same as soon as may be p~acticable, and provide for the
liquidation thereof by a sinking fund sufficient to pay the
accruing interest and redeem the principal within the period
of thirty-four years." (Art. 8, sec. 8.)
Upon this constitution the State of West Virginia was
admitted into the Union.
The indebtedness of the Commonwealth of Virginia prior
to the 1st day of January, 1861, was, as I am advised, something over $30,000,000. I am informed by your letter that
of this indebtedness nearly $1,600,000 was due to the United
States, and that the same, . with interest, remains mainly
unpaid.
Section 3481 of the Revised Statutes of the United States
reads as follows :
"Whenever any State is in default in the payment of inter~
est or principal on investments in stocks or bonds issued or
guaranteed by such State and held by the United States in
trust, the Secretary of the Treasury shall retain the whole,
or so much thereof as may be necessary, of any moneys due
on any account from the United States to such State, and
apply the same to the payment of such principal and interest,
or either, or to the reimbursement, with interest thereon, of
moneys advanced by the United States on account of interest
due on such stocks or bonds."
In my opinion, under this statute, it is your duty to insist
upon the right of set-off against the demand of the State for
5687-VOL 20-16
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a refimd of the direct tax to the extent of the ''equita"ble
proportion" of the debt of Virginia for which West Virginia
is liable. What this "equitable proportion" may be is not
a question of law, but of fact, or of mixed law and fact, and
is not for my determination.
Very respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TRE.A.SURY.

PUBLIC BUILDINGS-EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE
UNITED STATES.
Statutes of Kansas and Illinois, providing that the United States "shall
have the right of exclusive legislation and concurrent jurisdiction,"
do not comply with the requirements of the acts of Congre s providing for the construction of public buildings at .Atchison and Gale burg, in those States.
DEP.A.R'.I.'MENT OF JUSTICE,

August 13, 1891.
SIR: The note of the Acting Secretary of Augu t 11,
wherein my attention is called to the language of the tatutes of Kansas and Illinois l urporting to cede juri diction
to the United States over the ground to be purcha ed for
public buildings at Atchison, Kans., and Galesburg, ill., is
rec ived.
You tate that the language of tbe act of the 1 gi lature
in each State is that the United States '' shall have the right
of exclu ive legi lation and concurrent jurisdiction."
The act of Congre s providing for the con truction of the
public building at Atclli on provide that "no mou y hall
b u d or applied for the purpo es mentioned until a alid
titl to the ite for uch buildiug hall be ve t din the nited
tat n r until the tate of Kan a hall have • d cl t the
Uni d

public building at al buroi ion. In otll r w rd
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act of Congress a cession from the State of exclusive jurisdiction, with certain specific exceptions, is required.
The State grants the right of exclusive legislation and concurrent jurisdiction.
In my opinion the State legislation does not comply with
the requirements .of the act of Congress.
Very respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

REMISSION OR.DER-NUMBER IN GRADE.
An order remitting the unexecuted portion of the sentence of a lieutenant-commander of the U. S. Navy who had been suspended for two
years, and was to retain his number and grade, does not have the
effect of advancing him two numbers in grade, although dlll'ing the
time of his suspension from duty two officers with commissions dated
subsequently to his had been advanced above him in the grade of lieutenant-commander.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 27, 1891.
Sm: Your letter of the 12th instant, requesting my opinion as to the effect of the remission order given in the case
of Lfout. Commander George M. Book, U.S. Navy, under
date of December 14, 1889, is received.
It appears that Lieut. Commander Book was tried before
a general court-martial in April, 1889, upon the charge of
"Absenting himself from his command without leave," and
was found guilty of the charge, whereupon, May 3, 1889, the
court sentenced sa,id officer "to be suspended for two years
from rank a11d duty, on furlough pay, and to retain bis present number on the list of lieutenant-commanders during that
time."
The proceedings, finding, and sentence of the general
court-martia.l were duly approved on said May 3 by the Secretary of the Navy, whose order then made declares that
Raid Lieut. Commander Book "is accordingly suspended
from rank and duty, on furlough pay, for two years from
this date, and will rl.uring that period retain his present
number in his g racle."
Between May 3 and December 14, 1889, Lieut. Commander
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Book lost two numbers in his grade by promotions required
to be made in accordance with the rules established by law
·t o fill vacancies which then occurred in the next higher grade,
that of commander, and by the consequent advancement of
a eorresponding number of officers in the grade of lieutenant-commander above him.
As a consequence, although the commissions of Lieut.Commanders Longnecker and Ide were dated respectively Augu t
30 and October 12, 1881, whilethatofLieut. Commander Book
was dated May 28, 1881, yet by reason of the sentence which
held the latter to his number which he held May 3 on the
list, sajd Lieut. Commanders Longnecker and Ide passed to
big-her number~ on tbe list. On said 14th of December the
active list, as it would appear upon the register of the officers
of the Navy, stood thus:
Lieutenant-commanders: No. 5, Edwin Longnecker; No.
6, George E. Ide; No. 7, George M. Book.
On said December 14 the Secretary of the Navy issued
the following:
"NAVY DEPARTMENT,

"Washington, D. 0., December 14, 1889.
'' Lieut. Commander GEORGE M. BooK, U. S. N.,
"159 Washington Park, Brooklyn, N. Y.:
"Sm: The unexecuted portion of the sentence of the general court-martial before which you were tried at the navyyard, Washington, D. C., .April 15, 1889, is hereby remitted.
"Very respectfully,
"B. F. TRAOY,
"Secretary of the Navy."
The question submitted to me is, whether this remission
of sentence has the effect of advancing Lieut. Commander Book to No. 5 upon the list and regi ter and of moving
back Lieut. Commanders Longneck r aud Ide, re pee ti vely,
to o . 6 aud 7 on the li t
Tb enteu ·e rend red by auth rity of law give the law
in thi ·a , and ection 1467 ( v. Stat.) must, in it appli·
c ti n, a rd with th en ten e.
It will en ted th t tb fi rm of the remitting order i
n t a unllifi ti n f the original , entence, neither i it an
ab olu e pardon for the offen e com.mitt d. The ent nee is
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neither declared void nor vacated: " The unexecuted portion
* * * is * * * remitted."
While an ~bsolute p::i.rdon might, under the rule indicated
in 12 Opin. 547, and 17 id., 31 and 656, reinstate the officer
sentenced, an order by the Secretary remitting the unexecuted portion of the sentence can not, in my · opinion, produce that result.
That portion of the sentence which before December 14
operated to place the two officers referred to above the officer
sentenced upon the list was executed at the date of the
order of remission, and was therefore by the terms of the
order not affected by it.
·
It is my opinion that the question submitted should be
answered in the negative.
Very respectfully,
WM. H. TAFT,
Acting Attorney-General.
The SEORETARY OF THE NAVY.

COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS-INJUNCTION OF STATE
COURT.
The Commissioner of Indian Affairs and his subordinate, the Indian
· agent, have full discretion to remove from the Indian reservation any
person not of the tribe of Indians entitled to remain thereon, and can
not be interfered with by mandamus or injunction of any court. An
order of a State court restraining the Indian agent from so doing
should be disregarded.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTIOE,

August 29, 1891.
SIR: By letter of the 10th instant from Acting Se~retary
Chandler, with which was transmitted a copy of a communication of the 8th instant from the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, with inclosures, the opinion of the Attorney-General
was requested upon the question whether, under the circumstances, the Indian agent in charge of the Puyallup Indian
Reservation, Wash., might, with the aid of a military force,
oust from the school lands of that reservation certain trespassers thereon. The facts upon which the question is predicated are as follows: White men have settled upon the
school lands belonging to the Puyallup Indian Reserva-
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tiou in the State of Washing·ton. The Indian agent ha·
attempted to oust them. .A. local State court, on application
of the trespassers, issued a temporary order restraining the
Indian agent from making any further attempt, and then
directed the removal of the case to the United States court.
.A. detachment of United States troops was 8ent to the Indian
agent to aid him in ousting the trespassers. Gen. Kautz,
the commanding officer, visited the Indian agent, and stated
that, in view of the fact that the matter was in the courts, he
was not authorized to interfere. The question now fa whether
the Indian agent has authority, in spite of the restraining
order of the local court, with the aid of the detatchment of
United States troops, to oust the trespassers.
Section 2118 of the Revised Statutes provides that "every
person who makes a settlement on auy lands belonging,
secured, or granted by treaty with the United States to any
Indian tribe, or surveys or attempts to survey such land , or
to designate any of the boundaries by marking trees or otberwise, is liable to a penalty of one thousand dollar . The
President may, moreover, take such measures and employ
such military force as he may judge necessary to remove any
such person from the lands."
Section 2149, Revised Statutes, provides "that the Commi ioner of Indian Affairs is authorized al.id required, with
the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, to remoYe from
any tribal re er:vation any per on being ther in without
authority of law, or whose pre ence within the limit of the
r rvati n may, in the judgment of the Cowmi sioner, be
detrimental to the peace and welfare of the Indians; and may
em p] y for the purpo ' e uch force a may be nece ary to
enable the agent to e:ffi ct the removal of u h per on. '
ion ..,147 provide : 'The u1 erintendent of Indian
ffair. and the In lian ag nt and ubao·P.nt hall bav
anthorit t remov from th Indian country all per 011
fi und th r in contrary t law· and th
r id nt i uth riz cl t clir ct the miJit, ry f r
to be empl y d in
r 1 o al. '
' Ji
11dia11 r ~. •rvati 11 in
th pr vi ·i n in tlll
t b fi llll
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"That the people inhabiting said proposed States do agree and
declare that they forever disclaim all right and title to the
unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries
thereof and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held
by any Indian or Indian tribes; and that until the title thereto
shaU have been extinguished by the United States the same
shall be and remain subject to the disposition of the United
States, and said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute
jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States."
It would seem that tbe locus of the trespass and of the
attempted ouRter was not within the territorial jurisdiction
of the State court. But, however this may be, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and his subordinate, the Indian
agent, have full discretion under sections 2118, 2147, and 2149,
above quoted, to remove from the Indian reservation any
person not of the tribe of Indians entitled to remain thereon.
(United States v. Oroolc, 5 Dillon, 453.) No court can interfere with the exercise of such discretion by mandamus or
injunction. (Marquez v. Frisbie, 101 U.S., 473; Litchfield v.
Register and Receiver, 9 Wall., 575). I am therefore of the
opinion that the order of the State court is beyond its jurisdiction and void, and that it may be and should be entirely
disregarded. The Indian agent may lawfully eject the white
settlers from the Indian reservation, and may use, in so
doing, by direction of the President, any military force necessary for the purpose.
Very respectfully,
WM.H.TAFT,
Acting Attorney- General.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE INTERIOR.

DR.A.WRACK-ADDITIONAL DUTY.
The additional duty imposed by section 7 of the customs administrative act of June 10, 1890, is not subject to drawback upon the
exportation of the article.

JUSTICE,
September 8, 1891.
. Sm: Your communication of July 14, 1891, requests an
opinion upon the question whether the additional duty
imposed by section 7 of the act of June 10, 1890, entitled
DEP A.RTMEN'.I.' OF
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"An act to simplify the laws in relation to the collection of
the revenues" (25 Stat., 131), in cases where the a.,pprai ed
valne of any article of imported merchandise shall exceed by
more than 10 per cent the value declared in the entry, is
subject to rebate or drawback upon the exportation of such
article.
Section 7 of the act in question declares that • • *
"if tbe appraised value of any article of imported merchandise shall exceed by more tban 10 per centum the value
declared in the entry, there shall be levied, collected, and
paid, in addition to the duties imposed by law on such merchandisP,, a, further sum equal to 2 per centum of the total
appraised value for each 1 per centum that ~mch appraised
value exceeds the value declared in the entry." * * ~
The question propounded is answered, it seems to me, by
the opinion of tbe Supreme Court of the United State: in
the case of Bartlett v. Kcine (16 How;, 263). That case aro e
under the tariff act of August 30, 1842 (5 Stat., 548), which
contained a provision (section 17) that if the appraised value
of any imported merchandise exceeded by 10 per centn1n
the invoice value, there should be levied and collected on
such merchandise 50 per centum of the duty impo ed on the
same, when fairly invoiced, aud the que tion in the ca e wa
whether upon reexportation of the merchandise involved
tlte plaintiff was entitled to a return of the additional duty
which had been a se ed on said merchandise.
In denying this claim to drawback, the court u ed the
following language:
"An examination of the revenue laws upon the ubject of
levying additional duti , in con equence of th fa t of an
undervaluation by the import r, how that they w re
exa t d a' cli. ourag ments to fraud, and to prevent effort
by import r. to e ape the legal rates of duty. In everal
of h a t tbi additional duty has been di tributed among
offi r f th cu tom upon the same condition a p nalti
a l ti rf'. itur .
tween the United Stat
and the
an l in r .fi r n e to th ubj t of draw ba J- and
reg rded in th light of a p 11al

f the duty upon a r xr rof regulati n £ r im1 or-
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· tation and re venue from the earliest period of the Government, and has always been understood to establish relations
between the regular and honest importer and the Government.
"It does not include, in its purview, any return of the forfeitures or amercements resulting from illegal or fraudulent
dealings on the part of the importer or his agents. Those
do not fall within the regular administration of the revenue system, nor does the Government comprehend them
within its regular estimates of supply. They are the compensation for a viola ted law, and are designed to operate as
checks and restraints upon fraud and injustice. .A construction which would give to the fraudulent importer all the
chances of gain fro m success, and exonerate him from the
contingencies of loss, would be a great discouragement to
rectitude aud fair d ealing. We are satisfied that the existing laws relating t o exportations, with the benefit of drawback, do not apply to relieve the person who has incurred,
by an undervaluation of his import, this additional duty from
the payment of any portion of it."
It seems unnecessary for me to do more than say that,
upon the grounds taken by the Supreme Court in this case
of Bartlett v. Kane, I am of opinion that it was not the intention of Congress that the additional duty imposed for midervaluation by section 7 of the act of June 10, 1890, should be
the subject of drawback.
Very respectfully, yours,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
The Attorney-General will not give an opinion where the subject-matter
submitted shows no question of law in the Department submitting it
arising in the administration of that Department.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

September 8, 1891.
Sm: Your letter of July 3, 1891, submits for opinion generally the papers transmitted to you by tbe Secretary of
State with reference to the claim of the .Ahillar brothers,
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which is being urged against this Government by Seiior
Romero, the Mexfoan minister.
Your letter propounds no specific question of law ba ed
upon a case stated, nor does the subject-matter submitted
appear to relate to a busi1;ess which, in its present a ·pect,
belongs to the administration of your Department, but, on
the contrary, it appears to relate to a business belonging
exclusiYely to the administration of the DP,partment of State.
My predecessor ' have frequently held that the opinion of
the .Attorney-General can not be given upon a general ubject, but only on one or more specific questions of law ba ed
on a case stated. They have also as often held that the
opinion of the .Attorney-General can not be given upon a
matter referred to him by the head of a Department who is
not authorized to act on such matter. (6 Opin., 24; 9 Opin.,
421; 10 Opin., 50.)
Section 356, Revised Statutes, provides that "the head of
any Executive Department may require the opinion of the
.Attorney-General on any questions of law arising in the administration of his IJepcirtment."
In my opinion, the reference of the .Ahillar claim to you
by th
ecretary of State for the purpose of getting your
view upon it did not make any questions of law involved
in that claim "questions of law arising in the administration"
of your Department. The whole subject belonged, and till
b long , to the Department of State, which did not intend
to relinqui h its control over it by a king your opinion on
the claim, whi h, it eems, grew out of the claimants' arre t
and impri onrnent for muggling.
For th e r a on 1 I am compelled to return the papers
without any e pre . ion of opinion.
'ry r . p ctfully, y ur ,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The

EORETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
The Attorn ey-General is not required to give an opinion except on such
4uestions as are necessary to guide the heads of departments in
their actions. 11 Opinions, 4, followed, that he bas no power to give
an official opinion upon questions referred to him by the Secretary of
t.hf} Treasury for the guidance not of the Secretary but of the Third
Audi.tor.
DEPARTMEN'l' OF JUSTICE,

September 8, 1891.
Sm: On the 8th of July last you inclosed two communications from the Auditor of the Treasury for the Post-Office
Department, one dated June 13, 1891, with eight inclosures,
aud the other dated July 3, 1891, with one inclosure, in relation to the claim of Luke Voorhees, late mail contractor on
route No. 35040, Dakota, in which the Auditor asks that
you transmit the same to the Attorney-General wit.h the
request that he give his opiuiou upon the question of1aw arising on the case presented. In compliance with the Auditor's
wishes, you have requested the Attorney-General's opinion
thereon.
The case, as it is to be gathered from the inclosures autl
the statements of the Auditor, is as follows:
Voorhees was a mail contractor whose mail contract was
expedited on representations made by him to the Treasury
Department. On the recommendation of a special agent,
after he had been paid some $20,000 for expedited service,
a suit was brought to recover that amount, on the ground
that the action of the Department in expediting the service
had been induced by his misrepresentation. The decision
of the lower court was against the Government on demurrer
to the declaration. The case was carried to the Supreme
Court of the United States, where the judgment of the lower
court was affirmed. There remained due the contractor on
the books of the Sixth Auditor,for services rendered by him
untl.er the expedited contract, a balance of $9,356.37 duly
certified to the Auditor by the Postmaster-General, under
ectiou 405 of the Revised Statutes. Pending the suit against
Voorhees, the Po tmaster-General made an order suspendiug the pay on this balance, the reason being stated as follows:
"On account of frauds in the oath of contractor as to extra
~itock required for expedition, it not having been required,
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or he having employed e:x;tra stock therefor, and thus not
having incurred any extra expense by reason thereof."
The Postmaster-General, since the decision of the Supreme
Court upon the suit by the United States to recover the
amount already paid on the expedited Rervice, has been
req nested to revoke bis order suspending the pay on the
balance still sh owu to be due on the books of the Department, the claim being that the question decided by the
Supreme Court in favor of the contractor was exactly the
ame as that arising on the claim of the contractor for the
unpaid balance. The Postmaster-General refuses to revoke
thi order. The Auditor states the question which he desire
to be transmitted to the Attorney-General for decision, as
follows:
"In view of the deci ion of the Supreme Court of the United
ta tes, the provisfons of sections 191 of the .R evised Statute ,
a11d the a sumed state of facts as above given, am I now
antltorized to report the amount due Voorhees to the Secretn 1·y of the Tremmry, notwithstanding the order for u peuNion still being unrecalled 1"
the pre ent question is put, it is not one which the
Attorney-General can answer.
By ection 356 of the Revi ed Statute the head of any
Ex cutiv Department may require the opinion of the .Attorn y- e11eral on anyque tion oflaw ari · ing in the admini tration of bi Department. This ection has been con trued
to require from the Attorney-General opinions only on uch
qu tion of law a are nece ary to guide the bead of the
partment in bi a'1tion. It ha been expre ly decided by
ttorn y- eneral Bat
(11 Opin., 4) that the Attorn yGen ral ha n pow r to give an official opinion on que tion
ref, rr d to him by the
cretary of th" Trea ury at the
r 'llH' t f the Third Auditor for the guidance not of the
r 'tary but f th Third Auditor. (See al o A. G. XIX
pin. 74.)
ti po i l hatitmayben
an at m futur tim that the
au w r
y he d fl i n y bill f July 7 1 , 4 (2
t t. 25 ) it i
r ·icl
Tllc t the
r tary f tb Tr a ury hall at the
11t f c h
.. i n of
on ·
r p rt the
, h I im ut, ho e laim ha b en allowed in
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whole or in part to t he Speaker of the House of Represeutatives and the presiding officer of the Senate, who shall lay
the same before their respective Houses for consideration."
Should the Auditor 8Ubmit to you for transmittal to Cougress
a certified balance on this account it would then become
your duty to decide whether the Auditor, in view of the
order of the Postmaster-General, had any jurisdiction to consider and certify t he account at all, and in such case you
might properly ask the ad vice of the Attorney-General in the
premises. But if t he Auditor declines to certify the account
to you, you will never be called to take action upon the matter. The opiuion you ask, therefore, considered with reference to guiding your own action, if given now, would be an
answer t o an hypothetical question. Such a question the
Attorney-General, for obvious reasons, is constrained to
decline to answer. (19 Opin., 414.)
Very respectfully,
WM. H. TAFT,
Solicitor-General.

The SECRET.A.RY

OF ' THE TREASURY.

Approved:

W. H. H. MILLER.
REGISTRY OF l!~OREIGN-BUILT VESSEL-ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
If a forei gn-built vessel wrecked in American waters is repaired in an
American shipyard, the repairs exceeding three-fourths of the cost
of the vessel when repaired, some years after her restoration and after
sailing under a for eign flag be sold by her foreign owner to a citizen
of the United States, she may properly be registered under section
4136 of the Revised Statutes.
Section 4136 of t h e Revised Statutes must be construed in connection
vdth section 4132 and in the light of the purpose of Congress in passing both sections.
The Attorney-General is required only to answer questions of law and
can not consider questions of fact on evidence submitted.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTIOE,

Septmnber 29, 1891.
Sm: On the 22d instant you transmitted to the A~torneyGenera,l t be application of Benjamin F. Clyde for the registry of the foreign-built _schooner Oroatan, formerly called
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the Joaquin Ancona, and requested his opinion whether such
registry should be granted. The facts are that the ves el wa
built by a foreigner in a foreign country; was wrecked in
American waters, and the wreck was towed by direction of
her foreign owner to an American shipyard, where sbe wa.
repaired. The repairs made upon her before she was ready
for service again exceeded three-fourths of the cost of tbe
vessel when repaired•. Some years after her restoration, and
after sailing under a foreign :flag, she was sold by her foreign
owner to a citizen of the United States.
Section 4136 of the Revised Statutes provides that tl1e
Secretary of the Treasury may issue a register or enrollment
for any ves el built in a foreign country whenever such ve. sel ~hall be wrecked in the United States and shall be purchased and repaired by a citizen of the United States, if it
sha11 be proved to the satisfaction of the Secretary that the
repairs put upon such vessel are equal to three-fourths of
th co ·t of the ve sel when so repaired.
rt'he question is, do the facts above stated bring the
Or-Jatan within the benefit of the section 1 If the ection i:
to be litera.Uy and strictly construed, they do not. The
natural rnea11ing of the language would limit the privileg
· of reffi. try therein conferred to a vessel which bad fir, t
h n pnrcha d and then repaired by a citizen of the
nited ~ tate, .
nch a con truction, however, is too narrow.
y , ·tion 4132, vessels built within the United Stat
and bel011°·ing wholly to citizens thereof may be registered
a ve~ I. of tbe United States. It is clear that under thi
·tion if a foreigner hould build a ve el in the United
tate , , ail it under a f, reign flag, and then ell it to a citiz n of th
nitecl tate , uch citizen might obtain regi try
for h v , . 1 a an American ve el. The plain intention
of e tion 41 6, a to give to wreck d ve el , which were
pra ·ti ·all r lmil in th
nited tate tbe , ame privile e
:.· 1 would have if wholly built within the United
t ultimate purpo e wa to aid merican hiphuil lin , n it wa evi ntly c n id re by Congre that
nilcliu c, of hr -fi urth f a
el wa ' to be nc ur, w- 11 a. th
f ave l ntire. Th
i h
ion 413~ and in
in the I a age
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of both sections. Otherwise, and following the letter of
the section, a foreign-built vessel wrecked in the United
States a.nd purchased and repaired by a citizen of the United
States in a foreign port would be entitled to :American
registry. A result so plainly contrary to the spirit of the
section and the intention of Congress shows the necessity
of not following too closely the letter of the statute, and
warrants even a slight variation therefrom to carry out the
plain purpose of the enactment.
By transposing the words "purchased and repaired," so
that the section shall read '' repaired and purchased" by a
citizen of the United States, the section would be made literally to include within its benefit the vessel here in question,
and I do not think it is doing violence to the language of the
section to hold that it may be so construed, considering the
evident intention of Congress in its enactment. Your own
Department, by Treasury decision No. 8688, granted registry
to a British vessel which was wrecked in the waters of the
United States, transferred to a British subject as the agent
of the British underwriters who made a contract to raise her,
subsequently sold her to an American citizen, the consideration being a sum of money in addition to an assumption by
the latt.er of bills incurred by the British subject in raising
her before the sale. Repairs were then made upon her which,
together with the amount expended in raising her, exceeded
three-fourths of the cost of the vessel when so repaired. It
is obvious that there a very considerable part of that which
was counted as repairs, namely, the expense of raising the
vessel, was expended by a British subject, and that the case
djd not come literally within section 4136 any more than
the one under discussion. But an authority which is more
directly in point is a decision by Attorney-General Black,
to b e found in 9 Opi.n., 424. The question was there asked
by the Secretary of the Treasury whether a vessel huilt in
the United States, but transferred to a foreign owner, and
afterwards wrecked in the waters of the Unite<l States and
purchased and repaired by an American citizen, was entitled
to registry under what has since become section 4136. Judge
Black, after stating the case, uses the following language:
"Does this case come within the act of 185~, so as to entitle
the vessel so purchased and repaired to a registry¥ Liter-
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ally it does not, for the words of the act require the vessel to
have been built in a foreign country, whereas tbis vessel was
built here, and became a foreign vessel by the transfer of it t,o
a foreign owner. But though the case be not within tbe strict
letter of the law, it is within its spirit and general intent,
which manifestly was to let all foreign vessels wrecked and
repaired in the United States, and purchased by American
citizens, have the benefit of American registry. I am, therefore, of opinio:n- that the party who has made this application
is entitled to what he asks for."
The statement of the intention of Congress made by Judge
Bla:ck in this opinion would include the vessel with respect
to whose registry you ask the question, and the departure
from the letter of the section by him in the case there decided
was even greater than is required in the present case to grant
the registry. You are therefore advised that the application
of Mr. Clyde should be granted.
You accompanied your request for an opinion with papers
containing evidence upon which, under section 4136, you are
called upon to decide, :first, whether the vessel was wrecked ;
secoud, whether the wreck took place in the United States;
third, whether the repairs made upon her in the United States
before she was ready·for service again after the wreck were
equal to three-fourths of the cost of the vessel when repaired.
Thi opinion has been rendered on the assumption that all
the foregoing facts have been found in favor of the applicant
The Attorney-General, in discharging the duty imposed upon
him by section 356, Reviserl Statutes, is required only to
answer que tions of law and can not consider questions of
fact upon evidence submitted. (19 Opin., 672.)
The papers inclo ed with the letter requesting an opinion
are herewith returned.
Very respectfully,
WM.H.TAFT,
Soliaitor-General.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY .
.Approved:

W. H. H. MILLER.
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IMPORTATION-MACHINERY FOR DISABLED FOREIGN VESSEL.
The Attorney-General adheres to the views expressed by him in his opinion of date July 7, 1891. 20 Opinions, 194.
DEP AR'.I.'MENT OF JUSTICE,

September 30, 1891.
Sm: I have. your letter of the 26th instant, in which you
refer to my opinion of the 7th of July last on the application of the North German-Lloyd Steamship Company for a
refund of the duty levied on certain shafts and other machinery imported by said company in their own vessels to replace
broken and disabled shafts in other vessels of that company
lying in the ports of this country. You inclose for further
consideration a letter from Dr. George 0. Glavis, attorney
for the steamship company, of the 16th instant, in which he
cites the case of The United States v. A Chain Cable, reported
in 2 Sumner, 362, and suggests that it was overlooked in the
preparation of the opinion already rendered.
It was held, in the opinion referred to, that where a crank
shaft was imported into this country in one vessel, was
landed, and then put in place upon another as part of the
latter's equipment, that the shaft was an article imported
and subject to the duty imposed thereon by the tariff laws.
The case of The United States v. A Chain Cable, cited by Dr.
Glavis, is not in point against this view. There the question
was whether a chain cable which had been purchased in
Liverpool by the ship Marathon to replace an unseaworthy
hempen cable, and which immediately became part of her
equipment, could be assessed as dutiable when the ship
reached this country and the cable was loaned to another
ship for temporary use only. It was left to the jury to say
whether it was a mere temporary loan, and the jury found
that it was. Justice Story supported a judgment against the
Government on the ground that the cable had become a part
of the Mcirathon equipment in Liverpool, and, coming in as
part of the ship in which it was imported, was not goods,
wares, and merchanuise. He said, on page 365:
''Until Congress shall declare that the new rigging or
equipments of the ship procured abroad are dutiable, or
not to be landed without a permit, it seems to be difficult to
conceive how courts of justice can treat them as 'goods,
5687-V0L 20--17
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wares, or merchandise,' within the meaning of the general
revenue laws. The 'goods, wares and merchandises,' within
the meaning of the :fiftieth section of the revenue collection
act of 1797, chapter 128, are such only as are designed for
sale, or to be applied to some use or object distinct frorn their
bona fide appropriation to the use of the ship in which they
are imported."
A the crank shafts _in question were to be applied to some
use di tinct from the use of the ship in which they were
imported, it is not apparent how the decision of Mr. Ju 'tice
Story does other than make against the claim of the steamship company herein. It certainly does not conflict with the
views expressed by this Department in the opinion already
rendered.
The inclosure is herewith returned.
Very respectfully,
WM.H.T.A.FT,
Acting Attorney- General.
The SECRET.A.RY OF '.I.'IIE TREASURY.

ATTOR EY-GE ERAL.
It is against the practice of the Department of Justice to give an opinion upon a que ·tion o g neral as not to show what the que tion that
ha ari en in any Department is.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF Ju TICE,

October 6, 1891.
communication from you, dated March 7, 1 91,
re u t d my opinion upon th g neral que tion whether he
pat ut for th
ourtenay
ntomatic ~ignal Buoy had
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board can now go on and manufacture buoys of the kind
described in the Courtenay patent without infringing upon
the rights of the patentee."
This Department, some months ago, called the attention of
the Light-House Board, informally, to the fact that your communication presented no definite question of law for opinion,
but merely the general question, whether the patents in question had come to an end, and suggested that the precise question or questions disturbing the mind of the Board should be
stated.
Having heard nothing more from the Board, I beg leave to
say that it would be against the settled practice of this
Department to give an opinion upon so general a question as
that submitted in your letter.
If the Light-House Board has no doubt of the expiration of
the said patents they do not need my opinion. If, on the
other band, the Board has a doubt on the subject it will give
me pleasure to try to resolve that doubt when it is communicated to me.
I need ouly add, that it is apparent from the foregoing why
the d elay has occurred in replying to your letter.
Very respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

IMMIGRATION-SUPERVISING INSPECTOR-APPROPRIATION.
The Secretary of the Treasury has power to appoint or designate a
supervising inspector or special inspector to perform such duties as
he shall direct and to serve at such places as will, in the judgment of
the Secretary, best promote the administration of the ImmigrantInspection Service. 'l'he appointee may properly be paid from the
immigrant fund.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

October 19, 1891.
SIR: I have received your letter of the 10th instant,
together with other information in relation to the question
submitted.
Under the "Act to regulate immigration," passed August
3, 1882 (22 Stat., 214), the immigrant fund is, as you are well
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aware, to be used under the direction of the Secretary of
the Treasury for the purpose specified in section 1 of the act;
and the Secretary is charged with the duty of executing the
provi8ions of the act.
It is not apparent that Congress, by the provisions of section 4 of the act making appropriations for legislative, executive, and. judicial expenses (id., 219), passed three days later
than the immigration act, intended to ehange or to restrict
the broad powers given.in said act of .August 3.
It may properly be noted that section 8, of the act of March
3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1084), to which you refer, recognizes the
official existence and the service of ''inspection officers" and
of '' inspectors."
The general scope of the immigration laws and the powers
of the Secretary of the Treasury thereunder are considered
at some length in the opinion which I had the honor of submitting to you under date of .April 15, 1891, and to that, and
to 19 Opin., 486, I beg to refer you. The pending question
does not render it neces ary to discuss further these law or
powers.
In response to the inquiry now under consideration, I beg
to say: That if in your judgment it is nece sary so to do in
order to properly regulate immigTation or to carry the acts
relating thereto into full and effective execution, you are, in
my opinion, authorized to appoint or designate a supervi ing
in p ctor, or a pecial inspector, to perform such duties in
connection with the ervice a" you hall direct, and to serve
at u h pla e or place a will in your judgment best promote
the fficient admini tration of the Immigrant-In 'P tion
rvi e. Tb appointee may properly be paid from the
rant fuud.
ry re pectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The
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DEP.A.RTMEN'.l' OF JUS'l'ICE,

October 20, 1891.
Sm: I have made such investigation as I was able touching certain records of the late Confederate States mentioned
in the act entitled ".A.n act making appropriation for the
serviees of the Post-Office Department for the fiscal year
ending June 30, 1892." The part of said act relating to this
matter is as follows: "To enable the Postmaster-General, if
in his judgment, after a careful investigation, it shall be .
deemed advisable, and they shall by him be deemed valuable
as aids in facilitating and protecting the Government in the
settlement of the accounts now in the office of the Sixth
.Auditor of the Treasury Department and in protecting the
Government against overpayments and frauds, to purchase
certain books and records of the post-office department of
the late so-called Oonfederate Government, and referred to
in Senate Executive Document No. 7, second session Fiftyfirst Congress, $10,000, or so much thereof as may be necessary."
The books in question and their condition and contents are
briefly described as follows:
I. .A. book entitled '' Record of letters and other communications from the post-office department of the Confederate
States, John H. Reagan, postma,ster-general." This title is
found on page 53. The preceding pages contain an index,
in a mutilated condition. The book bears evidence that it
has been used as a copy book by some child. The book contains copies of letters of the postmaster-general beginning October 12, 1863. There are none earlier than that
date. It also contains copies of auditor's reports of the postoffice department, and other matters relating to the postoffice department of the Confederate States. From page 53 ·
to page 348, the book is substantially intact. The last communication is under date of .April 1, 1865. The evidences of
the book having been used ai::; a copy book appear scattered
through the entire book. From 378 forward the leaves
have been cut out, but the margins show that they were
used as a copy book. The book bears evidence of being a
genuine record, but there is no other evidence authenticating
it as such.
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A n:iemorandt1m on pages 85 and 86, shows that the amount
paid out to contractors with the United States for mail service prior to June 1, 1861, is $502,017.19. Other interesting
matter upon the same subject is found under the heading of
"Revenue accounts," pages 86 and following.
II. This book is apparently in a good state of preservation, a portion of it having been used for memoranda purposes by the holder. This shows the mail contract routes,
the name of the contractor, and the compensation for the
services. It relates to South Carolina alone. The entries
in this book commence in 1863. There is no special evidence
identifying the genuineness of the book, save that derived
from its appearance, which is satisfactory.
III. This is a blank book for postage stamp and envelope
accounts, in part completed but largely containing the names
of the of.fices, the county, and the postmaster, without any
entry thereunder.
IV. This is a mutilated book containing a record of dead
· letters. . It is not in a good state of preservation, but contains a large number of entries under the subject-matter.
There is no special evidence showing the authenticity of this
book, but its appearance carries out the idea of its being
genuine.
V. This book is a register of postage stamps sent. This,
like the others, is mutilated, and out of the 417 pages has
few left.
VI. This is the most important record of the list. It is a
register of reports of payments to mail transportation contractors and corresponds to that kept in the office of the
Sixth Auditor of the Treasury Department of the United
States. '.rhe fro!lt part of the book is mutilated and some
pages are out. The first account commences in October, 1861,
and continues down to April 1, 1865, inclusive.
The authenticity of this book is vouched for by one Henry
St. George Offutt, now of New York City, who appears by a
printed copy of the post-office records of the Confederacy,
to have been chief of its contract bureau. The affidavit
establishes beyond doubt the genuineness of the volume.
It seems to have been modeled after the record kept in the
Sixth Auditor's Office of the United States. I have examined briefly the items in,. relation to the payments. I find
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numerous payments marked "U. S.," under the head of
"Transportation." Whoever kept the book seems to have
made the distinction betweed accounts for Confederate States
contractors, and those of the United States, who had sums
due them prior to May 31, 1861, by marking the letters '' U.
S." after such latter accounts. These accounts give the
number of the route, the clerk, the contractor, ag-ent, etc.,
the appropriation and the amount paid. I have not personally verified the amounts appearing by this book to have
been paid to contractors of the class mentioned. But I am
informed by Messrs. McGrew & Small that they aggregate
$479,000.
It is not necessary for me to state in detail the history of
these books. From an affidavit attached to one of the most
important of these volumes it appears that the records of
the Confederate States Post-Office Department were modeled,
so far as applicable, after the forms then in use in the PostOffice Department of the United States. These volumes, at
the collapse of the rebellion, were taken by an employe of
the Confederate States Post-Office Department to Chester
court-house, S. C., there abandoned, and subsequently came
into the possession of the present holder, but whether at
once, or through prior possessors, does not appear. Although
the affidavit above mentioned relates to but one of the
books, I think there is no doubt of the genuineness of all
six of the volumes. An inspection of these several volumes shows that they were regularly kept in accordance
with their different uses in the postal department of the
Confederate States. They are thus authentic public records
of a defacto government.
It is a historical fact that in the year 1861, from January
1 to May 31, the postal affairs in the States in rebellion were
nominally under the control of the United States. May 27,
1861, the Postmaster-General of the United States, by proclamation, suspen ded all postal services in the States in
rebellion on and after the 31st day of May, 1861. Out of
the e circumstances it happened that there were a large
number of unsettled accounts for mail transportation due
the contractors, nominally, from the United States.
August 30, 1861, the Confederate States Government
passed an act to collect for distribution the moneys remain-
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ing in the several post-offices of the Confederate State , at
the time the postal services were taken iu charge by aid
Government, that is, June 1, 1861. By this act the Confederate States took possession of all the moneys then due the
United States from postmasters and others, and provided a
fund for the pro rata payment of claims for postal service ,
which accrued before its Postmaster-General took charge of
the postal service ,in the States com posing the Confederacy.
September 27, 1862, the Confederate States passed. another
act direeting the Postmaster-General to pay "to the 8everal
persons; or their lawful authorized agents or representatives, the sums respectively found due and owing to them
for postal services rendered in any States of this Confederacy
under contracts or payments made by the United State
Government before the Confederate States Government took
charge of such service, as the said sums have been credited
and ascertained by him under the provisions of the act
entitled 'An act ~o collect for distribution the money
remaining in the several post-offices of the Confederate State
at the time the postal service was taken in charge by aid
Government,' approved the 30th of August, 1 61; but
tbe sums authorized by this act to be paid are only the
balances found due after all proper deductions shall have
been made on account of previous pa,y melits made by the
United States or any States, or of available provision made
in whole or in part for such.payment by said Government,
or any of the State , and after making all proper deduction
for failure or partial failures to perform the services according to their everal contract or appointments during the
time for which they laim pay; provided, that the provi ion
f thi act hall extend only to loyal citizens of the Oonfedercite > tates."
In ac ordance with the provi ion of thi last act, the
Lma ter- en ral f tbe onfi d rat
tate paid ou to
th parti entitl d to it pr i ion about -02 000. The
Yi l n e of u h paymen n tb part of th Confed racy
n
< ud in ludino- th
i. '.'Hing f he warrant for ucb
, ·m nt i £ ncl xt n l in olurue number d 6 in tbi
1 t r.
tba
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amount so paid by the Confederate Government. N otwith. standing the payments by the Confederate States, the Con
gress of the United States has been and still is besieged by
claimants demanding a settlement of the accounts for transporting mails credited to them upon the books of the
Sixth .Auditor of the United States. The Congress of the
United States in 1877 passed an act making an appropriation of $375,000 for the payment of such claims, but
provided that no payments should be made where the claimant had already received pay for the same services for the
Confederate States Government. Claiming under this last
act, a large number of suits were commenced in the Court of
Claims. Some have been prosecuted to judgment favorably,
· and others have been dismissed for want of proof. A large
number have been dismissed in consequence of the decision
in the Selma, Rome and Dalton case hereinafter mentioned.
Very few are now pending.
No part of the $375,000, appropriated as above, was paid
out, because the Secretary of the Treasury conceived it his
duty to pay no part of said sum until all claimants had proffered their accounts to that Department. None so doing,
that amount lapsed into the Treasury, in accordance with law.
I am informed that parties making claims for these services have continued to demand of Congress a recognition
and payment of their claims; that in some instances such
· demand has been successful, while in others, by some happy
chance, the bills very narrowly escaped becoming law. It is
asserted that all such claims are accompanied with statements that no payment 1,t·as made by the Confederate States.
At this date the condition of affairs may briefly be summarized, thus: The hooks of the Sixth Auditor of the ~rreasury
of the United States show open accounts due parties for transporting ma,ils between the 1st day of January, 1861, and the
31st day of May, 1861. The dockets of the Court of Claims
show a number of suits pending for similar services brought
under the act of Congress, 1877, supra.
The :files of Congress show many bills providing for the
payment of the e cla.ims.
Under these circumstances, the Postmaster-General is
directed to investigate, if he deems it advisable, and determine if the books in question are valuable as a{rls in facil-
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itating and protecting the Government in the settlement of
the accounts now pending in the office of the Sixth .Auditor
of the Treasury Department, and in protecting the Government against overpayments and frauds.
The important question then is, what use or benefit will
accrue to the United States from the possession of thee
books1
First. They will enable the Sixth Auditor of the Treasury,
by the comparison of parties, routes, and amounts due, to
determine what sums were paid by the Confederate Government to the persons who have sums credited to them on the
books of the United States for the same service. The Sixth
Auditor being practically Comptroller and Auditor with
respect to these accounts, in the absence of direction from
Congress, will be ellabled to close all ·such accounts, and
against such decision there can be no successful appeal. In
the event that claimants whose names are found in the e
volumes attempt by aid of Congress to obtain from the
United States the amounts shown to have been due them on
the books of the Sixth Auditor, the Treasury Department of
the United States will inform Congress of such fact, and
thus prevent the passa,ge of a bill for such relief. It is
assumed that no committee of Congress would report favorably a bill for the relief of any party who appears to have
had hi pay.
econd. Are the e records legal evidence which may be
u ed in defense of suit pending in the Court of Claims¥
The que tion of the competency of the records as evidence
is entirely separate from the force to be attached to the ame
if admi · ible. It i apparent that the principal book in
que tion doe not purport to be a record of the complete payment, but of fact leading up to the i suing of the warrant
n whi ·h th paym nt i ompleted. The warrant. themI
are not produc d. The evidence, therefore, i a link
nl iu he chain of ev nts nece ary to show paym nt. I
am inclin d to th opinion that being public r cord of a de
facto p liti ·al ov rum nt, and howiugtran action between
u h Y- rnment and the claimant, th cu t dy of he record
being fairl - rac cl from the noss{~ssi n f uch overnment
to h ir , nt let ' h y ar a<lmi ibl .

TO THE POSTMASTER-GENERAL.

267

Books and Records of Postal Service of the Confederate Government.

The identity of the parties would be left still to be traced
and the ultimate payment to be proved. There is evidence,
however, dehors the record, that it was the part of the method
of keeping these accounts that when warrants were issued
upon the statements therein found, and such warrants were
unpaid, that fact was noted in the margin of .the record;
hence a reasonable presumption, unless such annotation is
found, that the payment was in fact made. So far as the
cases now pending in the Court of Claims is concerned this
evidence can be perpetuated.
It has been suggested that the possession of these books
would enable the United States to recoup from present contractors money paid by the United States heretofore on
claims found to have been paid in these books by the Confederate Government. Many railroad companies are now
employed in carrying the mails which carried them dudng
the period from January 1, 1861, to May :n, 1861; that payments have in many cases been made such railroad companies
for these antebellum services, and that the United States
may recoup from amounts presently due such companies the
amounts so paid. The circumstances under which such payments were made by the United States would necessarily
largely determine the right of the United States to recover.
Under ordinary conditions such payment would be made by
the United States under and by virtue of a right on the part
of the contractor as a creditor, and it would make no difference to the United States that the same contractor had
received pay for the same services from others, there being
no privity between the three parties. I can conceive, however, that if the payment made by the United States, was
made under a fraudulent statement as to the facts of the
same services having been paid by the Confederate States,
and under the condition imposed by the law of 1877, supra,
that the United States might recoup from the moneys presently due the same contractor such sums.
As I have, however, no sufficient data upon which to
determine this matter, I can give no opinion as to the usefulness of this evidence for that purpose.
I have attempted a verification of the usefulness of these
books by reference to a suit lately pending in the Court of
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Claims. The Selma, Rome and Dalton Railroad 01
successors of the Alabama and Tenne. see River:Company (which latter company transported the ma·
the United States between January 1, 1861, and ~ ..
1861), brought suit for the sum of $5,000 in the
Claims, claiming under the act of 1877, above m n ·
The claimant offering no proof as to whether paym
the same services had been ma<le by the Confederat
the Court of Claims ruled that the action could not b
tained and dismissed the petition. This ruling wa. a1u rwt::u
by an equa1 division of the justices of the Supreme
the United States, to which the claimant took th
appeal. The importance of the legal question inv ,
caused the then Attorney-General, Hon. A.H. Garlan .
join with the claimant's counsel to set aside the ju l
and reopen the ca e for further argument upon tbi
This wa done and the ca e was reargued at the ve'.ce:mc>er
term, 1890, and the judgment of the Court of Claim: a
by the unanimous decision of the ju tice .
An examination of book number six how the am
thu~ claimed by the elma, Rome and Dalton C n p
paid by tbe Confederate State .
I have not examined the book as to other claim I en ·
in tbe Court of Claim .
While primarily the act in que tion has r lation to h
tl ment of the e account in th office of the i.-th ..........................., ...
of the Trea ury Department alon , I think that th
found in the e volume may be of u e to the Go,- rnn e
another direction, namely, in the inv tigati n of Joye l
cla,imant~ under th Bowman ct for tor and
tal n and u ed by the Unit d tat Ann . Th
contai11 a large array of name of contractor of po
au<l otb r agent of tl?e Confederacy and the fa t
s t forth would be alua le in enablino- tbe
J arn•nen:1:
Ju · ice to tra e evid nee with re pect to l yalt
cl
..IAU. .U& VQ.'--C

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

269

Comptroll er of the (J urrency-Dividend-Cre1litor of Bank.

From this brief review of the history and legal aspect of
the case, whatever opinion I may holtl as to the custody and
ownership of these books by the present claimant thereof,
I feel warranted in the opinion that the Postmaster-Ge11.eral
may act favorably toward their acquisition.
Very respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL.

COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY-DIVIDEND-CREDITORS
OF BANK.
It is not within the province of the Comptroller of the Currency to
inquire what use the creditors of a national bank propose to make
of the dividend paid them.
If the r eceiver of the bank has authority of the proper district court
and the consent of every one of the creditors of the bank to a private
sale of any of its assets, then this dividend money could be used to
purchase such assets; the money thus used would again become assets
of the b ank for distribution.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

November 2, 1891.
Sm: I h ave considered your communication of October 2J,
1891, with reference to the 10 per cent dividend now payable
to the creditors of the Middletown National Bank, and am of
opinion that when the Comptroller of the Currency shall
have paid this dividend to the creditors or their duly authorized attorney or attorneys, it is not within his province to
inquire what use the creditors propose to make of the money
so paid. Consequently, if they should use it in buying an
asset of the bank from the receiver, the money thus used
will again become as ets of the bank for distribution.
In my consideration of this question, I have, of course,
as urned that the receiver bas the authority of the proper
di trict court fo_r disposing of the particular asset at private
ale, and that his plan for disposing of this asset has been
freely acquie ced in by every one of the creditors.
Very resp , Uy yours,
W. H. H. MILLER.

:m
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ATTORNEY-GBNERAL.
The Attorney-General can not investigate the papers and records for the
purpose of ascertaining the facts upon which the question arises.
DEPARTMEN'.1.' OF JUSTICE,

November 6, 1891.
SIR: Your note, dated October 5, in which you transmit
to me a bundle of papers in connection with the case of Luke
Voorhees, is re_ceived. In your note you say:
"The material facts in this case will be disclosed by the
papers and records herewith submitted. The opinion of
your Department is respectfully requested as to whether, in
view of all the facts and circumstances of the case, the order
of this Department suspending the pay of Luke Voorheeson
route No. 34040, Fargo to Pembina, Dakota., contract term
1878 to 1882, under date of June 19, 1883, is so far modified
or affected by the decision of the Supreme Court, in the ca e
-0f the United States v. Luke Voorhees, decided in the defend.ant 's favor at its October term, 1889 (135 U. S. Rep01ts, p.
550), ~s to impose upon me 'the obligation of rescinding said
-order of suspension; i. e., whether said decision affects or
-ought to affect the order of suspension in question."
The papers were returned to you before because when
requesting an opinion you made no statement of facts. They
are returned again for the same reason. It has been uniformly held by my predecessors, as well as by myself, that
when an opinion is desired by the head of a Department: a
statement of the facts upon which the question arises mu-t
be submitted. The Attorney-General can not investigate
~, the papers an~ records" for the purpose of ascertaining
these facts. (12 Opin., p. 206; 14 Opin., p. 367; 19 Opin., pp.
396-467, 696.)

Respectfully, yours,

W. H. H. MILLER.
The

POS1'MAS'.1.'ER-GENERAL.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION-ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
It is not within the authority of the Attornev-General to reYer ·e a
decision of the Civil Service Commission or to require it tq- issue
certificate of reinstatement.
'

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

271

Civil Service Commission-A. ttorn ey-Gen eral,

DEPARTMENT OF JUS'.I.'ICE,

November 13, 1891.
SIR: Your communication of the 7th instant, relating to
the case of William H. Wykoff, applicant for reinstatement
as a clerk in your Department, under amended Civil Service
Rule X, ha·s been duly considered.
It appears that Mr. Wykoff was, August 25, 1885, serving
as a clerk of class 2, and on that day resigned the position
and left such service through no fault or delinquency on his
part.
He now claims the right to reinstatement.
It appears from the report received from the War Department that Mr. Wykoff was hired by Capt. C. H. Irvin,
assistant quartermaster, at Nashville, during 1864, and "was
employed under bis direction as a clerk at $75 per month
from May 1, 1864, to August 6, 1864, when he was discharged,
no cause being assigned."
The report concludes as follows :
'' The records of this office also show that during the years
1863 and 1864 the civilian employes of the Quartermaster's
Department on duty at the most important quartermaster
depots, viz, Washington, D. C., Alexandria, Va., Nashville,
Tenn., etc., were, by direction of the Secretary of War, organized into regiments, uniformed, officered, armed, and drilled to
make a force for the protection of the Government property
and to be available for service in case of emergency to relieve
the regular troops.
"There having been no regular muster rolls prepared of
the quartermaster's employes at Nash ville, who belonged to
the quartermaster's volunteers, except the rolls upon which
they were reported and paid as civilian employes, the Quartermaster-General is unable to give a positive certificate as
to Mr. Wykoff's connection and service with the organization referred to, but inasmuch as the records show that Mr.
Wykoff was employed as clerk in the quartermaster's department at Nash ville, from May to August, 1864, it is presumed
that he was a member of the quartermaster's volunteers,
organized at that depot, during the time he was employed,
and performed the same military service as the other civilian
employes of the quartermaster's department on duty there
for the same period."
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The Civil Service Commission declines to i · ue a
cate for the reinstatement of the applicant, and con lu
its letter relating thereto as follows:
"It does not appear from the statement of the u
master-General that Mr. Wykoff served in the military
ice of the United States and was honorably di ch, r
therefrom within the meaning of the rule, but merely th
is presumed that he, with other civilian employe , wa
available for ervice for the protection of Government I
erty in case of emergency to relieve the regular troop .
the absence of positive evidence of the performance o
service the Commissfon thinks that it is without aotb
to issue the certificate for reinstatement."
It will be rernem bered that Rule X, so far a it i n
question, provides that:
"Upon requisition of the head of a Department th
mission shall certify for reinstatement in aid DeJlartm
* * * any person who served in the military or n,
service of the United State in tbe late war of the reb Hi
aud was honorably discharged therefrom."
It is plain that the Commi sion decided that the eYid n
pre ented does not bring the applicant within the rul .
This determinatfon has been communicated to the b
the Treasury Department. It is not within the cop o
· authority to reverse tbi deci ion of the Commi ion
require it to issue the certificate of reinstatement.
If the Commi sion determined the que tion in accord·
with law no further proceeding in the premi e are ant
ized.
If it llould be con idered that the Oommi
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necessary to the discharge of any duty properly belonging
to any Department it is not the duty of the Attorney-General to give an opinion thereon, and such opinion would consequently be extra-official and unauthorized."
rrhis decision is approved by Mr.Attorney-General Garland
(19 Opin., 8); and the principle that there must be a case of
present executive consequence pending in the Department
from which the request comes in order to authorize an official opinion has been affirmed many times.
As the Civil Service Commission i_s not included within the
Treasury Department, and as the rule formulated pursmmt
to law vests the Commission with authority in the matter of
certification, and as it has exercised that authority, it is not
apparent that any question in the premises remains with the
Treasury Department upon which the statute permits me to
act. I am therefore compelled to say, without considering
whether the applicant is or is not shown to come within the
terms of Rule X, that under the statutes, and the precedents
established by learned predecessors, I am without authorityto render to you an official opinion upon Mr. Wykoff's eligibility.
Very respectfully,
W. H. H. MILL.ER.
The SEORET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

COSTS-REl!'UND OF DUTIES.
In cases of' judgments against the United States by circuit courts on
appeal hy importers from illegal assessment of duties by the collector
of customs, the refund adjudged to be made by the United States does
not include costs.
DEP .A.R'.I.'MENT OF JUSTICE,

December 10, 1891.
SIR: Your letter of November 12, 1891, submitting the
question whether in cases of judgments against the United
States by circuit courts on appeals by importers from illegal ·
assessments of duties by collectors of customs the refund
adjudged to be made by the United States includes costs, is
received.
In my opinion, costs are not and can not be included in
such judgments without some declaration ·o f Congress to that
5687-VOL 20--18
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effect. As Chief Justice Marshall said in United d at~ v.
Barker (2 Ph., 395), in response to a motion for costs again
the United States, "The United States never pay co t . '
In United States v. Boyd (5 How., 29, 51), the court aid:
"Another ground upon which the judgment must be rever ed
is that a judgment for costs was rendered against the plaintiffs. The United States are not liable for costs."
In the case of The .Antelope (12 Wh., 546-549) the court ay:
"It is a general rule that no court can make a, direct
judgment or decree against the United States for costs and
expenses in a suit to which the United States is a party.
either on behalf of any suitor or any officer of the Government. As to the officers of the Government the law expressly provides a different mode." See also United States
v. McLenwre (4 How., 286).
The proceedings instituted by importers by way of appeal
to the courts under section 15 of the act of June 10, 18UO
are suits against the United States, as was held by this
Department, after much consideration, in an opinion dated
August 7, 1891, and, therefore, such .Proceedings as to co t
against the United States fall directly within the ruling of
the above cases.
Very respectfully, yours,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRE'.rARY OF THE TREASURY.

APPOINTMENT-RESIDENCE.
Where a resident of ·wisconsin is examined for the departmental seITice and passes at an eligible average and is subsequently appointed
upon certifica.t ion from the Wisconsin elegible list and his appointm ent charged to the apportionment of that State, and it is later a certained that subsequently to passing his examination he changed his
r idonce to Idaho and neglected, but not with any desire of concealing the fact, to notify the Civil Service Commission of such change of
re idence and had he so notified it he would have been transferred to
the Iclaho eligible register, and in consequence thereof Idaho h received an appointment to which it was not then and has not heen
since entitled: Held, that subsection 3 of section 2 of the civil service
act of January 16, 1883, chapter 27, is directory only, and that the
appointment is not invalid.
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DEP.ARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

December 10, 1891.
SIR: In reply to the question propounded to you by the
Civil Service Commission and submitted for my consideration by you in the case of Cyrus L. Hall, I beg to submit the
following opinion:
It appears by the statement of facts that on October 24,
1889, Mr. Hall sent in an application for the clerk examination for the departmental service, alleging an actual bona
fide residence in the State of Wisconsin, and on November
29, 1889, he was examined at St. Paul, Minn., and passed at
an eligible average.
On January 3, 1891, he was appointed to a ,$1,000 clerkship in the Pension Office, Interior Department, upon certification from the Wisconsin eligible register, and bis appointment was charged to the apportionment of that State.
On receipt of the notice of Hall's absolute appointment
at the end of probation it was observed that his actual bona
fide residence was given as Idaho, instead of Wisconsin, and
on inquiry it was learned that subsequent to his examination he had removed from Wisconsin to · Idaho and bad
become a resident and citizen of the latter State.
It is stated, furthermore, that under the regulations o~ the
Commission it was Hall's duty to advise the Commission of
his change of residence when it took place, but that he failed
to do so, and that had he done so his name would have been
transferred from the Wisconsin to the Idaho eligible register,
and would not have been certified when it was, but that the
name of an actual bona fide resident of Wisconsin would
have been certified, and that Hall would not have been
appointed, but that a resident of Wisconsin would have beeu.
As a consequence of this failure of Hall to give timely
notice of his removal to Idaho, Wisconsin was charged with
an appointment which it did not receive and failed to receive
an appointment it was entitled to, and Idaho received an
appointment with which it was not charged and to which it
was not then, nor has it been since, entitled under the law
and the rules in relation to appointment as understood by
the Commission.
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It also appears that Hall's omission to give due noticeo
bis change of residence was not with any purpose to uppress that fact, and that Hall is "a most excellent clerk.
and that the Commissioner of Pensions and the Secretaryo·
the Interior are desirous that he should be permitted to
remain in the public service upon his present footing.
Upon this state of facts an opinion is asked on the validity
of the appointment of Hall as a citizen of Wisconsin after
his change of residence from that State to Idaho.
Subsection 3 of section 2· of the act approved January 16
J 883, entitled "An act to regulate and improve the civil ser,.
ice of the United States," provides as follows:
"Third. Appointments to public service aforesaid in the
.Departments at Washington shall be apportioned among
the several States and Territories and the District of Columbia upon the basis of population as· ascertained at the last
preceding census. Every application for an examination
shall contain, among other things, a statement, under oath.
setting forth his or her actual bona fide residence at the
time of making the application, as well as how long he or
she bas been a resident of such place."
And section 2 of departmental Rule VII provides as follow~:
" Certification hereunder shall be made in such manner as
to maintain, as nearly as possible, thr. apportionment of
appointments among the several States and Territories and
the District of Columbia, as required by law."
The apportionment by the act of the appointments to tLe
public service in the Departments at W asbington amoLg
the several States and Territories and the District of Columbia is somewhat fundamental in its character, and wa no
doubt intended · to be faithfully observed by those charge
with the duty of enforcing the law under which the people
of the several States and Territories and the District o
Columbia have certain rights which it is the duty of the
Civil Service Commission, acting under your supervision: to
protect.
·
But while it is the undoubted duty of the executive branc
of the Government to give proper effect to this· requiremenof Congre , it is a very different thing to say that an appoin ment made in disregard of this rule of apportionment. thro g
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a mere inadvertence, is to fail entirely and be treated as a

nullity.
Is it reasonable to suppose that Oongress was so distrustful of the executive department as to legislate with such an
intention,
It is true that a failure to obey the statute with regard to
apportionment may produce inconvenience and, perhaps, hardship, but these may and will ·be repaired hy a return to the
rule of the statute in making subsequent appointments, and
the presumption is not to be tolerated that any officer having
the appointing power would fail to do this so soon as practicable.
It seems to me, therefore, more reasonable to conclude that
Congress did not intend that, in such a case as the one before
me, where everything was done in good faith, an inadvertent
disregard of the rule of apportionment in making an appointment should annul that appointment. I am of opinion, therefore, that the statute is directory only in the above particular, and, consequently, that the appointment of Mr. Hall was
not invalid.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, yours,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The PRESIDENT.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
The question as to the right of a State to tax lands in an Indian reservation is judicial and not administrative; the Attorney-General ought
not to express an opinion upon it. 19 Opinions, 56, followed.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

December ll, 1891.

Sm: In reply to your letter of November 7, 1891, inclosing
a communication to you . from the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs and requesting my opinion upon the question of the
right of the State of Michigan to tax lands in the Isabella
Reservation held by the Indians under patents denominated
"not so competent" and issued under the provisions of the
3d article of the treaty of October 18, 1864, I have the honor
to state that matters have gone so far in the direction of
assessing and enforcing taxes against the said lands by the
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State of Michigan that it seems to me the better com e
would be to make a test case with a view to the determination of the Federal question by the Supreme Court of the
United States. The question involved seems to be judicial
and not administrative in character.
In the case of the Klamath Indians (19 Opin., 56), my
predecessor, Attorney- General Garland, upon the same
ground, declined to give an opinion upon a matter of con,
troverted right between those Indians and the State of
California.
The following observations in that opinion seem to be pertinent to this case, namely"The matters covered by these questions are clearly ju ticiable in the appropriate courts at the suit of the Indians
themselves who are interested in them. They are essentially judicial in their character, and as each is readily resolvable into a case at law or in equity, I do not see how it can
be said to be a question arising in a course of executive
administration.
"There is nothing in the nature of the protectorate or
guardia.nsbip exercised by the United States over the Indian
tribes that warrants the Executive Department of the Govermnent in assuming to determine a controversy properly
cognizable by the Judicial Department of the Government
becau ' e the well being of an Indian tribe requires, that such
controversy should be decided. The organic dist.inction
between the three great division& of Government established
by the Constitution must be respected, or collisions and
discords inimical to good government will inevitably take
place.
"When the questions arose between the State of Kan a
and the Shawnee and Miami and Wea Indian tribes as t-0
the power of the State to tax certain lands held in severalty
by individuals of these tribes, the three tribes filed bills in
equity against. the State officials seeking to enforce the right
to tax, and the suits thus brought were finally determined
in favor of the Indians by the Supreme Court of the Uuited
State . ( The Kansas Indians, 5 Wall., 737; see also the ca e
of The ew York Ind-ians, ib. , 761.)
".My preclece or, 1\Ir. Butler, ueclined to pass upon claim
ari ing under a treaty with the Cherokee Indians, on the
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ground that a board of commissioners had been established
by the treaty for the purpose of determining cases of that
kind, saying that the Attorney-General had 'no power to
give an official opinion, on the request of a head of a depart- .
ment, except on matters . that concern the official powers and
duties of such department' (3 Opin., 369; see also section
356 Rev. Stat., and 13 Opin., 160, and 11 Opin., 407).
"It seems to me, therefore, that, as the only way to settle
the questions submitted is by judicial proceedings, it would
be hardly proper for me to express an opinion on them, while
my doing so might, at the same time, be regarded as an
attempt of the Executive branch of the Government to forestall such proceedings."
I shall be glad to cooperate with you in the proper measures
to get a judicial determination of the important question to
w bich you refer.
Very respectfully, yours,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRET.ARY OF THE INTERIOR.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
Unless the head of a Department has to pass upon a matter, it is not one
calling for an opinion of the Attorney-General.
DEP.ARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

December 14, 1891;
Sm: I have received the Jetter of the First Comptroller of
the Treasury referred to me by you, and also the letter of
the Hon. T. W. Ferry, inclosed with said letter, presenting
the question whether the clerk of the court of the third
judicial district of U tab is accountable for certain fees.
It would appear from the Comptroller's letter that the
question presented is one which he considers to be within his
exclusive jurisdiction. Unless, therefore, you have to pass
upon the matter, I do not see that it belongs to the class of
questions which may properly come before me. If, however,
it is a matter upon which your action will be necessary, I
shall be pleased to render an opinion on it.
Very respectfully, yours,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRET.ARY OF THE TREASURY.
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REVOCATION OF ORDER SUSPENDING PAY-RES ADJUDICATA.
Where an order suspending pay of a mail contractor is made by the
Postmaster-General, the order should not be vacated on unsupported
application for that purpose, or where no substantial ground is shown
for the application.
The principle of res adftidicata applies to departmental action of a final
nature.
DEPARTMENT OF JUST.ICE,

December 18, 1891.
SIR: Your communication of November 19, 1891, and the
accompanying statement of facts, bring to my attention the
following case:
Luke Voorhees entered into a contract with the Government to carry the mail from Fargo to Pembina, Dak., being
route numbered 35040, for the term of four years, beginning
July 1, 1878, and ending June 30, 1882.
As the contract stood originally, the service was to be
rendered six times week, the schedule of running time,
each way, was 62 hours, and the annual compensation was
$17,000. Prior to July 1, 1878, no mail service had been
per.formed on this route.
On July 30, 1878, an order was made by the Postma terGeneral, to take effect August .1, 1878, expediting the schedule and reducing the running time on said route from sixtytwo hours to forty-three hours in summer and fifty hours in
winter, and allowing an additional sum of $8,500 per annum.
This order of expedition was revoked by requests, and a.
petition, all moving, however,from Voorhees himself, through
his agents and employes, and so much of the order as allowed
Voorhees the additional sum of ·$8,500 per annum was ba ed
on the following statement, made and sworn to by Voorhees,
namely" I hereby certify that it will take 50 per cent more men
and horses to perform mail service on route 35040, from
Fargo to Pembina, on a reduced schedule from sixty-two hours
to forty-three hours in summer and .fifty hours in winter."
Thi statement was also signed by Voorhe·es.
It further appears that service on said route was performed
by Voorhee .. from July 1, 1878, to July 31, 1881, and that it
wa o certified to the Auditor.
On July 9, 1881, the Postmaster-General made the following order:

a
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"On account of fraud in the oath of contractor as to extra
stock required for expedition, it not having been required,
or he not having employed extra stock therefor, and thus
not having incurred any extra expense by reason thereof,
discontinue service July 31, 1881, and allow one month's
extra pay on $17,162.94, the cost of the trip service."
This last order was followed up by another on July 19, 1883,
in which the Postmaster-General directed a suspension of pay
on said route, and, as a consequence, the amount certified as
due to Voorhees for the period from April 1, 1881, to July 31,
1881, together with the one month's allowance for discontinuance of service, remain unpaid to this day.
The record does not state on what grounds the order of
July 19, 1883, was made, nor do I suppose that you intend me
to treat as a fact in the case the surmise, in paragraph 8 of
your statement, that the order of July 19, 1883, was based
"on the charges against Mr. Voorhees referred to in the order
of July 9, 1881," and was intended" to await the determination of the snit which had been or was to be instituted agai11st
Voorhees for the recovery of $14,342.52, alleged to have been
overpaid him on said route."
However that may be, suit was brought by the United
States against Voorhees to recover back the said amount as
so much money improperly and unlawfully obtained by him
through the expedition order above given; thf' theory on
which the said suit was ordered to be brought being, that
Voorhees, '' for his own advantage and for the convenience of
the public, had all along, from the commencement of service
by him on said route, performed it on a schedule of time as
fast as that required by the order of expedition, and that, as
no greater number of men and horses were required to perform the service on the expedited time, his affidavit was necessarily false and made for the purpose of defrauding the Government."
Voorhees demurred to the petition or complaint in the said
suit, and the demurrer was sustained, and upon error this
judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United
States (135 U. S., 550).
Since the result of that case, application has been made to
you to revoke the order of suspension made by one of your
predecessors on July 19, 1883.
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The question submitted for opinion, upon this state of
facts, is whether a proper case is presented for a revocation
of the said order of suspension.
There can be no doubt of the correctness of the theory 011
which the Postmaster-General ordered suit to be brought
against Voorhees, namely, that he actually employed no more
men or horses in performing the expedited service than he
had been theretofore employing. If such was the fact, he
was defrauding the Government by receiving compensation
for the increased number of men and horses authorized by
the order of expedition.
Congress has spoken plainly on this subject in section 3961
of the Revised Statutes, which is as follows:
"No extra allowance shall be made for any increase of
expedition for carrying the mail unless thereby the e11iployment of additional stock and carriers is made necessary, and
in such case the additional compensation shall bear no
greater proportion to the additional stock and carriers necessarily employed than the compensation in the original contract bears to the stock and carriers necessarily employed in
its execution."
In United States v. Barlow (132 U. S., 271), the defendant,
Barlow, was held bound to refund to the United States, under
ection 3961, money received under an expedited schedule as
payment for additional horses and men which he had never
u ~ed, although they had been allowed in the order of expedition.
If the same condition of facts had been presented in the
record in the case of Voorhees ·as in that of Barlow, the
demurrer would, no doubt, have been overruled, but unfortunately the petition or complaint in the case of Voorhees contained no averment of fraud. It is true that at the very
.
t1m
au expedition of his schedule was ' being applied for
Voorhe s was giving the public the increased speed under
the original contra.ct. But this he was not bound to do. He
wa at liberty ·to return to the contract at any time, and the
c urt ay that there was no allegation that Voorhees did
not u e the additional men and horses under the expedited
~hedule, or that the cost of the expedited service was exces1ve.
It thu appears that the charge of fraud which was, as you
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assume and as was probably the case, the basis of the order
of suspension, was not passe4" upon by the Supreme Court,
and so far as the judgment on the demurrer is concerned is
still undisposed of. Indeed, if the United States were to sue
Voorhees again for money had and received under a fraudulent claim for service never rendered, the judgment on the
demurrer would not be a bar to such a suit. As the Supreme
Court say in Gould v. Evansville, etc., R. R. Go. (91 U. S.,
526, 5:14), "if the plaintiff fails on demurrer in his first action
from the omissio!1 of an essential allegation in his declaration which is fully supplied in the second suit, the judgment
1n the first suit is no bar to the second, although the respective actions were instituted to enforce the same right, for the
reason that the merits of the cause, as disclosed in the second declaration, were not heard and decided in the first
action," citing Aurora Oity v. West (7 Wall., 90); Gilman v.
Rives (10 Pet., 298); Richardson v. Barton .(24 How., 188).
So far then from the judgment in the case of Voorhees having settled the question of fraud in his favor, that question
stands now precisely as it did when the order of suspension
was made.
In view of the charge of fraud in the order of July 9, 1881,
it is fair to presume that the order of suspension was based,
wholly or in part, on the finding of fraud in the preceding
order.
But however that may be, -the order of s·u spension was
made by competent authority, and is entitled to every reasonable presumption to support it. Such an order, although
of an inter]ocutory character, should not be vacated on an
unsupported application for that purpose.
That the prineiple of res judicata does apply to departmental action of a final nature is well settled. Said Attorney-General Hoar (13 Opin., 35):
"Under these circumstances, I am of opinion that the
deliberate decision of a former administration of a question
involving private rights and interests, can not with propriety
be reconsidered by its successors. No new facts are shown
to exist which were not known when that decision was made.
Ample opportunity has occurred for Congress, by a ·new provision of law, or by a declara.tory act, to establish authoritatively the construction of the statute.
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"It was said by Mr. Wirt 'to be a rule of action pre' cribed
to itself by each administration, to consider the acts of 1
predecessors conclusive as far as the Executive is concerned.
(1 Opin., 9.)
"An adherence to this rule, which has been often restated
by this Department, I consider as of great importance.
Without it there would seem to be no _end to the number of
times in which a question might be presented for reconsidera.
tion." (See also 9 Opin., 34; and 13 Opin., 388.)
I am of opinion that the principle of res judicata should
also protect the order of suspension, to the extent, at lea t.
of requiring some substantial ground to be shown for setting
it aside.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, yours,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL.

OWNERSHIP OF IMPROVEMENTS ON LAND -GOVERNME1'1'
PROPERTY .
.A. large expenditure of money was laid out by the Government in building on a military post which afterwards was ascertained to be on land
covered by a Mexican land grant, and a patent was issued by the
Government to the owner: Held, That the United States had the
right to remove or sell the improvements on the land so far as the
right of the owner of the land was concerned: held fu1·ther, that no
authority exists in the President or Secretary of War to sell or di po
of the property, and that application therefor should be made to Congress.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

December 22, 1891.
SrR: Your communication of December 15, 1891, submit
for an opinion several questions, which will be stated further
on, and which arise upon the following state of fact :
In October 1868, the President of the United State reserved from what he supposed to. be a part of the public
domain, a considerable area of land to be used in the Territory of New Mexico as a military reservation, and, accordingly, the military po t known as Fort Union wa e tabli hed
th re. A large amount of money was expended on thi land
in buildings and other improvements necessary for a military
po t.
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After these things had been done, it came to light that
this supposed military reservation lay within the boundaries
of a grant of' land made by the Government of Mexico to
one of its citizens prior to the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,
and embracing a district about 50 miles square.
After the conquest and the cession of New Mexico by the
treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo the said grant by Mexico was
recommended to Congress for confirmation by the Secretary
of the Interior, in pursuance of a report of the surveyorgeneral of New Mexico, under the provisions of the act of
July 22, 1854 (10 Stat., 308); and, accordingly, Congress confirmed the said grant by an act approved June 21, 1860
(12 Stat., 71).
On March 16, 1876, the Secretary of the Interior notified
the Secretary of War that the claimants of the Mora grant,
as it is called, were entitled to a patent. It is said that at
the time that notice was given the improvements which had
been put upon the land by the Government were valued at
$290,000.

On June 22, 1876, a patent for the whole Mora tract was
issued by the General Land Office to the parties shown to be
entitled to it under the grant from Mexico, confirmed by Congress.
In consequence of representations by the Secretary of War
to the Secretary of the Interior with regard to the importance
of Fort Union to the Goverm:n ent as a military post, and the
value of the improvements there, the Secretary of the Interior reconsidered the case, and recalled and canceled the
patent before it reached the parties for whom it was intended.
On August 15, 1876, another patent was issued which contained the following clause:
"The United _States herein expressly reserves to itself the
buildings and improvements situated on the Fort Union military and timber reservations· as at present established,
together with the possession and use of the same, and the
right to remove said buildings and improvements upon the
discontinuance or abandonment of said reservation by the
United States."
In other respects the second patent was the same as the
first.
On August 19, 1876, the second patent was delivered by

286

HON. W. H. H. MILLER.

Ownership of Improvements on Land-Government Propert 1,

the surveyor-general of New Mexico to Thomas B. Catron
as part owner of the claim and attorney for his co-owners with
full powers.
In the letter of the Commissioner of the General Land
Office, dated July 14, 1891~ which is an inclosure of your communication, it is stated that ''Hon. S. B. Elkins, as part
owner in the grant and attorney with Mr. Catron for co-owners, represented the case before this office in person; and not
only made no objections to the cancellation of the first, and
is1:mance of the second patent, containing said stipulation a
to the Fort Union property, but held that the maintenance
of said military post, for a time, upon said grant, would bea
benefit to the inhabitants."
It is true, as the Commissioner informs us in the same letter, that Mr. Catron protested, for himself and his co-owner ·
when he received the patent, that the United States had no
right to reserve any part of the said g~ant for its own u e'
and that it had no right or title to any part of the land covered by the grant. But no allusion whatever was made in
the said protest to the buildings and improvements at Fort
Union, or to the right claimed by the Government to remove
them.
It appears, furthermore, that since the patent was is ued
a military post has been maintained at Fort Union, and that
the United States is still in possession and control of it.
But the public interests now require that this military po t
hould be broken up and the reservation abandoned and the
right. of the Government in said buildings and improvement ~ di po ed of, and my opinion is requested on several
que tions which I will consider in their order.
1. The fir t question is, "Whether the above-mentioned
buildings and other improvements belong to the United
States, and whether they are real estate or personal property."
·
It i cl ar that the executive order establishing the re ervation, o called, and the subsequent improvements, made at
larg expense to the United State , took place under the
mi ' take of fact that the land covered by the executive ord r
form d part of the public domain, but I do not think that in
uch a a e a this the Government should be held subje
to the legal or equitable principles that would control in the
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case of an individual who has entered and erected buildings
on the land of another, believing himself to be the owner of
it. In my judgment it would be a dangerous limitation on
the rights of the United States to hold that any relief it may
be entitled to in this case must be worked out through the
law of fixtures .or the equitable principle vdth reference to
compensation for i~provements made, in good faith, by one
person on the land of another.
It seems to me safer to place the rights of the Government
in this case on the well-settled principle that it should not
be made to suffer by the !aches of its officers. As it must
operate through agents in the performance of its manifold
functions, this principle is essential to its protection. In
United States v. Beebe (127 U. S., 344) the court say "that
the United States are not * * * barred by any laches
of its officer-s, however gross, in a suit brought by them as a
sovereign Government to enforce a public right or to assert
a public interest." This passage was quoted with approbation in the subsequent case of United States v. Insley (130 U.
S., 206). Indeed, a surety in an obligation to the Government can not claim a discharge from the obligation in consequence of the laches of a public officer, although a surety
is said "to possess an interest in the letter of bis contract,"
an example which is, alone, sufficient to show that this case
must be governed by the principle invoked . . ( United States
v. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wh., 720; United States v. Van Zandt, 11
id., 184; United States v. Nicholl, 12 id., 505; Gibbons v.
United States, 8 Wall., 269; Jones v. United States, 18 id.,
662; Minturn v. Un-ited States, 106 U.S., 444; Dox v. Postmaster-General, l Pet., 318.)
I am of opinion, therefore, that, un.der this principle, the
United States had a perfect right to remove or sell the
bujldings or improvements in question, aud that the owners ·
of the Mora grant have no right whatever to those buildings
or improvements, the mistake or laches of the Government
officers who failed to ascertaiu the ownership of the so-called
re ervation being no obstacle in the way of the assertion of
the Government's right in the· premh;es.
It is unnecessary to inquire as to the effect of the recall
and cancellation of the first patent and the issuing of the
second with the reservation for the protection of the United
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States, because such reservation was, in my view, unnece·sary. Nor is it necessary to inquire whether either patent
operated to convey title, seeing that the land covered by it
had been already granted at the time of the cession and conquest.
2. The next question is, whether, if the buildings, etc., belong to the United States, the S!3cretary of War may ell
them.
I am not able to say that section 3618, Revised Statute , i~
a source of authority or anything more than a law regulating
the disposition of the proceeds of "old material, condemned
stores, supplies, or other public property,'' nor do I find any
provision of law either in the statutes proper or in the Army
Regulations in force in 1863 and adopted by Congress by the
act of July 28, 1866 (14 Stat., 332), which seems to authorize the President or tli e Senretary of War to dispose of property such as that in question. This is not remarkable, because it did not occur to Congress as possible that a case
like the one before me could occur. It seems to me, therefore, that application should be made to Congress to authorize some disposition of the public property at Fort Union.
3. The next question is based on the contingency of au
affirmative answer to the second jnquiry, whether the property at Fort Union can be sold by the Secretary of War, and
requires no answer, the second question having been
answered in the negative.
Very respectfully,
W. H.' H. MILLER.
The SEORET.ARY OF WAR, ·
DESERTER-ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
A soldier enlisted for three years August 27, 1862, who deserts between
September 27 and October 16, 1862, and enrolls October 16, 1862, for
nine months, and serves faithfully and is honorably ditwharged August
16, 1863, is then arrested as a deserter, admitted to a United States
hospital January 5, 1864, and deserts February 8, · 1864, his second
enrollment not having been made for tbe purpose of bounty or gratuity other than what he woul9- have received under the original
term of his enlistment, is barred by his desertion after his arre t in
January, 1864, from deriving advantage under the act of March 2,
1889, chapter 390.
The Attorney-General will not answer a purely hvnothetical que t ion.
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DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

December 29, 1891.
Sm: Your communication of September 19, 1891, brings to
my attention the following state of facts:
On August 27, 1862, Adam Zarn enlisted for three years
in Company B, One hundred and seventh Pennsylvania
Volunteers, and deserted somewhere between September 27
and October 16, 1862.
On October 16, 1862, Zarn enrolled for nine months in
Company B, One hundrf'd and fifty-eighth Pennsylvania
Drafted Militia Volunteers, and served faithfully with the
regiment last mentioned, and was mustered out and honorably discharged from the same August 12, 1863.
It also appears that Zarn was afterwards arrested as a
deserter January 5, 1864, and admitted to a United States
hospital February 8, 1864, and that he deserted March 12,
1864. There is no record of his further arrest or return, and
the regiment in which he owed service has long been mustered
out.
Zarn's second enrollment was not effected for the purpose
of securing "bounty or other gratuity that he would not have
beeu entitled to had he remained under his original term of
enlistment,'' except the time he was absent from the service.
Upon this state of facts have arisen the two questions following:
1. Is Zarn entitled to relief under the act of March 2, 1889
(2tj Sta,t., 8u9) 1
2. Is he entitled to relief from the first desertion by reason
of his service in the One hundred and fifty-eighth Pennsylvania Drafted Militia1
These questions may be considered together.
In my opinion, Zarn's desertion after his arrest in January,
1864, is a bar to his deriving any advantage from the act of
March 2, 1889, entitled "An act for the relief of certain
volunteers and regular soldiers of the late war and the war
with Mexico" (25 Stat., 869), which authorizes the removal
from the records of a charge of desertion standing against a
soldier in any one of the several cases enumerated in the
statute, and restores to such soldier his lost rights to pay and
bounty.
5687-V0L 20-19
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That Zi:irn, when arrested in 1864, owed service as a soldier
under his first enlistment for three years on .August 27, 1862,
does not admit of doubt. It was, therefore, desm·tion in him
to leave the service in March, 1864, after his arrest.
This final abandonment of the service by Zarn is not
condoned by anything I can discover in the act of March 2,
1889 (supra).
This answer to the first question makes the second purely
abstract and hypothetical in so far as Zarn is concerne<l, and,
therefore, is not such a question as I may answer under the
law, which restricts me to questions of law arising in the
administration of any Department (see sec. 356, Rev. Stat.).
I am unable to regard the second question as arising in Zarn's
case, and therefore as properly arising in your Department,
If you shall deem it proper to refer to me for opinion a ca e
presenting the second question now propounded, it will be
my pleasure to give it prompt attention.
I have the honor to be, yours very respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRET.A.RY OF WAR.

McKINLEY .A.CT-PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION.
The Pre itlent has not the power to issue the proclamation prodded for
in ection 3 of the act of October 1, 1890, chapter 1244, to take effect
infuturo, nor has he the power to reimpose duties on one or more of
five articles enumerated in said section but not on the other . . In the
proclamation the particular couutry on whose products the duties are
to be reimposed should be named.

DEP.A.RTMENT

JUSTICE,
J anuary 5, 1892.
Sm: Your of Jauuary 2, in which you ask three queRtion in reference to the con truction of section 3 of the act
of Congre of October 1, 1890, known as the McKinley
ct (""6 Stat., 612), is received.
ction 3, in o far as important to this inquiry, reads as
follow :
That wi h a view to se ure reciprocal trade with countrie pr lucin the followin article and for tbi purpo e
n and ft r th :fi t ay of January, eighteen huodr d and
nin ty-tw , wb
r, and o of n a the Pre id nt hall be
OF

TO THE PRESIDENT.

291

McKinley Act-President's Proclamation.

satisfied that the government of' any country producing and
exporting sugars, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides, raw and
uncured, or · any of such articles, imposes duties or other
exactions upon the agricultural or other products of the
United States, which, in view of the free introduction of
such sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and bides into the United
States he may deem to be reciprocally unequal and µnrea.
son able, he shall have the power and it shall be his duty to
suspend, by proclamation to that effect, the provisions of this
act relating to the free introduction of such sugar, molasses,
coffee, tea, and bides the production of such country for
such time as he shall deem just, and in such case and during
such suspension duties shall be levied, collected, and paid
upon sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides the product of
or exported from such designated country."
Your first question is:
" If I should find that our trade with a particular nation
is reciprocally unequal and unreasonable and should so
declare by proclamation, have I the power to make the
proclamation take effect at a future indicated day, or does
the law, of its own foree, reimpose the duties from the date
of my declaration of the fact,"
The constitutional objection made to legislation of this
character is that it is practically an attempt, by statute, to
authorize the Executive to exercise the legislative fmtction.
The answer to this objection is that the Executive is, by the
statute, required to ascertain, and by his proclamation
deelare, the facts, and that then the law authorizing the
reimposition of the duties becomes operative as the expres~ion of the legislative will. If it were to be held that the
Executive coulrl find the facts to exist at one time, but, by
his own will, could <leclare that the duties i;;bould not be
reimposed until Rome future date, to be determined by him,
the constitutional objection would not seem to be clearly met.
Moreover, upon the language of the statute, the meaning
eems not doubtful. That language is, that "whenever and ·
o often a the President shall be satisfied" that the state of
fact' calling for such action exists he shall have the power
and it shall be his duty, to suspend by proclamation, etc.
'.rbat i , it ball be hi duty then, at that time, to make such
sn pen ion. The answer to tLis que~tiou, therefore, 1 think,
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must be that you have not the power to make the proclamation to take effect at a future indicated date.
Your second question is as follows:
"As all of the articles enumerated in section 3 are to be
taken into account in considering concessions which the
Uuited States has made to secure reciprocal trade, is it
competeut for me, if I find the existing conditions of trade
with a particular nation to be reciprocally unequal and
unreasonable, to suspend by proclamation the free introduction of one or more of these articles t" * * *
It seems to me quite clear that this statute groups sugar,
molasses, coffee, tea, and hides in such a way as to be conclusive upon the President, so that when he shall be satisfied that the government of any country producing these
five articles imposes duties or other exactions upon the products of the United States which we deem reciprocally
uuequal and unreasonable he is in duty bound to suspend,
by proclamation to that effect, the statute providing for the
free in.trod uction of all of those articles from that country
into the United States. I am unable to find in the Statute
any warrant for a selection of one or more articles as subject
to reimposition of duty. The second question is therefore
answered in the negative.
Thirdly, you ask, ip. substance, whether in the proclamation the countries with which this Government has sati 'factory trade arrangements ma,y be named, and the proclamation reimposing the duties made general as to all other ,
or whether the countries imposiug duties or other exactiou '
deemed reciprocally unequal and unreasonable shall be
specifi aUy mimed in the proclamatiou, and the duties
impo d accordingly. Thi is, perhaps, a que tion of form
ratller than ubstance, but I can not doubt that the latter i
the mode contemplated by the statute. Thi i the direct
and natural cour~e. Moreover, the last line of the portion
of the t, ti.1te above q noted eems to leave no room for doubt
that the parti ular country on who e product the duties
are t b reimpo ed i. to be named. The language used is
' . uch e i<Yuat d country."
r r r
l ·tfully,
W. H. H. ITLLER.
Th
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REMOVAL OF DEPOSIT OF BALLAST.
There is no power in the Secretary of War or in the supervisor of the
harbor of New York to prevent the deposit of ballast in New York
Harbor at a, distance of more than 3 miles from the shore at low-water
mark.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

J anua.ry 6, 1892.
Sm: I have, by reference, the letter of December 23,
written by H.B. Robeson, supervisor of the harbor of New
York, to Gen. Casey, Chief of Engineers, with the indorsements, touching· the matter of the deposit of ballast outside
of New York Harbor, and at a distance of more than 3
miles from the shore at low-water mark.
You ask my opinion as to whether or not the supervisor of
the harbor or the War Department can interfere to prevent
these deposits.
In answer I have to say: I know of no statute authorizing such interference, nor of any power to so interfere in
the absence of statute. The indorsement of Col. Lieber,
Acting Judge .Advocate-General, seems to cover the subject-.
matter.
Very respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRET.A.RY OF WAR.

OCEAN

MAIL SERVICE-CONDITIONAL BIDS_:._DISCONTINUANCE OF SERVICE-CONTRACT.

Where the Government formally accepted the proposition of one party
for carrying ocean mails over route No. 11, and the offer of another
party for carrying ocean mails over routes-Nos. 31 and 32, pursuant to
the act of March 3, 1891, chapter 519: Held, that the position of the
Post-Office Department that contracts for routes 31 and 32 would not
be executed until the contract for route No. 11 had been executed and
the claim of the successful bid<ler for route No. 11 that he would not
execute the contract as to route 11 because another party had been
awarded the contract as to a route known as No. 35, claiming it had
verbally agreed that his bid as to route No. 11 was contingent on his
obtaining the contract as to route No. 35, were equally untenablo.
Section 817, Postal Laws and Regulati9ns, can not be applied to contracts
for ocean mail service under this act. The bidder to whom the contract for route No. 11 was awarded, if he really understood that hi11
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bid was contingent on his obtaining the contract for route 'o. 35, cau
not be prosecuted under section 3954, Revised Statutes, as amended
August 11, 1876. Action can be brought against him and his sureties
on his bid under Aect.ion 3945, Revised Statutes, as amended January
23, 1874, The acceptances of the Government of the bi<ls on routes
Nos. 31 and 32 constituted a contract.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 18, 1892.
Sm: It appears by your communication of January 12,
instant, and the inclosures thereof, that, in obedience to the
act of Congress of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 830), e11titled "An
act to provide for ocean mail service between the United
States and foreign ports and to promote commerce," the
Postmaster-General, by adverth,ement, invited proposals for
carrying the mails between the United States and various
other countries, and that William H. T. Hughes, of New
York, ent in proposals for carrying the mail from New York
to Buenos Ayres, Argentine Republic, being route No. 11,
and that the ew York and Cuba M~il Steamship Company,
a corporation existing under the laws of the State of New
York, sent in pro11osals for carrying the mail from New
York to Tuxpan, Mexico, by Havana, Progreso, and Tampico, etc., bein()' route No. 31, and that this ame comnany
sent in propo alR for carrying the mail from New York to
Havana, etc., being route 3~.
Th
propo. al have been formally accepted by the Postma. ter- eneral.
on ~ay, however, that "the Po trna. ter-General ha.
decli11 d to exe ute the. contract for route 31 and 32 until
tbat for route 11 ba been xecnted, it having all along been
t, t d by Hn ·he and the company he repr • nt that th r
propo ed operating tl1e thr e route together and a on
int r t no with . tan<lino- th contract for 11 was awarded
to ug-b und r hi own bid."
n h other hand, Iltwh de line to execute a contract
fi r route 11 b au. e th bid f h _ w ork and
' - La

n t b
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te_n contracts resulting from the proposals made by Hughes
~nd the company, and their acceptance by you, verbal understandings and conversations which took place before said
contracts were formed. !Dach of the said proposals was separately accepted, and stands upon an independent footing,
and the execution of the contract under any one of the said
proposals can not be made a condition to the e~ecution of the
contract under another. Indeed, it was one of the terms of
advertisement inviting proposals that "consolidated or combined bids proposing one sum for two or more routes, or offering to peiform one service on one route conditioned on the acceptance of any other bid will not be considered."

It follows, therefore, that the position taken by the PostOffice Department, that the contracts for routes 31 and 32
will not be executed until the contract for route 11 shall have
been executed, and that the position taken by Mr. Hughes
that he will not execute the contract for route 11 because the
l>id of the New York and Cuba Mail Steamship 0ornpauy for
route 35 has not IJeen acceptedcannotbesustained. Indeed,
to sustain either of these positions would be to hold that one
kind of contract might be advertised for and another kind
actually executed, at the option of the parties, thus depriving
the service of the mail/ advantages of advertising for vroposals.
'I'lte uext inquiry is whether section 817, Postal Laws and
Regulations 1887, respecting the discontinuance of mail
service and the allowance as full indemnity to the contractor
of one month's extra pay, can be applied to ocean mail service
under the act of March 3, 1891, which regulation reads as
follows:
" The Postmaster-General may discontinue or curtail the
service on any route, in whole or in part, in order to p]ace
on the route superior service, or whenever the public inter€Sts, in his judgment, shall require such discontinuance or
~urtailment for any other cause, he allowing as full indemnity to the contractor one month's extra pay on the amount
-0f services dispensed with and a pro rata compernmtion for
the amount of services retained and continued."
In my opinion, to hold that contracts for ocean mail service
unuer the act of March 3, 1801, were subject to regulation
817 would introduce an element of instability into such con-
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tracts which would tend to impair seriously the usefulness of
the act.
The act requires (section 3) that contractors for mail service
under it shall construct ships of several classes "after the
latest and most approved types, with all the modern improvements and appliances for ocean steamers," the vessels of each
class to be capable of maintaining a certain speed in ordinary
1
weather.
It also provides (section 4) that vessels of the first, second,
and third classes shall be constructed "with particular reference to prompt and economical conversion into auxiliary
naval cruisers, and according to plans and specifications to
be agreed upon by and between the owners and the Secretary of the Navy, and they shall be of sufficient strength
and stability to carry and sustain the working and operation
of at least four effective rifled cannon of a caliber of not less
than 6 inches, and shall be of the highest rating known to
maritime commerce."
It is further provided (section 9) that such steamers may
be taken aud used by the United States as transports or
cruisers upon paying their actual value at the time of taking.
Having regard now to the large amount of capital nece sary to enable a contractor under this law to furui h the
plant requi ite for executing his contract, and to the fact
that all ve sels to be built must be of a particular con truction and have a certain speed, it seems to me only rea.sonable to say that Congre s intended that a contract under thi
law should not be discontinued or modified, as indicated in
regulation 817, unless authorized by the terms of the contract
it elf.
In other words, Con~ress intended that the law governing
the ·e contracts, in the particu1ars stated, should be given by
tlle contracts themselves and not by the will of one of the
contracting partie .
Your next inquiry is in the following words: "The
D partment i al o d irous of ascertaining if, in the event
of lluo-he ' failure to execute bis co:p.tractfor routell, he can
be pr ceeded again t under Revised Statut s 3954, a
, m ntled by act of
ngress of August 11, 1876 (19 Stat.
l 0) • pem 1 y i r making traw bids.''
The provi ion of I w referred to declares "that any" per-
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son bidding for the transportation of the mails upon any route
which may be advertised to be let, and receiving an award of
the contract for such service, who shall "wrongfully refuse
or fail" to enter into a contract with the Postmaster-General
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and be punished
by a fine of not more than $5,000, and by imprisonment for
not more than twelve months.
It appears by the correspondence accompanying your communication that Mr. Hughes bases his refusal to execute a
contract for route No. 11 upon what he cla.ims to be a verbal
understanding between him and the Postmaster- General. It
is true, that officer denies the existence of any such understanding,· but if Mr. Hughes has been acting on the belief
that such an understanding was to be collected from conversations between him and the Postmaster-General that
occurred before the proposals were accepted, I do not see
how Mr. Hughes can be said to have "wrongfully'' refused
or failed to execute the contract in question. Congress
evidently meant to make a distinction between a refusal or
failure on some honest ground or reason, however bad in
point of law, and a "wrongful" refusal or failure proceeding from intentional disregard of the contract rights of the
United States.
I am next asked "if action can be brought under Revised
Statutes 3945, as amended by act of June 23, 1874, section 12
(18 Stat., 235), against the accepted bidder and his sureties,"
by which I understand you to ask whether an action will lie
against Mr. Hughes and bis sureties on the bond that accompanied his bid, and which the above legislation requires shall
accompany every bid. From the facts before me it seems
that Mr. Hughes has been guilty of a breach of the condition
of his bond.
I am asked to say whether "the fact that notice was given
of the award of routes 31 and 32 binds the Department, not_
withstanding the Postmaster-General has not yet affixed his
signature to the contracts."
In my judgment, a col}.tract between the successful bidders
for routes 31 and 32 and the United States resulted from
notice to them of the acceptance of their bids by the Postmaster-General, although he had not signed the contracts
for said routes.
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In Garjielde v. United States (93 U. S., 242, 244) this court
said '; the Court of Claims holds that the proposal on the
part of Garfielde a,nd the acceptance of the proposal l>y the
[Post-Office] Department created a contract of the same
force and effect as if a formal contract had been written out
and signed by the parties. Many authorities are cited to
sustain the proposition. We believe it to be sound, and that
it should be so held in the present case." (See also Taylor
v. 11-Ierohants' Fire Insurance Oompa.n y, ~ How., 390.)
This I believe disposes of all the questions submitted for
opinion.
Very respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL • .

PUBLIC BUILDING-JURISDICTION.
A State statute that the United States shall have over land to be taken
for a public building "the right of exclusive legislation and concurrent jurisdiction together with the State of Louisiana" is not a compliance with the act of April 26, 1890, chapter 160, requiring a cession
to the United States of jurisdiction over the site selected.
DEP AR'l'MENT OF JUSTICE,

January 25, 1 92.
SIR: On the 19th in tant you invited the attention of the
Attorney-General to the act of Congress approved April 26,
1 90 (26 Stat., 67), authorizing the Secretary of the Tr .a ury
to erect a I ublic building at Baton Rouge, La., and to procure a uitable , ite therefor. You request him to ad viRe you
wh ther tbe State of Loui iana bas complied with the requir m nt of that :tatute in it ce ion of juri. diction to the
Unit d ta,te. over the ite ahout to be purcha. ea.. Th a t
provid that payrn ut for the property el eted for tb ite
hall n t be mad until the re ipt of the written opinion of
tb
ttorn
n ral jn favor of the validity of the title to
th : it , l te 1 and 11 n the tate of Loui iana hall have
nit d tate, juri diction ov r th it select d,
urin o- th tim that the nited tate hall be or remain
th w r th r f fi r all pnrp
excepting the admini r, i n 1f th rimin 11 w f ai
tate and th ervice of
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civil process therein. The State of Louisiana, by the act of
its legislature, volume 118, page 166, approved July 6, 1882,
has provided that the United States shall have over all
property selected for the purposes of the Federal GoYernment ''the right of exclusive legislation and concurrent
jurisdiction together with the State of Louisiana" and "shall
hold the same free from aJl State, parochial, municipal, or
other taxation."
Is this cession of jurisdiction within the requirements of
the act of April 26, 1890, above referred to~
Section 355 of the Revised Statutes provides that no publie money shall be expended upon any site or land purchased
by the United States for the purpose of erecting thereon a
public building until the written opinion of the Attorney- .
General shall be had in favor of the validity of the title, or
until the consent of the legislature of the State in which the
land or site may be to such purchase has been given. The
act of the legislature of Louisiana would seem to be a compliance with section 355, but of course the special act controls the section in the general statutes in so far as it is
more restrictive. Section 355, therefore, does not aid the
discussion. By an opinion renderecl .August 13, 1891, the
Attorney-General decided that acts of the legislatures of
Kansas and Illinois, providing that the United States should
have "the right of exclusive legislation and concurrent jurisdiction" over sites selected for Federal public buildings did
not comply with a requirement of the statute that these
States sllall cede to the United States ''exclusive jurisdiction over the same during the time the United States shall
be or remain tbe owner thereof for all purposes except the
administratiou of the criminal laws of said State and the
service of eivil process therein." The only difference between
the case now presented and that upon which the AttorneyGeneral passed, in the opinion referred to, is the omission in
the Baton Rouge act of the word "exclusive." The difference does not change the construction.
The ce sion required is of jurisdiction for all purposes
except the administration of the criminal laws of the State
and the ervice of civil process therein. The exception is of
juri.·diction, which could only, under any circumstances, be
cxerci ed by the State. If the requirements were satisfied
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by a cession of concurrent jurisdiction, no such exception
would be necessary. Jurisdiction in the United States Government for all purposes, except ajurisdiction whichonlythe
State can exercise, must mean exclusive jurisdiction in the
United States with the exception named. For these rea ·on~
the cession by the State of Louisiana of jurisdiction to the
United States by the act of the legislature in 1882 is not a
compliance with the requirements of the act of Oongre.-~
authorizing the construction of the public building at Baton
Rouge.
Very respectfully, yours,
WM.H.TAFT,
Solicitor- General.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY .
.A.pproved:

W. H. H. MILLER.

APPROPRIA'I'ION-TRANSFER.
The appropriations in the act of June 14, 1880, chapter 211, and in the
act of March 3, 1881, chapter 136, were general and available for payment of damages sustained by the improvements contemplated to be
made by those acts as weJl as for the actual work of construction.
Consequently the transfer made of a portion of this appropriation to
the Interior Department, to be used in payment to Indians, wa
proper, but the act of August 19, 1890, chapter · 807, relieved the
amount so transferred from the use to which by such transfer it had
been assigned, and, unless the money has now been covered back iuto
the Treasury, the unexpended balance of the portion so transferred
can properly go back into the original fund.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 26, 1892.
Sm: By your letter of January 21 you submit for opinion
the con truction of the Jangnage of certain statutes:
Fir.·t, in the act of June 14, 1880 (21 Stat., p. 193), is an
appropriation in these words:
"For the re ·ervoirs at the bead waters of the Mis i ippi
River, to be u ed in the construction of a dam at Lake Winnibio- hi b, eventy-:five thousand dollars: Provided, That
all injuries occasioned to individuals by overflow of their
land hall be ascertained and determined by agreement or
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in accordance with the laws of Minnesota, and sha11 not
exceed in the aggregate :five thousand dollars." * * •
The act of March 3, 1881 (21 Stat., p. 481), reads as follows:
"For reservoirs upon the head waters of the Mississippi
River and its tributaries, one hundred and :fifty thousand
dollars; and this sum, together with the sum of seventy-five
thousand dollars heretofore appropriated for the construc,ion
of a dam at Lake Winnibigoshish, shall be expended at such
places on said head waters of the Mississippi River and its
tributaries as the Secretary of War shall determine: And it
is provided, That compensation for any private property .
taken or appropriated for any of said improvements, and all
damages to private property caused by the construction of
any of said dams, by :flowage or otherwise, shall be ascertained and determined under and in accordance with the
laws of the State in which such private property is situated .
.And the Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized and
directed to ascertain what, if any, injury is occasioneu to the
rights of any friendly Indians occupying any Indian reservation by the construction of any of said dams, or the cutting or the removing of trees or other materials from any
such reservation for the construction or erection of any of
said dams, and to determine the amount of damages payable
to such Indians therefor; and all .such damages to private
property and to friendly Indians, when ascertained and
determined in the manner herein directed and provided, shall
be paid by the United States: Provided, however, That such
damages shall not exceed ten per centum of the sums hereby
and heretofore appropriated for the construction of said reservoirs." * * *
Upon these statutes the question arose whether the damages
to private property resulting from any of said improvements
were to be paid out of the funds so appropriated. Assuming that they were to be so paid, you state that in 1882 the
Secretary of the Treasury transferred $15,966.90 of these
appropriations from the books of the War Department to
those of the Interior Department, for the payment of damages
of the character above described sustained by the Chippewa
Indians; that the Indians refused to accept this sum in settlement of such damages, and by act of August 19, 1890 (26
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Stat., p. 357), Congress made a further appropriation, in the
following words:
"To enable the Secretary of the Interior to pay the
Chippewa Indians of the State of Minuesota the amount of
the several sums, not hitherto paid, awarded them by commission appointed December second, eighteen hundred and
eigltty-two, for damages sustained on account of the buildiug of dams and reservoirs on Lake Winuibigoshish, Cass
Lake, and Leech Lake, one hundred and fifty thousand dollars, to be in full payment for all damages . and claims of
whatever nature on account of the construction and maintenance of such dams and reservoirs." * * *
Only $333. 73 of the $15,966.90 transferred as above having
been expended, the question now arises whether the unexpended balance of the sum so transferred may be retransfened to the War Department, and thus again become a
part of the original appropriation for the com,truction of the
reservoirs.
In m~ opinion, the appropriations of $75,000 and $150,000,
first above recited, were general and were available for the
payment as well for the property taken and damages sustained by reason of the improvements, as for the actual work
of 'uch construction. Hence the transfer of the $15,966.90
to the Interior Department for the payment of such compensation and damages was, I think, authorized by law. I think
th appropriation of $150,000 in full for such claims by the
act of 1890, operated to relieve the amount transferred from
the War to the Interior Department books from the use to
which, by uch tran ·fer, it had been assigned, aud to make
it proper that uch fund should be retransfened and become
a part of tile original appropriation from which it was taken
atl if the trau fer had never been made. The transfer of the
m n y fr m the book kept in the Treasury for the War
partm nt to tho 'e kept for the Interior Department was
a matt r of b okke ping and convenience only, upon the
b r that m uey to be paid to the Indians should ue pai<l
hr ugll he Interior Department, rather than through the
\ ar D partm nt. The nece ity for holdillg the fund in the
t rior
partment being at an end, there would seem to
b no rea on why the unexpended balance should not go
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back to tbe original fund. This is, of course, upon the supposition that the money has not been covered back into the
Treasury.
I return herewith the papers inclosed.
Uespectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRET,4-RY OF THE TREASURY.
ABSENCE ON P.A.Y.
Section 4 of the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 128, inhibits heads of Departments and the Executive fi:om granting leave of absence to Department clerks with pay and without charging th~ time against the period
of absence allowed annually by law, in every case except that of the
sickness of the clerk concerned.

DEPARTMENT

OF JUS1'ICE,
January 26, 1892.
Sm: Your letter of the 14th ultimo relatiug to the question of authority to direct or authorize leaves of absence for
Department clerks with pay and without charging the time
agaiust the annual leave of absence, bas, with the letters
inclosed therewith, received careful cousideration.
Section 4 of the act of March 3, 1883, has reference to the
service of clerks and other employes of the several Departments of the Governmeut, and the concluding paragraph
thereof (22 Stat., 564) is as follows:
" All absence from the Departments on the part of said
clerks or other employes in excess of such leave of abseuce
as may be grau ted by the heads thereof, which shall not
exceed thirty days in any one year, except in case of sickness, shall be without pay."
This enactment, which is obligatory upon all who are
vested with authority in the premises, appears to prohibit
the Executive from authorizing leaves of absence beyond
thirty days in any one year except in case of the sickness of
the clerk or employe concerned.
In Chisholm v. The United States, decided January 11,
1892, the Court of Claims considered section 4 of said act of
March 3, 1883.
It is tated in the opinion of the court, that"Prior to this legi lation the 'principal officer' in each of
the Executive Departments had full discretion in the man-
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agement of this and kindred minor matters in the Department which he administered, and leaves of absence depended
entirely upon· his discretion, exercised through the appropriate subordinates."
It is stated that the statute is " one of limitation upon a
power necessarily implied as an incident to Executive responsibility;" and that it "recognizes a privil~ge to a certain
leave of absence during the year."
Upon the question presented by your letter the court
declares that~
"The act authorizes leaves of abs~nce to be granted for
thirty days in any one year with pay; it prohibits pay for a
longer absence tt.arfthirty days in any one year (eveIJ ifleave
be properly given), but with this exception, that pay may be
given for an absence exceeding the said thirty days in any
one year when sickness is the cause of that extended
absence."
.Although the patriotic service which · has occasioned this
inquiry is one that is rightfully entitled to such favorable
consideration as can be given under the laws, yet, in view of
the phraseology of the statute, and of such constructions
thereof as have been made, it is my opinion that heads of
Departments, and the Executive of the United States, a.re,
alike, inhib1ted by the enactment from granting leaves of
absence to Department clerks with pay and without charging the time against the period of absence allowed annually
by law, in every case except that of the sickness of the clerk
concerned.
Very re pectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The PRESIDEN'l'.
OCEAN MAIL SERVICE-CONTRACT.
rhe Postmaster-General may accept a proposal from the P.acific Mail
teamship Company, the holder of a contract with the Government
for perform.in,.,. second-cl a s mail service, to perform first-class mail
ervice under the subsidy act of March 3, 1891, chapter 519, on the condition that 1f the proposal be accepted, the existing contract shall be
re. cinded, but the company should bereq uired to stipulate for the safety
of the Government that, in consideration of the above, the existing
contract shall, a.t the option of the Government, be void in case some
oth r party than the company shall be the successful bid-der for fir tclass service.

TO THE POSTMASTER-GENERAL.

305

Ocean Mail Service-Contract.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 30, 1892.
Sm: Your communication of January ~n, 1892, lays before
me for an opinion the following case and question:
"A contract has been entered into with the Paci:fi~ Mail
Steamship Company, of New York, to carry the mails of the
United States from San Francisco to Hongkong, via, Yokohama, under the provisions of an act entitled 'An act to provide for ocean maii service between the United States and
foreign ports, and to promote commerce/ approved March 3,
1891, for a term of ten years begun November 1, 1891; in
vessels of the third class for the first two years of the term,
and in vessels of the second class for the remaining eight
years of the term, being in accordance with the proposal of
the said company which was rendered in response to thePostmaster-G.en~ral's advertisement of July 15, 1891..
"The company is now desirous of performing the service
between the ports named in ve::ssels of the :first class in lieu
of those of the second class covered by the contract; and the
better servfoe would, in my judgment, be advantageous to
the public interest. A. contract for the improved service
could not, of course, be let except to the lowest bidder in
response to an advertisement to be hereafter issued. If such
an advertisement were published and the Pacific Mail Steami--hip Company should be the lowest bidder, and a contract
a warded to it in vessels of the highest class, the company
would insist that the contract for the same should include a,
provision for the annulment of the contract now in existence
for vessels of tbe lower grade. Without an understanding
that a stipulation of this kind would be included in the contract th e company would not care to bid in response to an
advertisement. It therefore becomes important to determine whether the Postmaster -General is authorized in law to
accept a proposal, and to execute a contract thereunder, which
contained a provi ~ion for the annulment of the former contract and the substitution of the other in its stead. I will
thank you t o inform me if, in your judgment, an acceptance
of thi kind and the execution of a contract accordingly
are authorized by the law."
To answer your communication in the negative would be
to place a restriction on the powers of the Postmaster5687-V0L 20-20
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General under the act of March 3, 1891, which the act does
not expressly impose, and which, if imposed by implication,
might, as tLe case submitted shows, stand sometimes in the
way of the main purposes of the ac~.
It has not been usual to treat powers to make contracts for
service:s and materials for the use of the Government as
belonging to the class of powers which, when once exercised
upon a matter, cease to have further existence as to such
matter. Instances will be found where Government officers
authorized to make contracts and contractors have rescimled
or wo<.lified contracts, or substitutecl other contraetl'\ for
those rescinded, and,,where such officers Lave waived technical
breaches of conditions by contractors (Mason v. United
States, 17 Wall., 68; Un·ited States v. Corliss Steam Engine
Co., 91 U. S., 321; United Sta,tes v. Martin, 94 U. S., 400;
United States v. Justice, 14 Wall., 535; United States v. Adams
7 Wall., 464). The effect of these cases is to establish the
general proposition that, within varying limits, officials
invested with authority to bind the Government by contract
have more or less power, after making a contract, to rescind
or affect it in some way by supplemental agreement with the
contractor.
Congress must be supposed to have been acquainted with
the ca es and the well-established practice in which this
principle ha been recognized, and, it may be pre urned,
would have imposed some express restriction on the
Po tma ter-General as to the re:sci ion of contracts if it had
in tended that that officer should be governed by some stricter
principle.
I think, therefore, that the Postmaster-General may accept
a propo al from the Pacific Mail Steamship Company to perform fir t-cla s ocean mail service on the route above mention d under the u bsidy act of March 3, 1891, depending
on the condition that, if the proposal should be accepted,
th xi ting contract between that company and the Po tma -t r-General for ocean mail 'ervice under the ame act
hall be re cinde , and that the Po tmaster-General may
exe ute a formal contract in furtherance of uch accepted
prop al.
u b fore nch a a.rrahuem nt
safi y to the overnment it will
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Pacific Mail Steamship Company should stipulate with the
Po tmaster-General that in consideration of the premises
the existing contract between them for ocean mail service
shall be null and void, at the option of the PostmasterGeneral, in case some other person or corporation than the
Pacific Mail Steamship Company should be the successful
bidder for first-class service on the said route under the
subsidy act.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL.

LAND GRANT-FORFEITURE.
In the absence of any action on the pa.rt of Congress declaring forfeiture
or directing suit, the Attorney-General is not warranted in instituting
proceedings to recover to the United States the title and possession
of the land granted by section 19 of the a.ct of March 3, 1877, chapter 108.
DEPAR'l'MENT OF JUSTICE,

February 2, 1892.
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication, bearing date October 2, 1891, calling my
attention to the grant made by the United States to the
county of Garland in the State of Arkansas by section 19
of the act of March 3, 1877 (19 Stat., 380), and to the acts
performed and proceedings had in relation to such grant and
the lands set apart in pursuance thereof. You refer to the
opinion given by Mr. Attorney-General Garland, October 7,
188{> (18 Opin., ~64), and to the decision in State v. Baxter
et al. (3 Ark., 462), and request an exa.mination with a view
to a recon~ ideration, etc., and suggest that proceedings be
in tituted to recover to the United States the title and possesion of the lands designated under said section 19.
The section cited is as follows:
"SEC. 19. That a suitable tract of la.nd, not exceeding five
acres, shal1 be laid off by said commissioners, and the same
i. hereby granted to the county of Garland in the State of
.Arkan a,' as a site for the public building of said county:
Provided, That the tract. of ]and hereby granted shall not be
taken from the land re., rved herein for the use of the United
tate ."
SIR:
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It appears that June 23, 1879, the Hot Springs commission set apart 3-/020- acres, the same being block No.114 of the
city of Hot Springs, and ordered that such tract should be
"dedicated as the land granted by the United States to the
county of Garland * * * as the site for a public building."
The county never has occupied any of said land, but has
located its court-house and jail at a considerable distance
therefrom.
It appears that in January, 1880, the county judge of Garland County assumed t.o lease said land from said county to
Baxter and Moore for a term of ninety-nine years for a total
reutal of $1,025, and these lessees entered into possession
and subdivided the lot and sublet considerable portions
thereof to innocent parties, who expended considerable sums
of money in building upon and improving the same. ·
January 15, 1881, suit was brought in the name of the
State of Arkansas for the use of Garland County against
Baxter and Moore and their sublessees and the sa.id county
judge, to obtain to the county the exclusive title to and
po se, ion of said 1and. The circuit court of Garland County
sustained a demurrer to the amended bill :filed, "for want of
proper parties plaintiff," but the supreme court of the State
(38 Ark., 462) at its May term, 1882, reversed this ruling
and rem anded the case for further proceedings.
It is stated that said court, since making the above decision,
ha declared said lease to be a fraud upon Garland County
and ha et the same a ide.
Following this decision, January 2, 1890, a :final decree
wa ntered in the circuit court of the State declaring the
county to be the owner of block 114 and adjudging the Jea e
void, and carr ing ajudgment against aid county and in
fa or of owner, of improvements for 6,144.89, and giving
these occupants tbe right to hold the land m1til they are repaid by rent or otberwi, e.
aid county i i en judgments against other parties for
rent. aggreg ting "",385. 74.
Tak:in · into onsideration the phraseology of the granting
a th a tion taken thereunder, the proce ding bad in the
tat c urt a d th compli ations existfo g between the
th
ant , and giving due att ntion to th
in the opinion of Mr. A torney-Gen-
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era.I Garland (supra), it is my opinion that in the absence
of any action on the part of Congress declaring forfeiture or
directing suit I am not warranted in instituting proceedings to recover to the United States the title and possession
of the lands granted by section 19 of the act of 1877.
Very respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SEORETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

REWAREHOUSlNG.
The act of March 28, 1854, section 3000, Revised Statutes, strictly construed, does not authorize repeated warehousing, but where merchandise has been rewarehoused in conformity with the regulations and
practice of the Department the action of the owner can not be
declared unauthorized.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 6, 1892.
Sm: I have received your letter of the 18th of December,
requesting an opinion as to the construction of section 5 of
the act of March 28, 185! (10 Stat., 272), as in part set forth
in section 3000 of the Revised Statutes.
The case stated arises upon certain casks of domestic
whisky exported to Europe, imported therefrom, entered for
warehousing at New York, withdrawn for transportation to
Louisville and rewarehoused there, and sometime subsequently returned to New York and rewarehoused at that
port.
The question involved is whether the law authorizes imported merchandise to be rewarehoused repeatedly in different districts, or whether the force of the statute is spent by
one withdrawal from a bonded warehouse and transportation
to a warehouse in another district and a rewarehousing
thereat.
It i understood that the general regulations of the Treasury Department have always conceded to importers the privilege of repeated rewarehousing under the law, and that the
common practice has been in accord with the regulations.
The act of March 2, 1799 (1 Stat., 627), which is·" An aet
to regulate the collection of duties," etc., provides that imported merchandise may be transported from one collection
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di 'trict to another to be exported, with the benefits of dra,r ba,ck; a,ud safeguards are prescribed to protect the United
States in the proceeding.
Section 2 of" An act to establish a warehou~ing system,"
etc., passed August 6, 1846 (9 Stat., 54), provides: "That
any goods when deposited in the public stores in the manner provided * * * may be withdrawn therefrom and
tran ported to any other port of entry uuder the restrictions
provided for in the act of the 2d of March, 1799, in re. pect
to the transportation of goods * * * from one collection
district to another to be exported;" • * * and the owner
is required to give his bond for the deposit of the goods '' in
store in tlle port of en try to which they shall be destined."
The act of 1854 (supra) is "An act to extend the warehonsi n g system," etc., and provides in section I for the storage
of merchandise "which Hhall have been duly entered and
bonded for wareltou ing," and the "place of storage [is] to
be designated on the warehouse entry at the time of entering
such merclia11clise at the custom-house."
By ·ection 5 the merchandi e "may be withdrawn under
bond without payment of duties" aud transported to a
bonded warehouse in any other collection district "and
rewal'ehou ed thereat," aud provi ·ion is made for a designation by the Secretary of the Treasury of the routes over
which "such good ' , wares, or merchandise, may be o tran p rt cl to their de tination."
Thi enactmeut, so far as applicable, is codified as follow :
EC. 3000. Any merchandise, duly entered for warehou ing, may be withdrawn under bond, without payment of the
dutie~, from a bonded warehouse in any collection di trict
and be trnu 'port d to a bonded warehou e in any other coll cti n di. ·tri ·t, and rewarehoused thereat; and any uch
mer bandi may l, o tran ·1 orted to it. de tination wholly
by laud, or who1ly by water, * * * ov r uch route a ·
th
·r tary of the Trea ury may pre cribe." • • •
othing i found in ith r na tm 11t whi h, in t rm or
n
ar;v irnpli atiou authoriz ," a third or a e ·ond
re ar h u ing- r a .· · ud or furtli r <l . tinatiou of th merChe D li Ul ll whieh b
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th

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

311

Bonds-Partners-Po,ver of Attorney.

rnent, therefore he was justified in rewarehousing a second
time. The fact should be noted also, although it is not necessary to determine its consequence, that in this instance the
merchandise was not sent to a new district; it was returned
for warehousing where it was originally entered.
It is my opinion that as the merchandise designated in
your inquiry was rewarehoused in conformity with the regu•
lations and practice of the Department, the action of the
owner can not now be declared unauthorized.
It is my opinion that the statute, strictly construed, does
not authorize repeated re warehousing. A continuance of the
practice as new cases may arise must depend upon executive
direction, and the legal effect of a change in the procedure,
should one be made after this long period of practical construction, is a judicial question which can only be determined
by the courts.
Very respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

BONDS-PARTNERS-POWER OF ATTORNEY.
If a, power of attorney signed by the individual members of a firm as
well as in the firm name confers explicit authority upon one of its
members to use the partnership name in signing entries and executing,
certain customs bonds, acts performed in compliance with such authorization are obligatory upon the firm.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTIOE,

Febru,ary 9, 1892.
Sm: Your letter of the 21st ultimo, relating to the execution of certain custom-house bonds, is received.
You state that complaint is made that at the port of Baltimore the attorney of a firm is compelled to sign the individual name of each partner to the entry and to each of the
several bonds required, while at the port of New York the
attorney of a firm is permitted to use the "partnership name
in 'igning entries and executing bonds, the power of attorney filed with the collector being signed by each member of
the firm individually as well as for the firm."
You call my attention to the act of June 20, 1876 (19 Stat.,
60), and to Synop, is No. 9238.
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The act of June jO, 1876, is iu effect a reenactment of the
first clause of section 25 of the act of March 1, 1823. (3
Stat., 737.)
It does not in terms extend beyond bonds given for the
payment of duties and can not be rested upon as authorizing a partner or attorney to bind the partnership by signing
the firm name to documents other than those specified in the
statute.
The rule referred to in Haid synopsis, that one partner has
no implied authority to bind his copartners by executing a
bond in the firm name, is well established.
It can not be said, however, that the partners constituting
a firm are powerless to authorize one of their number, or
another proper person, to bind the partnership by executing
a bond to be used in the transaction of its business.
The inhibition of the common law rule referred to is against
an implied power in one partner to execute the instrument
without specific authority.
I have not a copy of the power of attorney in use in New
York before me, but if full and explicit authority to make
the entries and to sign the bonds in question in the firm
name i specified, and the instrument is duly executed "by
each member of the firm individually as well as for the firm,"
and filed with the collector, it must, in my opinion, be held
that aet performed in compliance with such authorization
are obligatory upon the firm.
Very respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY •
..A.TTORNEY-GENERA.L-CIYIL SERVICE COMMISSION.
The question whether the Civil Service Commission shall jesue a certificate for r einstatement of an officer of the Treasury Department is
not a que tion ari ing in the admini tration of the 'l'reasury Depart ment, and not, therefore, a que tion upon which it would be proper
for the ttorney- n ral to expre s a.n opinion at the request of the
ecr tary of the Treasury .
DEP ..A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 9, 1 92.
lett r f the 22d ultim you a ked the opinion
of the
tt rn - eneral upon the u tion wheth r the
Civil ervice Com.mi ion h uld i ue a
r iftcate for the
IR:

By

TO THE SECRETARY OF ~HE TREASURY.

313

Attorney-General-Civil Service Commission.

reinstatement of one J. H. Wilkinson, formerly a clerk in
your Department, under amen<led civil service rule 10. The
Commission have declined to issue such a certificate on the
ground that he is not eligible under the rule mentioned.
The rules of the Civil Service Commission are established by
the Commission, with the approval of the President. It is
their duty under the law to execute those rules, and in the
execution of them necessarily to construe them. The Civil
Service Commission is not included within any of the great
Departments of Government-it is an independent bureau.
The question whether the Commission shall isi:me a certificate ·
for the reinstatement of an officer of your Department is
not a question arising in the administration of your Depart·m ent, and is not, t:Jierefore, a question upon which it would
be proper for the Attorney-General to express an opinion at
your request. The question is ·one which perhaps affects
the administration of your Department, but it js not one
which you, as the bead of the Department, are calle<l upon to
decide in its administration. The Civil Service Commission
is independent of your Department. Many of your appointments are made by law to· depend upon its decision, which
you can not control or review. Until the Commission shall
request the President, to wbom they are directly responsible,
to present the question of law arising in th.e discharge of
their duties to the Attorney-General, he is not called upon
to give, and should not under the law give, his opinio.n. It
is true that questions of this kind, with reference to the
action of the Civil Service Commission, have been answered
by the Attorney-Geueral when the questions were submitted
by the beads of Departments (19 Opin., 434, 533), but the
question of the right of the head of the Departments to have
an opinion from the Attorney-General was not raised or considered in those cases.
Very respectfully,
WM. H. TAFT,

Solicitor- General.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY .

.Approved:

W. H. H. MILLER.
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COAL FOR USE OF GOVERNMENT-IMPORTATION.
Bituminous coal imported for the use of the Government is dutiable
under paragraph 432 of the tariff act of October 1, 1890, chapter 1244.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 9, 1892.
SIR: Replying to your letter of the 30th ultimo, requesting
an expression of the opinion of the Attorney-General on the
question whether coal, if bituminous, imported for the use of
the United States marshal's office at Sitka, Alaska, is
dutiable under the act of October 1, 1890, paragraph 432, I
have the honor to state that in my opinion such coal is
dutiable. In the tariff act of 1874, Revised Statutes, section 5, page 483, there was a provision that all articles
imported for the use of the Government should come in free.
This was part of the free list of the tariff act of 1874. In
the tariff act of March 3, 1883, under paragraph 645, in the
free list of that act, a similar provision was made. No such
provision is contained in the free list of the act of October
1, 1890. The omission of such a provision, in view of the
previous legislation, would seem to show nece, sarily the
intention of Congress not to exclude from the operation of
the act al'ti le imported for the benefit of the United States.
V ry re pectfully,
WM.H.TAFT,
Solicitor- General.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
Approved:

W. H. H. MILLER.
.ATTORNEY-GENER.AL.
The Attorney-General is not authorized to give an opinion on a que tion
judicial in charact r.

DEP.A.RT IBNT OF J

TICE,

F ebruary 11, 1892.
ation of ~ ebruar 9 iu tan t and the

mpany to con tru a dam
purpo
of irrigati n.

TO 'l'HE POSTMASTER-GENER.AL.

315

Credit-Postal Funds.

The Yakima River is one of the boundary streams of the
Yakima Reservation, and you desire to know whether, i.n my
opinion, the construction of the dam in question, which is now
in course of being built, will be an invasion of the rights of
the Indians residing on said reservation, as the same are
guaranteed by the treaty of June 9, 1885. (12 Stat., 951.)
I do not perceive that the question presented is one that
arises in a matter before the Department of the Interior
which you must pass upon, for I apprehend that the Secretary of the Interior bas no authority to settle the question
which has arisen between the Indians and the irrigation compauy. That question is esGentially judicial in character, and
must be determined by the courts.
It has been repeatedly held by my predecessors that the
.Attorney-General has no authorityto give an opinion in such
a case. (1 Opin., 5 75; 3 ib., 368; 9 ib., 421; 10 ib., 50, 122,
220; 13 ib., 160.)
I regret, therefore, to say that I have no power to give the
opinion requested.
Very respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRET.ARY OF THE INTERIOR.

CREDIT.-POST.AL FUNDS.
The act of September 30, 1890, chapter 1126, is mandatory, and compels
the Postmaster-General to credit the sum named in the act on the
accounts of the postmaster named therein.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 15, 1892.
Sm: By letter of the 27th ultimo you requested the .Attorney-Genera] to advise you what ;:i,ction you should take under
the following provision in the deficiency appropriation act of
eptember 30, 1890 (26 Stat., 525):
"That the proper officers of the Post-Office Department
are hereby authorized and directed to credit in the account
of 0. M. Laraway, late postmaster at Minneapolis, Minn., the
um of 11,115.38, being the valne of certain postal funds
which were tolen from the safe in said post-office ·on the 8th
day of July, 18"l6, without the fault of said postmaster."
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The facts upon which this action of Congress was founded
are as foilows:
On the night of July 8, 1886, the post-office at Minneapolis
was entered by burglars, who stole therefrom postage stamps
amounting in value to $15,330. The loss was not due to any
fault or negligence on the part of the postmaster. On January 6, 1887, the claim for a credit by the postmaster was
transmitted to Congress by the Postmaster-General, as
required by the acts of March 7, 1882, and May 9, 1888, with
the recommendation that the credit for the amount above
mentioned be authorized. Pending the consideration of the
claim by Congress, postage stamps of the value of $4,115.62
were recovered from the burglars and returned to the Department and credit therefor allowed to the postmaster. This
fact was communicated by the Postmaster-Geueral to the
House of Hepresentatives December 18, 1889, with a recommeudation that a credit should be authorized i11 the post ma ter's account for the difference between the amount
tolen and the amount recovered, which was $11,214.38.
The provision in the deficiency _a ppropriation act, quoted
above, was made in view of this recommendation.
You state that your Department has held that there was
a manifest misapprehensiou of the facts on the part of Congress in authorizing an allowance for property which had
not been tolen , namely, postal funds, and that it would be
improper and illegal to allow credit for such property; and
that on the other hand the language of Congress above
quot d confi r no authority to allow credit for the post age
t amp which w re tolen.
I can not concur in this view. The only theft which
occurred on the day mentioned from the po t-office at Minne- ·
apolis was of postage stamps. It wa thi theft, unquestionabl , from which Congress intended to save the po tma ter barmle . Ther i no doubt as to the identity of
the tran action. The term Ci po tal fund ," nuder the cirt n
i wide enou h to include po tage tamps.
r thi
true or no , the Ian ag of the statute
i mand
r .
o di r ion i left to you or b officers of
I ar m nt to ra t r wi hhoid the redit therein pronr
th e r
mmand of Congress,
v i l cl fc r.
ar ntir ly pr tected. It i not
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for you to find the fact under this act. Congress has found
the facts, and reciting them lays down your duty. The Government also is entirely protected. No doubt exists that
Congress intended to relieve Mr. Laraway from the loss occasioned by the burglary on the night of the day mentioned.
The identity of the loss referred to is not doubtful, nor is the
amount in dispute. One payment of it secures the Goverument.
Whether, when Congress, acting on a palpable mistake of
fact, has directed an officer to allow credits or pay money to
persons not in any way entitled to the same, such officer may
delay obedience to the mandatory language of the statute
until he can submit the evidence of the mistake to that body
for its correction is ·not here decided, because the facts of
the case do not require it. Mr. Laraway is ~ntitled in equity
to this credit. Congress bas ordered that it shall be allowed
to him. A mere misdescription in a recital is no ground for
delay in obeying the command of Congress.
The fact that the credit allowed by Congress lacks about
$100 of the actual loss is ground for an appeal by Mr. Laraway to Congress for an additional allowance, but certainly
constitutes no ground for refusing to accord the partial relief
given him under this act.
Very respectfully,
WM. H. TAFT,
Solicitor- General.
The POSTMA.STER-GENERAL.
Approved:
W. H. H. MILLER.
TREASURY NOTES-UNITED STATES NOTES.
The Treasury notes authorized to be issued in payment for silver bullion
by the act of July 14, 1890, chapter 708, are not receivable on deposit
in exchange for the currency certificates authorized by the act of June
8, 1872, chapter 346.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 15, 1892.
Sm: Your letter of February 10, 1802, asks an opinion
upon the point whether the Treasury notes authorized to be
issuod in payment for silver bullion by the act of July 14,

318

HON. W. H. H. MILLER,
Trllasury Notes-U nited States Notes,

1890 (26 Stat., 289), are receivable on deposit i~ exchange
for the currency certificates authorized by the act of June
8, 1872 (17 Stat., 336). In other words, I am asked whether
Treasury notes issue<l t~nder the act of1890 are" United States
notes" within the meaning and for the purposes of the act of
June 8, 1872.
At the. time the act of June 8, 1872, was passed that part
of the currency of the country called United States notes
consisted of notes issued on the credit of the United States
under the acts of Fel,ruary 25, 1862 (12 Stat., 345), July 11,
1 G2 (ib., 532), and March 3, 1863 (ib., 709)~ andJ as you inform
me, these notes are still outRtanding to the amount of about
346,000,000.
Tb e first section of the act of June 8, 1872, now section
5193, Redsed Statutes, provides as follows:
"Tbat the Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized
to receive United States notes on deposit, without interest,
from national banking a ·sociations, in sums not less than ten
thousi.and dollar , and to issu certificates therefor in such
form as the ec1·etary may prescribe, in denominations of
not le tl1an five thou, and dollars, which certificates shall
b payable on demand in United States notes, at the place
wl1ere the d po it were made."
The act of July 14, 1890 (section 1 ), authorizes the Secretary of the Trea, ury to purchase a certain amount of silver
bul1ion in each month, and to is ue in payment therefor
"Tr a nry notes of the United State to be prepared by the
~ r tary of the Trea ury, in such form and of uch denomination not le than one dollar nor more than one thou and
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and when so received may be reissued; and such notes, when
held by any national banking association, way be counted
as a part of its lawful reserve."
The fact that the act of July 14, 1890, has, as yon suggest,
placed the" Treasury notes" issued under it substantially
on the same footing as "United States notes," but has not
called them such, seems to be a stro11g circumstance to show
that Congress did not use these well-known terms synonymously.
The term "Treasury notes" has been generally employed
by Congress from an early period to designate interest-bearing notes of the United States, something intermediate
between the currency and the funded debt of the United
States, and it does not appear probable that Congress would
have designaterl. the notes issued under the act of 1890 as
"Treasury notes " if it had intended them to be the same, in
all particulars, as '' United States notes." Such an indiscriminate use of terms which had been thr.retofore kept distinct, for the most part, can hardly be attributed to Congress.
I am confirmed in this view by the fact that in section 2 of
the act of 1890 Congress provides, as we have seen, that the
"Trea ury notes" authorized to be issued byit may be counted
as a part of the lawful reserve of any national banking association; for if it had been intended that the "Treasury notes"
should be identical with the'.' lawful money of the United
States," that is to say, coin or United States notes, of wbicli
alone national-bank reserves can be composed under section ·
5191, Revised Statutes, there would have been no more
nece ity for the provision in question than if the act of 1890
bad authorized an additional issue of United States notes.
But to my mind, the strongest reason for denying to
national banking as ociations the right to exchange these
"Trea 'ury notes" for certificates of deposit, under the act of
1872, is that the power of the Secreta.ry of the Treasury,
under that act, is to issue such certificates in exchange for
"United States notes," no other kind of notes being mentioned.
·
It may have been that Congress· refrained from extending
to national banking as, ociations the privilege of exchanginO' tho e ''Trea. ury notes" for certificates of deposit, by
enlarging the scope of the act of 1872, under the apprehen-
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sion that to do so would tend to defeat the purpose of the act
of 1890, to increase the volume of the circulating medium of
the country. To receive $10,000 in small Treasury notes and
issue therefor a single certificate would tend to a contraction,
rather than an enlargement of the ordinary circulation of
currency.
Very respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

LOCATION OF PUBLIC BUILDING.

While the Secretary of the Treasury has the power to erect the public
building to be built in the city of Portland, Oreg., at any point within
the present limits of that city, yet it is more in accord with the intent
of the act of January 24, 1891, chapter 91, to select the location in the
limits of said city as they existed at the time that statute was passed.
DEPARTMENT OF JUS1'IOE,

February 19, 1892.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the
letter of Acting Secretary Spaulding of February 16, in
which it is tated that: "By act of Congress, approved J anuary 24, 1891, the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized
to 'acquire a site and cause to be erected thereon a suitable
buil<ling for the use and accommodation of the custom-house
and other Government offices, in the city of Portland and
tate of Oregon.' "
The letter further states that: "At the date of the enactment of this -= tatute the city of Portland was located on the
we t bank of the Willamette River, and at the same date
th re wa the city of East Portland and the city of Albina,
on tb oppo ite ide of the river. Each of these citie had
it own ity government, post-office, etc. Ha t Portland had
pulation in exc s of 10,000, and Albina a population in
of 5, 0. Since January 24, 1891, these latter-named
have by proper legal proces , become parts of the city
ortlan ."
Y n a k my opinion upon the que tion whether, "ln the
1 ti n of the ite nth riz d by the above tatute is the
ret· ry of the Trea n.ry limited to a, selection within the

TO THE POSTMA,STER-GENERAL.

321

Ocean Mail Serylee-Con tract-Surette s.

boundaries of the city of Portland as they existed at the
time of the passage of the act, or as they now exist or may
exist at the time when the authority conferred by said act is
exercised."
In answer, I have to say, as a matter of strict law, I think
that the Secretary has the power to locate the public building at any point within the present limits of the city of
Portland. Congress, in enacting the statute making the
appropriation, must be held in law to have contemplated
that the boundaries of the city might be changed before the
location should be made, and that thereby the location of
the building might be affected.
In my opinion, therefore, the location of the building iu
what was formerly Albina, or East Portland, or, for that
matter, in the remotest corner of the remotest addition
within the city limits, would not as a matter of strict law
be objectionable. At the same time, it is clear that Congress, in enacting this statute and making the appropriation, had in contemplation the location of the building in
the city of Portland proper, having then a population of
nearly 50,000 people, rather than in one of these suburbs.
To so locate the building would be not only within the law
but witbiu the pla,in intent-as matter of fact, not merely
as matter of law-of Congress at the time the statute was
enacted.
Very respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
P. S.-The two inclosures accompanying your letter are
returned herewith.

OCEAN MAIL SERVICE-CONTRACT-SURETIES.
Where a contract has been entered into with a party for foreign mail
service f'>r a term of ten years under the act of March 3, 1891, chapter
519, it would not be competent to make a new contract with that same
party for :five years in lieu of the ten years unless the party procured the
same by new bidding after due advertisement, and any change in the
terms of the contract between the parties releases the sureties on said
contract from subsequent liability.

.
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DEP A.R'.l'MEN'.l' OF JUS'l'ICE,

February :.!O, 1892.
SIR: By letter of the 16th instant the Acting PostmasterGeneral requested the opinion of the Attorney-General upon
the question whether it is competent for you, having entered
into a contract for service with the New York and Cuba Mail
Steamship Company under '' the act to provide for ocean mail
service between the United States and foreign ports and to
promote commerce," approved March 3, 1891, by whid.1 the
company has agreed for ten years to carry the mail ou certain designated routes at certain prices, to ·change the contract by agreement with the compauy so that the term thereof
shall be five years instead of ten, and secondly whether,if
such change is made, it would release the sureties upon the
original contract.
The first q uestioo is not free from donbt; but, in view of the
strictly competitive letting enjoined by the act, the safer
opinion is that the chauge in the term is such a material
change in the contract as to require new advertisements ancl
a new letting.
It would therefore not be competent for you to make a
new contract witb. the New York and Cuba l\Iail Steamship
Company for five yea.rs, unle ·s the company procured the
same by new bidding after due advertisement.
The second q ue tion i freer from doubt. Any change of
the contract between the parties releases the suretie from
sub equ nt liability.
Very respectfully,
WM. H. TAFT,
Solicitor- Genera.l.
The Po, 'TM.A.STER-GENERAL •
.Approved:
W. H. H. MILLER.
PEX IO T-ENLI TED fA

T.
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Jl!Iarch l, 1892.
SIR: IR your letter, received by me on the 16th of February last, you make, in substance, the following statement of
facts:
June 15, 1863, the President of the United States, by proclamation, called upon the executive of the State of Pennsylvania for 50,000 volunteers, to serve for six months, unle~s
sooner discharged; and on the same day the governor promulgated said call to the people of the State by General
Order No. 43. In response to this call those persons who
afterwards constituted the Forty-seventh Regiment of Pennsylvania Militia did volunteer. They enlisted; the regiment
was duly organized, and its members were, as they supposed,
regularly mustered into the service of the Unit~d States.
As a matter of fact they were not so mustered into the
United States service. The regiment was, however, actually
engaged in t,he service of the United States, under the command of a general officer of the U. S. Army, acting under
direct orders from tlie War Department at Washington.
This service was mainly rendered outside the State of Pennsylvania, and continued for the period of three monthR.
Randolph M. Manley was a member of Uompany I of such
regiment, and while so in the service with bis regiment, iu
the line of his duty outside the State of Pennsylvania, he
incurred the disability (sunstroke) on account of which he was
granted a pen ion. The payment of this pension having
been suspe11ded, the question presented is whether he was
iu the military service of the United State~ in. such a sense
a to give him a pensionable status under section 4693 of the
Revised Statutes.
The first three subdivisions of that section describing the
per ons entitled to pensions-being the only portions pertaining to this que::stion-read as follows:
"First. Any officer of the Army, including regulars, volunteers, and militia, or any officer in the Navy or Marine
Corps, or any enlisted man, however employed, in the military or naval service of the United States or in its Marine
Corp , 'whether regularly' mustered or not, disabled by
r~a. on of any wound or injury received, or diRease con-
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tracted, while in the service of the United States and in the
line of duty.
"Second. Any master serving on a gun boat, or any pilot,
engineer, sailor, or other person not regularly mustered,
serving on any gunboat or war vessel of the United States,
disabled by any wound or injury received, or otherwise
incapacitated, while in the line of duty, for procuring his
subsistence by mutual labor.
"Thir·d. Any person not an enlisted soldier in the Army,
serving for the time being as a member of the militia of any
State, under orders of an officer of the United States, or
wlio volunteered for the time being to serve with any regularly organized military or naval force of the United States,
or who otherwise volunteered and rendered service in any
engagement with rebels or Indian8, disabled in consequence
-0f wounds or injury received in the line of duty in such
temporary Rervice. But no claim of a State militiaman, or
nonenlisted person, on account of disability from wounds, or
injury received in ba,ttle with the rebels or Indians, while
temporarily rendering service, shall be valid unless pros
ecuted to a successful issue prior to the fourth day of July,
eighteen hundred and seventy-four."
In the .first line of the .first of these subdivisions the word
"army," as u ed in relation to the word '' officer," is defined
to include ''regulars, volunteers, and militja." In my opinion
the words "mllitary service" are equally broad in their relation to the term "enli ted man," as used in the third line.
In other words, the .first subdivi ion includes an enlisted man
in the" military , ervice," whether be bein the regulars, volunteer , or militia," however employed." But the word "militia"
i very comprehen ive. It includes the entire reserveforees
of the tate or nation ubject to military duty. Ordinarily
it covers all able-bodied male citizen between the age of 18
and 45, and f c ur e include the enli ted as well as the nonenli ted militia.
In my opi11i n b di tinction b tween the cla e.' cover d
th fir t, nd th tbirct ub livision fthi, ection is found
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some definite status; while the third subdivision covers the
unenlisted militia or other persons; that is, those who may
never have been enlisted or in any manner regularly organized for or received into such service, but who. nevertheless,
as need requires, do volunteer and as "minutemen" render
to the Government acceptable "temporary service." To
illustrate: In my opinion Mr. Manley, a regularly enlisted
member of Company I~ of the organized Forty-seventh Regiment of Pennsylvania Militia, is of the class covered by the
:first subdivision; and "Old John Burns of Gettysburg,"who
left his home and served t,h rough the battle without any legal
connection with any company or regiment of the Army, except
that he obeyed orders and fought for his country like a soldiei;,
is an extreme illustration of the class covered by the third
subdivision. This view is, to my mind, confirmed by a number of considerations:
First. It is incredible that Congress should, by thi~ first
subdivision, have intended that an officer of the militia
should be pensionable, while an enlisted man, incurring a
disability under the same circumstances, should not.
Second. The first subdivision covers militia, "whether
regularly mustered or not." The third subdivision says
nothing about "muster." The use of the word "muster"
at all ordinarily implies an antecedent enlistment. The
fact that the word is used in the first subdivision, and not
in the third, therefore indicates that the first subdivision
has reference to the enlisted or organized militia, and the
third to the unorganized militia or other persons.
Third. It is unreasonable to suppose that Congress would
have been less liberal in the matter of pensions to enlisted
militiamen than to "other persons not regularly mustered"
serving upon gunboats, covered by the second division.
Fourth. With reference to persons volunteering simply
as minutemen for temporary service, without organic connection with the Army, it is reasonable to suppose that
Congress would be more exacting as to the origin of the
disability giving a party a pensionable s_tatus; and, accordingly we find that as to such persons, covered by the third
subdivision, the disability must be "in consequence of
wounds or injury received in the line of duty of 8uch temporary service." In other words, it does not cover incapacity
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re 'ulting from '' disease" contracted in such service. Moreover, the same restrictive policy is further carried out by
the last clause of the third subdivision, providing that no
claim for disabi]ity from "wounds or injury received in
battle" by one of such unorganized volunteers sllall be
valid unless prosecuted to successful issue before July
four, eighteen seventy-four.
For these reasons, in my opinion, Mr. Manley was an enlisted man within the meaniug of the :first subdivision of
section 4G03.
All papers are herewith returned.
Very respectfully,
W. H. II. l\1ILLER.
The 8ECRE1'A.RY OF THE INTERIOR.

ROCK CREEK PARK-PRWE OF LAND-POWER
PRESIDENT.

OF THE

Where an appropriation for acquiring title to land for a public park is
limite<l to $1,?00,000, and the law requires the President to decide
that the prices to be paid for various parcels of land are rea onable,
and tlrn couuni sion appointed by the act has presented for his
decision a r port of appra.isers in condemnation that would ma,ke the
cost of the park on iderably exceed that aruount, it would not be
lawf'nl for the President to decide that the prices as snbmitted are
rea onable.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

111rtrch 3, 1892.

Sm: The commis ioners appointed by you under .an act
entitled'' n a ·t authorizing the establi, hiug of apublicpark
in the istri t of Columbia," approved
ptember 27 1 90,
(2 tat. 49""), have pre ented to you a report of the proe cling had under the t art and now in ite action by you
h r n.
ou hav ran mitted th report to tbe Attorneyview upon your power t act in the
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erty to be taken for the purpose mentioned, and that the
prices for the different parcels thereof were determined by
said commission, with your approval, and submitted to the
owners thereof for acceptance, the aggregate of these prices
being about $830,000. A few owners accepted the sums
thus offered, but the larger number declined to do sq. Thereupon the commission, in accordance with the provision of the
act contained in the second clause of the third section, made
application to the supreme court of the District of Columbia,
by petition, for an assessment of the value of such lands as
it had been unable to purchase. The court, in accordance
with the next clause, appointed three competent and disinterested appraisers to assess the values of the lands selected.
The appraisement was had, and was returned to the supreme
court of the District of Columbia, which has approved the
same. The law, after directing the return of the appraisement to the court, provides as follows:
"And when the value or values of such land are thus
ascertained, and the President of the United States shall
decide the same to be reasonable, said value or values shall
be paid. to the owner or owners, and the United States shall be
deemed to have a valid title to said land."
The commission have presented to you, for your decision
that the same are reasonable, the prices for tbe parcels
condemned as assessed by the appraisers appointed by the
. upreme court of the District of Columbia, and now invoke
your action and ask you to make such decision.
It is conceded that the prices of the lands already
purchased by the commission, and those now submitted to
you for your decision that they are reasonable, together with
the expenses of the condemnation, aggregate something more
than $1,430,000.
The first section of the act reads as follows:
'' Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That
a tract of land lying on both sides of Rock Creek, beginning
at Klingle Fora bridge, and running northwardly, following
the course of said creek, of a width not less at any point
t han six hundred feet nor more than twelve hundred feet,
including the bed of the creek, of which not less than two
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hundred feet shall be on either side of said creek, south of
Broad Branch road and Blagden Mill road and of such
greater width north of said ·roads as the commissioners
designated in this act may select, shall be secured, as
hereinafter set out, and. be perpetually dedicated and set
apart as a public park or pleasure ground for the benefit and
enjoyment, of the people of the United States, to be known
by the name of Rock Creek Park: Provided, however, That
the whole tract so to be selected and condemned under the
provisions of this act shall not exceed two thousand acres nor
the total cost thereof exceed the amount of the money herein
appropriated."
The appropriation to which reference is made in the first
section is contained in the last clause of section 6 in the
words following:
"To pay the expenses of iuquiry, survey, assessment, cost
of lands taken, and all other necessary expenses incidental
thereto, the sum of one million two hundred thousand
dollars, or so much thereof as may be necessary, is hereby
appropriated out of any money in the Treasury not otherwi e appropriated."
It is now definitely a certained what the parcels selected
by the commission under the .first three sections of the act
will cost. Their co t exceeds the amount provided in the
pro vi o of the first ection. Upon the decision of the President that the price are reasonable, the law contemplates
that the money therefor shall become immediately payable
to tile owner of the property. 'fhere i no di cretion
v ted in anyone, after your action with reference to the
payment of he money for tb prices which you shall decide
to be rea uabl . Your deci ion i the last act nece . ary to
show a d t rrnination on the part of the Government to
take the pr p rty. In my opinion, if the aggreo-ate of he e
and a
m nt were within the requirem nt of
our deci ion woul 1 v t in ach property-owner a
i n for th alue of hi pr p rty taken. But the
the prop rty at all i dep nd nt upon two cond nt n that th park hall n t exceed 2, 00
in xt nt nd the other that th aggregate co t hall
xc d 1,2 , 00. In vi l tion of either of the e con-
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ditions you have no right to act at all. It therefore follows
that it is not within your power to decide the prices as
submitted in the present report of the commission to be
reasonable.
Very respectfully,
WM.H.TAFT,
Solicitor- General.

The PRESIDENT.
Approved:

W. H. H. MILLER.

ENSIGN OF NAVY-PATENT RIGHTS.
The Secretary of the Navy may lawfully contract with an ensign of the
Navy for the purchase of patent rights and improvements in "B. L. R.
ordnance" for use in the Navy, when the ensign was not employed to
make experiments, paid himself th~ expenses of obtaining letters
patent, and when no expense was authorized or facility furnished by
the Bureau of Ordnance to aid him in making or perfecting his invention.
Section 3721, Revised Statutes, not section 3718, applies to the case.
DEP AR'.l1MENT OF JUSTICE,

March 8, 1892.
Sm: It appears by your communication of February 25,
1892, that Ensign Dashiell of the U.S. Navy has made certain improvements in "B. L. R. ordnance" for use in the
Navy, for which he has obtained letters patent from the
United States, and that he offers to sell the improvements or
the right to use them to the United States.
It further appears that the improvements in question do
not relate to a matter as to which Ensign Dashiell was
employed to make experiments, with a view to suggesting
improvements, and that he was not assigned to any such
duty; and that the fees and expenses of obtaining the letters
patent were paid by him, and that no expense was authorized or facility furnished by the Bureau of Ordnance to aid
him in making or perfecting his invention.
The question submitted for opinion, on this state of facts,
is whether the Secretary of the Navy can, under existing
laws, purchase Ensign Dasbiell's rights under the patent, or

330

HON. WM. H. TAFT.
Amnesty-Power of the President.

contract with him for the use of the pateut in consideration
of the payment of a royalty by the United States.
This case, unlike that of Lieut. Dunn ( 19 Opin., 407), to
which you call my attention, does not fall within section 3718
(Rev. Stat.), requiring that provisions, etc., for the use of
the Navy shall be furnished, when time will permit, by contract by the lowest bidder, but falls wi~hin section 3721,
Revised Statutes, which expressly exempts from the operation of section 3718, purchases of "ordnance, gunpowder, or
medicines." Your power of contracting for supplies of the
excepted classes being uncontrolled by legislative regulation, I see no reason why you may not lawfully. contract
with Ensign Dashiell for the purchase or the use of his
patent rigllts.
In 1858 the Secretary of War made a contract with Maj.
Henry B. Sibley, of the U. S. Army, to pay him a royalty
for the use of his patent conical tent, which, together with
the fact that section 1673 (Rev. Stat.) prohibits the paying
of a royalty to any officer or employe of the United States
for the use of any patent for "the Springfi.eld breechloading
y tern" or any part thereof, or for any such patent in which
uch officer or employes may be directly or indirectly intere ted, bow that to make contracts of that character, in
proper ca. e,, has not been foreign to the practice of the
Governmellt.
V ry re pectfully, your ,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The E RETA.RY OF TIIE NAVY.

AMNESTY.-POWER OF THE PRESIDENT.
Th Pre ident ha the constitutional power, without Congressional
authority, to i ne a general pardon or amnesty to classes of fori"'n r .
The qne tion of the Pr iclent' parcloning power reviewed and the
au hori i
collated. Various proclamations of general amnesty
apJ ended.
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cohabitation or adultery as denounced by the acts of ~arch ·
22, 1882 (22 Stat., 30), and March 3, 1887 (24 Stat., 635).
You have asked the opinion of the Attorney-General upon
the question whether you have the constitutional power,
without Congressional authority, to issue such a general pardon or amnesty. Upon this question the following is
respectfully submitted:
Section 2 of Article n of the Constitution, in defining the
powers of the President, provides that "he shall have power
to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses aga.inst the
United States, except in cases of impeachment."
It has been decided by the Supreme Court that the power
herein conferred upon the President is unlimited (ex parte
Garland, 4 Wall., 333). The pardon may be granted before
or after conviction, and absolutely or upon conditions. The
ground for the exercise of the power is wholly within the dis- .
cretion of the Executive. He may, therefore, if he thinks
fit, pardon an offender because his offense is one of many
like offenses, arising from a widespread, popular feeling and
without ·regard to the character or the particular circumstances of the individual. He may, for the same reason,
grant, by separate acts of pardon, immunity from punishment to each of a thousand such offenders. If he may do so,
it is difficult to see why he does not exercise the same power,
when by public proclamation he extends a pardon to ten
thousand offenders, without naming them, but describiug
them as persons committing, or participating in, the same
kind of offenses.
It is said that the power to grant pardons is a power to
examino the circumRtances of each case and then confer
immunity on the offender. If the right to pardon were
dependent on the existence of any particular grounds in the
case of each offender, the argument, it seems to me, would
be of more force. There is, however, no such restriction on
its exercise. The ground may be as properly one which has
equally and the same a,p plication to ten thousand or a hundred thousand cases, as one which is peculiar to the case
under consideration. If o, does not the contention in favor
of the narrower view become an argument in favor of a formality rather than a substautial and logical distinction 1 No
one will deny that the President, without Congressional

332

HON. WM. H. TAFT.
Amnesty-Power of the President.

authority, may issue separate pardons to every individual
of the thousands of Mormons who have lived in polygamy
in Utah. Only those would have to be omitted whose posi tion i:s so obscure, or bumble, that the President can not learn
their names. Does not the power of amnesty, therefore,
depend only on the question whether pardons can be made
sufficiently definite in respect to the beneficiaries by a
description other than by namei If the grantor is certain,
the extent of the grant is certain, and the grantees are so
described that they can be made certain, what is the inherent
difference between the power involved in the grant of an
individual pardon, and that in au amnesty to a class of persons to each one of whom the power to grant separate pardon, for a reason applicable to all, is conceded f
It is suggested that ofl'end.ers can not be pardoned as a
cla any more than they can be trjed and convicted as a
clas . This argument is not of force unless there is an analogy between a sentence of conviction and a pardon. The
sentence i a judgment upported by a verdict rendered by a
jury, on lawful evidence and full hearing, with the issue of
th accu eel's guilt or innoce.n ce clearly defined. A pardon
is a gracious act of mer y re ting on any groand which the
Ex , •utive may regard a sufficient to call for its exercise.
Tbere is no hearing of evidence; there is no issue made.
The re ital in the act of pardon may show a ground which
in law and logic would be wholly irrelevant to the guilt or
cbaract r of th offender, and not in the slightest degree
a:IB · tbe validity of the pardon. State policy may require
th Executive to grant it. Such considerations show the
ab ence of any parallel between the trial of an offender and
the xerci e of Executive clemency in bis case, and wholly
de troy an analogy which would require the same procedure in oth.
But it is urged again t thi view that it intros ts too great
a p wer t the Exe utive. In what wayf It only enable
him to do that in one a ·t which be might do by a thou and.
The p wer whi h th Exe utive exerci e i till the pardoning
w r an that he Con titution giv him. It is no
ar ument ain ti exerci
hat it may be abu ed. That
i true f e ry pow r intra t d to h Ex cutive.
h refor , the unlimited
principle it
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power to grant pardons for all offenses against the United
States, except in cases of impeachment, includes power to
issue a geueral pardon or amnesty to any class of offenders.
Practice and authority confirm this view. Alexander
Hamilton, in the seventy-third number of the Federalist,
referring to this clause of the Constitution, said:
"But the principal argument for reposing the power of
pardoning in this case in the Chief Magistrate is this: In
seasons of insurrection or rebellion there are often critical
moments when a well-timed offer of pardon to the insmgents or rebels may restore the tranquility of the commonwealth and which, if suffered to pass unimproved, it may
never be possible afterwards to recall. The dilatory process of convening the Legislature or one of its branches,
for the purpose of obtaining its sanction to the measure,
would frequently be the occasion of letting slip the golden
opportunity."
Such language leaves no doubt that in the mind of this,
one of the greatest of the framers and expounders of the
Constitution, the pardoning power included the authority
to offer and grant pardon and amnesty to a whole body of
insurgents or rebels, i. e., to a class of offenders~ This language was quoted and used by Mr. Justice Story in his work
on the Constitution. (Sec. 1500 et seq.)
The practice, contemporaneous with the adoption of t1e
Constitution, supports the existence of the power of the
Pre ident to grant amnesty without legislative sanction.
In 1794 President Washington is.sued a proclamation extend ing pardon to the whisky insurrectionists, and Gen. Lee,
as Commander-in-Chief of the United States forces, issued a
similar proclamation in the name of the President, and by
his authority. Copies of these proclamations are appended.
Governor Mifflin, of Pennsylvania, acting under a constitutional authority conferred in the same words as that of the
President, issued a similar p.ioclamation of pardon (also
appended) to the insurgents for their offenses against the State
of Penn ylvania. President Adams issued a proclamation
of pardon to the same insurgents in 1800, a copy of which is
appended. President Madison granted pardon by proclamation to a class of offenders known as the "Barataria ''
pirates, who were a large band of men engaged in smug-
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gling and violations of the revenue and navigation laws of
the U uited States. I have appended a copy of this proclamation. By the thirteenth section of the act of July 17, 1862
(12 Stat., 592), the President was authorized, at any time
thereafter, by proclamation, to extend to persons participating in the then existiug rebellion pardon and amnesty, with
such exceptions and conditions a.she should deem expedient.
On December 8, 1863 (12 Stat., 737), President Lincoln issued
a proclamation offering pardon and amnesty to the rebels.
The recitals of this proclamation show that he did not admit
tllat he had uot the power to issue such a proclamation,
without Co11gressional authority, but that he distinctly
a serted the contrary. The two recitals on this subject are
as follows: "Whereas, in and by the Constitution of the
United States, it is provided that the President shall have
power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses affainst the
United State , except in cases of impeachment aud * * *
"Whereas * * * lamdrnrn been enacted by Congress *
* * declaring that the President was thereby authorized
at any time therealter, by proclamation, to extend to person wl10 may Lave participated in the existing rebellion in
any tate or part tlJ<.~reof, pardon and amnesty, with uch
exceptiou and at , neh times and on such condition,· as he
may deem xpedi 11t for the public welfare, and whereas the
'ongr 's,·ional declamtions for li'niitecl and conditional pardon
accord.· with icell-established judicial exposition of the pardoninr1 power,' etc.
Pr id nt John on i u d everal limited pardon proclamation of this chara ·ter, · and then in January, 1 G7 (14
tat. 377), 'on O'r . ,' r pealed th amne ty ection of the
a t of 1 n~. Th reaft r, on Septemb r 7, 1 67 (lo Stat. 699),
h i.·.'n <l ~moth •r limited ancl conditional pardon proelamau Jul· 4 J( G (1., ~'tat. 70 ... ), h i , u d a full and
tion.
< h. olnt
pardon by vr ·lam, tiou to all n•b l , xcept th e
who w •r n11d •r, 11 iudi ·tme11t for trea on all(] by a pro lamation of 1 <· nib r 2;3, 1 ·,; (L, tat. 711) he e~ t ndecl full
ab ·olnt • a11cl u11 nditional 1 ardon to , 11 who had tak n
part in th l' h llion.
r ·id n ,John. n on ,Jnly 3, 1 6 ,
i.·. n l, pro •Jam~ ti n .·t nclin °· pardon to all d : rter. who
ho 111 r tnr11 t th ir
J l'-'·
e py of thi,
, I p ncl cl.
m
·tob .r J L',: Pr :icl
rant
1

1
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issued a proclamation pardoning all deserters who should
return to the Army, which is also in the appendix.
We thus see that the contemporaneous exposition of the
Constitution and the contemporaneous practice under it by
the early Presidents, continued down to the period afkr the
war, support the view that the power to grant pardons
includes the power to grant pardons to a class by proclamations describing the class by the offense committed. The
practice has been fully sustained by the Supreme Court of
the United States.
In ex parte William Wells (18 How., 307) the question was
whether the Constitution gave the President the power to
commute a sentence of death to imprisonment for life. This
is held to be a conditional pardon and within the power of
the Executive. Referring to the significance of the word
"pardon," Justice Wayne says, on page 310:
"In the law it has different meanings, which were as well
understood when the Constitution was made as any other
Jegal word in the Constitution now is. Such a thing as a pardon without a designation of its kind is not known in the
law. Time out of mind, in the earliest books of the English
law, every pardon has its particular denomination. They
are general, special, or particular, conditional or absolute,
not necessary in some cases, and in some grantable, of course."
And, again, referring to the power under the Constitution,
the same justice says:
"The real language of the Constitution is general, that is,
common to the class of pardons, or extending the power to
pardon to all kinds of pardons k11own to the law as such,
whatever may be their denomination."
The neces ·ary effect of this language would seem to be that
the power to pardon given the President includes the authority
to is ue general pardons.
In ex parte Garland (4 Wall., 333) the question was whether
a tatute which excluded from practice in the courts attorneys
wbohadparticipated in the rebellion would operatetoexclude
one who had received full pardon for his offenses before trial.
It was held that it could not. Mr. Justice Field delivered
the opinion of the court and said, referring to the pardon
clause of the Constitution:
"The :riower thus conferred is unlimited, with the exception

336

HON. WM. I-I. TAFT.
Amnesty-Power of the President.

stated-i. e., in cases of impeachment. It extends to every
offense known to the law, and may be exercised at any time
after its commission, either before legal proceedings are taken
or during their pendency, or after conviction or judgment.
This power of the President is not subject to legislative control; Congress can neither limit the effect of his pardon nor
exclude from its exercise any class of offenders. The benign
prerogative of mercy reposed in him can not be fettered by
any legislative restrictions."
In United States v. Padelford (9 Wall., 531) the effect of
President Lincoln's proclamation of December 8, 1863, was
under consideration, with respect to wtiich the court say:
"This proclamation, if it needed legislative sanction, was
fully warranted by the act of July 17, 1862, which authorized
the President at any time thereafter to extend pardon and
amnesty to persons who bad participated in the rebellion,
with such exceptions as he might see fit to make. Tbat the
President had power, if not otherwise, yet with the sanction of
Congress, to grant a general conditional pardon has not been
seriously questioned. And this pardon, by its terms, included
restoration of all rights of property, except as to slaves and
as against the intervening rights of third persons."
Here is an intimation that in the mind of the court there
was good ground for the contention that no legislative sanction was needed for the issuance by the Executive of a general conditional pardon.
In the case of the United States v. Klein (13 Wall., 128)
the Chief Ju tice referred to the amnesty clause of the act
of July 17, 1862, as follows :
" The suggestion of pardon by Congress, for such it was,
rather than authority, remained unacted on for more than a
year."
Again, after r ferring to the proclamation of general condi i nal pardon i ued while the amne ty clause of the act of
July 17, 1862, was in force, the Chief Justice de cribed the
hr e proclamations is ued by Pre ident Johnson after it
r p 1 the la tone of which, a we have een, conf~rred full
n un 11 'ti nally, on all participating in the rebellion,
a,ll(l h n aid:
ti true that the e tion of the a t of C ngr
whi h
rted to authorize the pr lamation of pardon and
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amnesty by the President was repealed on January 21, 1867;
but this was after the close of the war, when the act had
ceased to be important as an expression of the legislative
di 'position to carry into effect the clemency of the Executive,
and aaer the decision of this court that the President's
power of pardon 'is not subject to legislation;' that Congress
can neither limit the t\ffect of his pardon nor exclude from
its exercise any class of offenders."
.Again, on page 147:
'' It is the intention of the Constitution that each of the
great coordinate departments of the Government-the
legislative, executive and the judicial-shall be, in its
sphere, independent of the others. To the Executive alone
is intrusted the power of pardon, and it is granted without
limit. Pardon includes amnesty. It blots out the offense
pardoned, and removes all its penal consequences."
It is perfectly clear from these extracts that in the opinion
of the court the proclamation of absolute pardon, December
25, 1868, was entirely within the constitutional power of the
President, though it may be admitted that it was not necessary to the conclusion in the Klein case, that it should be so
· decided.
In the case of Armstrong v. The United States (13 Wall.,
154), however, the rights of the claimant against the United
States rested solely on the proclamation of Decern ber 25,
1868, and the absolute and unconditional pardon thereby
conferred and those rights were sustained.
aid the Chief Justice:
"The proclamation of the 25th of December granted pardon unconditionally and without reservation. This was a
public act of which all courts of the United States are bound
to take notice and to which all courts are bound to give
effect. The claim of the petitioner was preferred within two
years. The Court of. Claims~ therefore, erred in not giving
tbe petitioner the benefit of the proclamation."
This is an express holding that the proclamation of absolute and general pardon and amnesty is within the power
of the President without legislative authority or sanction.
Thi· ruling has been followed in Pargoud v. The United
tates (13 Wall., 156); Oar lisle v. The United States (16 Wall.,
147); Knote v. The United States (95 U. S., 149).
56 '7-YOL 20--22
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The only authority which can be cited against this view is
the report of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate on the
right of the President to issue the proclamation of December
25, 1868. This will be found in the bound volume of Senate
Reports of the Fortieth Congress, third session, No. 239.
They reported for adoption by the Senate the following
resolution:
"Resolved, That in the opinion of the Senate the proclamation of the President of the United States of the 25th of
December, 1868, purportfog to grant general pardon and
amnesty to a.U persons guilty of treason and acts of hostility
to tbe United States during the late rebellion, with restora
tion of rights, etc., was not authorized by the Constitution
or laws."
And accompanied their recommendation with an argument
in support thereof. Arguments on the subject by Senator
Ferry and Senator Conkling will be found in Congressional
Globe, third session Fortieth Congress, Part r., pp. 168,
438. I can not .find that the resolution which was reported
February 17, 1869 (Cong. Globe, 3d session 40th Cong., 1381),
was ever adopted by the Senate. As the validity of the
proclamation here condemned has been since four times sustained by the Supreme Court, the committee report can not
now be considered an authority of weight.
A very full di cu sion of the power of the President to
grant a general pardon or amnesty to a class of offenders
will be found in the American CyclopIBdia, 1873, under the
head of '' Amne ty ." There will be found a reference to the
prerogative of the Engli h Crown in granting pardons and
an explanation of the statutes.of amnesty pas ed by Parliame11t which cl arly bows that the power existing in the
Crown included power to i sue general pardon . I have
alr ady taken too much pace, and I forbear to di cu this
a p ct of the ubject.
·
Th ame view ha been taken in some of the State courts
t of gen ral amne ty pas ed by the State legi. lae n h Id in lid on the ground that , u ·h acts
ar n hi
ion of the pardoning power, which i ex lu i ely
.,. t l in t
,. xecntiv , by laugua e in th
tate con tituti n imil· rt
hat 3f th
d r I on tituti n~
e tate
. l
(~- .. f .
1) · The tate v. Fleming (7 Humphrey
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Tenn., 152); Ha,ley v. Clark (26 .A.la., 439); see also People v.
Moore, (62 Mich., 496).
It is submitte<l. that reason, practice, and authority established the constitutional power of the Executive, without legislative sa~ction, to issue proclamations extending pardon or
amnesty to classes of offenders.
· '
There a;e appended copies of the proclamations of general
pardon and amnesty to which reference has been maq.e in
the foregoing opinion., for the reason that they are not found
in the regular publications of the Statutes at Large, and
some of them are not recorJed in the State Department.
Very respectfully,
WM. H. TAFT,
Solicitor- General.
The PRESIDENT.
I concur in this opinion.
W. H. H. MILLER.
PROCLAMATION GRAN'.I.'ING PARDON
INSURGENTS.

TO

THE

WESTERN

[Sparks' Life of' Washington, vol. 12, p.134, 135.)

Whereas the commissioners, appointed by the President of the United
States to confer with the citizens in the western counties of Pennsylvania, during the late insurrection which prevailed therein, by their
act ancl agreement, bearing date the 2d day of September last, in pursuance of the powers in them vested, did promise and engage, that, if
assuran~es of submission to the laws of the United States should be bona
fide given by the citizens resident in the fourth survey of Pennsylvania,
in the manner and within the time in the said act and agreement specified, a general ·pardon should be granted, on the 10th day of July then
n ext ensuing, of all treasons and other indictable offences against the
United States, committed within the said survey before the 22d day of
August last, excluding therefrom, nevertheless, every person who
i,houl<l. refuse or neglect to sµbscribe such assurance and engagement in
manner aforesaid, or who should after such subscription violate the
same, or wilfully obstruct, or attempt to obstruct, the execution of the
acts for raising a revenue on distilled spirits and stills, or be aiding or
abetting therein;
And whereas, I have since thought proper to extend the said pardon
to all persons guilty of the said treasons, misprisions of treason, or
otherwise concerned in the late insurrection within the survey aforesaid,
who have not since been indicted or convicted thereof, or of any other
offense against the United States;
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Therefore beit known, that I, George Washington, President of the
United States, have granted, and by these presents do grant, a full, free,
and entire pardon to all persons ( excepting as is hereinafter excepted,
of all treasons, misprisions of treason, and other indictable offenses
against the United States, committed within the fourth surv~ of Pennsylvania before the 22ntJ_ day of August last past, excepting and excluding therefrom, neverthel ess, every person who refused or n,eglected to
give and subscribe the said assurances in the manner aforesaid (or having subscribed, hath violated the same), and now standeth indicted or
convicted of any treason, misprision of treason, or other offense against
the said United States; hereby remitting and releasing unto all p ersons,
except as before excf'>pted, all penalties incurred, or supposed to be
incurred, for, or on account of, the premises.
In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my band, and caused the
seal of i:be United States to be affixed, this tenth clay of July, in the
year of our Lord one thousanil seven hundred and ninety-five, and the
twentieth year of the indepeJJdence of the said United States.
GEORGE WASHINGTON.
GENERAL LEE'S PROOL.A.M.A.'.I.'ION OF PARDON.
[Pennsyln,nia Archives, Vol. IV, pp. 479-80].

By Henry Lee, Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia, Major-General therein, and Commander in Chief of the Militia Army, in the service of the United States.
·
A Proclamation.
By virtue of the powers an!l authority in me vested by the President
of the United States, and in obedience to his benign intentions therewith communicated, I do, by this, my proclamation, declare and make
known to all concerned, tltat a full, free, and entire pardon (excepting
and providing as hereafter menti, ned) is hereby grantecl to all persons
r icling within the counties of Wusbington, Allegheny, Westmoreland,
and Fayette, fo the State of Pe11n1:1ylvania, and in the county of Ohio,
in the tate of Virginia, guilty of treason, misprision of treason against
the nited Stat s, or otherwise directly or indirectly engaged in the
wick d and unhappy tumult and disturbances lately existing in those
c·onntie , excepting, neverthcle, , from the benefit and effect of tbi
pardon, all persons charged with the commision of offenses against the
United State , and now actually in custody or held )>y recognizance to
app ar an<l an wer for such offen e at any jn<licial court or courts,
e.·cepting al o, all per ons avoi<lin(l' fair trial by abandonruent of their
bom • ; and xc pting moreover, the following persons, the atrocity of
d10. t- ·ou,luct r 'lHler it prop r to maTk th m hy name for th purpo , of uhj<'cting th m, with all po sihle c rtainty, to the regular
rour
f judi<'ial proc dinn-., and whom all offic T, civil and military,
are r qnire<l to endeavor to apprehend and brought to ju tice, to-wit:
Benjamin arkin n 1 Arthur :miner, John Holcraft, Dauiel Hamilton
"I ho. Lap ley
illiam !ill er, · dward 'ook, Ed ward Wright, Richar,l
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Holcraft, David Bradfor<J, John Mitchell, Alexander Fulton, Thomas
Spiers, William Bradford, Geo. Parker, Wm. Hanna, Edward Magner,
jr., Thos. Hughes, David Lock, Ebenezer Gallag~er, Peter Lyle, John
Shields, William Hay, William McElhenny, Tho. Patten, Stephenson
Jack, Patrick Jack, and Andrew Highlands, in the State of Pennsylvania;
and William Sutherland, Robert Stt,pbenson, William McKinley, John
Moore, and John McCormick, of Ohio county, in the State of Virginia.
Provided, That no person who shall hereafter willfully obstruct or
attempt to obstruct the execution of any of the laws of the United
States, or be in any wise aiding or abetting therein, shall be entitled to
any benefit or advantage of the pardon hereinafter granted: And provided also, That nothing herein contained shall extend, or be construed
to extend, to the remission or mitigation of any forfeiture of any penalty
incurred by reason of :infractions of, or obstructions to, the laws of the
United States for collecting a revenue upon distilled spirits and stills.
Given under my hand, at headquarters, in Elizabeth Town, this
twenty-ninth day of November, seventeen huu<l.red auJ. niuety-foi;ir.
HENRY LEE.
By order of the commander in chief.
.
G. K. TAYLOR, Aid-de-Camp.
GOVERNOR MIFFLIN'S PROCLAMATION OF PARDON
[Pennsylvania Archives, Vol. IV, pp. 536-39.)
WEDNESDAY, August 26, 1795.
The President of the United S'tates having by his proclamation, dated
the
day of August, instant, thought proper'to extend the pardon of
the Government of the United States to all persons who have been
guilty of the treasons or misprisions of treason in his said proclamation
mentioned, or who have been otherwise concerned in the late insurrection within the four western counties of this State, who have not since
been indicted or convicted thereof~ the Governor this day took the
same into consideration, and being desirous on his part to pursue a like
policy, as well on account of its Jrnmanity as for the sake of preserving
uniformity in the proceedings of the General and State Governments in
relation to the same important object, accordingly issued his ·proclamation in the words following, to wit:
Pennsylvania, ss:
In the name and by the authority of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania., by Thomas Mifflin, Governoc of the said Commonwealth:

A Proclamation.
Whereas at the commencement of the ln.te insurrection in the western
part of this State, constituting the fourth survey thereof, I deemed it
expedient to attempt a vindication of the violated authority of the laws
and the restotation of peace, harmony, and order by the influence of
reason and lenity upon the minds of the deluded and refractory insurgents;
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And whereas the better to promote so desi\1,tl,ble an object I appointed,
authorized, and employed the Hon. Thomas McKean, Chief Justice of
this Commonwealth, and Maj. Gen. WHliam Irvine (with full confidence
in their wisdom, prudence, and patriotism), as commissioners, to confer
with the said insurgents, and on behalf of the Government of Pennsylvania to promise to them and every of them an act of pardon and
oblivion for nll past transgressions upon receiving a satisfactory assurance of a future submission to the laws;
And whereas the said commissioners in pursuance of the trust thus
reposed in them clid, by an instrnment under their hands bearing date
the twenty-fourth day of August, in the year one thousand seven hundred and ninety-four, promise ilpon certain terms and conditions of snbmission to the laws of this State and of the l:nitecl States, to be made in
the manner and within the time in the said instrument specified, that if
the people of the said western counties should keep peace and be of good
behavior until the :first day of June, now last past, an act of free and
general pardon and oblivion of all treasons, insurrections, arson, riots,
and other offenses inferior to riots, committed, perpetrated, counseled,
or suffered by any person·or persons complying with the terms and conditions aforesaid, -within the counties by the said commissioners specified, since the fourteenth <lay of July, in the year one thousand seven
hundred and ninety-four, should be granted so far as the laid offenses
concerned the State of Pennsylvania or the government thereof.
And whereas it appears by a proclamation heretofore issued by the
President of the United States that he has thought proper to extend the
pardon of the Government of the United States to all persons who have
been guilty of treasons or misprisions of treason in his said proclamation specified, or have been otherwise concerned in the said insurrection
within the said survey, but who have not since been indict,ed or convicted thereof, and I am desirous, on my part, to pursue a like policy,
a well on account of its humanity as for the sake of preserving uniformity in the proceedings of the General and State Governments, in
relat,ion to the ame important object: Therefore, I, Thomas Mifflin,
governor of the Commonwealth of Pe~nsylvania, have granted and by
these presents do grant a full, free, and entire pardon to all persons_(not
included in the exception hereinafter declared) of all treason , insurrections, arsons, riots, aud other offenses inferior to riots, committed within
the said fourth survey, between tho said fourteenth day of July and the
twenty-second day of August, in the year one thousand seven hundred
and nii;tety-four, and which may have been and are indictable offense
a<Ta,in t he aid tate of P nnsylvania, together with a free and entire
remi ion and relea e of all fines, forfeitures, and penalties consequent
thereon, xc pting aod xclnclioo- always, neverthele s from all the
b nefit and ad van tao- or an., claim to the benefit and advantage of the
pardon h r b, grant d v ry p r on who ha
ither refused to give tbe
a urance of nbm i,·. i n ·tipnlat d and required as aforesaid, or who,
having given th ame h 11 afterwards have deviated therefrom, and
n w a tuall t, nd indicted or convicted of any offense against the
, ta
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Given under my hand and the great seal of the State, at Philadelphia,
the twenty-sixth day of August, in the year of our Lord one thousand
seven hundred and ninety-five and of the Commonwealth the twentieth.
THOMAS MIFFLIN.
By the Governor.
A. J. DALLAS,
Secretary of the Commonwealth.
PROCLAMATION GRANTING PARDON TO THE PENNSYLVANIA
INSURGENTS, MAY 21, 1800.
[From the Life and Works of John ~dams, Vol. IX, pp. 178, 179.]

Whereas the late wicked and treasonable insurrection against the just
authority of the United States of su~dry persons in the counties of
Northampton, Montgomery, and Bucks, in the State of Rennsylvania,
in the year 1799, having been speedily suppressed, without any of the
calamities usually attending rebellion, whereupon peace, order, and submission to the laws of the United States were restored in the aforesaid
counties, and the ignorant, misguided, and misinformed in the counties
have returned to a proper sense of their duty, whereby it is become
unnecessary for the public good that any future prosecutions should be
commenced or carried on against any person or persons by reason of
their being connected in the said insurrection:
Wherefore be it known that I, John Adams, President of the United
States of America, have granted, a.nd by these presents do grant, a full,
free, and absolute pardon to all and every person or persons concerned
in the said insurrection, excepting as hereinafter excepted, of all treasons, misprisions of treason, felonies, misdemeanors, and other crimes
by them respectively done or committed against the United States in
either of the said counties before the twelfth day of March, in the year
one thousand seven hundred and ninety-nine, excepting and excluding
therefrom every person who now standeth indicted or convicted of any
treason, misprision of treason, or other offense against ·the United States,
whereby remedying and releasing unto all persons, except as before
excepted, all pains and penalties incurred or supposed to be incurred
for or on account of the premises.
Given, etc.
JOHN ADAMS.
[From the Archives of the State Department.]

BY THE

PRESIDENT OF TIIE UNITED STATES OF .A.MERICA.

A PROCLAMATION.
Among the many evils produced by the wars, which, with little intermission, have afflicted Europe, and extended their ravages into other
quarters of the globe, for a period exceeding twenty years, the dispertion of a considerable portion of the inhabitants of different counties,
in. orrow and fa want, has not been the least injurious to human happie , nor the least severe in the trial of human virtue.
It had been long ascertained that many foreigners flying from the
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dangers of their own home, and that some citizens forgetful of their
duty, had cooperated in forming an establishment on the Island of
Barrataria, near the month of the river Mississippi, for the purposes of
a clandestine and lawless trade.
The Government of the United States caused the establishment to be
broken up and destroyed; and having obtained the llleans of designating
the offenders of every description, it only remained to answer the
demands of justice by inflicting an exemplary punishment.
But it has since been represented that the offenders have manifested
a sincere penitence; that they have abandoned the prosecution of the
worse cause for the support of the best, and particularly that they
have exhibited in the defense •of New Orleans unequivocal traits of
courage and :fidelity. Offenders who have refused to become associates
·of the enemy in the war upon the most seducing terms of invitation,
and who hav,e aided to repel his hostile invasion of the territory of
the United States, can no longer be considered as objects of punishment, but as objects of a generous forgiveness.
It has therefore been seen with great satisfaction that the general
assembly of the State of Louisiana earnestly recomm~nd those offend_
ers to the benefit of a full pardon; and in compliance with that recom_
mendation. as well as in consideration of all the other extraordinary
circumstances of the case, I, James Madison, President of the United
States of America, do issue this proclamation, · hereby granting, publishing, and declaring a free and full pardon of all offenses committed
in violation of any act or acts of the Congress of the said United States
touching the revenue, trade, and navigation thereof, or touching the
intercour o and commerce of the Unitetl States with foreign nations, at
any time before the eighth day of January, in the present year one
thou and eight hundred and :fifteen, by any.person or persons whomsoever, Lei11g inhabitants of New Orleans and the adjacent country, or
being inhabitants of the said Island of Barataria and the places adjac •nt: Provi led thn.t every person chiiming the benefit of this full pardon, in orcler to entitle himself thereto, shall produce a certificate in
writing from the governor of the 'tate of Louisiana stating that such
p r on ha aided in tbe defen e of Tew Orleans and the adjacent country durino- the inva ion thereof as afore aid.
And I do hereby further authorize and direct all suits, indictments,
and pro ecution for tin s, penal tie , and forfeiture against any person
or p rson who ball be ntitl d to the benefit of this full pardon forthwith to be stayed, discontinu d, and r lea ed. And all civil officer are
hereby required, according to the duties of their re pective stations, to
c rry tbi proclamation into ilum drnt and faithful execution .
one at th city of Wa hington the sixth day of February, fa the
year on thon and iCYht hun<lr d and fifteen, and of the Independence
of tbe nit <l , ·rate the thirty-ninth.
( i rn cl)
JAME MADISON.
By the r iclent: ·
( igned)
JAME M ... ~noE,

..4.oting as ecretary of tale.
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General Orders, No. 43.J

DEPARTMENT,

A.DJUTANT-G ENERA.L'S OFFICE,

Washington, July 3, 1866.
OFFER OF PARDON TO DESERTERS FROM THE REGULAR ARMY WHO SURHENDER,

By direction of the President, all deserters from the regular Army
who voluntarily join their regiments or snrrender themselves at any
military post or recruiting rendezvous before the 15th of August, 1866,
will be returned to duty without trial or punishment, ou condition that
they make good the time lost by desertion, and forfeit all pay and
allowance for the time of their absence.
.
Such deserters as, under this order, surrender themselves at any other
place than the stations of their regiment will be subject to assignment
to other regiments, ·as if they were unattached recruits.
By order of the Secretary of War:
E. D. TOWNSEND,
.Assistant .Adjutant- General.
Official:

General Orders, No. 102.]

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
ADJUTANT-GENERA.L'S OFFICE,

Washington, October 101 1873.
The President of the United States commands. it to be made known
that all soldiers who have deserted their colors, and who shall, on or
before the 1st day of January, 1874, surrender themselves at any military
atation, shall receive a full pardon, only forfeiting the pay and allowances due them at the time of de ertion; and shall be restored to duty
without trial or punishment on conJ.ition that they faithfully serve
through the term of their enlistment.
By order of the Secretary of War.
E. D. TOWNSEND,
.A djutant-Genm·al.
Official.
ASSISTANT Al>JUTANT-GENEliAL,

CLASSIFIED CIVIL SERVICE-WEATHER BUREAU EMPLOYES
The employes of the Weather Bureau of the Department of Agriculture,
·on duty a.way from and outside of the city of Washington, are not
members of the classified Civil Service.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 12, 1892.

Sm: Your communication of March 9 instant, submits
for an opinion the question, whether the employes of the
Weather Bureau of the Department of Agriculture, who are
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on duty outside and away from the city of Washington~ are.
members of the classified Civil Service by the mere operation of sections 5 and 6 of the act of Congress of October 1,
1890, entitled '' An act to increase the efficiency and reduce
the expenses of the Signal Corps of the Army, and to transfer the Weather Service to the Departmen~ of Agriculture."
(26 Stat., 653.)
By general ni.le 2 of the Revised Civil-Service Rules the
President of the United States has declared that "There
shall be five branches of the classified Civil Service, as
follows:
1. The classified Department service.
2. The classified customs service.
3. The classified postal service.
4. The classified railway mail service.
5. The classified Indian service.
The employes in question fall within no oRe of these
classifications. There is no room for holding that they
belong to thP, classified Departmental service, because rule
1, of the Departmental rules, says that that service "shall
include the several officers, clerks, and other persons in any
department, commission, or bureau at Washington," etc.
I am, sir, your obedient servant,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRET.A.RY OF AGRICULTURE.
SUMMARY COURT .A.CT-MITIGATION OF SENTENCE.
The :1et of October 1, 1890, chapter 1259, does not give the reviewing
offi er power to mitigate or approve a part and di approve a part of a
sentence of a summary court, where the sentence was within the power
of the court-martial to impose.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 14, 1 92.
Sm: By letter of December 9, 1891, the then Acting
r tary of ar requ ted the an wer of the Attorneyn .1:al to th fi Jl wing ue ti n:
t
act nti 1 d an ' ct to promote the administi n of ju ti ·e in the rmy,' approved October 1, 1890
t· .
the reviewin officer power to mitigati~ or
n di approve a part of a sentence of a,
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The act referred to provides that hereafter, in time of
peace, all offenses cognizable before a garrison or regimental
court-martia1 shall, within twenty-four hours from ~he time
of the arrest of the offender, be submitted to a summary
court, consisting of the line officers second in command at
the post or station ·of the accused, which court is to have
power, ~fter hearing the case, to adjudge the punishment to
be inflicted. No sentence adjudged by said summary court
is to be executed until it shall have been approved by the
post or other coupnander. It is provided· that any enlisted
man brought before such court may have a trial by courtmartial on request, a~ a matter of rigJ:.t. It will be observed
that this section _does not repeal articles 81, 82, 83, et seq.,
providing for regimental and garrison courts-martial, ~r
article 104, providing that no sentence of a court-martial
shall be carried into execution until the whole proceeding
be approved by the officer ordering the court, or by the
officer commanding for the time being; or that part of article
112, providing that every officer commanding a regiment or
garrison in which a regimental or garrison court-martial may
be held, shall have power to pardon or mitigate any punishment which such court may adjudge. The summary court
provided in the act of October 1, 1890, is merely a substitute
for the ,garrison or regimental court-martial. The accused
may still, as a matter of right, have his trial by court--martial, in which case he will enjoy the benefit of article.104 and
article 112. There is, however, no provision in the new act
appro-ved October 1, J890, by which the power of pardon or
mitigation is given to the commanding officer of the post,
nor is there anything in the act which extends article 112 so
that it shall apply to convictions by the summary court.
The power of pardon is vested by the Constitution in the
President, and, in the absence of special provision. to the
contrary, it must there remain. It is a power the existence
of which can not rest on mere implication, but must be
expressly conferred.
But it is said that the power to approve includes power to
partiaUy approve and partially disapprove, and so to mitigate sentences. The language. of the act as to approval is
as follows:
"There shall be a summary court-record book or docket
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kept at each military post, and in the field at the headquarters of the command, in which shall be entered a record of
.a ll cases heard and determined and the action had thereon,
and no sentence adjudged by said summary court shall be
executed until it shall have been approved by the post or
other commander."
What is the nature of this power and duty of approval in
the commanding officer¥ .An examiuation into its derivation will be of assistance.
We derived both our common law and our military law
from England, and to that country's history we may properly Jook for tbe origin of the principles and procedure in
both. From Clode's Military Law (Eng.), Chapter vn, paragraph 6, p. 145, we learn that~'Tbe original intention of interposing the authority of t11e
Crown, as confirming officer before a court-martial sentence
was carried into execution, was· assuredly one of mercy.
Mflitary tribunals were (then, at any rate, if not now)
prone to severity, and hence the attribuiie of mercy was
ecurcd to the criminal."
.
And in support of this view the high authority of Lord
ChancellorR Hardwicke and Talbot is cited. In their reports
to King George II (Reports of tlte Law Officers to George
II, YoJ. I, pp. 510-520) they say (p. 510):
''Though it is provided that the sentence of any general
ourt-martial shall not be. put in execution until report be
made of the whole proceedings to Hi Majesty, or the general commanding in chief, and his directions are signified
ther upon, yet we conceive that was only to give His Majesty
an pportunit~ of extending His Royal Mercy by pardon or
reprieve."
.And again (p. 514):
".Ac ·ording to the principle of tbe law of England, the
King per onal1y ne er oi
judgment, especially of punishment; fi r mercy i hi pr per act."
No r vi ory power over th trial and entence of criminals
y c nm n-law ourt in Engl, 11d xi t , except that whi h
i x r ·i d b tlJ
r wn, hrough the home office, by wa~
of pardon. Th
wer of pardonino- military offender wa
n
fi r th
me purpo a11 l l d t di i cti ns between
it
r vi ry power, and a au act of pure m rcy
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and grace. The confirming or approving of the sentence of
the court-martial became a revision of the proceedings like
that of an appellate court. The pardoning and mitigating
power remained to be exercised on different grounds, resting
wl10lly in the arbitrary discretion of the par<louing power.
If thi is the true derivation of .o ur present system of milita,ry
procedure, then certain conclusions must follow which make
easy the answeP to the question here under discussion. Tbe
fact that the power of the Crown over sentences of courtsmartial is divided into approving, pardoning, or mitigating,
is strong evidence that neitller includes the other. The
power of approval is strictly a revisory power. In the consideration of the validity of a sentence, therefore, the approving autllority would be limited to an examination of the
power of the court to impose the sent~nce and the legality of
the proceedings upon which it was founded. It would seem
to be contrary to generally accepted ideas of a legal review
of the proceedings of a lower court that the revising authority should be enaltled to pass upOJl and modify a simple ex,•rcise of discretion in the lower tribunal. Within the limits of
the punishment provided by law the discretion of the sentencing court is complete to affix such penalties as it sees flt;
at least, a revisory jurisdiction could not do more than to set
aside the sentence altogether for an abuse of discretion. It
could not make a new sentence. Whether the approving
officer might disapprove an illegal and separate part of the
sentence, and order the enforcement of the remainder, is a
question not before us, but it would seem clear on principle
that where there is no invalidity in the sentence any modification of it by the confirming authority, by lessening its
everity, is an exercise of the pardoning or mitigating power,
and not, properly speaking, an approval or disapproval.
The conclusion reached is supported by the decision of
the present Acting Judge-Advocate-General, and would
seem to follow from a decision of Gen. Hancock in 1874,
approved by the then Judge-Advocate-General, upon the
rigltt of the approving authority to so modify an illegal
e11tence as to bring it within the power of the court-martial.
(Ive's Military Law, p. 184.)
The summary court act is a substitute for post and regimeutal courts-martial, and offenders may or may not submit
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themselves to its jurisdiction. The articles of war, as we
have een, expressly give to the officer convening the courtsmartialnot only the approving, but also the pardoning and the
mitigating power. The summary court act gives to the commanding officer only the approving power. This may have
been a mere casus omissus, but there is nothing which entitles
us to so regard it. On the contrary, it must be taken as
strong evidence of the purpose of Congress t. withhold from
the commanding officer, in case of summar court convictions, the pardoning aud mitigating power. Following the
distinctions heretofore pointed out, it must be concluded that
the act entitled "An act to promote the administration of
justice in the Army," approved October 1; 1890 (26 Stat.,
648), doe not'' give the revie.wing officer power to mitigate
or to approve and disapprove a part of a sentence of a summary court" where the sentence was within the power of the
court-martial to impose.
Respectfully, yours,
WM.• H. TAFT,
Solicitor-General.
The SECRET.A.RY OF W.A.R.
Approved:
W. H. H. MILLER.
COMMISSIONER OF SOLDIERS' HOME-RE'rIRED OF~'ICERS OF
TIIE ARMY.
The board of commissioners of the Soldiers' Home are authorized to
permit tbe governor, deputy governor, and treasurer, who are retired
officerA of the Army, and reside at the Home and have its affairs in
charge, to make use of ordinary supplies of fuel, light, forage, milk,
ice, or v getable , produced at and obtained for use at the Home, and
are al o authorized to pay to the trea urer, out of the funds of the
Home, a salary for his services.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUS1.'ICE,

March 14, 1 92.
Your communi ation bearing date the 3d in tan t, and
r 1, tin t allowan e, by the Board of , mmi ion er of the
ldier
locat at a hington, to retired officer of
h
" ffi •ial po ition under the tatute estabe, ha been duly con idered.
IR:
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The inquiry involved in the question submitted to me 1s:
Whether the board of commissioners possesses authority to
permit the governor, deputy governor, and treasurer, who are
retired officers of the Army, and who reside at tbe Home and
have its affairs in charge, to make use of ordinary supplies
of fuel, light, forage, milk, ice, or vegetables, produced at or
obtained for the uses of the Home; and also, whether the
board is prohibited from paying to the treasurer, out of the
funds of the Home, a salary for his services.
There were issued to the three officers na.med during the
year ending October 31, 1891, vegetables, milk, garden products, ice and gas, including governor's and treasurer's offices,
as follows: To the governor, $308.38; to the deputy-governor,
$305.97; to the treasurer, $303.73, making a total of $918.08.
These issues were approved by the board of commissioners
and the allowances were in accordance with usages of the
Home which have existed since the establishment of the institution.
Itis not understood that the articles designated are gratuitously furnished, or that they are sold and delivered at
agreed prices upon measureme~t, but they are supplied as
convenience and economy may require, an account thereof
being duly kept; and the same are considered as a :veeognition of, and in the nature of compensation for, services performed by these officers.
The governor, deputy-governor, and treasurer now serving are retired officers of the Army, and if they can receive
no compensation from the property or funds of the institution they become subject to an exacting service for which
they receive no additional recompense.
But it has been contended that these retired officers are
prohibited by law from receiving the allowances in question.
It has been suggested from sources entitled to the highest
consideration that the articles specified are "pay or emohiments" received ''from the Government" and that their
. allowance and receipt are in violation of an inhibiting
statute.
Is the allowance by the board of the articles designated
prohibited by statutei
Are the articles pay or emoluments received from the
Government of the United States Y
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To answer these inquiries requires an investigation as to .
the origin of the Soldiers' Home and the property and funds
thereof, and as to the statutory limitations to which the
board of commissioners and the officers of the Home are
subject.
Following the war with Mexico came the enactment of
the statute of March 2, 1847 (9 Stat., 149), which, for providing for the comfort of discharged soldiers so disabled by
disease or by wounds received in the service as to be unable
to proceed to their homes and for forwarding destitute
soldiers to their homes, appropriated $500,000.
The act of March 3, 1851 (9 Stat., 595), is, as declared by
its title, "An act to found a military asylum for the relief
and support of invalid and disabled soldiers of the Army of
the United States."
By section 7 it is enacted ''that for the support of the
said institution the following funds shall be set apart, and
the same are hereby appropriated: 'First, the unexpended
balance of the $500,000 above referred to; second, the sum of
$118,791.19 levied by the commanding general of the Army of
the United States in Mexico during the war with that Republic, for the benefit of the soldiers of the United States Army,
regular and volunteers, engaged in that war, but taken
po es ion of as funds of the United States and placed in the
Trea ury; also, all stoppages and fines adjudged against
soldiers; all forfeitures on account of desertion; all moneys,
not exceeding two-thirds, of the hospital fund; the post funds
of military tations; unclaimed moneys belonging to the
e tate of deceased soldiers; and also 25 cents per month to
be deducted from the pay of every non-commissioned officer,
mu:ician, artificer, and private of the Army of the United
State , the same to be deducted by the pay department of
the Army, and passed to the credit of the commissioners of
th a ylum."
.
Ry ,·ection 7 of the act of March 3, 1859 (11 Stat., 434),
h above pay deduction is reduced to 12½ cents per month,
and the name of the institution is changed to that of "Soldier. H me.''
It i tat d that the amount turned over to the Home
from t e appro riation of the act of 1847 was $54,391.23.
The money provided as above shown and some other
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very inconsiderable items coining from the soldiers have furnished the property and funds of the Home.
By section 12 of the act of March 3, 1883 (22 Stat., 565),
the sum of $10,000 is appropriated for the "employment of
additional clerical force to be used in adjusting accounts in
the Treasury Department of those funds which under the
law belong to the Soldiers' Home."
By section 8 of said act all funds of the Home not needed
for current use are directed to be" deposited in the Treasury
of the United States to the credit of the Home as a permanent fund," and interest at the rate of 3 per cent is directed
to be paid thereon.
The act of March 3, 1851~ directed that the officers of the
iustitution should consist of a governor, a deputy governor,
and a secretary (who should also act as treasurer), and that
they should be appointed from the Army by the Secretary
of War on the recommendation of the board of commissioners. The act of March 3, 1883, vests the selection of these
officers in the President, and directs that the treasurer shall
give a bond in the peua.I sum of $20,000.
The act of January 21, 1870 (16 Stat., 62), declares that no
retired officer of the Army shall be assigned to duty, or be
entitled to receive more than the pay and allowances provided by law for retired officers of his grade; but on April
6 of the same year Congress, by a joint re~olution (16
Stat., 372), directed that the act cited above shall not apply
to officer selected for this Soldiers' Home: "Provided, That
they receive from the Government only the pay and emoluments allowed by law to retired officers." In the revisioh of
the tatutes the act and resolution of 1870 were incorporated
into, ect1on 1359, Rfwised Statutes. The proviso was omitted
in th original revi:ion, but came into the second edition by
virtue of the act of February 27, 1877 (19 Stat., 243); so that
a the law now stands the retired officer may be assigned to
this Home as one of the officers required by statute to serve
there, but he can receive from the Government only the pay
and emoluments allowed by law to retire<l officers. As it is
manife t that the articles specified as having been received
y the officers now serving were not pay or emoluments
allowed by law to retired officers as such, the question ariser
wheth r the e article were received " from the Govern56 7-YOL 20--23
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ment." If a retired officer is employed by a private person
or by a corporation, public or private, he may properly
receive payment for bis services. He may give military
instruction in a college and accept cpmpensation from the
college therefor.
He may, except in cases of statutory prohibition, hold a
civil office and receive its emoluments without yielding his
right to those that belong to him as a retired officer, and it
must be held that the officers in question may receive the
articles specified in addition to their pay and emoluments
as retired officers, unless it shall appear that these articles
are pay or emoluments received by them from the Government.
It is not shown that any original appropriation from the
undistinguishable moneys of the United States gathered in
its Treasury, has ever been made to the asylum or Home.
The nucleus of the fund was provided by Gen. Scott, to
whom is credited the inception of the purpose of establishing
tbe institution.
Congress approved the project by creating a board of commissioners to carry it into effect, and by turning over the
moneys levied in Mexico and the remainder of those previously appropriated for the use of our disabled soldiers
returning from that country.
The appropriation of $10,000, by the act of 1883, was noi to
the Home, but was to provide clerical aid to transfer to the
institution "those funds which under the law belong to the
Soldier ' Home."
While some portions of the remainder of the funds coming
to the Home may in one view appear to have been moneys
of the United tate , they came to the Home under the laws
by way of the soldier .
The reports how that prior to May, 1882, the contributions
to the Home from pay of oldiers, fines, and stoppage again t
enli d men, and pay forfeited by de erters, amounted to
3, 0
. 6.
The xt nt of the contributions is sugge ted when we
re
b r that the property now con i ts of over 500 acres
of valuable I nd su1 plied with nece ary and exp n ive building for the u e of the inmate , officer , and a i tant of the
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Home, and, in addition thereto, a "permanent fund" wbich,
on the 30th of September last, amounted to $2,427,986.34.
This permanent fund is not public money, but is held by
the Treasurer of the United States as the banker for the
Home, and 3 per cent interest is paid to the Home for the u:se
thereof.
The equities existing between the Government, represei1tfag the public, and the Home as now existing, appear quite
suggestive]y when we see that an institution, the · needs of
which 200 acres will supply, practically gives to the public
the free use of a beautiful and finely kept park of 500 acres,
and that nearly 10 miles of charming driveways are kept
open to the people of the whole country at a cost, to those
who never drive over them, of $10,000 per year; and these
equities appear even more distinctly when we remember that
the Government still holds in its Treasury moneys that have
belonged to this Home from ten to thirty years which now
aggregate more than $1,500,000, upon which no interest is
paid, and which are withheld because of the cost and trouble
which will attend the settlement of the accounts involved
and the ascertainment of the balance due to th_e Home.
The allowance of supplies of the nature of those now under
consideration to the officers of the Home residing upon the
premises has been the rule ev~r since the Home was founded.
A custom like this, just and reasonable in its results, and not
hown to be in violation of a statute, and which has been
acquiesced infor a long period, acquires the force of law; it
is a practical construction which courts and executive officers
accept and follow.
In the case before us great additional consequence must be
given to the fact that the Committee on Military Affairs of
the Senate, in 1882, made· a thorough and important investigation of the affairs of the Home and submitted an elaborate
report, accompanied with the evidence taken (Sen. Rep. No
-31, 47th Cong., 1st sess., May 3, 1882), and that the act of
March 3, 1883, proceeded therefrom.
From that investigation it appears that quarters for these
re ident officers were constructed in 1870 under the direction of the commissioners and from the moneys of the Home.
I t also appears that quarters, fuel, forage, vegetables,
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fruit, light, and some other supplies were furnished to these
officers by the Home when they were not otherwise supplied
by law.
Although the report criticises with some severity certain
acts of some of the commissioners in permittiug unjustifiable
uses of moneys and products of the Home, there is nothing
therein nor in the law enacted in consequence of that report
to indicate a prohibition or even a disapproval of the use or
consumption by resident officers of the Home of the articles
now being considered.
It must therefore be held that practice, acquiescence, and
Congressional approval have established the construction of
the law that permits the allowances in questiou.
The use of the articles in question as shown is merely an
indirect application of a smaJI fraction of the trust funds to
the benefit of the cestuis que trust.
The e articles when received by a retired officer of the
Army acting a governor, deputy-governor, or treasurer of
the Home residing thereat are not pay or emoluments
received from the Government.
Here, as in most cases of trusteeship, some things must be
left to the di cretion and judgment of those who are empowered to administer the tru t.
In thi ca e the article received must be issued by the
allowance of the board; they mu t not be exce ive in amount
or valu ; th y hould be uch a , in the nature of thing ,
may be readily supplied at th time and place, and uch as
may be properly is ued with due regard to convenience and

in 1 ....
ompen-
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sation had been paid to the treasurer from the funds of the
Home.
The act of 1883, which was the outgrowth of this investigation, not only fails to prohibit or restrict such payment,
but it recognizes the importance of the services of this officer by requiring him to give a bond in the penal sum of
$20,000, for the faithful performance of his duty .
.As the compensation received by the treasurer through
the board of commissioners is not pay or emoluments received
from the Government, it is my opinion that he is not prohibited by any statute from receiving such salary, reasonable in
amount, as the board in its discretion shall grant.
Very respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.

COMMENCEMENT Ol!' DUTIES.
The President having proclaimed March 15 as the date at which the
suspension of free importation of enumerated articles from countries
designated in the proclamation is to take effect, goods shipped prior
to the date when such change takes effect are admitted at the old rate
of duty.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

]J,[arch 17, 1802.
SIR: Touching the time when duties are to be imposed

under the tariff bill of 1890, about which inquiry was made
from your Department of me yesterday evening, I beg to say:
The language of the statute, after providing for the proclamation by the President, is as follows:
"In such cases and during such suspension duties shall be
levied, collected, and paid upon sugar, molasses, coffee, tea,
and hides, the product of or exported from such designated
country, as follows." (26 Stat., 612.) ,
By bis proclamation, the President has fixed March 15
in. tant as the date on which the suspension of free importation of the above-named articles from the countries desig11ated is to take effect. My understanding is that under the
rulings of the Trea ury Department it has been customary,
when the law has been changed, to admit goods shipped prior
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to the date when such change takes effect at the old rates,
and tbis being so, I see no reason for applying a different
rule under this section. Indeed, upon that point I think the
judicial mind would lean to a liberal rather than a rigorous
construction.
Very respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

CHIEF ENGINEERS-GRADES-PROMOTIONS.
The relative rank among the chi'ef engineers changes with tL.eir seniority in that grade, but such change may be indicated by a notification
from the Secretary of the Navy. No examination or appointment
or confirmation by the Senate is necessary.
DEPAR'.l'MENT OF JUSTICE,

March 18, 1892.
Sm: On the 13th ultimo you requested the opinion of the
Attorney-General on the question" Whether in the division of the seventy chief engiueers
into three grades, by relative rank, as provided for in sections
1390 and 1476 of the Revised Statutes, three grades of chief
engineers were created, within the meaning of the word grade
asu ediu sections1493and1496of the Revised Statute , which
provide that no line officer aud no officer not of the line,
shall be promoted to a higher grade on tbe active list until
his phy ical, mental, moral, and professional :fitness therefor
ha been established to the satisfaction of the board of
examining officer appointed by the Pre ident; also whether
upon the advancement of a chief engineer from the third to
the second, or from the second to the first or highest grade of
relative rank, uch officer bould be ubjected to examination
before a board of officer , a required in the ca e of officer
promot d to a higher grade, and given a new commi ion
after c nfirmation by the nate, a is done in the ca e of
11 offic )r of the line, and f all of tho e f the everal taff'
rp ex pt naval con trn tor , civil engineer , chaplain
and pr fe r of math ma i ." (S c .1477, 1478, 1479, and
1
. .)
Secti n 13 of the Revi ·ed tatute is as follows:
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''The active list of the Engineer Corps of the Navy shall
consist of seventy chief engineers, who shall be divided ID to
three grades, by relative rank, as provided in chapter four
of this title;
"Ten_chief engineers;
"Fifteen chief engineers; and
"Forty-five chief engineers who shall have the relative
rank of lieutenant-commander or lieutenant.
"And each and all of the above-named officers of the Engineer Corps shall-have the pay of chief engineers of the Navy
as now provided.
'' One hundred first assistant engineers who shall have th~
relative rank of lieutenant or master; and
'' One hundred second assistant engineers who shall have
the relative rank of master or ensign; and the said assistant
engineers shall have the pay of first and second assistant
engineers of the Navy, respectively, as now provided."
Section 1476 provides as follows:
" Officers of the Engineer Corps on the active list shall have
relative rank as follows:
'' Of the chief engineers, ten shall have the relative rank
of captain, fifteen that of commander, and forty-five that of
lieutenant-commander or lieutenant.
"l~'irst assistant engineers shall have the relative rank of
lieutenant or master, and second assistant engineers that of
ma ter or ensign."
The concluding part of section 1480 is as follows:
"The grades established in the six preceding sections for
the staff corps of the Navy shall be filled by appointment
from the highest·:rpembers in each corps, according to seniority; and new commissions shall be issued to the officers so
appointed, in which the titles and grades established in said
section shall be inserted; and no existing commission shall
be vacated in the said several staff corps except by the issue
of the new commissions required by the provisions of this
i:;ection; and no officer shall be reduced in rank or lose seniority in his own corps by any change which may be required
under the provisions of the said six preceding sections:
Provided, That the is uing of a new appointment and commi. · -ion to any officer of the Pay Corps under the provisions
of this section shall not affect or annul any existing bond,
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but the same shall remain in force and apply to such new
appointment and commission."
These three sections were derived from sections 7 and 10
of the act of .March 3, 1871. (16 Stat., 538.) Section 7 of that
act was as follows:
"That the officers df the Engineer Corps on the active list
of the Navy shall be as follows:
"Ten chief engineers who shall have the relative rank of
captain;
'' Fifteen chief engineers who shall have the relative rank
of commander; and
"Forty-five chief engineers who shall have the relative
rank of lieuten:-1 nt-commander or lieutenant.
"And each and all of tbe above-named officers of the
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By act of March 3, 1859 (11 Stat., 407), chief engiueers of
more than twelve years rank with commanders; chief engineers ofless than twelve years, with lieutenants; first assistant engineers next after lieutenants; second assistant engineers next after masters; third assistant engineers with
midshipmen; but the rank conferred no authority to exercise
military command, and no additional right to quarters.
It is perfectly evident from this history of the grades
among engineers that when the sections 1493 and 1496 were
enacted iu 1864, such grades were notregulated by the relative
rank with tbe line incident to them, but that. the relative rank
was assigned merely for the purpose of establishing precedence between the ::,taff officers and officers of the line and
al. o for the distribution of prize money. By the act of 1864
already referred to a new grade among engineers was created,
that of fleet engineers. When the act of 1864 went into effect,
therefore, the examinations required for promotion from one
grade to another applied in the Engineer Uorps to promotions
from third assistant engineer to second assistant engiueer,
from ::,econd assistant engineer to first assistant engineer,
from fir t assistant engineer to chief engineer, and from chief
engineer to engineer of the fleet. The act of 1871 in effect
aboli bed t,he grade of third assistant engineer and the grade
of fleet engineer, and the question now presented is whether
that act, by providing different relative ranks for the three
divi ions of the chief engiueers, thereby created three different gra<lcs of chief engineers, promotion from one of which
to another was enjoined by the act of 1864 now embodied in
sections 1493 and 1496. Were this a new question and one
which your Department had not already decided by a practice of twenty years, strong grounds might be urged for the
view that it was the intention of Congress by the act of 1871
to create three grades among the chief engineers and to
make new appointments and new commissions essential in
promotions from one to another. The practice of twenty
year , however, can not be lightly overturned, and when
there is grave doubt as to the proper construction, the practice is controlling. The use of the word "grades" in section
1390, in referring to the three different relative ranks of chief
engineers, lends weight to the contention that "grades" as

I
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used in sections 1480, 1493, and 1496 should be held to apply
to the three classes of chief enginee1s. But the fact already
alluded to that the word " grades" appeared. first in section
1390 in the revision of the statutes, and did not appear in
section 7 of the act of 1871, which was the parent section,
weakens that argument very much. It is clear that the
mere fact that different relative rank is assigned to officers
whose office is designated by the same title does not necessarily put ,such officers in different grades. Take the case,
for instance, of a passed assistant surgeon to whom a different relative rank is given from that given to an assistant
surgeon. It was decided by Acting Attorney-General Jenks
(19 Opin., 169) that a passed assistant surgeon and an assistant surgeon are officers of one and the · same grade, but
belong to different classes in such grade. And this conclusion was based on the reasoning of the Supreme Court in the
case of The United States v. Moore (95 U.S., 760).
There is language in the opinion of Attorne.y-General
Devens (16 Opin., 414) which may support the view that
chief engineers are of three different grades, but the question was not before him and bis intimations were in the
nature of illu trations rather than well-considered conclusion • He did not have before him what, as I have said, is
all-controlling in the construction of a doubtful statute-the
practice of the Department for more than twenty year . Were
it now to be decided that the chief engineers are by law
divided into three grades, in promotion from one of which
to anoth r, examination, appointment by the President, confirllll.ttion by the Senate, and a new commission are essential,
it would require that nearly every chief engineer in the first
t, o cla es now acting should be examined, and appointed,
and confirmed by the Senate, though they have discharged
th functions of tho . . e two fir t clas e, and enjoyed the privithereof for many years. It i not o important that
·on truction of a tatute as doubtful as this be exactly
wh' t pongre intended, a that a construction, acted on for
tw nty ye r
hould be upheld. The conclusion follows,
th r for , that th r, de of chief engineer is one grade; that
r m tion to that T d fr m fir t a i tant ngineer requires
x, mination un er
ti n 14 3 and 1496; that the relative
rank among the chief engineer hanges with their eniority
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in that grade, but that such change may be indicated by a
notification from the Secretary of the Navy; and that, as
they hold the same office, no examinatio~ or new appointment or confirmation by the Senate is necessary. The office
of chief engineer remains the same. The relative rank, however, is changed by seniority and notification from the Secretary of the Navy. The distinction between rank and office
is very clearly brought out in the case of Wood v. United
Sta,tes (107 U. S., 414), where it was held that a colonel of
cavalry who was by brevet a major-general, could have his
rank changed by act of Congress, though not bis office.
Very respectfully,
WM. H. TAFT,
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE NAVY•

Solicitor- General.

.Approved:

W. H. H. MILLER.
DIRECT 'r.A.X-SET-OFF OF INDEBTEDNESS OF STATE.
Where through errors overpayments have been made by the United
States to the State of Indiana, it is the duty of the Secretary of the
Treasury to withhold from the amount to be paid to that State under
the refund of the taxes collected under the direct-tax act, a sufficient
amount of money to meet the indebtedness of the State of Indiana to
the United States.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 19, 1892.
SIR: On the 12th of October, 1891, you referred to the
.Attorney-General a letter of the Second Comptroller, in
which that officer requested you to submit to the AttorneyGeneral the question whether in paying to the State of
Indiana the amount of direct tax to be ascertained and paid
under the act of Congress approved March 2, 1891 (26 Stat.,
820), it was your duty to withhold and set off an amount
equal to $46,103.01, which said sum, by the report of the
Third Auditor and· the decision of the Second Comptroller
was found to be due to the United States from the State of
Indiana. The direct-tax act referred to provides in its first
section" That it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury
to credit each State and Territory of the United States~ and
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the District of Columbia, a sum equal to all collections by
set-off or otherwise made from said States and Territories
and the District of Columbia, or from any of the citizens or
inhabitants thereof, or other persons under the act approved
August fifth, eighteen .hundred and sixty-one, and the
amendatory acts thereto."
Section 3 appropriates such sums as may be neceRsary to
reimburse each State, Territory, and the District of Columbia
for all money found to be due to them under the provisions
of the act, and provides that where any of the sums credited
to the States have been collected by the United Sfates from
the citizens, either directly or .b y sale of property, then such
sums are to. be held by the State in trust for such citizens or
their legal representatives.
A second proviso is expressed as follows:
"And provided.further, That no part of the money collected
from individuals, and to be held in trust as aforesaid, shall
be retained by the United States as a set-off against any
indebtedness alleged to exist against the State, Territory, or
the District of Columbia, in which such tax was co1lected."
The term of tbis ·Jast proviso raise a necessary implication
that the power exist in the Secretary of tlie Treasury in
making payment of the claims under this act to withhold by
way of et-off from the payee an amount equal to any indebtedn
due from such payee to the United States, except in
the ·a e fatted in the proviso where the payment is to be
made to the State, not as ihe real creditor, but as trustee for
h r citiz ns from whom the tax had been directly collected.
Th implication in the proviso is, and may properly be
founded on the act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat., 481), which
pro id " Th, t when any final judgm nt recover d against the
Unit d tate or other claim duly allowed by legal authority hall b pre ented to the ecr tary of the Trea ury for
a ·m ut
the plaintiff or laimant th rein shall be
t th
nit d
at in any m, nn r, wh tber a
hall b the du y of the e retary to
h an a unt of u h judo-m nt or
thu due t h
nit
ta
, h, if tb ·I im
·ut a full r 1
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debt. If he denies it, then the Secretary is to withhold
enough in addition to the amount to be set off to cover the
costs of prosecuting the debt to final judgment, and it is
made the duty of the Secretary to cause legal proceedings
to be commenced to enforce the same.
I can not see why the claim adjusted under the direct tax
act in favor of the State of Indiana is not a "claim duly
allowed by legal authority," it having been allowed by the
proper accounting officers of the Treasury, and it having
been lawfully presented to the Secretary of the Treasury for
payment. It is not denied that more than $700,000 of the
payment to be made to the State of Indiana is for money
paid by her as a State and not for money directly collected
from her citizens. This case, then, is not within the proviso
in the third section of the direct tax act, which has been
quote.cl, forbidding set-offs. No reason exists, therefore, why
the amount named should not be set-off if that amount is a
debt due from the State of Indiana to the United States. In
order to determine whether this is a valid debt, it is necessary to make a short statement of the facts on which was
ba ed t.he decision of the Third Auditor and the Second
Comptroller that the amount is legally due. By the act of
July 27, 1861 (12 Stat., 276), it was provided that''The Secretary of the Treasury be, and he is hereby,
directed, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise
appropriated, to pay to the governor of any State, or to bis
duly authorized agents, the costs, charges, and expenses
properly incurred .by such State for enrolling, subsisting,
clothing, supplying, arming, equipping, paying, and transporting its troops employed in aiding to suppress the present insurrection against the United States, to be settled
upon proper vouchers, to be filed and passed upon by the
proper accounting officers of the Treasury."
The act of March 29, 1867 (15 Stat., 9), provided for the appointment of three commissioners, not residents of the State
of Indiana, to ascertain the amount of moneys expended
by the State of Indiana in enrolling, equipping, subsisting,
transporting, and paying such State forces as were called
into service in said State after the 1st day of January, 1862,
to act in concert with the United States forces in the suppression ofrebellion against the United States. These commis•
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sioners were to make a written report to the Secretary of the
Treasury, who was to cause the same to be examined by the
proper accounting officers of the Treasury, and the said officers were to audit the said accounts as in ordinary cases.
.As a result of the examination and auditing of the expenditures claimed by the State of Indiana uuder-the~m two acts, a
large amount of money, aggregating several millions of dollars, was paid in various warrants to governors of Indiana,
and by them deposited in the treasury of the State. The confusion necessarily incident to the immense number of transactions under examination in the accounting offices of the
Treasury Department led to a duplication of vouchers and
to clerical errors, the result of which was that $46,123.01 was
paid to the governors of Indiana and by them deposited in
the treal3ury of the State of Indiana to which the State of
Indiana was not properly entitled by such adjustments.. The
error arose from mistakes in adding columns and in the
duplication of vouchers. The State of Indiana therefore has
in its possession something more than $46,000 belonging to
the United States. It was paid by mistake, and if the two
parties were individuals, the State of Indiana would be liable
in an action of assumpsitforthemoneybelongingtothe United
States thus had and received to the u e of Indiana. There
is no doubt about the legality and equity of a set-off founded
on such a debt.
The agent of the State of Indiana and the governor of
that State maintain that there is still a large amount of
money, aggregating mething more than $1,000,000, due to
Indiana from the United States under the acts of 1 61 and
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Indiana as decided by the Third Auditor and the Second
Comptroller. The error was discovered in 1886, and was at
once called to the attention of the governor of Indiana. The
correctness of the claim then made by the accounting officers
has never been disputed.
Much reliance has been put by the gentlemen representing
Indiana upon an opinion rendered by the present AttorneyGeneral in the matter of a set-off against the claim of the
State of Vermont under this same direct tax act. That case
bas no application here. There the question was whether
certain arms furnished to the soldiers of the State of Vermont to resist an invasion by Confederate forces assembled
on the Canadian border were properly chargeable against
the State as a debt to the United States under the old militia law of 1808. It was held that they were not so charge.
able, because they were furnished for a national purpose,
i. e., of resisting a national invasion, exactly as arms were
furnished to volunteers from other States. Here the debt ·
set-off is a simple overpayment of money into the treasury
of the State of Indiana, and its validity can not be disputed.
I have the honor to advise that you continu·e to withhold
from the amount to be paid under the direct tax act a sufficient amount of money to meet the indebtedness found due
by the Third .Auditor and the Second Comptroller from the
State of Indiana to the United States. If the State of
Indiana is dissatisfied with this decisi9n, she has recourse to
the Court of Claims to enforce there the payment of the full
amount allowed to be due her under the direct tax act of
1891.
Very respectfully,
WM. H. TAFT,
Acting Attorney-General in this O,ise.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

TONNAGE DUES-COMMISSIONER OF NAVIGATION-THE PRESIDEN'l'.
The President is not. clothed with authority to reverse the decision of
the Commissioner of Navigation so as to adjust the claims of Sweden
and N orwa,y for the return of tonnage dues alleged to have been erroneously exacted. Any application for relief should be addressed to
the legislative branch of the Government.
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DEP .ARTMENT OF JUS'l'ICE,

March 23, 1892.
Srn: By documents transmitted the 12th instant I am
-called upon for an opinion as to whether it is now within the
scope of the authority of the Executive to determine and
adju t the claim presented by Sweden and Norway, under
the Rhipping acts of 1884 and 1886, construed with the treaty
of 1827, for a return of sucl1 tonnage dues as are alleged to
have been erroneously exacted since said acts went into
effect, and for a reduced rate of tonnage duty.
By article 8 of the treaty of July 4, 1827, concluded
between the United States and Sweden and Norway (Treaties and Conventions, 1061 ), it is agreed that (with an exception which is not applicable here) neither party shall "impose
upon the navigation between their respective territories, in
the ves els of either, any tonnage or other duties of any
kind or denomiuation which shall be higher or other than
tho. e which shall be irnpo ed on every other navigatiou."
In 1828 the Government of the United Kingdom ought to
impose tonnage taxes upon vessels classified by geographical test , placing lower charges on those coming from the
port of Europe than on those coming from ports of the
United State .
pon th demand of thi country, and after diplomatic
di cu ion, it wash .ld that it wa the purpose of arti ·le
(to u e the word then mployed by Mr. Clay) "to re train
ith r part from d mandiu o- higher or other tonnage duties
e · 'els of the other than tho e which hould be
from th
there-
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America, or the coast of South America bordering on the
Caribbean Sea, or from certain specified islands and the
6-30 cent rate upon all vessels entered from other foreign
ports.
.
Section 3, of the Bureau of Navigation act of July 5, 1884
(23 Stat., 118), so far as applicable, provides, as to the Commissioner of Navigation, that:
'' On all questions of interpretation growing out of the
execution of the laws relating to * * * the collection of
tonnage tax, and to the refund of such tax, * * * · his
decision shall be final."
It was held by Mr. Attorney-General Garland, in an opinion bearing date June 12, 1885 (18 Opin., 197), that the
decision of this officer is fiual '' as to all claims for refunds of
the tonnage tax."
The opinion which I had the honor to submit to the Secre- •
tary of the Treasury, under date of September 26, 1890 (19
Opin., 661), was based upon an inquiry which assumed the
authority of the Commissioner to decide the legality of the
tonnage tax there in question, and the rule as laid down in
the opinion of June 12, 1885, was follow.eel:
The circuit court of the United States for the distrfot of
Oregon in August, 1890, in Laidlaw v. Abraham (43 Fed.
Rep., 207), considered the effect ef the Commissioner's decision under this cla.use, and held that it did not take from an
unsuccessful appellant the right to bring an action in the
courts to review the decision.
The court says that at first blush it may appear that one
paying an illegal tax loses his right to redress in the courts
after an adverse decision by the Commissioner, and adds:
"But, on reflection, I am satisfied that the word 'final' is
u ed in this connection with reference to the Department, of
which tlle Commissiourer is gei1erally a subordinate part.
'' In my judgment, the purpose of the provision is to
relieve the head of the Department from the labor of reviewing the action of the Commissioner in these matters * *· *."
No other decisions ~po~ the question involved have come
undn my notice. .
£ otwitbstanding the treaty of 1827 and the construction
put upon it in 1828, the giving of due weight to the act of
July 5, 1 SJ, and to the foregoing decisions appears to pre56 7-VOL 20--24
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elude the Secretary of the Treasury from repaying tonnage
dµes already exacted in those cases where the Oommi sioner
of Navigation decid es that they ~hould not be refunded.
An applica,tion now of the rule adopted in 1828 wm give
the lower rate to vessels coming to the United State · from
the United Kingdom.
And tl.Jc rule thus applied will at the same time tax our
own ships i::iailing between our ports and those of Sweden
and Norway at the 6-30 cent rate, while these foreign ships
plying between the same ports will come into our ports at
the 3-15 cent rate.
It is improbable that Congress intended to give more advantageous rates to the United K iugdom than to any othen.European nation, and it is quite as improbalJle that a purpose
existed of imposing a lighter tonnage tax upon these foreign
:-;hip than upon our own vessel:;;.
While the case presented here has a connection with the
treaty of 1827, it bear.:: the color of a claim. It is ai claim
for a refund of tonnage dues exacted in accordance with the
laws applied to all other European nations, and seeks the
stabli ·hment ~f a rule that will hereafter give special rate.'
to the Unit d Kingdom.
In tlii conne tion, aud omewhat· to te t the purpo ' e of
Cougre .-, thought may be given to the confu ·ion wllieh may
ari e in our r lations with many natious in consequence of
th 'mo t favored nati n" clau e which o many treati s
ontai11, if th rule upon which this claim re ' t ' shall be ·tabli ·h d.
In 1 7th re wa
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within the enactment quoted, which ma,kes the decision of
the Commissioner final on all questions of interpretation
growing out of the execution of the laws relating to tLe collection of the tonnage tax, and to tbe refund thereof. Of
course it is not intended to advise tLat the Commissioner of
Navigation; if convinced that he has made an erroneous
mling, may not make a different ruling. But it is my opinion
tbat tile construction of the law declared in due course l>y
that executive officer designated by Congress to illterpret
the same ought to be regarded, and that, as this case now
stands, the Executive is not clothed with authority by rcversiug tbat decision to adjust this claim for past exactions.
Any application to be made for relief in the premises
. hould, fa my opinion, be addressed to the legblatirn bra11ch
of the Government. The propriety of tbi8 course is empbaized by the danger of complications likely to follow a different course as above suggested.
Very respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The PRESIDENT.
L\E\IIGRANTS-CRIMINALS-ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
Where immigrants formerly tempor\rily resitling in, the United States,
unt without taking any step::i to become citizens thereof, r eturned to
Italy and were convicted there of crime and served out a sentence
aml upon their discharge were given passports to the United States,
they are not exemp ted from the provisions of sections 2 and 4 of the
act of Ang11st 3, 1882, chapter 376, · and section 1 of the act of March
3, 1891, ch:i pter 551.
It will be safer and better practice not to attempt a definition of the
word "immigrant," but to decide each bse with reference to its particular drcum tances.
DEPAR'.l.':i.VIENT OF JUSTICE,

Mcirch 29, 1892.
Sm : Yom letter of the ~6th iustant, in which you request
the opinion of the Attorne.y-Geueral on the question whetlier
certain immigraut~ are e11titled to land, who some years ago
re ·ided t rnporarily in the United States, ancl" thereafter
re tum <l to Italy, were there convicted of crime and served
out their enteuces of impl'isonrnent, and upon their dis·barge were given passpol't. aud came to tbe United States,
ha· received my consideratio:n.
·
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.Assuming that the persons referred to did not become citizens of the United States, or take steps to that end, it is my
opinion that a former temporary residence in this country
in no way exempts them from the provisions of sections 2
and 4 of the act of .August 3, 1882, and section 1 of the act
of March 3, 1891. .As was said in an opinion by AttorneyGeneral Garland (18 Opin., 500), construing these sections
"The literal seuse of statutes * * * yields to the manifest legislative intent." The intent of these laws is to exclude
criminals from. the country. The exclusion of these persons
does no violence to the lauguage of the statute.
I do not attempt any definition of the term "immigrant,"
as you request. In my opinion it will be safer and more in
accordance with the practice of this Department to decide
each case with reference to its particu1ar circumstances.
The persons described in your letter are to be deemed both
aliens and immigrants within the acts of Congress regulating
the ubject of immigration, and should be returned, as indicated.
Very respectfully,
CHARLES H . .ALDRICH,
Solicitor- General.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

Approved:
W. H. H. MILLER.
RF.ID CLAIM-JURISDICTIO.i: OF PROBATE COURT-UNITED
STATES-RES .A.DJUDICATA.
A claim of ..one Reid to a portion of certain balances of the . ,:frmstrong
fund remaining in the Treasury, considered in the light of his having
obtained letters of acl.ruini tration on the estate of one of the owner
of th brig, because of the de tru tion of which the fund wa appropriat tl, a being a creditor of aid own r, and held that, as that claim
of his being- a r di tor of said o 1vn r had been adjudicated aqver ely
by the tate D partm ·nt t 11 y ar · pr viou ly, the probate court was
, ithout juri diction to appoint I eid administrator, and that the
nited tat
hould int rvcue by way of suggestion to the court,
a. kin th t the letter of admini tration heretofore grant d be
vac,t d. (17 pinion ,590,600,and626;antl19 pinion ,32 follo w d. )
The nit d tat , both a
tru t efor th lawful owner, or if there be
no lawful o '°n r, a ultima haer , i a. proper p rty.
9
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DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

.
April 4, 1892.
Sm: By your letter of lVIarch 14, 1892, it appears that "by
the act of May 1, 1882, the Secretary of State was authorized
and directed to examine and adju~t the claims of the captain,
owners, officers, and crew of the late private-armed brig
General Armstrong, growing out of the destruction of the
said brig by a British force in the neutral port of Fayal, in
September, 1814, * * * and * * * to draw his warrant in favor of said claimants, their heirs, executors, administrators, agents, or assigns for the amount which may be by
him found due to said claimants" (22 Stat., 697), and that,
acting thereunder, Mr. Frelinghuysen, on the 24th of July,
1882, rendered a decision in which he found that by "an
instrument in writing dated December _12, 1885, the owners
of the vessel, comprising fifteen persons and firms, 'in consideration of $1 to each of us (them) paid, and in further consideration of the undertaking of Samuel 0. Reid, of New York,
to bear all the expenses and charges and to perforrri. all necessary services for the collection of the demands hereafter
mentioned,' assigned to said Reid all their interest in the brig
General Armstronq, 'subject to the payment to each of us
(them) of the one-half of any moneys that he may_recoverfor
or on account of said vessel.'" This finding also recites an
instrument in writing dated October 31, 1851, signed by Samuel
C. Reid, purporting to assign to his son, Samuel C. Reid, jr., .
the foregoing interest in the brig Armstrong received by
assignment from the owners. Your communication states
that th~ amount now proved before the Court of Claims to
which amount the appropriation was limited was $70,739, and
that as there was no specific evidence of the relative amount
of interest of each of the fifteen owners, Mr. Frelinghuysen
decided to apportion such interest equally among them. Of
the amount above named, $43,000 was awarded to the owners
of the brig and $27,739 to the officers and crew. Of the amount
awarded the owners, 50 per cent, or $21,500, and of the amount
awarded to the officers and crew, 40 per cent, or $10,095.60,
were paid to Mr. Reid, making a total payment to him for the
pro ecution of the claim of $31,595.60. The decision divided
the $43,000into fifteen shares of $2,866.66 each, and awarded
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to each of the :fifteen owners the sum of $1,433.33, the remaining one-half being awarded to Mr. Reid, as above stated.
You state that Mr. Reid at the time contended that be
was entitled as attorney, agent, and assignee of the claimant •
to the balance of the fund remaining to the credit of the Secretary of State in this case, and that he also claimed to be
indemnified for the time, labor, and disbursements made as
such agent, attorney, and assignee. These claims were
referred to this Department, and au opinion ad verse thereto
was rendered. (17 Opin., 590.) Upon Mr. Reid's reque t,
this opinion w.as reconsidered, and afterwards reaffirmed on
July 31, 1883 (17 Opin., 600). Mr. Reid then urged his right
to be reimbursed for expenses, making the pojnt that the
decision of the Attorney-General covered only ordinary
expenses, and that the expenses for which he sought reimbursement were extraordinary. This claim was referred to
this Department on the 27th of October, 1883,and an adver e
opinion given on the 19th of December, 1883 (17 Opi11.,
626). In June, 1887, Mr. Reid again presented a claim that
he should be allowed, in addition to the proportion stated to
hav been received by him under the decision of the Secretary of State, reimbursement for certain parts of his intere.t
which he allege he a igned in order to raise money to enable
him to pro ecute th claim, amounting in the aggregat to
· ,281. H cont nd cl that the expen es incurred by him in
pro e uting the claim , hould have been charged against ~be
whole fund and deducted therefrom before any distrilmtion "a mad among the claimant . On June 9, 18 7, thi
DeJ.1artm nt decide adver ely to this claim. ( l9 Opin., 3:!.)
It now appear from your c mmunication that on D cember
10 1 !Jl l\lr. J icl procur d letter of adrnini tration from
the, upr m, court of h
i. ri t of olumtia, upon th e tat
of H my oit wbi h be pr nt d n that day to
partm nt au r <Jn :t d I a ·m nt by you of aid
,·h, r iu th Arm trong fund. It al o app c r ' bat
my
oi " . 11 of th fift n wn r · of the brig. Th admini ration i: p1·oc·m·e<l by ~Ir. t i upon r pr
nta i 11 nu de
t th
m· that b wa th ag nt an 1 a t rn , of
it
l · , d in th r . ·u ion f ,', i 1 claim an l tha th
t t
t cl t him th p titi II r; in th
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one-half of Coit's share remaining in the hands of the Department after having been diminished by 50 per cent payment
to l\Ir. Reid as above stated. The petition for administration
state8 that Henry Coit "died in New York City, as petitioner
believes, about the year 1862, * * * and that petitioner
has no knowledge or information that the said decedent ba,s
any legal representatives iu this District or elsewhere." It
is sufficiently disclosed that Mr. Reid is not a creditor of the
e tate of Coit except for services and expenses in connection
with the prosecution of the claim. 'That question was adjudicated by the Secretary of State ten years ago, and bas
since been passed upon four times by the Department of
Justice. You sta,te "if the payment is made to Reid in tbis
ca e, it is presumed that he has equally valid grounds for ·
securiug letters upon the estates of the other unpaid claimants, and so of withdrawing from the Treasury the whole
balance of the fund, which at this time amounts to about
16,000." You submit to this Department the question
whetb.er you are '· legally bound to pay the money to Mr.
Reid as administrator," and ask "for such other advice or
a ·tion in the premises" as this Department may deem proper.
The general principle is that the granting of letters of
c {lmini tration is a matter resting exclusiv~ly in the jurisdiction of the probate court, and its action therein is binding and conclusive, and its legality Cl:LD not be questfone9- in
any other court, nor collaterally impeached for irregularity.
The only exception to this is tbe fact of the death of the
alleged decedent. This proposition assumes that th\ probate court mak.illg the appointment has jurisdiction. As a
ge11eral rule, the court of the domlcile of the deceased is the
court authorized to administer his estate. In rnanyinstances
law · have been enacted providing for administration where
he left property. We do Hot :find any act authorizing the
appointment of administrators in this District by reason of
tlie situs of pl'Operty belonging to the deceased ·within its
limit.. In any event it may be doubted whether a claim
again. t the United States would justify such appointment.
In Wyman v. Halstead (109 U . S., 654), the court held:
~
'' For the purpose of founding administration, a simple con-·
tr, d debt is assets where the debtor resides. even if a bil!
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of exchange or promissory note has . been given for it, and
without regard to the place where the· bill or note is found
or payable.
"Debts due from the United States are not local assets
at the seat of government only."
Mr. Justice Story, in delivering tbe judgment of the court
in Vaughan v. Northup (15 Pet., 1), is quoted as follows (p.
657):

"1,'he debts due from the Government of the United States
have no locality at the seat of government. The United
States, in their sovereign capacity, have no particular place
of domicile, but possess, in contemplation of law, an ubiquity
throughout tbe Union rand the debts due by them are not to
be treated like the debts of a private debtor, which constitute
local assets in his own domicile. On the contrary, the administrator of a creditor of the Government, duly appointed in
the State where he was domiciled at the time of his death,
bas full autbotity to receive payment and give a foll discharge
of the debt due to his intestate in any place where the Government may choose to pay it.
.
Again, the facts show that Mr. Reid has been fully paid.
The only grounds upon which administration can be granted
to him, even if this court bas jurisdiction, is that he is a
creditor.
Hi, claim is also barred by the statute of limitations, and
he is not entitled, by securing bis own appointment as admini trator, to make any acknowledgment of the debt due himself which will remove the bar of such statute.
He is al -o, in my opi11ion, precluded from recovery irre pective of the former rea on sugge ted by reason of the deciion of your Department.
In view of the fa tthat the appointment can n t be attacked
collat rally it eem' a<lvi able that the United State acting
by be ttorney-G neral hould intervene by way of uo·ge. ti n t tbe court, a kin CT that he I tters heretofore granted
a ·at d and s ta ide. Thi can be done wi b ut ubrnitof he

•
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the trust estate, and if Coit died without heirs or real credit.
ors, it is suggested that the United States is the ultima hwresAt least no other power than the State of the cit,izenship of
the decedent could dispute such a right. The legislation of
Congress by which provision is made for the covering of
unused appropriations into the Treasury of t~e United States
at le:;1,st warrants the claim that the Government is the ultimate beneficiary of this fund in the event that no person'
claiming through Coit can be found.
I therefore ad vise that you are not bound to make such
payment, or to recognize the claim of the administrator, but
that it is your duty to refuse so to do. Appropriate action
will be taken by this Department.
Very respectfully,
CHARLES H. ALDRICH,
Solicitor-Genercil.
The SECRETARY OF ST.A.TE.

Approved:

W. H. H. MILLER.

ROCK CREEK PARK-PURCHASE OF LAND-THE PRESIDENT.
The President having declined to certify that the prices assessed by
commissioners of appraisal for lands proposed to be taken for the
Rock Creek Park were reasonaule because the cost was limited by the
act of September 27, 1890, chapter 1001, qreating the park to $1,200,000
and the assessed price would bring the entire cost over that sum, and
the commission, without filing any new map, having asked the President to certify to tbe reasonableness of the values assessed by the
appraisers as to certain of the parcels, proposing by reducing the area
of the park to bring the cost down within the $1,200,000: Held, that
it is competent for the Presiaent to certify whether the prices named
are reasonable or unreasonable, the question of the validity of the
proceeding not being one for the Executive to determine, but a purely
judicial question for the court, as to which no ~pinion is expressed.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 5, 1892.
SIR: By your communication of March 23, I am _
a dvised

of the following facts: Under the act of September 27, 1890,
authorizing the establisbiug of a public park in the District
of Columbia, the Rock Creek Park Commission caused to be
made and recorded a map of said Rock Creek Park, as pro-

378

HON. W. H. H. MILLER.
Rock Creek Park-Purchase of Land-The Pre si<lent.

vided in section 3 of the act; that the commission determined as to each tract what would be a just compensation
therefor, which determination was approved by you.
I am-further advised that, with some of the owners of the
ground embraced within tlle map of said park, the commission agreed as to prices and purchased said tracts; that as
to most of said iands they were unable to make such agreei!i.ents; that thereupon proceeding~ were taken, pursuant to
said act, in the supreme court of the District of Columbia for
the appraisemellt of tbe lands not purchased as provided by
the act, and the appraisements so made having been submitted to you, and the same, together wHh the cost of the
lands purchased, being in the aggregate in excess of the
appropriation, you declined to decide the same to be reasonable, npon tlie grou11d that the limitation of cost to $1,200,000
being a condition precedeut, you bad no power to a.p11rove
selections aud valuations for sa.kl park in excess of that
amount.
You now state, "Thattbe commission, under dateofl\farc-11
11, liave filed with me, aud request that I will approve, tlie
action of the couC't in assessing values as to parcels oflands
witbin the lines originally proposed by them for the park,
with a view to bringing the-cost of the park wit,h in tlle amount
named in the statute providi11g for its e tablishment." In
otlrnr word , I am advised that the comrni 'sion propo e to
so reduce the area of the-contemplated park as to aggregate
only 1, 90.27 acres, and in co t le s than $1,200,000; thi
reduction to be accompJished by abandoning a large number
of tra ·t embraced within the map and in the proceeding
heret fore ha<l.
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-within the amended or reduced lines of the proposed park
are reasonable or unreasonable; these valuations being tlie
·ame fixed by the appraisers appointed by the court, herein'before referred to.
The answer to this question is to my mind by no means
clear. It must, however, have been the intention of Oongres' that your approval or disapproval of the valuations o~
these la11ds should relate to tbe parcels severally, and it was
not the purpose that in so doing you should review or pass
upon the regularity of the proceedings. The validity and
regularity of the preceedings are properly judicial questions;
questions for the court, and not for the Executive. But it
is entirely clear that, unless and until you approve or disapprove of these appraisements, no further proceeding, within
or out of court, can be had. Until you act, the enterprise
top:. U11der these circumstances, and without expressing
auy views as to other legal questions involved, I am of the
opinion that you may proceed to determine, parcel by parcel, whether the valuations of these lands are reasonable or
unreasonable.
Very respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The PRESIDENT.
P. S.-I return herewith all papers in tbe case.
'

IM UGRANT :FUND-SECRE'fARY OF THE TREASURY-ELLIS
ISLAND.
The 'ecretary of the Treasury is authorized to expend from the immigrant fund snch money as may l>e n~cessary for -finishing certain contrac·t and making final payments thereon in connection with putting
Ellis Island in condition for use as a receiving station for immigrants.
DEPAR1':M:EN'.l.' OF JUSTICE,

April 8, 1892.
Sm: Your letter, which bears date tbe 30th ultimo and
relate, to expenditures made on Ellis Island, in New York
Harbor, in connection with putting the same in condition for
u . e a. a receiving station foc immigrants, has received due
co11. ideration.
It i · tated that the improvements are approaching completjon, and that "certain r,ontracts are yet unfinished and
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final payments thereon yet remain to be made," and I am
asked whether you are authorized to expend from the immigrant fund such moneys as are required to properly complete the necessary improvements.
The capitation tax collected from the ship-owners for
each and every alien passenger brought from foreign ports
constitutes the immigrant fund, which is paid into the Treasury. The statute directs tllat this fund "Rball be used, under
the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, to defray the
expense of regulating immigration under this act, and for
the care of immigrants arriving in the United States, for the
relief of such as are in clistress, and for the general purposes and expenses of carrying this act into effect." (22
Stat., 214.)
The Secretary of the Treasury is charged by law with the
duty of executing the provisions of the immigration act quoted
from, ''and with supervision overthe business of immigration
to the United States," and is vested with the general direction and management of all 9f tbe immigration affa.irs of this
Government, and with the general control and application of
the funds pertaining to tho e affairs.
Th
ope of the duties of the head of the Treasury Department in connection with immigration is shown also in the
'' contract-labor" Jaw .
Th act of F bruary 26, 1 85 (23 Stat., 332), provides for
the exclu ion of hired alien , but omits to name an officer to
11force it provi ion ; but the amendatory act of February
2 , 1 7 (24 tat. 414), enact·: "That the Secretary of the
Trea nry i her by charged with the duty of executing the
1 r vi ion. of thi a t,' aucl elaboration i. made of the metho l ' which he is authorized to employ; and thi autlwrity i
.till fl1rtuer r COO'niz cl by OonoTe (25 Stat., 566, 567 · id.
-"). Th act of March 3, 1 91 (26 tat., 10 4), which am nd
, nd onne t with a h oth r tbe variou immjo-ration act
_·t rnl . till further the r pon ibilit of the ecretary of ·
th Tr a. nrv.
t mn t
h 1d th, t 1 ·i. la i n ha cloth d th
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It is well known that Ellis Island is property of the United
States, and that it has been practically dedicated to the uses
of the immigration service.
April 11, 1890 (26 Stat., 670), Congress by a joint resolution directed the Secretary of the Navy to remove the naval
magazine from that island, appropriating $75,000 for the
establishment of the magazine elsewhere.
Said joint resolution concludes as follows:
"And the further sum of seventy-five thousand dollars, or
so much thereof as may be necessary, is hereby appropriated,
to ea able the Secretary of the Treasury to improve said Ellis
Island for immigration purposes."
The" sundry civil" appropriation act of 1890 (26 Stat., 372),
carries the following item:
''For Ellis Island, New York: For improvements upon the
island for the business of the immigration service, seventyfive thousand dollars."
The" deficiency act" of March 3, 1890 (26 Stat., 861), makes
an appropriation for furniture for the'' immigration buildings,
Ellis Island, New York."
Aud the "sundry civil" appropriation act of 1891 (26 Stat.,
949) contains the following pantgraph:
"For Ellis Island, New York: For completing the building
and other improvements on Ellis Island, and for procuri_ng
the uecessary transportation facilities to and from said island,
the sum of one hundred thousand dollars, or so much thereof
as may be necessary in addition to the head-money heretofore or hereafter applied to that purpose, be, ·and the same
is hereby, appropriated and made immediately available, and
the said sum shall be reimburse<l, in installments of twentyfive thousand dollars per annum, from the head-money,
license privileges, and rentals received at the port of New
York."
It will be seen that Ellis Island was, under the direction
of Congress, relieved from its former public charge and turned
over to the Secretary of the Treasury to improve for immigration purposes. Appropriations were made from the miscellaneous moneyR in the Treasury for the contemplated
improvements which were necessary to fit the island for the
"bu 'iness of the immigration service," and, in addition to
these appropriations of $150,000 (besides the · furniture pro-
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visiou), there was loaned to the immigration fond for completing the building and other improvements and to procure
transportation facilitie.s $100,000, which is to be paid lJack
in four annual installments out of the head-money aud other
receipts of the immigration business. (26 Stat., 949.)
It is qnite significant that Oo11gress Joans tLis $100,000 for
tLe purposes designated "in addition to the hecicl-nwney heretofore 01· hereafter appliecl to that purpose."
Not on1y is the separate and special character of theimmigraut fund made plain, but the previous applkation of its
moneys and their contemplated future use by the Secretary
of the Treasury in providing the improvements is distinctly
recognized with apparent approval.
Iu view of tlle general 8Cope.of the powers given by law
to the Secretary of the Trea ury in imrnigrntion affairs, and
of the control given to t!ia., t officer oyer the imrnigTant fu11d,
and in view of the statutory provi ·ions for irnproviug Elli·
I 'land and completing- its bui1<lings and appurtenance for
the governmental Hse to wllich tbe i ' laud is now devoted,
and e ~p cially i11 view of the statute last cited, ,d1iC'h not
only, as above, Hi.lllctiolls such u -e, but distinctly treats the
h ad-money a tlrn primary fund available for making such
improverneut by 1· qn iri11g- tlie ~, 100,000 appropriated ancl
1 ancd for that pnrpo ·e to be repaid out of ·uclt beadmon 'Y·, it i. my opinion that th
ecretary ii;; authorized
to < xpcncl from th immigTm1t fund . nch ~011cys a: are
r<·qnir d to prop rly cornpl t the neces ·a ry improv ment .
\,' th fo1Iowing- opinion , 11 retoforc tran mitt cl to the
, '<'crdar.v of th Tr a ·nry, r la,t, i11 part to th pow r po .- .-.·< <l by him y virtn' of tllr immigTc tion law., aiHl 11av
an import:mt b , riug npon th qnr. tion now ·01vi<1 r d T
be 0 • to call tltr111 to yonr att II ti 011, • s foJI w :
Opi1iio11. c1at ·<l F, ruar
!JO (1D Opin. 4 0) · pm1on
clat <l • pril 1.3, 1 :)1 • id., d, t •cl ,Tuly ..., 1 1; id. dat d
0 ·tolwr rn, 1 n1.
r l'I'Y I'P. 'JI
•tf'n1) r
W. . TI. ~ IILLE .
TlI , E JI E'l'AH • , TIU, ' TIE ' RY.
1
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ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
An opinion will not be given by the Attorney-General whe.re it docs not
appear that some question exists calling for the action of tho Department requesting it.
DEPAR1'MENT OF JUSTICE,

April 28, J 802,

Your communication of .April 23 instant, asking an
opinion as to the proper construction of certain railroad land
grants made by Congress to the State of Minnesota, b~s
received my consideration.
I do not perceive that the questfons presented relate to any
matter that calls for t.he action of the Department of the
Interior. On the contrary, it Reems quite evident, from your
letter, that those questions relate to a matter which is now
before Congress, and that action with reference to it is contemplated by Congress, and not by the Department of the
Interior.
If I conectly understand your relation to the matter in
question, it seems quite clear that I can not pass upon the
q 11e. tions submitted without stepping outside of the limits
which tbe law has thrown around me .
.: ection 356, Revised Statutes of the United States, provicleR that "the head of any Executive Department may
require the opinion of the .Attorney-General on any questfon of law arising in the admi?-iistra,tion of his Department.
Accordingly, where the head of a Department, at the request
of a Senator, asked the opinion of Attorney-General Brewster upon a certain Senate bill, the Attorney-General declined
to giye an opinion on several gronndR, one of which ,ms that
no que:tion of law was presented that had arisen in the
aclmiui 'tration of the Department by whose hea,d the opinion
l1ad been requested. (J 7 -Opin., 357. See also 6 Qpin., 24;
18 Opin., 77, 107; 19 Opin., 7, 331, GD5.)
1' nrthermore, the questions propounded are judicial in
cliaracter, and must be decided by the courts, if decided at
q,11, and therefore an expression of opinion on them by me
would have no more weight than the opinions of any unofficial per. on (19 Opin., 56; 13 Opin., IGO). But the law 111tcnded
that the opinion of the Attorney-General should have
outlwrit.11, and this object can only be accomplished by conSIR:
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fining them to questions strictly appertaining to executive
administration. It is true the law does not say what effect
shall be given to the opinion o~ the Attorney-Genera.I, yet the
general practice of the Government has been to follow it, and
this for the reasons stated by Attorney-General Cushing (6
Opin., 334), namely, that an officer gojng against it ''would be.
subject to the imputation of disregarding the law as officially
pronounced," and that, without "the guidance of a single
Department of assumed special quali:fieations and official
authority," uniformity and stability in the application of the
laws would pe hardly attainable.
Very respectfully,
CHARLES H. AL_DRICH,
Acting Attorney-General.
The SECRET.A.RY OF '.l.'HE lN'.I.'ERIOR •

.ATTORNEY-GENERAL-QUESTION OF FACT.
The Attorney-General declines to express· an opinion to the Postmaster_
General on the question whether a certain publication is within the
description of matter which the statute denominates second c]a s, upon
the ground that it is a pure que tion of fact, which it is the province
of the Postmaster-General to decide.
DEP A.R'.I.'MEN'.l.' OF JUSTICE,

Jlfay·3, 1892.
Sm: e tions 10, 11, and 14 of the act of March 3, 1 79
(20 tat., 359), chapter 1 O, entitled "An act rnakiu<>' appropriation for the ervice of the Post.Office Department for the
:ti aly ar ndingJunethirtieth,eigbte011hundredandeighty
aud for oth r purpo e ," provide as follows:
" EC. 10. That mailable matter of the econd cla
. ball
emura all n w,'pap r and other periodical publi ation
which ar i ue 1 at . tat cl int rval , a d a fre<1u ntly a four
tim , y ar and , r wi hin the condition nam d in ectiun
12 and 14.
1
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through the mails at 2 cents a pound or fraction thereof, such
postage to be prepaid, as now provided by law.
"SEC. 14. rrirnt the conditions upon which a publication
shall be admitted to the second class are as follows:
"First. It must regularly be issued at stated intervals, as
frequently as four times a year, and bear a date of issue and
be numbered consecutively.
"Second. It must be issued from a known office of public,ation.
'' Tbird. It must be formed of printed paper sheets, without board, cloth, leather, or other sul>stantial binding-, such
as distinguish printed booktfor ·prc•servation from periodical
publications.
"Fourth. It must be originated and published for the dissemination of information of a public character1 or devoted
to litera,ture, the sciences, arts, or some special industry, and
having a legitimate list of subscribers: P.rav,ided, however,
That nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to·
admit to the second-class rate regular publications designed
primarily for advertising purposes, or for free circulation, or
for circulation at nominal rates."
My opinion is asked upon the point whether a certain
publication called Printers' Ink is a publication" designed
primarily for advertising purposes or for free circulation or
for circulation at nominal rates," and also whether this publication is shown, by the facts stated, to have "a legitimate
list of subscribers."
After having given due consideration to your communication submitting these questions, I am unable to perceive that
they involve any matter of ht,w.
I do not understand the questions submitted as indicating
any doubt in your mind as to the meaning of the several provi ions of tbe statute to which you direct my attention, but
your ole difficulty appears to be whether the publication
called "Printer's Iuk" comes within the description of matter which the statute denominates "second elass."
Thi , in my judgment, is a pure question of fact, upon which
I am not at liberty to expre s an opinion, under the law.
ection 356, Revi ed Statutes of the United States, provide that ' The head of any Executive Department may
require the opinion of the .Attorney-General on any quesM 7-VOL 20--25
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tions of la;W arising in the administration of his Department."
From the foundation of the Government down, this limitation has beeu imposed on the Attorney-Genera], ancl I, in
common witjl my predecessors, have generally obeyed it.
In 'my opinion of October 21, 1890 (19 Opin., 673), I declined to give the Secretary of the Interior an opinion upon
the question whether certain persons had establislled "their
rights to citizenship in the Choctaw Nation," on the ground
that it was a pure question of fact.
In his opinion of March 5, 1875 (14 Opin., 541j, AttorneyGeneral Williams decliued to exptess an opinion as to whether
a certain steamboat had been impressed by the military
authorities, upon the ground that au impressment of property was '' simply a conclu ion of fact to be deduced from
other facts established by the evidence," and, therefore, that
the determination of tbe question submitted '' appeared to
be a matter not appropriate to, or at least not falling within,
the duty of the Attorney-General."
In reply to the question what constitutes "a regular publication primarily designed for advertising purposes" under
ection 14 of the said act of March 3, 1879, submitted for
opinion by the Postmaster-General, Att~ney-General Devus aid (16 Opin., 304, 305):
"I fear that I hall not be able to define the e terms
(which are in them elves simple and intelligible) so as to aid
you in th deci ion of the varioa question whi h are before
you a. to th charact r of individual publication . .
The <lifllcuW pr ented ·cem to me to be ntir Jy a to
a u :tion of fa.ct with which the Po tma t r-Geueral nm t
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that class upon which tllere is conflicting evidence, certain
circumstances indicating an intention to publish a journal
valuable for literary or scientific purposes, certain others
indicat,ing an intention to employ the same Journal for advertising purposes. It is impossible, however, to lay down a
rule of law in the matter. The fact must be found by the
Postmaster-Genera l from such evidence as he may be able
to obtain, connected with his own experience and that of his
ubordinates, so as to determine in each case whether the
publication concerning which the question arises is in the
first or second class."
I do not overlook the fact that Attorney-General Legare
(4 Opin., 10) did undertake to define_ what was a newspa,per,
at the request of fue Postmaster-General. The question
submitted was not dealt with by him as a question of law,
and there is nothing to show that his attention had been
directed to the question of his power to give an opinion on
a matter of fact. Under these circumstances, and in view
of the consideration that the law is settled, in this Department at least, that the Attorney-General can not pro1jerly
decide questions of fact, I must decline to follow the precedent set by my distinguished predecessor.
In 'order to meet the question presented in the demand of
the publishers of '' Printer's Ink" that it be passed through
the mails as second class matter, you have to determine
three questions of fact:
First. Is this document "originated and published for the
di semination of information of a public character, or
de voted to literature, science, or art, or some special ind us try t"
'econd. "Does it have a legitimate list of subscribers t"
Third. Is it issued "primarily for advertising purposes
at 11ominal rate f "
These, as already tated, are questions of fact, which you,
not I, must determine. These facts being found, the law is
plain.
I re 0 -ret that I :fi.ncl it to be out of my power, under the
law: to aid you in determining these questions of fact wl1ich
appear to involve difficulty.
Very respectfully, your obedient serva,n t,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The POST::\1.AS'l'EH.-GENERAL.
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TREATY OF WASHINGTON.

Article XXIX of the treaty of Washington was terminated two years
after the date of the giving of the notice provided for in Article
XXXIII.

DEPARTMEN'.I.' OF JUSTICE,

May 6, 1892.
SIR: The following is a copy of an opinion I gave you
some months ago in response to your verbal request totrnhing the proper construction of certain articles of the treaty
of Washington. I send this in response to your personal
inquiry of the 4th instant.
Respectfully, yours,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The PRESIDENT.
The treaty between the United States an<l. Her Britannic Majesty, concluded at Washington, May 8, 1871 (twenty-ninth article), rea<ls as follows:
"It is agreed that /01· the term of years mentioned in .tfrticle XXXIII of
this treaty, goods, wares, or merchandise arriving at the ports of New
York, Boston, and Portland, and any other ports in the United State
which have been or may, from time to time, be specially designate<l by
the President of the United States, and destiued for Her Britannic
Majesty's possessions in North Arnerfoa, may lrn entered at the 1iroper
cnsto1n-ho11se and conveyed in transit, without the payment of dntie ,
throu"'h the territory of the United States un<ler such rules, regulnt10n ,
and conditions for the protection of the revenue as the Government of
th United tate may from time to time prescribe; and under like rules,
r gulation , and conditions, goocl , wares, or merchandise may be conveyed in tran it, without the payment of duties, from uch po e:; ions
throuo-h the territory of the United States for export from sai<l Jlort of
the nitecl tates.
·

..
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merchandise arriving at Canadian ports destined for the United States
may pass through Canada without the payment of duties; (4) merch::mdise may be conveyed from the United States without the payment of
duties to ports in Canada for export, and (5) merchandise from the
United States, destined to other points in the United States, may be carried through Canada.
The :first and second and the third and fourth of those provisions give ·
reciprocal ad vantages to the citizens of the two countries; but the fifth
gives an advantage to the carriers of Canada to assist in carrying fro~
one point to another point in the United States, while the carriers of
the United States are not, by its terms, permitted to assist in carrying
the merchandise of Canada from one point in Canada to another point
in Canada.
It was agreed that this-the twenty-ninth article-should be in force
" for tbe term of years mentioned in Article xxxn1."
It will be observed that tbere is no reference here to .any manner,
way, or process of terminating these provisions. 'l'he sentence qu_!?ted
above has relation only to "time," "perio(l," and in no sense to " manner" or "method."
.Article xxx1n of tbe treaty is as follows:
"The foregoing Articles XVIII to xxv, inclusive, and .Article xxx
of this treaty, shall take effect as soon as the laws required to carry
them into operation shall have been passed by the Imperial Parliament
of Great Britain, by the Parliament of Canada, and by the legislature
of Prince Ed ward's Island on the one hand, and by the Congress of the
. United States on the other. Such assent having been given, the said
articles shall remain in force for the period of ten years from the date
at which they may come into operation; and further, until the expiration of two years a.fter either of the high contracting parties shall have
given notice to the other of the wish to terminate the same; each of
the high contracting parties being at liberty to give such notice to the
other at the end of the said period of ten years or at any time afterward."
This article treats both of "t,ime" and "manner." The "time," at
lea t, is the sum of ten years and two years. The" manner" is the recognition of the right to terminate, and the giving of a notice which shall
terminate the duration of certain articles. Therefore, I have concluded
that it was the intention of the contracting parties that the duration
of .Article XXIX should be dependent upon the existence of articles
namecl in XXXIII, and that no method independent of the termination
of .Articles XVIII to xxv was given for its termination . .
Section 2 66, Revised Statutes, indicates very clearly that the legislative opinion contemporaneous with the conclusion of this treaty was
that Article XXIX and the articles named in xxxnI were to have the
same duration .
. ection 2866, Revised StatuteR, is taken from section 4 of the act
approved March 1, 1873, entitled '' Au act to carry into effect the treaty
between the Unitetl States and Great Britain, signed in the city of
Wa hington the 8th day of May, 1871, relating to the :fisherieR."
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Section 2866, Revised Statutes, is as follows:
"From the d:1te of the President's proclamation declaring that he has
evidence that the Imperial Parliament of Great Britain, the Parliament
of Canada, :1nd the legislature of Prince Ed ward's Island have passed
laws on their p:1rt to give effect to the provisions of the treaty of Washi11gton of ~fay eighth, eighteen hundred and seventy-one, as contained
· in nrticles eighteen to twenty-fiv·e, inclusive, and :1rticle thirty of said
tre~ty, and so long as said articles remain in force, according to the
terms and conclitions of article thirty-three of said treaty, all goods,
wares, or merchandise arriving at the ports of New York: Boston, aucl
Portland, and any other ports in the United States which have been
or may, from time to time, be speci:1lly designated iiy the President of
the United States and destined for Her Britannic Majesty's possessions
in North America, may be entered at the proper custom-house and conveyed in transit, without the payment of duties, through the territory
of th!-') United States, under such rules, regulations, and conditions for
the1)rotection of the revenue as the Secretary of the Treasury may, from
time to time, prescribe; and, under the like rules, regulations, and conditions goods, wares, or merchandise may be conveyed in transit, without the pn,yment of <l.utics, from such possessions, through the territory
of the United St:1tes, for export from the said ports of the United
States."
This section relates only to Article XXIX of the treaty, and in it we
find that it is to remain in force as long and only so Jong as Article
XVIII to xxv and Article xxx are in for<·-e.
It i claimed. that the debate in the Senate on the passage of the joint
re olution approved M:uch 3, 18 3, entitled "A joint resolution providing for the termina.tion of articles numbered XVIII to xxv, inclusive,
and Article .Txx of the treaty between the United States of America
and II r Britannic Majesty, concluded at Washington, May 8, 1871,"
indicate that it was not the pnrpose of Congress, at least, to abroga_te
Article x, ·1x of the treaty. That contention is based upon the fact that
the words "so far as it relates to the articles of said treaty to be terminated" were added to the third section of the joint resolution as an
amendment.
That. ection sought to repeal the act of Congress of March 1, l c'i3
and th section of the R vi ed t::ttntes numbernd 2 66, but it will be
notice,1 that thia tatute and section cea ed to be operative at the time
of the abrogation of Articl XVIII to xxv and xxx without repeal. The
JH'OYi ion. of th• section w r not ·ontinniug, but were dependent upon
th
xi tcnce of th se article of the treaty (article 1 to 25 and arti1 30) and when they w re terminat d the law ceased to exi t by it
owu t rm·. .Tor could it be revived. or continued by the lancruacre usecl
in the arn n<.lm •n t th third s ·tion of the j int re olution of 1. rch
3 1·
h v quot d.
ngr
thought that om lecri lation wa
ne . arr tha with .·i tin 1, law would cnrr. into eff ct th pr vi ion of
th tw nty-ninth articl anti na t d what i now
ti n 2 6-. Tl1 .col•
pnq o. of thi
c· 10n i to h· • fl' ct to thi, art' l . It tr at' fno
th ·r ubje t. But for th rticl it pa ·• ge would not ber quired, aud

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

·391

Consular Jurisdiction-Service of Sen te nc e.

as its passage was made necessary by the conclusion of the treaty, so itR
duration should correspond with-the duration of the article that required
its enactment. Hence, Congress made the statute contemporaneous, as
to the time of its taking effect and the time of it.s repeal, with the
period that the twenty-ninth article should be in force. Congress, therefore, said it (sectfon 2866) should remain in force "so long as said articles
(18 to 25 and 30) remained in force." Believing at the time of the enactment of section 2866 that Article xxrx terminated with the last-named
articles, it merely provided that the provisions of the statnte intended .
to make Article XXIX effective should terminate when it terminated.
I have, therefore, concluded that Article xxrx was abrogated two
years after the date of the giving of the notice provided for in Article
XXXIII.

CONSULAR JURISDICTION-SERVICE OF SENTENCE.
The appropriation act of 1891 authorized the expenditure of no money
for a prison house in Chinai except at Shanghai. The question having
arisen whether a sentence could be served outside the limits of the
jurisdiction of the consul who imposed sentence: Held, that while it
is properly a question for the consul himself to decide and does not
belong to the Attorney-General, yet as the Secretary of State has been
requested by the consul for advice in the matter1 the Attorney-General
advises ihat the -sentence of imprisonment imposed in any of the consular courts of China may be served out in any portion of China and
not necessarily within the limits of the consul's ordinary jurisdiction.
Whether the coi;i.sul's jurisdiction is limited to the cognizance of mat- ·
ters occurring within the territory nearer his consulate than to any
other consulate of the United States in China the Attorney-General
does not decide, as it is not a proper question for him. to answer.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 7, 1892.

Sm: I have yours of March 5, 1892, by which jt appears
that an American sailor, named Harkaway, belonging to
the U. S. S. Alert, then in the harbor of Amoy, became
intoxicated while on shore on leave and assaulted and beat
three_ Chinese citizens, one of whom was then, November,
1891, employed in the British consulate. Subsequently upon
complaint duly made, the accused pleaded guilty and was
entenced by the consular court to pay a fine of $~5, or in
default to be imprisoned for twenty-five days. There being
no pri on at Amoy the accused was dispatched with the U. S.
marshal to the consul-general at Shanghai, with proper commitment, who confined him for one day in the jail there and
then released him without application therefor, and on his own
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motion, for the reason, as given, that he had no jurisdiction
to there hold in custody a person convicted in another consular jurisdiction. This action was taken upon the supposed
authority of certain opinions of this Department.
The opinions referred to are those of February 4, 1875
(14 Opin., 522); of August 14, 1889 (19 Opin., 377); and June
17, 1890 (not reported).
.
You state that there is but one consular jail in China and
six consular courts; that you have construed the appropriation act of _1 891 (26 Stat., 1061), which provides for the" actual
expenses of renting a prison at Shanghai for .American convicts in China seven hundred and fifty dollars, and for the
wages of a keeper of such prison eight hundred dollars"
* * * "and for the purpose of paying for the keepiug and
feeding of prisoners in China, Corea, Japan, Siam, and Turkey nine thousand dollars" * * * to mean that no
money is to be·spent for a prison house except at Shanghai,
and that the second provision is for the sustenance of prisoners and hire of keepers only.
You request an opinion supplemental to those referred to
upon the followmg points, viz:
1. As to the correctness of the construction of the appropriation act above indicated.
2. Whether in the light of the treaty and statutes conferring judicial powers on one consul in China and providing
fi r the exerci e of tho e powers, each consul's judicial function are limited to the cognizance of matters occurring
within the territory nearer to his consulate than any other
con ulate of the United States in China.
3. Whether the law intends that the sentence of impri onm ut impo eel by a con ular court in China must be enforced
an l erved out within the limits of the consul's ordinary
juri:diction, and not in any other portion of China where
pri. n ac mm dati n have been provided for by law.
ll int rJ retation given to the appropriation act is, in my
r in i n th ri ht on
ec. 4121 evi ed Statute , authoriz l th >r ·iden~
' \ 11 n pr vi i u
th rwi e made, • • • to
all w in th , ju t n
the account of each of the
r
n ul , th , tnal exp n e of the rent of nitllil lin a or part of uiltlin r,· to be u ed a pri on for
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.American convicts in those countries, not to exceed in any
case the rate of six hundred dollars a year; · and also the
wages of the keepers of the same, and for the care of offenders,
not to exceed, in any case, the sum of eight hundred dollars
:per annum. But no more than one prison shall be hired in
Japan, :(our in China, one in Turkey, and one in Siam, at
such port or ports as the minister, with the sanction of the
President, may designate, and the entire expense of prison
and prison-keepers at the consulate of Bangkok, in Siam,
hall not exceed the sum of one thousand dollars a year."
Section 4122 provides :
"The President is authorized to allow, in the adjustment
of the accounts of the consul-general at Shanghai, the actual
expenses of the rent of a suitable buildiug, to be used as a
prison for American convicts in China, not to exceed one
t housand five hundred dollars a year; a,nd also the wa,ges of
the keepers of the same, aucl for the care of offenders, not
to exceed .five thousand dollars a year; and to a,llow, in the
adjustment of the accounts of the consuls at other ports in
China, the actual expenses of the hire of constables and the
care of offenders, not to exceed in all five thousand dollars a
year."
These are substantial reena,ctments of various statutes
pas:ed at different dates, and, so far as they relate to the
subject of consular prisons in the Chinese Empire, are, to
say the very least, suspended by the act of 1891, above
~eferrecl to. .At the present time but one prison is provided
for prisoners convicted in our consular courts in China,
which must be located at Shanghai and may cost $750, not
being limited to $600 as provided by section 4121, supra.
The later act (1891) so designating Shanghai is, in my
opinion, "provision otherwise made," and it would not be
competent to hire four prisons in China. This is made clear
by the general language of the later act describing the buildin g a "a prison at Shanghai for American convicts in China,"
tbus comprehendillg the entire Empire.
Your econd questiqn is not one upon which I feel at liberty
to express an opinion, being limited as I am by section 356, ·
Revi ed Statute , to questions of law arising in the adminis.
tration of the Executive Departments of the Government.
The juri diction of consuls as courts is a judicial question,
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subject to review by regular appeal provided by statute, and
any oph1ion thereon would be beyond the power conferred
upon rne, and might be regarded as an invasion by the executive branch of the Government of another and independent
branch, so far as judicial functions are exercised. Moreover,
as no ca e appears to have arisen requiring a decision of thi
question, it appears to be purely by})Othetical.
Your third question is also one for the decision of the consular courts; but as you are called upon by the consul for
advice in the matter, although not strictly within the line of
my offidal duty, I advise that it be answered in the negative.
.Assuming that there are in China six consular courts
invested with judicial power to try and sentence offender
and assuming, but not expressing any opinion to that effect
that each cou, ul is limited in jurisdiction to a particular di ·
trict of the Empire, ' till, as there appears au intention on the
part of the law-making power to sustain but one place for
the confinement of such offenders, it follows that a pri oner
convicted in any one of these courts cau be ent to uch
prison, without reference to the fact of its being situated
within or witl1out the supposed territorial jurisdiction of tbe
consul pa sing the sentence.
It is not um1 ual in our jurisprudence for a prisoner to be
condemn d to ,· rve a entence in another di trict of the
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COMPENSATION-EMPLOY£S OF THE WEATHER BUREAU.
By the acts of October 1, 1890, chapter 1266, and of March 3, 1891, chapter 544, the Secreta,ry of Agriculture is authorized to reduce the compensation of any pen;on in the Weather Service trausferred from the
War Department to the Department of Agriculture, ancl he i~ also
authorized to appoint any person transferred to one of the $1,500 places
specified in the latter act, and to promote to the vacancy created by
such appointment any other person of tlH1 transferred class, although
the salary of this promoted person becomes increased.
DEPA.RT:tv.:ENT OF Jus·rrcE,
Jl{ay 24, 1892.

SIR: Your communication of the 16th instant, relating
to compensation of employes of the Weather Bureau, has
received due consideration.
The questions which you present depeud upon the construction and force of certain provisions of the act of October
1, 1890 (26 Stat., 653), and that of March 3, 1891. (Id.;1044.)
The principal purpose of the act of October 1, 1890, was
the transfer of the Weather Service from the War Department to the Department of Agriculture.
That act established the Weather Bureau in the Department of Agriculture on July 1, 1891, and placed the Chief
thereof under the direction of the Secretary of that Department.
The Bureau is in charge of the Chief, and is entitled to
such nece sary civilian employes as Congress may annually
provide for.
Section 5 directs the discharge of such portion of the enli ted force of the Signal'force as shall not, upon their election, be transferred to the Department of Agriculture, and
aid section further proviu.es that"The compensation of the force so transferred shall continue as it shall be in the Signal Service on June thirtieth,
eighteen hunctred and ninety-one, until otherwise provided
by law: Provided, That' skilled observers serving in the Signal Service at said date shall be entitled to preference over
other persons not in the Signal Service for appointment in
the Weather Bureau to places for which they may be properly qualified until the expiration of the time for which they
were la t enlisted."
Section 9 enacts that '' It shall be the duty of the Secre-
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tary of .Agriculture to pre1:>are future estimates for the
Weather Bureau which shall be hereafter specially developed and extended in the interest of agriculture."
The agricultural appropriati.on act passed March 3, 18!)1,
refers to the transfer made by the act of October 1, 1890,
and carries for salaries and expenses of the Weather Bureau
the sum of $182,380, and the paragraph relating to this
appropriation concludes as follows : ·" and the Secretaty is
hereby authorized to make such changes in the personnel of
the Weather Bureau, for limiting or reducing expenses, as he
may deem necessary."
The concluding paragraph of said act relates to general
expenditures for the Bureau, "under the direction of the
Secretary of .Agriculture, for the benefit of agriculture,
commerce, navigation," etc, and provides for "salaries
of forecast officials, observers, assistant observers, operators, repairmen, and other necessary civilian employes outide of the city of Wa, hington," and for other specified
expen e , and for tho, e of "officers and employes when
trav 1ing on business connected with the Bureau," and for
" a!aries (including twenty local forecast official , at $1,500
each)."
I am informed that nearly all of the enli ted· men of the
ignal Corp r ferred to in ction 5 of the act of 1890 were
tran ferr d to the
partmeut of .Agriculture and went upon
it rolls at the ame rate of compen ation, respectively, that
they had r .ceiv d prior to the transfer.
ovember 19, 1891, the Secretary, with intent to ultimat ly bring the Wea th r Bur au force within the cla ified
ervi , dire t d that in m, 1 ing appointment and promotion th r after the followin · grades hould be ob erved,
4
66 , 72 , · 40, , 1,000, 1,2 o, 1,400 61,600,
0.

C ll·
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Upon the transfer a great diversity of compensation vas
found to exist among the men transferred June 30, 1891, arising mainly from petty differences in Army pay, rations, and
commutations, and an adjustment of these salaries, without
essential change in amount, but in accordance with the grading stated, was found to be desirable. Consequently, the
transferred men have been classified under said grading.
It is understood that such grading and arrangement is a
step in the process of classifying the em ployes in question,
under the third subdivision of section 6 of the civil-service
act of January 16, 1883 (Supp. Rev. Stat., 395, 2d ed.), and
that such employes as have not been promoted receive no .
higher compensation than formerly.
I am assured that those who were transferred and who
now receive higher rates of compensation than they received
at the time of their transfer (and who were not appointed to
tbe $1,G00 places mentioned), have been promoted to the
places they now occupy under the .established practice of
the Department.
The current accounts of the Department of Agriculture,
when presented to the accounting officers of the Treasury.
Department, exhibited upon comparison the changes made
in compensation without explaining the occasion or grounds
thereof.
Thereupon, under date of May 12, 1892, the First Oomp·troller writes: '' It is noticed that in your account for general
expenses, Weather Bureau, now before this office for adjustment, the compensation of several of the transferred employes
has been increased beyond the amount received by._them in
the Signal Service for June 30, 1891."
The right of the Secretary of Agriculture to promote, or
to appoint any of the persons transferred, to positions where
they will receive bigher rates than they received at the date
of tlle transfer (except the individuals appointed to the
specified $1,500 places), is placed in question.
It fa a general rule of administration which applies to
each of the Departments, that the head thereof fa authorized, within the lines of law, to prescribe regulations for the
government of his Department, the conduct of its officers
and clerks, the di tribution and performance of its business,
and to employ such numb.er of clerks, employes, and other
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sub9rdinates, and at such rates of compensation, respectively, as may be authorized by law, and to control, subject
to the enactments, the promotions which shall be made in
his Department.
By the act of February 9, 1889 (Supp. Rev. Stat., 641), the
Department of Agriculture is made an Executive Department and included within section 158, Revised Statutes, and
the provis~ons of title 4, Revised Statutes, are made applicable to the new Department.
It is claimed, and the circumstances of the transfer give
stren°th to the claim, that the provision of section 5 of the
act of 1800, continuing compensation, was intended as a protection to the men transferred, and not as a limitation of the
right which they would o~herwise possess by reason of being
employed in a service giving opportunities for promotion.
It would be contrary to reason and to the analogies of the
puolic service if it were to be held that persons who had
become skillful by long experieuee should, without fault1 ue
precluded from ad van cement because of their former service,
while new appointees, les qualified by experience to serve
the Government, l10ultl become entitled to promotion in
po 1tion and compensation as changes and vacancies occur.
It will be noticed that ·ection 5 especially recognize the
right of kill cl ob erver of the Signal Service to preference
for appointment to place for which they may be qualified;
, ml al. o, that the act of 1 91 gives the Seer• tary authority
t make, uch ·han°·e in the per omiel of the Btueaufor limiting r reclucing xven e a he ma, deem nece,. ary.
U pon th ]eo-i lation referr d to and the related fact and
proc •eding·. it i m
inion that th ecretary of Ao-ri tiltnr i: anthoriz cl tor due th ·om1 en ation to be paid to
any of th p r:on. tr, n. fi rred, ·o a to
nform the ame to
th 0 Ta<li11 o- adopt d.
It i my opini 11 al o
·r tary wa not nly
an lwriz cl t ar point, n r p r: u tran. f rr d t
. ·1,5 plac· :1 e ·ifi ,(1 ut i wa: within hi,
w r t pr rn t to the Yac·an<"y ·r , t cl by . uch appointm nt an · th r
JI •1:. 011 f Ji • tra11. f' 'IT <l tla :, although th
f thi
pr m >t 11 p ·r~ n h' ·am in ·r a. c1.
ti. m · opi11i l1 hat , moT
<li<l 11
I r on. tr,rn ·f IT •cl fr m th· ,,·ar
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Wea.ther Bureau of the Department of Agriculture June 30,
1891, from the privileges or the benefits of promotion in the
service to which they were transferred.
Very -r espectfully,
·
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE.

DISTRICT ATTORNEYS-COMPENSATION.

AU. S. district attorney is entitled to receive for making inquiry ancl
examination under section 838 of the Revised Statutes in a seizure case
which is reported by the collector and afterwards tried or disposed of
before the court, such sum as the SecTetary of the Treasury shall deem
just and reasonable, upon the certificate of the judge; and the receipt
of such sum will not preclude him from ·recovering those fees under
section 824, Revised Statutes, to which he would otherwise be entitled.
DEPARTMENT OF JUS1'ICE,

May 28, 1892.
Sm: In your communication relating to the appliration of
sections 824 and 838 of the Revised Statutes, you present
two accounts of the U. S. district attorney named which
arise in conuection with three several cases of seizure
for viola,tion of the statutes against smuggling. Tbe items
of both accounts relate respectively to three cases bearing
corresponding numbers, each account carrying one item in
each case. The three cases were prosecuted in the district
court.
Account A presents a charge of $5 in the first case and
one of$10 in each of the other cases, and designates the cfaim
a one for "Fees under section 824."
Acconnt B presents a charge of $50 in each case under
, ection 838, and designates the claim as one for "Fees for
ervices in preparing for trial certain cases wherein forfeittires were incurre.d * · * * ·for violations of the laws
* * * relating to customs revenue." * * *
.A. ccount A is shown to have been duly and formally approved by the comt, and Account B is duly certified by the
juclge uefore whom the cases were disposed of.
·
Tll "three ca. e under con ideration were severally reported
to the district attorney by the collector of customs, and the
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proceedings for which compensation is sought were commenced in pursuance of such reports.
The. statutory sections designated appear in the chapter
of the judiciary title which relates to fees, but came from
different sources.
Section 824 comes from the act of February 26, 1853 (10
Stat., 161), which establishes a fee bill in lieu of compensation theretofore allowed by law to attorneys and other specified officers.
Section 838 had its inception in the customs act to prevent smuggling, passed July 18, 1866 (14 Stat., 179), and
was amended and extended so as to include int,ernal-revenue ca~~s by the act of March 3, 1873 (17 Stat., 580), and
upon the revision became the section named.
The questions presented oy the facts submitted are these:
:First. Is the district attorney entitled to receive, for making inquiry and examination under section 838, in a revenue
case which is reported by the collector and is afterwards
tried or disposed of before the court, such sum as the Secretary of the Treasury shall deem just and reasonable upon
the certificate of the judge¥
Second. If the first inquiry is answered in the affirmative
and an allowance shall be given to the officer under section
838, is be precluded from receiving those fees under section
824, to which he wonld otherwise oe entitled¥
The upreme Court ha held that while the statements
made and the opinion advanced by the promoters of an act
in the legi lative body are inadmissible as bea,1ing upon it
con truction, y t reference to the proceedings of such body
may properly be made for information of the exigencie '
whi ·h occa:ioned the legi lation aud the reasons for the
en ctment.
3 , Re i ed Statute ·, came into existence a
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It was stated by Senator Morrill, of Maine, who had
charge of the bill, that the measure was prepared at tbe
Treasury Department, its main feature being to amend the
statutes to prevent smuggling. (Seep. 2563, part 3, Cong·.
Globe, first session thirty-ninth Congress.)
Some of the provisions of the bill were debated in the
Senate at great length, but the seventh section was adopted
without controversy, although many amendments were made
therein. (Id., p. 2568,)
The most important amendment made was that which
directs that in case the district at,torney decides not to prosecute "he shall report the facts to the Secretary of the
Treasury for his direction."
The record does not show that any question was raised as .
to tbe scope or effect of section 7 in the House of Representatives, and this section was enacted without controversy.
The section as enacted appears, 14 Stat., 179.
March 20, 1871, Mr. Poland, of Vermont, introduced in
the House of Representatives a bill to amend the "Act to
prevent smuggling," and the same was sent to a committee.
January 30, 1872, the bill was reported back with recommendations for amendments.
This original bill provided that internal-revenue cases, as
well as customs cases, should be ieported to the district
attorney and acted upon by him, and contained this clause:
"And for the expenses in.curred and services rendered in all
such cases, the district attorney shall receive and be paid
from the Treasury such sum cis the judge before whom such
ca e are tried or disposed of shall certify is just and reasonable."
The committee recommended that after the word "as," the
-paragraph should read as follows: "the Secretary of the
Trea ury shall deem just and reasonable upon the certificate
of the judge before whom such cases are tried or disposed of."
Said amendment was duly incorporated in the bill, which
wa immediately passed. (P. 712, part 1, Cong. Globe, sec-ond e ion Forty-second Congress).
,vhen the bill was considered in the Senate, Senator
Edmunds, who had the same in charge, stated in relation
thereto, in ub tance, that it placed the law as to the compen. ation of district attorneys of the United States in
5G 7-VOL 20--26
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customs cases and internal-rnvenue cases "upon exactly the
same footing." The bill was the;eupon passed by the Senate. (P. 1250, part 2, Cong. Globe, third session, Forty-second Congress.)
The act became a law March 3, 1873 (17 Stat., 580), and
upon the revision became incorporated with several minor
changes into section 838 of the Revised Statutes.
It will be noted that section 15 of the act of January 22,
1874 (18 Stat., 189), makes it the duty of collectors of customs to promptly report violations of the customs laws to the
district attorney, who, if he deems that the. complaint can be
sustained,. shall cause investigation to be made before a
U. S. commissioner, and shall initiate proper proceedings and
prosecutions.
'
It will be noted, also, that by the act of 1866 it is provided that "the district attorney shall receive such allowance as the Secretary of the '11reasury shall deem just and
reasonable, upon the certificate of the judge before whom the
prosecution was had," and that by the act of 1873, after adding internal-revenue cases to customs cases, it is provided:
"That for the expenses incurred and. services rendered in all
such cases the district attorney shall receive and be paid from
the ~I.1reasury such sum as the Secretary of the Treasury shall
deem just and reasonab:W, upon the certificate of the judge
before whom such cases are tried or disposed of."
It will be noticed that by section 3085, Revised Statute ,
wliich provide compensation for df trict attorneys in certain
cu~tom ca e. ; the phraseology of the act of 1866 is ub t:mtially adopted by aying that" they shall receive such allowance a the Secretary of tbe Trea. ury shall deem ju t and
r a ouable, upon the certificate of the judge before whom
·uch pro ecution wa had."
ctiou 3 direct the di 'trict attorney to can, e lJroper
proeeeding- to be commenced and pro ecuted for fine ', p naltie , and forfeitur in ca e of the violation of any law of
h
nit cl 'tate relative to th revenue, 1ml', upon
inquiry an l exa nination he hall lecid that, ueh proc d' n n pr uably l> u. taiu •cl, or tllat the nd: of pnblic
ju ti
lo 11ot r q nir t]iat :n ·h pr c· ding. hou]cl b in. titut d · in whi •h tc: h
hall r 1 or
h fa ·t · in ·n t mca . t th
•r ary f th Tr ury and in int rn, I-rev1
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enue cases to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for .
their direction; "and for the expenses incurred and services
rendered in such cases the district attorney shall receive
and be paid from the Treasury such Rum as the Secretary of
the Treasury shall deem just and reasonable, upon the certificate of the judge before whom such cases are tried and
disposed of."
.
In the words last quoted this section adopts the words of
the act 0£ 1873 instead of those of the act of 1866, or of section 3085, Revised Statutes.
Many rulings and decisions have been made upon the
application and construction of the phraseology·of section
838, and of that of the enactments that are merged therein,
as l:o the compensation of district attorneys. It is asserted
without being contradicted th~t the practice of the Treasury
Department, ever since the passage of the act, of 1873, has
steadily supported one constrnction, although there are indications of efforts to change the practice.
In Keasbcy's Case, which is reported 1 Lawrence, dee. 172
(1880), the construction now under consideration was discussed at considerable length.
The fees in the cases involved, authorized by section 824,
hai:l been previously paid.
Mr. Secretary Bristow is alleged to have expressed the
opinion that the act of 1873 applies only "where the case in
question has been 'tried or ·disposed of' by the certifyi~g
judge." He also says that the compensation intended is
only for services rendered which a·r e not subject to charge
under the fee bill of 1853; and Mr. Secretary Sherman is
stated to have approved o·f' the same construction.
Mr. Assi tant Secretary of the Treasury French is here
quoted as saying that if the fees of .the district attorney for
the calendar year "do not exceed six thousand dollars he
may receive pay for certain services under Rections 838 and
3085, Revised Statutes, both of which seem to relate to fines,
penalties, and forfeitures, and cover the same class of
cases."
He then states that the First Comptroll~r is understood to
hold that under said sections only fees for preparation before
trial can be allowed, inasmuch as the fee bi11 provides for
and fixe the fees for service in court.
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It is held (p. 182) that "the construction which has been
given in the Treasury Department to section 838, Revised
Statutes, will be adhered to."
This is the subst~nce of the case, although comments are
made which detract somewhat from the force of the Comptroller's decision.
The question was again considered in Leake's Gase (2 Law.,
dee. 431, 1881}, where the district attorney claimed $1,500
for legal services in the inquiry, examination, and preparation for trial (but not for trial itself) in the district court of
cases known as the " Match Bond cases." The cases were
tried and disposed of in court and the judge certified to the
fee claimed.
The practice of the Treasury Department in allowing payment only for preliminary services in cases that are afterwards tried or disposed of before the court is practically
asserted.
·
In Oonnoly's Gase (4 Law, dee. 45), which came before the
Comptroller in 1883, that officer ruled substantially as he had
ruled in Leake's Case.
It was stated repeatedly in these ca,.es (outside of the
question actually passed upon) that a United States attorney
was entitled to compensation for preliminary examinations
in cases that were not tried or disposed of before the court
or judge, and these statements became a disturbing element
in the practice of the Treasury Department. Subsequently
the question was sharply presented and clearly rul ed upon
in the District Attorney's Case (5 Law., dee. 138, 1884). In
this case the amount included charges for services preparatory to trial in cases that were tried, and also for services
in cases that were not tried or disposed of before the judge.
It was held, first, that the statute of 1873 (now section 838)
did not allow compensation for services during the trial
in addition to the regular fees payable under ection
824, and, second, that said section did allow for services and
expenses preparatory to trial in cases that were tried and di posed of before the judge, in addition to the fees allowed
under the foe-bill (p. 139).
It is stated that Keasbey's Case, and the like case were
tried and disposed of by a judge, that fees had been allowed
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under section 824 and that the only question arising under
them was as to the allowance of an additional fee for examination preparatory to trial. It is then held that the established construction of the Department justifying such allowances should not be changed.
In 1884 Mr. Secretary Folger (30 Int. Rev. Rec., 61) says:
'· My attention having recently been called to the proper
construction of section 838, Revised Statutes, I have, after
careful consideration, decided to reaffirm what I find to have
been the deliberate rulings of my predecessor:s in 1874 and
1877, viz:

*

*

*

*

*

*

~, Third. That said section does allow compensation 'for
the expenses incurred and services rendered' preparatory to
trial in addition to the regular fees allowed under section 824
in cai:.;es 'that are tried or disposed of before' a judge, and
which are 'prosecuted for the fines, penalties, and forfeitures
in (each) case provided."'
In 1886 (32 Int. Rev. Reci, 405) Assistant Secretary Fairchild, referring to Mr. Secretary Folger's decision with evident approval, says:
<, It is held that said section 838 does not allow compensation for services in cases 'not tried or disposed of before the
judge,' but does allow compensation' for theexpensesincurred
and services rendered' preparatory to trial, in addition to the
regular fees allowed under section SU Revised Statutes, in
cases that are 'tried or disposed of before a judge.'"
In May, 1891 (37 Int. Rev. Rec., 158), Assistant Secretary
Nettleton declares the ruling of the Department to be that,
"The services for which allowances can be made in cases
tried or disposed of before a judge were only the services
rendered in preparing the cases for trial, in contradistinction
to the services that had previously been provided for in the
fee-bill, now section 824 Revised Statutes;" and he declares
that this has been the uniform rule of the Department since
the act of March 3, 1873.
It thus app~rs that it has been the unbroken practice and
the practical construction of the Treasury Department for
nearly twenty years, that allowances can be made to district
attorneys for services performed in preparing for .the trial of
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cases that are afterward. di po ed of before the judg : u ·h
allowance to be ind pendent of the fee allowed by ecti n
824.

The two que~ tions considered in this opinion have b n
touched upon many times by executive and judicial officer
in connection with a contention that has exi t d, viz wh th r
a di trict attorney may be paid under section 3 for inve. tigations made in case in which no proceeding are ever
initiated in any court; but that contention is not involv d
in either of the three cases submitted, and, therefore, i not
before me.
On account of that proper d ference which orderly procedure in official affairs require. to be conceded to precedent
the determinations heretofore made by head of tbe Trea ·ury
Department upon the questions under con ideratiQn mu. t be
held to be conclusive. No authority to change the la tlm
establi bed can ordinarily be recoo-nized unle,R Congre: or
a court of controlling juri diction hall declare a different
con truction.
.
The Supreme Court has said (142 U. S., 621) that contemporaneou con truction given by an Executive Department,.
and continued through different administrations thereof
though incon i, tent with the literalism of the act, hould be
con idered a decisive of the suit.
It is tated (138 U.S., 572) that "in all case of ambiguity, th contemporaneous construction, not only of the
courts but of the departments, and even of the official who e
duty it i to carry the law into effect, is univer ally held to
be controlUng."
In my opinion it is_ established for all purpo e of pre ent
exe utiv . action, that the di trict a torney is entitled under
section 3 to receive, for the preliminary inve ti ation made
in a h of the three ca e pr . ented uch sum a the ecr tary f the 'Irea ury ha11 d em ju t and rea ·onable upon
the ertifi ate of the judge.
It i. nJ 'O my opinion that the receipt of such um will not
pr lu l him from receiving tho, e fe
under ection 24 to
whi ·h he oulcl o herwi. e be ntitled.
Very re pe tfully,
W. H. H. l\IILLER.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

'
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REMISSION OF REVENUE TAX-SEAL SKINS.
The tax of $2 prescribed by section 1969, Revised Statutes, can not be ·
remitted upon skius taken from seals killed by the natives for food,
but shipped by the lessee company.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 14, 1892.
SIR: Your letter of June 9, instant, presents for considera-

tion and opinion the question whether the Secretary of the
Treasury has the right to "remit" to the North American
Commercial Company, the lessee of the United States of the
exclusive right of taking seals on the islands of St. George
and St. Paul, in the Territory of Alaska, the revenue tax prescribed by section 1969, Revised Statutes, "upon skins killed
last year for food by the natives prior to the date when the
modus vivendi took effect." You say that these skins, 1mmbering some 6,000, were "taken by the company as merchantable skins," by which I understand you to mean that they
were received by tbe company from the natiyes, and that it
is claimed for the company that tb.ey were not subject to the
revenue tax because they "were known as food slcins."
Section 1969, Revised Statutes, provides that "in addition
to the annual rental required to be reserved in every lease,
as provided in section nineteen hundred and sixty-three,
a revenue tax or duty of two dollars is laid upon each furseal skin talcen and shipped from the islands of Saint Paul and
Saint George during the continiuince of a,ny lease, to be paid
into the Treasury of the United States," etc.
It seems to me that as tb.e skins in question were '' taken
and shipped" from these islands by the lessee company it
:-;hould pay the tax, the fact that these skins were taken from
. eals captured by the natives for food or clothing being
immaterial, for' whether captured by the lessees or the
natives, jt is the former alone that can ship them. from the
island.
Moreover, to hold that all skins obtained from natives as
'food skins" are to be free would be opening a door and
offering a premium for an evasion of the tax, as all skins
thus obtained wou1d .be $2 cheaper than those talrnn regularly under the lease.
I do not think such a construction of the law warranted.
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For quite twenty years this is the meaning that bas been
put on the statute by the Treasury Department and the former lessees, and it would seem to be too late now to contend
for a different interpretation.
Very respectfully; yours,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

DISMISSAL OF APPEAL-INTEREST AND COSTS.
Where an appeal of the Government in a customs case is dismissed and
the order and mandate is silent upon the subject of interest, no interest
can be paid or allowed.

JUSTICE,
June 14, 1892.
Sm: I have yours of June 7, inquiring whether the case
of J.l farine v. Robson, dismissed at the last term of the
Supreme Court, is one falling, so far as relates to the payment of interest and costs, within the scope_ of the letters
of August 7, 1891 (Treasury Synopsis 11616), and December 10, 1891 (Treasury Synopsis 12171).
The importation, which involved the dutiable character of
a painting imported by Mr. Robert Garrett, was made
August 25, 1890, ·and the protest thereunder was duly
passed upon by the Board of General Appraisers, under
the provisions of the act of June 10, 1890. The court held
the painting not subject to duty, as being an antique and
part of a collection of antiquities. From this decision an
appeal was directed both to the circuit court of appeals for
the fourth circuit and to the Supreme Court, there then
b i:lio- an uncertainty as to the proper construction of the
act e, tabli hing the circuit courts of appeal with reference
to appeals in customs cases. Through some misunder tanding or oversight the appeal was not taken to the circuit
court of appeals but was taken to the Supreme Court of
the nited tate . Afterwards it was decided tb'at in uch
ca e the app al hould be taken to the circuit court of
ap e, 1 , and the ca e was di missed from the Supreme
C urt upon motion of the Government, no one opposing.
DEPARTMENT OF
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It is the practice of the Supreme Court to allow interest as
damages where it affirms the judgment in a customs case.
(Schell v. Cochran, 107 U.S., 625.)
When, however, a dismissal takes pla·ce as to this case,
and the order is silent upon the subject, no interest can be
paid or allowed. (Schell v. Dodge, 107 U.S., 629.)
The measure of the payment in each case will be found in
the order and mandate of the Supreme Court.
Such cases do not fall within the scope of the letters
referred to.
Respectfully,
CHARLES H. ALDRICH,
Solicitor-General.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
Approved:
W. H. H. MILLER.
OCEAN MAIL SERVICE-PAYMENT.
Where a contract is made with a company for carrying foreign mails,
pursuant to tlie act of March 3, 1891, chapter 519, in vessels of the
third class provided for in that act, but the Secretary of the Navy
accepts the vessels as of the fourth class but not of the third class,
the company is not entitled to pay at the rate of $1 per mile, as provided for in section 5 of said act for the third class of vessels nor at
the rate prescribed in said act for fourth-class vessels, but must
receive its com~nsation under section 4009 of the Revised Statuteti.
DEPARTMENT , OF JUSTICE.

June 16, 1892.
SIR: In your letter of June '3, 1892, addressed to the
Attorney-General it is stated that the Pacific Mail Steamship Company is under contract with the Post-Office Department to carry the ocean mails agreeably to the provisions of
an act entitled '' An act to provide for ocean mail service
between tbe United States and foreign ports, and to promote
commerce," approved March 3, 1891, for a period of ten
years from February 1, 1892, in steamships of the third class,
at the maximum compensation provided for in said act ($1
per mile), from New York to Colon, upon the schedule time
of six and one-half days for the outward voyage. Two of
. the vessels offered by the company for said service, and
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designed for temporary use only, until they could be replaced
by new steamers, failed to meet the speed tests by the fraction of a knot each, to wit, one showed a speed of 13.75
knots and the other of 13.12 knots, and, by means of the
failure, were not reported to your Department as having
been accepted by the Se:cretary of the Navy as ships of the
third class, in accordance with the provisions of section 4:
of said act, but were accepted by him as ships of the fourth
class. It is stated that from the commencement of said
. contract, the mails have been carried from New York to
Colon within the contract schedule of six and one-half days.
The company demands pay for the service thus performed at
the contract,price of $1 per mile, as provided by section 5 of
said act, which, so far as it relates to compensation for such
service, is as folJows:
" Sec. 5. That the rate of compensation to be paid for
such ocean mail service of the said first-class ships shall not
exceed the sum of four dollars a mile, and for the secondclass ships two dollars a mile, by the shortest practicable
route, for each outward voyage; for the third-class ships
shall not exceed one dollar a mile, and for the fourth-class ships
two-thirds of one dollar a mile for the actual number of miles
required. by the Post-Office Department to be traveled on
each outward-bound voyage."
You request an opinion whether you ·can +awfully pay to
the company the _c ontract price of $1 per mile for the service of these ships, thus failing to meet the . requirements of
the act, or whether you shall pay therefor, as being performed without contract, under the provisions of section
4009 Revised Statutes.
Under the provisions of the act of March 3, 1891 (£6 Stat.,
830), your powers are limited.
A certain adverti ·ement must precede your contract. The
ve. els employed are required to be American-built steam' hip. or owned, officered, and regi tered in conformity with
exi ting law . They are divided into classes. It is required
by ·tion 3 that '' the third class hall be iron or steel steamhip , apable of maintaining a peed of fourteen knot an
hour at ea in rd.inary weather, and of a gro s regi tered
t nage of not le .. than two hou and :five hundred tons."
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Sec. 4 is as follows (26 Stat., 830):
"SEC. 4. That all steamships of the first, second, and third
classes employed as -above, and hereafter built, shall be constructed with particular reference to prompt and economical
conversion into auxiliary naval cruisers, and according to
plans and specifications to be agreed upon by and between
the owners and the Secretary of the Navy, and they shall be
of sufficient strength and stability to carry and sustain the
working and operation of at least four effective rifled cannon
of a caliber of not less than six inches, and shall be of the
highest rating known to maritime commerce. And all vessels
of said three classes heretofore built and so empl9yed shall,
before they are accepted for the mail service herein provided
for, be thoroughlr inspected by a competent naval officer or
constructor detailed for that service by the Secretary of the
Navy; and such officer shall report in writing to the Secretary of the Navy, who shall transmit said report to the Postmaster-General; and no such vessel not appmved by the
Secretary of the Navy as suitable for the service required,
shall be employed by the Postmaster-General as P!Ovided
for in this act."
Unless a vessel inet these requirements as to speed, and
had been approved by the Secretary of the Navy, you could
not by express contract engage it in this service at the compensation provided in this act. Such speed and approval
are conditions precedent to any right to act under the contract. Having entered into a contract under this act, you
have no power to accept any vessel not meeting these conditions, and service performed in vessels not doing this can
not be paid for under this act, or any contract entered into
thereunder. To hold otherwise would enable a head of a
Department to waive the positive provisions of the statute.
The company must therefore receive its compensation·under
section 4009, Revised Statutes, referred to by you.
It has been suggested that, inasmuch as the vessels were
approved by the Secretal'y of. the Navy as belonging to the
fourth class, payment might be made at the rate allowed vessels of that class. The objection to this view is found in the
fact that you advertised for proposals for third-class service.
and your contract with the Pacific Mail Steamship Company
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is for service of that character. This has exhausted your
powers until you have again advertised and received public
bids. (15 Opin., 556.) Vessels ca.n not be engaged under this
act in the fourth-class service without proper advertisement
and opportunity for competitive bids. ,
Very respectfully,
CHARLES H. ALDRICH,
Solicitor- General.
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL.
Approved:
W. H. H. MILLER.
\
REFUND OF DIRECT TAXES-INTEREST AND PENALTIESCOSTS.
Under the aet of March 2, 1891, chapter 496, interest and penalties are
collections and should be repaid, but costs should not be repaid.
Where redemption of lands held for direct taxes was made the party
in interest should have a repayment of the tax penalties and interest
paid by him for such redemption. The act supersedes the provision
of the appropriation bill of March 3, 1883, inasmuch as it is now the
duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to repay not merely the surplus
but the entire amounts collected under that law and brought into the
Treasury.

DEPARTMENT

JUSTICE,
June 29, 1892.
Sm: Your letter of June 11, instant, inclosing the letter
of Hon. I ham G. Harris in reference to the refund of direct
taxe und~r the act of March 2, 1891 (26 Stat., 822), was duly
received.
In that letter you say:
"To ummarize: The tax proper having been refunded to
the several State , I desire your opinion as to whether additional credit should be given"First, for the interest;
" econd, for penalties;
"Third, for co ts attending the collection to the several
St te and Territorie ;
ourth what amount hould be credited, where redempn made under the act of June 7 1 62, and the
extending the time of uch redemptions; and,
OF

t
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"Fifth, whether or not the act of March 2, 1891, repeals
the act of March 3, 1883; and, if so, shall the several States
be credited with the surplus produced at the sales over and
above the amount of the interest, penalty, and costs; and if
said act is not repealed, whether or not said surplus shall be
held in the Departme!it to be paid out under the act of March
3, 1883."
By the act of Congress approved August 5, 1861, and the
acts amendafory thereof (12 Stat., 294), provision was made
for collecting a direct tax from the several States arnl Territories and the District of Columbia for the purpose of carrying on the war. By the States and Territories upholding the
Union, and by the District, this tax was generally paid; .but
by the States in insurrection such payments were not made.
Under the machinery provided in the act, large amounts in
some of these insurrectionary States were collected by distress and sale, including considerable sums ~for penalties,
interest, and costs, as prescribed in the law.
The first section of the act of Congress of March 2, 1891,
reads as follows:
"That it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury
to credit to each State and Territory of the United States
and the District of Columbia a sum equal to all collections
by set-off or otherwise made from said States and Territories
and the District of Columbia, or from any of the citizens or
inhabitants thereof, or other persons under the act of Congress approved August fifth, eighteen hundred and sixtyone, and the amendatory acts thereto."
Section 2 reads as follows:
"That all moneys still due to the United States on the
quota of direct tax apportioned by section eight of the act
of Congress approved August fifth, eighteen hunured and
, ixty-one, are hereby remitted and relinquished."
By subsequent 'sections of the act the matter of such payments and credit is regulated, and provision is made for
giving the benefit of such repayments to individual citizens
from whom collections have been made.
Your first and second questions, viz, whether this act
requires the repayment of penalties and interest collected,
are, I think, free from doubt. The language of the law
require you to give credit to each State, Teri;itory~ and the
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District of Columbia for a "sum equal to all collection b
set-off or otherwise made from said 8tates and Territori/
~nd the District of Columbia, or from any citizens or inhabitants thereof, etc." That interest and penalties are collections within the meaning of this language seems to me too
clear .~or reasonable question. To thfs view it is objected
that if payments ~ad been promptly made interest would
not have accrued and penalties would not have attached
and this is true. But it is not to be forgotten that at th~
time this tax was assessed and due, the condition' of the
people in many of these States, notably along the border,
was most embarrassing; they were between two fires, not
to speak of the fact that they were generally in desperate
:financial straits. Their situation was such that to pay the
tax was to incur the charge of disloyalty and danger of punishmeut at the hands of the de facto Confederate Government, and to 1.·efuse to pay the same was to incur the like
charge and danger of punishment at the hands of the de
j'ure Federal Government. At any rate, it seems to me that
it was the plain purpose of Congress, in this act, to restore
to these States and people the moneys which had been, '
under the color ·of this tax, brought into the Federal Trea ury. The legislation is an act of liberality on the part of
the Government, and should be literally construed.
Second. The same reasons for the restoration of costs of
collection do not seem to me to obtain. The costs presumably have been paid out as compensation for services rendered in collection. They have not come into the United
States Treasury at all, and therefore there is no equity in
demanding their repayment. It is unlikelythatitwas within
the legislative purpose that the Government should reimburse, either to the States or individuals, the moneys thus
expended. To do so is not to pay back something which ha
been paid into the Treasury by these people, but to pay them
money derived from other sources of taxation on account of
moneys taken from them for fees or costs, and from which
the Government has received no benefit. Your third que ·
,, tion is answered in the negative.
Third. Your fourth question seems to be substantially
answered by what has already been said. Where, under the
act of June 7, 1862 (12 Stat., 422), redemptions of land ,
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held for direct taxes were made, the same principle heretofore
announced should be applied, and the party in interest should
have a repayment of the tax, penalties, and interest paid by
llim for such redemption.
Fourth. In my opinion, the act of March 2, 1891, supersedes the provision in the appropriation bill of March 3,
1883. That provision reads as follows: .
"The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized and
dhected to cause to be audited by the proper accounting·
officers of the Treasury, and paid, the claims of the original
owners of lands which were sold for nonpayment of United
States direct taxes, for the surplus proceeds of the . same,
under the provisions of the act of August fifth, eighteen
hundred and sixty-one, and for such purpose the sum of one
hundred and ninety thousand dollars, or so much thereof as
may be necessary, is hereby appropriated."
By this enactment it was made the duty of the Secretary
to repay to the original owners any surplus proceeds of property taken under the direct.-tax law of 1861, and an appropriation was made for that purpose. By the act of March 2~
1891, it is· made the duty of the Secretary to credit or repay,
not merely the surplus, but the entire amounts collected
under that law and brought into the Treasury, and an
appropriation of such sum as may be necessary is made for
that purpose. The greater, of course, includes the less, and
the act of 1891 being· passed, the act of 1883 is superseded.
Respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.

The

SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

IMMIGR.A'fION

ACT-CUSTODY OF
.APPEAL.

IMMIGRANTS

PENDING

By the immigration act steamship companies are held responsible for
the custody of immigrants pronounced to belong to the prohibited
classes by the Commissioner of Immigration at Ellis Island, pending
proceedings on appeal or habeas corpus.
Shipowners, chargeable, as above stated, with the safe custody of aliens,
may detain them at some suitable place off the ship until the time of
ailing, provided the permission of inspection officers be first obtained ,
in every case.
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DEP .A.R'.l.'MENT OF JUSTICE,

June 30, 1 92.
Sm: The act of Congress of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. 10 !)
prohil>iting the introduction into this country of certain objectionable classes of aliens, provides (section 8) that on the
arrival of immigrant ships the inspeetion officers shall enter
them and make inspection of the alien on board, or they
''may order a temporary removal of such aliens for examination at a de, ignated time and place, and then and there
<letain them until a thorough in pection is made. But uch
removal shall not be con$iclered a landing during the pendeucy of such examination."
It is the practice of the port of New York to make
iu pect.ion of immigrant at Ellis Island, to which point
they are taken in barge ·ontrollecl by the team hip compmiie eno·aged in tran porting immigrants. The immio-raut' that appear after e 'amin~tion to belong to the pro1dbit )d •]a. · are imm diately r turned to the ve el in
whi h th y am , or av el of the same line, for deportation und r e tion 10 of th act.
tat d the team1

ip comr aui

to
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receive the emigrants, as claimed by the Commissioner of
Immigration, whether they will be authorized in detaining
them at some suitable place off the ship until the time of
sailing°?"
It is not easy to see on what provision of the statute the
contention re~ts that aliens held unfit to land, after inspection at Ellis Island, must remain in Government custody
until they can be taken out of the country. It may be inconvenient to shipowners to have the responsibility of the safekeeping of these people, but it is an inconvenience which
they have brought on themselves by omitting precautions
necessary for their protection and that of the public, and I
thiuk it a wise instance of preventive justice that violations
of the statute, in this important particular, should entail
serious inconvenience.
The statute authorizes (sec. 8) the required examination or
inspection of immigrants to be made on board ship, as well
as elsewhere, but I do not understand the shipowners to
claim exemption from responsibility for the safe-keeping of
aliens rejected after inspection on board ship while awaiting
deportation, and yet, if the argument of hardship and inconvenience is valid as to aliens rejected after inspection on
land, it would seem to be equally so as to those rejected after
inspection on shipboard.
It is quite inadmissible to infer that the control ofcimmigrants assumed by the inspecting officers after removal from
the ship fo~ inspection was intended to continue as to immigrants rejected on such inspection while awaiting deportation.
I do not think the language of the act can be made to
accord with any such understanding of it, for what does it
mean when it speaks of the removal of immigrants to the
place of inspection as "temporary," and declares that they
shal1 be detained there" until a thorough inspection is made,',
if not that after the inspection is accomplished the detention
of immigrants so removed shall cease by admission into the
country of such as are fit or rejection of such as are noH
But if the Government is to detain these people while
appealing from the decision of the Commissioner of Immi.
gration or applying for the writ of habeas corpus, and up
to the hour of deportation, as the shipowners contend, what
5687-VOL 20--27
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value has the word '' temporary" as the attributi e of
"removal," and how can the right to detain immigrants at, a
designated time and place" and "1mtil a thorough inspection
is 1nade" have reference to appeals or habeas corpus procr-edings, which are conducted at places predetermined by law
and not by regulation, and which involve no inspectiort or
examination of immigrants,
In complete accord with this meaning is section 10 of the
act, which makes it an offense" if any master, agent, con.
signee, or owner of such vessel shall refuse to receive back
on board the vessel such aliens, or shall neglect to detain
them thereon, or shall refuse or neglect to return them to the
port from which they came," etc., and suggests inquiry a to
the value to be given the significant words "or shall neglect
to detciin them thereon," if what is contended for by the shipowners is correct, It is difficult to believe that these words
have reference only to the detention of immigrants on arrival
in port and before removal for inspection, or just before
deportation. It seems to me that such restriction of their
meaning would be quite as inadmissible as it would be to hold
that immigrants rejected after inspection on shipboard and
there awaiting deportation, are at the risk of the United
State and not of the violators of the law, the shipowners.
.As already suggested, it is far from satisfactory to ay
that Congress, in leaving it optional to conduct inspections
of immigrants on shipboard or elsewhere, intended that in
the latter case the Government should be burdened with the
custody of rejected immigrants any longer than neces ary
for thorough inspection. It is to be presumed that Congress
intended that public considerations and not caprice should
dictate whether inspections· should be on board ship or on
land, and I can not suppose that it was intended that inspection in the latter case should be more burdensome to the Government than in the former. Besides, the act expressly provide (sec. lO)'that the cost of maintaining aliens "while on
land" and the expense of their~return shall be borne by the
shipowuer , and, if Congress bad intended that the Government hould have the custody of these people any longer than
the I urposes of inspection required, it is fair to presume
the law would have contained a provision that the ship-
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owner should defray the cost of their detention while awaiting to be returned. This disposes· of the first and second
questions.
The third and last question presents the inquiry whether
shipowners, chargeable, as above held, with the safe·custody
of aliens, "will be authorized in detaining them at some
suitable place off the ship until the time of sailing."
It seems to me that it would be an inadmissible construction of the act to hold that the vessel is the only place recognized by it for the detention of aliens unlawfully brought
here while awaiting return or the finaJ decision of their
claim to admission into the country.
If it is impracticable to return them in the ship that
brought them, as section 10 requires, "if prncticable,'' or if
for any other reason, as, for example, the presence of contagious diseases on the vessel, it becomes necessary or deRirable to land them temporarily, I can not doubt that this may
be lawfully effected under one of the provisions of section
8, with the permission of the inspection officers, and at ,the
risk and cost of the shipowner.
It is true the statute declares (sec. 8) that the removal for
inspection "shall not be a landing during the pendency of
such examination;" but it is not a fair deduction from this
that removals for other reasons, satisfactory to the inspection officers and at the request of the shipowner, are not compatible with a continuing responsibility on his .p art under
the act up to the time of deportation. If the provision for
l'emovals for inspection purposes by order of the Government had not been followed by the restrictive words above
quoted, an implication unfavorable to the Government might
have been the result. But there does not seem to be any
room for holding that a temporary landing of aliens at the
request of the shipowner and by permission of the inspection
officers can affect his responsibility under the act. This
view derives support from the recent case of Nishimura Ekiu
v. United States (142 U. S., 651), where it was said by the
court that placing a female alien in the mission house at
San :Francisco and keeping her there pending the decision of
the que tion of her right to land, by agreement between her
attorney and the attorney for the United States," left her in
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the same position, so far as regarded her right to land in the
United States, as if she never had been removed from the
steamship." (P. 661.)
This view of the act is consistent with both its language
and intent, and I am therefore of opinion that the third
question should be answered in the affirmative, with the
qualification that the permission of the inspection officers
must in every case be obtained.
Very respectfully,
W. H. H. ,MILLER.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

POWER TO SELL GOVERNMENT PROPERTY.
The opinion of December 22, 1891 (20 Opins. 284), covers the question
asked in the letter of the Secretary of War of date June 25, 1892.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTIOE,

July 11, 1892.
SIR: Your letter of June 25·, 1892, and the inclosure
therein referred to, with reference to the sale of the Gov-ernment property at Fort Union, have received my consideration, and I beg to say in reply that I think it will be found
-on examination that my opinion of December 22, 1891, covers
the subject of your inquiry.
I will direct an inquiry, with a view to bringing to justice
the persons guilty of the depredations mentioned in the
report of Capt. Patten.
Very respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SEORET.A.RY OF W .A.R .

.A.TTORNEY-GENER.A.L.
The Attorney-General will express no opinion where the matter is not
one requiring the action of the head of a Department as falling within
his official duties.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTIOE,

July ll, 1892.
SIR: Your letter of June 7, 1892, bring to my attention
th acti n f the econd Auditor of the Trea ury in directing ha a u en ion again ~t Lieut. Col. Barr be made to
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the extent of $7, the same being the amount of, an alleged
excessive allowance made to him by Deputy PaymasterGeneral Gibson for sleeping-car fare.
Several questions are submitted by you for opinion, which
I would be glad to answer were it not for the limitation
imposed on me by section 356 of the Revised Statutes, which
only authorizes the head of an Executive Department "to
require the opinion of the Attorney General on any questions
of law arising in the administration of his Department."
Now, I do not understand that the action of the Second
Auditor of the Treasury, with reference to Lieut. Col. Barr,
relates, in any way, to a matter which requires the action of
the Secretary of War as falling within the circle of bis
official duties.
Very res pectftilly,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.

MEDAL OF HONOR.
A claim for a medal of honor considered and advice given that it be not
entertained.

DEPARTMENT

JUSTICE,
July 11, 1892.
SIR: Dr. John T. Nagle, who was employed as an acting
assistant surgeon in the U. S. Army during the late civil
war~ presented a claim on February 3, 1892, to the Secretary
of War to be awarded a "medal of honor" under section 6,
of the act of March 3, 1863 (12 Stat., 751), which authorized
the President to present '' medals of honor" to '' such officers,
non-commissioned officers, and privates" as should" most distinguish themselves in action."
This claim of Dr. Nagle rests on circumstances of gallantry
alleged to have been displayed by him in the battle of Kernstown, in Virginia, on July 24, 1864.
The statement made by Dr. Nagle in his application is not
accompanied, however, by an attempt even to explain the
cause of the delay of so many years in bringing his case to
the attention of the Executive.
My opinion is asked as to the validity of this claim.
OF
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Section p of the act of March 3, 1863, provides, amongst
other things, as follows:
"That the President cause to be struck from the dies
recently prepared at the United States mint for that purpose
'medals of honor' additional to those authorized by the act
[Resolution] of July twelfth, eighteen hundred and sixtytwo, and present the same to such officers, non-commissioned
officers, and privates as have most distinguished or who may
hereafter most distinguish themselves in action; and the
sum of twenty thousand dollars is hereby appropriated out
of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated to
defray the expenses of the same."
It is reasonable to suppose that Congress, in enacting thjs
provision, proceeded on the idea that the evidence which
would ehiefly, if not exclusively, guide the judgment of the
President in awarding "medals of honor" would be the
official reports of battles made to the "\Y"ar Department, in
which it may reasonably be expected to find the names of
all who specially distinguished themselves in the battles and
encounters of the ]ate war. In Dr. Nagle's Case, however, the
files of the War Department furnish no· evidence tending to
substantiate the statement on which he bases his claim, and
con equently his applicatio~ is, in effect, that a "medal of
honor" be awarded to him on such unofficial evidence as
may be producible after an unexplained delay of twenty-eight
years in bringing forward his claim.
· The statement of the case seems to be its refutation. .A
court of equity, if it had jurisdiction over such a matter,
would decline to consider it at all, on the mere ground of
d lay unaccounted for, and in obedience to
principle of
general jurisprudence, ba ed on the teaching of experience,
that "the lapse of tim carries with it the memory and life
of witne e , the muniment of evidence, and the other
m c Ill-\ of judicial proof.' ( Godden v. Kimmell, 99 U.S., 212.)
t can hardly bet nable, therefore, thatlaches which would
bar a ]em nd for property in a court of equity, i not u:ffi.
ci n
li redit an a1 I Ii ·ation for the medal of honor. He
wh w uld ·laim the di tin tion of thi medal mu· t do o by
virtu of an un ·I ud d titl . T require le would be to
tak fr m it alue in the h, nd of the veterans on whom it
n£ rr 1.
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It follows, therefore, that, in my opinion, the claim of Dr.
Nagle should not be entertained.
The case presents other interesting questions which, however, need not be considered, as, for example, whether the
medal of honor may be the subject of a claim against the
United States, and whether it may be awarded on evidence
that is not strictly official.
Very respectfully, yours,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The PRESIDENT.
INTEREST.
Where no appropriation is made for payment of interest on ajudgment
of the Court of Claims against the United States, interest can not
lawfully be paid.
DEP .A.R'.I.'MENT OF JUSTICE,

Jitly 18, 1892.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of the 13th instant, inclosing an application of Messrs.
McDonald, Bright, and Fay, for the payment of interest on
the judgment rendered by the Court of Claims, in the matter
of Maloney and Gleason v. The United States, N o.16310, Court
of Claims. I am requested to give you an opinion upon the
question of whether interest is payable; and, if so, for what
time and at what rate. I :find that September 30, 1890,
an appropriation was made to pay the judgment of the Court
of Claims in the above-entitled cause (26 Stat. L., 504, 536),
and that the same has been paid. I am not aware of :my
other appropriation _of Congress for the purpose of paying
this judgment, or of any appropriation whatsoever for the
payment of interest on the sarri.e. I am of the opinion, tllerefore, that you can not lawfully pay the amount claimed as
interest.
The papers are herewith returned.
Very respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLlnl.
The SECRE'l'.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.
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CITIZENSHIP-EVIDENCE.
A certificate of the governor and commander in chief of the colony of
Hong Kong and its dependencies and vice-admiral of the same, to the
effect that he believes a person to be a British subject, is not competent evidence to prove such citizenship.
DEPARTMENT OF JUS'l.'IOE,

July 19, 1892.
SIR : Your letter of July 7, instant, and the inclosure
therein referred to have received my consideration.
The case presented by you for an opinion is, substantially,
this: Mr. Ho-Fook, a resident of Hong Kong, China, has
presented to the United States consul at that place, for
authentication, an invoice averring a shipment of prepared
opium to the United States.
Mr. Ho-Fook claims to be a British subject, and in support
of the claim exhibited to the consul a certificate of Sir
William Robinson, governor and commander in chief of
the colony of Hong Kong and its dependencies and viceadmiral of the same, in which that officer sets forth that he
has examined '' affidavits of birth" and has satisfied him elf
by such examination that Mr. Ho-Fook "was born in the
aid colony of Hong Kong of Dutch father and Chinese
mother, on the 30th of November, 1863, the King of Holland
beii1g, , t the above date, in amity with the Queen of England," and that he, therefore, "believes the said Ho-Fook to
be a British subject."
This being the only evidence to sustain Mr. Ho-Fook's
claim to be a British subject the consul withheld the desired
authentication until he should be further advised, and thereupon applied to the Secretary of State for instructions, in
view of Article n of the supplemental treaty between the
Unit d State and China of November 17, 1880 (22 Stat.,
82 ), which is as follows:
"The Governments of China and of the United States
mutually agree and undertake that Chinese subjects ·hall
not b p rmitted to import opium into any of the ports of the
nit d tate ; and itizen of the United States shall not be
I rmitted toimpo1to1iumintoanyoftheopenport ofChina;
t tran port it from one open port to any other open port; or
to buy and sen opium in any of the open ports of China. This
a
Int prohibition, whi ·h xteud to vessels owned by the
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citizens or subjects of either power, to foreign vessels em.
ployed by them, or to vessels owned by the citizens or subjects of either power and employed by other persons for the
transportation of opium, shall be enforced by appropriate
legislation on the part of China and the United States; and
the benefits of the favored-nation clause in existing treaties shall not be claimed by the citizens or subjects of either
power as against the provisions of this article."
The Secretary of State has invited your views on the questions presented in the consul's dispatch, and you request my
opinion on the questions (1) whether Mr. Ho Fook may engage
in the transportation of prepared opium into the United
States, or should be considered as a "Chinese subject" within the meaning of the above-quoted article of the treaty of
1880, and (2) whether the said certificate of the governor of
the colony of Hong Kong is legal evidence to establish the
claim of Mr. Ho Fook that he is a British subject .
.Addressing myself to the second question first, I fail to
discover in the governor's certificate an indication that it
emanated from an officer authorized to determine the question of British citizenship, or to certify that such a question
had been determined. On the contrary, the document seems
to show on its face that it finds its source in Mr. Ho Fook's
application for it for his own purposes and not in any requirement of British law. No one, I should suppose, would think
of exhibiting such a paper in the British dominion as evidence of the right to be admitted to the exercise and enjoyment of the privileges of British citizenship.
Taking the certificate in connection with the use made of
it before the consul, I have very little doubt that it was
secured by Mr. Ho Fook for the express purpose of obtaining the authentication of the invoice of opium.
In the case of Urtetiqui v. D 1.Arbel (9 Pet., 692) the Supreme
Court held that a passport signed by the Secretary of State
of the United States and bearing the seal of the Department
was not evidence to prove citizenship in a suit involving
the question of citizenship of the United States, although by
usage and the law of nations it is received as evidence of
that fact. The court says:
"There is no law of the United States in any manner
regulating the issuing of passports or directing upon what
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evidence it may be done, or declaring their legal effect. It
is understood, as matter of practice, that some evidence of
citizenship is required by the Secretary of State before
issuing a passport. This, however, is entirely discretionary
with him. No inquiry is instituted by him to ascertain the
fact of citizenship, or any proceedings had that will in any
manner bear the character of a judicial inquiry. It is a
document which, from its nature and object, is addressed to
foreign powers; purporting only to be a request that the
bearer of it may pass safely and freely, and is to be considered rather in the character of a political document, by
which the bearer is recognized in foreign countries as an
American citizen, and which, by usage and the law of
nations, is received as evidence of _the fact. But this is a
very different light from that in which it is to l!>e viewed ina
court of justice where the inquiry is as to the fact of
citizenship. It is a mere ex parte certificate; and, if founded
upon any evidence produced to the Secretary of State establishing the fact of citizenship, that evidence, if of a character admissible in a court of justice, ought to be produced
upon the trial as higher and better evidence of the fact."
While the duties of consuls of the United States with
reference to the autllentication of invoices are· not strictly
judicial, they do however, in some particulars, partake of
that character, as in the present instance, and I must confess my inability to perceive why, when a consul is called on
to act in a matter of so much importance as that involved in
this ca e, be ha not as much right as a court to insist upon
original evidence.
The probability is that the personal appearance of l\fr.
Ho Fook, like his name, strongly indicated Chinese citizenhip, and the con ul, having in view the importance of the
article of the treaty above quoted, acted discreetly in declining for the time being to consider the certificate offered as
l gal evidence of citizenship.
If, in a uit between private parties, a passport iss..ued by
th e r tary of State i no evidence in the Federal courts of
th i izen hip of the person therein stated to be a citizen of
th
nit d tate · i an hardly be that the certificate of a
imil, r h, r t r off r d t he con ul in thi case, was comJ) nt vi 1 u
t prove Jir. Ilo Fook's citizenship. Cer-
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taiuly I can perceive no imaginable reason why the rules of
evidence applicable to suits between individuals should be
relaxed in an inquiry of so much importance to the United
States as that involved in this case.
I am therefore of opinion that the certificate in question
was no evidence of Mr. Ho Fook's citizenship.
The conclusion I have reached on the second question
makes the first an abstract one, requiring no answer.
Very respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

VACANCY.
The acceptance of an appointment as Chief of the Record and Pension
Office of the War Department, with the rank and pay and allowance
of a colonel, by a surgeon of the U.S. Army, creates a vacancy in the
latter office.
DEP ..A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 26, 1892.
Sm: By your communication of July 21, 1892, it appears
that Maj. F. C. Ainsworth, surgeon, U. S. Army, has been
appointed chief of the Record and Pension Office of the
War Department established by the act of May 9, 1892, with
the rank, pay, and allowances of a colonel, and bas accepted
that appointment. An opinion is requested whether the
acceptance of this appointment by Maj. Ainsworth makes a
vacancy in the office of surgeon. The act of May 9, 1892,
under which this appointment was made, reads as follows:
"That the division organized by the -Secretary of War in
his office for the preservation and custody·of the records of
the volunteer armies under the name of the record and pension division is hereby established as now organized, and
shall hereafter be known as the Record and Pension Office
of the War Department; and the President·is hereby authorized to select an officer of the Army whom he may consider
to be especially well qualified for the performance of the
duties hereinafter specified and, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, to appoint him' in the Army to be
chief of said office, who shall have the rank, pay, and allowances of a colonel and shall, under the Secretary of War,
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have charge of the military and hospital records of the volunteer armies and the pension and other business of the War
Department connected therewith; and all laws or parts of
laws inconsistent with the terms· of this act are hereby
repealed."
By the act reorganizing the several staff corps of the Army
(Supp. Rev. Stat., 45) it is provided "that the medical department of the Army shall hereafter consist of * * * fifty
surgeons, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of major ."
The duties of surgeons in the Army are well known, as are the
duties of the chief of the Record anq. Pension Office of the
War Department. Each of these positions is an office in the
active service of the Army. So, the relative rank of a colonel
and a major in the active service in the Army are well known.
In rank, in duty, in the insignia evidencing rank they are
distinct and diverse. There are numerous decisions to the
effect that in the absence of statute a person holding and
receiving the emoluments of one office under the Government
of the United States is not thereby precluded from holding
and receiving the emoluments of another. But in every case
in which it has been so held the two positions have not been
incompatible, and the discharge of the duties in the one was
not incon istent with the discharge of the duties of the other.
In my opinion such is not this case. The duties of a surgeon
in the Army are incompatible with those of the chief of the
Record and Pen ion Office of the War Department. The
holding of the rank, pay, and emoluments of a colonel is
incon i tent with the holding of the rank, pay, and emolument of a major, both in the active service. In my opinion,
therefore, the acceptance and qualification under the appointment in pursuance of the statute of May 9, 1892, by Maj .
.Ainsworth, vacated hi office as Rurgeon in the Army. But
whether this be the correct view or not, I beg to sugg e t tb at
the appointment of a succe sor in the office of surgeon, and a
confirmation of that appointment by the Senate, would, in
any event, di place Col. insworth in that office. (See Blake
v. United States, 103 U. S., p. 227; Keyes v. United States, 109
u. s., p. 33 .)
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LE.A.VE OF ABSENCE-EMPLOYtS OF BUREAU OF ENGR.A.VING
AND PRINTING.
The act of July 6, 1892, chapter 154, relating to leave of absence to
employes of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing, contemplates a
maxim.um abE>ence of thirty days with a continuance of average compensation and a leave of absence and pay during the same to a pieceworker whose service and consequent earnings are less than the maximum determined by the average amount of his work and of his pay
therefor.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 1, 1892.
Yoar inquiry · under date of July 27, relating to the
act allowing leave of absence to employes in the Bureau of
Engraving and Printing (act No. 110, approved July 6,
1892) has received due attention.
This act provides that "the employes of the Bureau of
Engraving and Printing, including the pieceworkers, shall
be allowed leave of absence with pay, not exceeding thirty
days in any one year."
The concluding clause of the enactment is as follows:
"Provided, That the length of the leave of absence of any
employe of said Bureau doing piecework, and the pay during
such leave of absence, shall be determined by the average
amount of work done by such person and the pay therefor
during the several months of the year."
•
This statute secures the privilege of a leave of absence
with pay to the pieceworker, but declares that the extent of
the privilege shall be determined by his work and earnings.
It is eviden~· that Congress intended to ·establish the rule
that the pieceworkers referred to, who continue in regular
employment throughout the year, may have not exceeding
thirty days leave of absence annually, subject to the rules of
the Department and the proper supervision of the chief of
the Bureau acting under the approva_l of the Secretary.
The proviso seems to rest upon the theory that one who
performs but a small amount of work per year, or who is
employed but a fraction or a moiety of the time, is not equitably entitled to an absence, or to compensation during the
absence, equal to that allowed to a pieceworker who is employed to the full capacity of a skilled workman through
the year.
SIR:
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It is manifest that Congress intended to authorize, subject
to the limitations fixed, a leave of absence and current pay
to correspond with the extent and value of the service performed by the pieceworkers respectively.
In more direct response to your inquiry I may say, that
as the pieceworker is entitled to the leave of absence with
pay only in accord with this act it can not be said that any
reduction arises from the proviso, but, on the other hand, the
proviso designates the measure by which the length of the
leave and the amount of leave pay may be determined.
The leave of absence can not extend beyond thirty days per
year, and the pay can not exceed the average pay of the
employe concerned during the several months of the year.
Thirty days' absence per year, with a continuance of average compensation during the absence, appears to be the maxim nm allowance of tbe act in favor of a pieceworker so
situated as to receive the greatest benefit therefrom.
The length of the leave of absence and the amount of pay
during the same given to a pieceworker whose service and
con equent earnings are less than the maximum, must be
determined by the avijrage amount of his work and of his
pay therefor.
While phe proviso may be somewhat obscure as to the
method of its execution, it purpose does not admit of question, and authority to make all necessary regulation to
ex ute the act and carry out the intent of the proviso is
explicitly given.
Very re pectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The EORETARY OF THE TREASURY.

DEED TO LAND-TAX RECEIPTS.
A deec1 pronounced sufficient to conv y to the Government a valid title
Tc x r ceipt are sufficient evidence that the land is discharged and
red emecl from a tax sale and ta.xe .
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JtJS'.I.'ICE,

A itgust 4, 1892.
her with retnrn the deed of Ca ie G. Pugh to the
t, t t
h r with ta r eipt which accompaf the rth ul i o in relation to cer-
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tain land sought to be purchased for the site of the proposed
quarantine station at Port Townsend, Wash. The said
receipts are satisfactory evidence that the land referred to
is redeemed and discharged from the tax sale and taxes
mentioned in my letter to you of the 25th of June last, and
the said deed is, in my opinion, sufficient to convey to the
Government a valid title to the premises.
I may add that in the last-mentioned letter the premises
were erroneously described as the "northwest quarter of the
southeast quarter," etc. The correct description is the
"northwest quarter of the soiithwest quarter," etc., as set
forth in the deed.
Very respectfully,
JOHN B. COTTON,
Acting Attorney- General.
The SECRE'l'.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

CONDEMNATION OF LAND.
Two proceedings for the condemnation of land resulted in an order of
the proper court that on the payment of the award, together with the
sum taxed as costs of the proceeding, into the registry of the court,
the U. S. marshal make and deliver to the United States a good and
sufficient deed of the premises. It was stated that on payment of
said awards and costs and delivery of said deeds a valid title to the
land will vest in the United States.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 4, 1892.
Sm: I herewith transmit two certified transcripts (marked
"A" and ".B," respectively) of the . record of proceedings
recently had on behalf of the United States in the U. S.
circuit court for the northern district of Florida, for the
acquisition by condemnation of certain lands on Tiger Island,
Florida, which have been selected for sites of range lights to
guide vessels into the. harbor of Fernandina, Fla. These
proceedings were instituted by . the U. S. attorney for said
di trict, pursuant to instructions given him, agreeably to the
request contained in a letter received by this Department
from the Secretary qf the Treasury, dated November 7, 1890.
Transcript "A" covers the following-described pieces of
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land, portions of said island, in township 3 north, range 28
east, in Nassau County, Fla., to wit:
"Tract.A.," beginning at a stake marked XIII, near the
mouth of Tiger Creek, where it empties into Cumberland
Sound, and running thence north 83 degrees 30 minutes
west, 72½ feet, to a stake; thence north 6 degrees 30 minutes
east, 300 feet, to a stake; thence south 83 degrees 30 minutes
east, 72½ feet, to a stake; thence south 6 degrees 30 minutes
west, 300 feet, to the place of beginning, containing one-half
acre, more or less.
"Tract B," beginning at a stake marked XIII, placed 1,295
feet north 88 degrees 30 minutes west from the similarly
marked stake first above mentioned, and running thence
north 88 degrees west, 72½ feet, to a stake; thence north 2
degrees east, 300 feet, to a stak~; thence south 88 degrees
east, 72½ feet, to a stake; thence south 2 degrees west, 300
feet, to the place of beginning, containing one-half acre, more
or less.
Together with a right of way over and across the land
lying between the above-described two pieces of land, etc.
For the above-de cribed two pieces of land, including the
aforesaid right of way, the amount awarded in said proceeding, is $100, upon payment whereof by the United States,
together with the sum of $187.41 taxed as costs of the proceeding , into the registry of the court, the U. S. marshal
for said district is ·by order of the court required to make and
d liver to the Government a good and sufficient deed of the
I remises.
Tran cript "B" embraces other piece of land, portions of
the ame i land, in the same township and range. These
pie es are thu, de cribed:
''Tract A.," beginning at a stake marked XIII, standing at
high-water mark on tlle beach of Amelia River, Florida, and
b nee outh 73 d gree ea t, 147½ feet, to a stake; thence
uth 17 d gree w ·t 147½ £ et, t a take; thence north 73
d 0 T e we t, 147½ feet, ~o a tale; thence north 17 degree
a t, 147½ £ et, to the place of beginning containing one-half
acr more or 1
Tra t B ' begi ning at a take marked XIII, placed 397
£ et o th 17 d (Tr
w t from th
imilarly marked take
an runni g thence outh 73 degrees

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

433

Navy Department-Vacancies.

east , 147½ feet, to a stake; thence south 17 degrees west, 147¼
feet, to a stake; thence north 7.3 degrees west, 147½ feet, ·to a
stake; thence north 17 degrees east, 147f feet, to the place of
beginning, containing- one-half acre, more or less.
Together with a right of way over and across the land
lying between the last above-described two pieces of land, etc.
For the two pieces of land last mentioned, including the
r ight of way, tke amount awarded is $100, upon payment of
w hich, together with the sum of $133.79 taxed as costs of
the proceedings, into · the registry of the court, the U. S.
mar shal is by order of the court required to make and ·
d eliver to the United States a good and sufficient deed of
t h e premises.
I am of the opinion that under and by virtue of the aforesaid proceedings, on payment of the awards and costs above
m entioned, and the delivery of the marshal's deeds, in conformity to the judgment and order of the court, a valid title
t o the above-described pieces of land and rights of way will
v est in the United States.
Very respectfully,
JOHN B. COTTON,

Act-ing Attorney-General.
The SECRETARY

OF THE TREASURY.

NAVY DEPARTMENT-VACANCIES .
.A question havfng arisen as to whether the officers to be promoted in ·
the U. S. Marine Corps to vacancies existing in the offices of major,
captain, ancl first lieutenant, said succession of vacancies having been
created on July 10, 1892, shoulrl or should not be examined under the
act providing for t,he examination of certain officers of the Marine
Corps and r egulating proceedings therein, of date July 28, 1892, chap_
ter 315, the opinion was given th at the promotions under consideratio~ might be made without the examination in question.
DEF A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

A itgust 10, 1892.
Sm: Yours of the 1st instant states that "On the 10th
ultimo a vacancy occurred in the U.S. Marine Corps for the
promot ton of a, captain to the rank of major, a first Iieuten~nt
to the rank of captain, and a second lieutenant to the rank
5687-V0L 20--28
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of fir t lieutenant," and require my opinion as to whether
the officer to be promoted to fill the e vacancie hould or
shoul<l not be examined under the act "To provide for the
examination of certain officers of the Marine Corp , and to
regulate promotion therein" ~being act No. 182, approved
July 28, 1892), in accordance with the requiremeuts of the
third ection of the act entitled "An act to provide for the
examination of certain officers of the Army, and to regulate
promotion therein," approved October 1, 1890. (26 Stat.,
562.)

With the exception of a proviso which declares the con, titution of examining boards thereunder, the aid statute of
1892 is comprised of the following provi~ion, viz:
"That hereafter promotion to every grade of commi sioned officer in the Marine Corp below the grade of commandant shall be made in the same manner and under the
same conditions as now are or may hereafter be pre cribed,
in pursuance of law, for commi ioned officers of the Army.''
The act of October 1, 1800, provides, by ection 1, that
"hereafter promotion in every grade in the Army below the
rank of brigadier-general, * * * hall, su~ject to the
examination hereinafter provided for, be made aceorcling to
eniority in the next lower grade,' etc.
The fir t paragraph of section 3 enacts:
"That the Pre ident be, and he is hereby, authorized to
pre cribe a y tern of examination of all officer of the rmy
b low the rank 6f major to determine their fitne for promotion, uch an examination to be conducted at uch time
anterior to th accruiug of the right to promotion a may be
be t for the in tere t of the ervice."
The following pro vi o are al o contained in aid ction:
"And provided, That if any officer fails to pa a ati factory examination and i reported unfit for promotion, the
officer n xt below him in ra.nk, having pa d aid .· amination, ball r c i e the promotion: And pro ided, That 'hould
th officer fajJ in hi phy ical e ·amination and be f und
inc, pacitatecl for ervice by rea n of phy ical di ability
tra t d iu Iin f du y he hall e retir d with h rank
hi h hi ' niori y ntitled him t b promot cl; but if he
uld f: il f, r an o her rea on he . llall be u pend d from
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promotion for one year, when he shall be reexamined, and
in case of failure on such reexamination he shall be honorably discharged, with one year's pay, from the Army."
T he right of the senior captain referred to, t.o promotion
to t he rank of major, and that of the senior first lieutenant,
to p romotion to be a captain, and that of the senior second
lieutenant, to be first lieutenant, existed from the 10th of
July last.
In accordance with that practice under which an "officer
is promoted in due course to fill a vacancy" it is clear that
for a period of eighteen days the officers referred to were
entit led by law to promotion without examination under the
act of 1890.
It appears that the succession of vacancies, which includes
the t hree under consideration, was created by the retirement
of Col. Hebb, ori the 10th ultimo.
On the 3d instant a lieutenant-colonel and a major were
severally nominated by the President and confirmed by tlte
Sen ate to be colonel and lieutenant-colonel from tlrn 11th of
July, 1892, on account of the retirement of Col. Hebb (Cong.
Rec., p. 7802).
No sugg. .estion is made that the failure to promote the three
officer s specified in your letter occurred from any act or omission of their orni.
The right to promotion inhering in one who is a commissioned officer is m1der existing legislation in the nature of a
vested right, subject, nevertheless, to being defeated in
accordance with the provisions of the Jaws. The opinions of
learned predecessors (17 Opin., 117; and 18 id., 398), in statement and cit ation are instructive in the premjses.
The act of 1892 speaks only from July 28 and creates new
conditions as to promotions thereafter to be made in the
l\.Iarine Corps.
It would be going very far to say that Congress int~nded
tliat a right of promotion eamed by long service, and actually accrued, may, by force of this enactment, be taken away
from t he officer who has performed the service.
That it i not the purpose of the act of 1890 to have the
examinations take place so long subsequent to the occurring
of the right to promotion as to be affected by intervening
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rights and obligations is indicated by that clause of section
3 which directs the "examination to be conducted * * *
anterior to the accruing of the right to promotion."
· Following this provision the first rule of the "system of
examination" prescribed by the Presid~nt pursuant to section
3 directs that: "At such time anterior to the accruing of the
right to promotion, as may be best for the interests of the
service, officers * * * below the rank of major shall be
examined by a board," etc. (General Orders, No. 128.)
This general purpose is not affected by the occasional procedure which obtains in analogy to section 1562, Revised
Statutes, in cases of necessity.
The executive construction under the act of October 1,
1890, in analogous cases is of much weight in rea,ching a
proper conclusion.
When that act went into effect several officers of different
grades below the rank 'of major were entitled to promotion
to the~ existing vacancies, and the promotions to fill these
va,cancies were in every instance filled under the law as it
exi ted prior to October 1 without the examination prescribed
by that act.
·
This was a practical executive construction that can not
be reversed without assuming the risk of occasioning confu ion and violating those rules which require stability and
cou istency in construction.
In ScheU's executors v. Fauche (138 U. S., 572) the court
says:
" * * * In all cases of ambiguity, the contemporaneous construction, not only of the courts but of the Departments, and even of the officials whose duty it is to carry the
law into effect, is universally held to be controlling."
lthough it may be fairly claimed that the practice under
the a ·t of 1890 h~s not had sufficient time to ripen into the
principle quoted, it should clearly appear that the executive
a tion tated was contrary to law to justify the overruling of
thi d partmental deci ion.
It i quite important to note that it must be understood
that the 1 gi lation of 1892 was made by Congress with a full
kn wl dge of the executive con truction which had been
r i u.J made upon the act of 1 90 and the inference i a
· ary ne that if thi con truction had not been in
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accord . with the intent of Congress the act of 1892 would
have contained a provision requiring a different executive
ruling. Permit me to say, in conclusion, that a construction .
which requires the three officers specified by you to be
examined under the provisions of the act of July 28, 1892,
will disregard rights· which ought to be treated as vested
rights of the officers affected, and will run counter to the
established determination of the War Department, and will
reverse a decision which bas been practic'ally acquiesced in
by Congress.
It is my opinion that the promotions under consideration
may lawfully be made without the examination in question.
Very respectfully,
CHARLES H. ALDRICH,
Acting .Attorney-General.
The ~EORE1'.A.RY OF THE NAVY.

MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL GUARD-GOVERNMENT CLERK
ABSENT ON PARADE.
An employe of a Department absent from his duty while at Omaha,
Nebr., at a prize drill duly ordered by a superior officer of the National
Guard, of which he was a member, is entitled to his pay while absent.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTIOE,

.August 11, 1892.
SrR: Your letter of August 2 requests my opinion whether
John J. Gavin, jr., an employe of the Treasury Department
and a member of the "Fencibles," a company of the National
Guard of the District of Columbia, is entitled to pay as such
employe while absent at Omaha., Nebr., with the company for
the purpose of competing in a prize drill, the period of such
absence exceeding the usual thirty days allowed employes of
the Departments, under the act of M~rch 3, 1883 (22 Stat.,
563), which provides that:
"Ali absence from the Departments on the part of said
clerks or other employes in excess of such leave of absence
as may be granted by the heads thereof, which shall not
exceed thirty days in any one year, except in case of sickness,
shall be without pay."
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This is to be read in connection with the act of March 1,
1889, entitled" An act to provide for the organization of the
militia of the District of Columbia" (25 Stat., 772). Section
49 of that aet is as follows:
"1'hat all officers and employes of the United States and of
the District of Columbia, who are members of the National
Guard, shall be entitled to leave of absence from their respective duties, without loss of pay or time, on all days of any
parade or encampment ordered or authorized under the provisions of this act."
The word ''parade" as used in.this section is notlimited to
its popular meaning of a pompous exhibition for purposes of
display. As a military term it is defined as "an assembly
and orderly arrangement of troops, in full equipments, for
inspection or evolutions before some 8uperior officer; a review
of troops." (Webster's International Dictionary;. subject:
"Parade.")
The next inquiry is, What days of parade or encampment
are ordererl or authorized by this act~
Section 43 provides: "That the National Guard shall perform not less than si consecutive days of camp duty in each
year, at such time as may be ordered by the commandiu g
general."
Tllis is the only section prescribing any fixed time. It
plainly appears, however, that it was not contemplated that
thi annual encampment should be the only service required,
a power is given to the commanding general, by section 41,
to '' pre cribe such stated drills and parades as he may deem
neces ary for the in"truction of the National Guard, and may
order out any portion of the National Guard for such drills,
in pection , parades, escort, or other duties as he may deem
proper. The commanding officer of any regiment, battalion,
or company may al b a emble his command, or any part
thereof, in the evening for drill, in trnction, or other bu ine ,
a. h may leem expedient; but no parade hall be performed
by any r o·jment, battalion, company, or part thereof, without
th p rmi i n of th commanding eneral."
·ti ll 42 provide : "That an annual in pection and
mu. t r f ea h rg-anization of the ational Guard, and an
in p ction f heir armori and of public property in their
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possession, shall be made at such times and places as the
commanding general may order and direct."
Section 40 provides: "That any drill, parade, encampment, or duty that is required, ordered, or authorized to be
:performed under the provisions of this act, shall be deemed
to be a military duty, and ~ nile on such duty every officer
and enlisted man of the National Guard shall be subject to
the lawful orders of his superior officers, and for any military
offense may be put and kept under arrest or under guard for
a time not extending beyond the term of service for which
he is then ordered. '
Section 46 provides: " For absence from any other military
duty required or ordered under the provisions of this act
the penalty shall be such as may be prescribed by the commanding general, or the by-laws of the organization to which
the officer or soldier belongs."
_ ·
Mr. Gavin was thus subject to the orders of his commanding general and superior officers, and to military discipline if he failed to yield the strictest obedience.
Inquiry of the. commanding general shows that this c9mpany wen~ to Omaha pursuant to regularly published orders
by that officer.
.
It has been suggested that the commanding general had
no right to order the company into anyencampme1;1t,orupon
any service beyond the confines of the District of Columbia;
tbat Mr. Gavin could have refused to go beyon<l the limits
of the District, and, in the absence of such refusal, must be
held to have voluntarily gone to Omaha.
In the first place, the act does not ·limit the parades and
encampments to the District of Columbia. In the second
place, it would be subversive of all discipline, and can not be
eriously contended, that a private is required to refuse to
obey the orders of his superior officers in order to escape the
loss of a few days' pay, and thus subject himself to military
trial, and the risk and expense incident thereto. A soldier
is not the judge in such cases. His first duty is obedience.
The answer to this su·ggestion, and to the suggestion contained in the inclosure accompanying your communication,
that the civil service might be greatly impeded by long-continued absences by order of the commanding officers, is found

.
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in the presumption against official misuse of power. This
danger may well be considered remote where, as in this case,
the commanding officer is subject to the orders and directions of the President as commander in chief (section 6), who
would doubtless remedy any abuses of the kind suggested.
My conclusion, therefore, is that Mr. Gavin is entitled to
his pay while absent under the circumstances herein stated.
Respectfully, yours,
CHARLES H. ALDRICH,
Acting Attorney-General.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL.

Where the Attorney-General is not called upon to give an opinion upon
any question pending undetermined, but is asked to review and express
his conclusions upon the correctness of interpretations and applications of law heretofore made, he is not permitted to give an opinion,
nor will he give an opinion upon a hypothetical case as to questions
which may arise in the future.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

.A. ugust 17, 1892.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a letter from your Department, signed by the Acting Secretary
of the Treasury, and bearing date the 6th instant, calling my
attention to an act entit1ed "An act relating to the limitation of the hours of daily service of laborers and mechanics,"
etc., approved August 1, 1892.
I trust that I may be permitted to employ a paragraph of
the opinion of Attorney-General Speed (11 Opin., 188), in
saying that "it would give me great pleasure to comply with
the request contained in [the] letter if I could clearly see
that it is proper for me to <lo so, in view of the law which
prescribes the duties and limits the powers of this office."
After a preliminary paragraph, the letter tates as follows:
'' In giving practical consideration and application to said
law ( o far a necessity bas arisen for the con iu.eration and
application of the ame) to cases pertaining to work being or
to be done by the day or under contract at the various public
buildings under the control of the Treasury Department
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(through the office of the Supervising Architect) this Department has held:"
Then fol1ow two decisions set forth at length and designated "first" and "second," which declare the conclusions
of your Department-upon certain questions which have arisen
or may arise under the enactment.
These decisions are followed by a ''third" subdivision,
which states the "Alterations and additions," provision of
certain contracts entered into prior to August 1, and continues:
"In cases where it ~ay become necessary for the Department to order from such contractors any additional work providing for additional materials and labor, under such contracts as have been entered into prior to August 1, 1892, the
date of approval of said act, and which said contracts contained the provisions above q uQted, the Department holds,"
etc., setting forth, as I understand, the determination at
which your Department has arrived upon the question
involved.
The next subdivision of the letter is as follows:
"Fourth, I have the honor to specially request your opinion, as to the correctness of the interpretations and applications of said law as specified in the first, second, and third
paragraphs of this letter."
It therefore appears that so far as the questions above
referred to are concerned I am not called upon to give an
opinion upon any question now pending and undetermined
in the Treasm.-y Department, but am asked to review and
express my conclusions upon the "correctness of the interpretations and applications of said law" that have heretofore been made.
Numerous and unequivocal precedents concurred in by
several Attorneys-General preclude me from rendering a.n
opinion in such a case.
Section 356 of the Revised Statutes under which official
opinions are authorized is as follows:
"The head of any Executive Department may require the
opinion of the Attorney-General on any question of law
arising in the administration of his Devartment. "
It is required not only that the question must be one arising in the administration of a Department, but it must be
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one which i , till pending. .A matter which has been conidered and decided is not now a "question" upon which the
bead of a D partmen t 111.ay require an opinion of the head of
the Department of Justice. It is said by Mr. Wirt (1 0pin.,
493), in peaking of his own action, that "no officer should be
permitted to stretch his authority and carry the influence of
his office beyond the circle which the positive law of the
land has drawn around him."
It may be added in the words of Mr. Taney (2 0pin., 531)
that: " nything, therefore, which I might say in relation to
it would be nothing more than the advice of any other counel you might choose to consult."
l\fr. Butl r (3 Opin., 39) declines giving an official opinion
upon a question submitted, "inasmuch as it appears to have
been decided and inde:finitelydisposedofbythe Department/'
* * * etc. He adds, '' I can not undertake to give an
official opini u on the question proposed to me without
a urning that this office possesses a revisory jurisdiction not
conferred upon it by law."
In 9 Opinion , 421, Mr. Black was asked as to the authority
of a State to tax a resident employed by the United States.
1I aid: "But this point is not practically raised ou the
ca e pre ented. The tax has been paid, and my opinion is
only de ir d because the same difficulty may occur ag~in.
ut it m y not, and to settle it in advance is to anticipate
tr ubl ."
b g to a l your attention, also, to an opinion rendered
Jun 17, 1 89, and appearing 19 Opinions, 331,
I now come to the second general division of the said Jett r.
It n i ts of four subdivisions and calls for a general
int r1 r tation and application of the provisions of the act of
u u t 1, 18 2 a to questions which may at some future
time ari in Y ur Department.
. ~ tually existing case requiring present executive
a ti n 1 • all
d to be pending in the Department upon which
arises.
a u _. 1 n f I
h fifth ,u l i vi ion of the letter is as follows:
ny cases the Department enters into conI• if b.
tr,
PPly of certain articles, such as post-office
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lock boxes, drawers, and keys, plaster models, etc., manufactured and made by laborers and mechanics employed by
contractors with this Department, at private manufactories
or w~rkshops, to be delivered, but not placed in position, at
various public buildings throughout the United States."
The sixth subdivision goes in the same direction, and further and more into details, but sets forth no actual case or
pending question.
The next two subdivisions read thus:
''Seventh. I also have the _honor to specifically request
your opinion as to the aJ?plication of said law to the cases
specified in the fifth and sixth paragra,p hs.
"Eighth. I also have the honor to specifically request your
opinion in regard to the practical interpretation and application of _said law so far as it relates to laborers and mechanics employed, directed, and controlled, either by this Department or by contractors or subcontractors~ so far as it relates
to public works under the control and jurisdiction of the
Treasury Department."
A careful consideration of the several paragraphs leads
me to the conclusion that no question of law is here presented.
An opinion submitted to the Secretary of War, October 25,
1889 (19 Opin., 414), in response to suggestions relating to
the status of the Quartermaster's Volunteers, sets forth the
practice of this Department as follows:
"I am unable.to see how this Department has any right to
pass upon the suggestions. * "" * They do not seem to
pre ent any actual existing case arising in the administration of your Department. They apparently call for an
opinion in advance as to what this Department would hold in
the future upon indefinite and varying facts. In such cases
the Department has universally declined to give opinions. I
take the liberty of quoting from a late opinion of this Department, which will serve to show how uniformly this rule
has been adhered to, and the reasons therefor, as follows:
'From this statement it appears that the question submitted does not spring out of any present, actually existing
case arising in the administration of your Department.' It
i a question in a hypothetical case, and one, indeed, which
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may never arise, and calls in advance for an op1mon a to
. what the Department would hold in the future upon a somewhat indefinite state of facts.
"That being the case, it is respectfully submitted that this
Department is not permitted, by statute or precedent, to give
an opinion upon it."
Mr. Black says (9 Opin., 82):
'' It has always been the rule of this office to give advice
only in actual cases where the special facts are set forth by
tbe Department. It is impossible to reply to mere speculative points or supposed cases. The Attorney-General is not
required t<9 write abstract essays on any subject.
"If there be a claim pending before you on which you desire
to have my ad vice, and you will be pleased to say how it
arises, what are the facts, and wherein the law seems doubtful, I shall with great pleasure give you my opinion."
Mr. Bates says (10 Opin., 267): "I have no power to investigate or decide on facts, but only to give advice and opinions
on questions of law as they arise out of facts authoritatively
laid before me."
Mr. Speed (11 Opin., 192) declines to prepare an opinion
upon a hypothetical case, theoretical in its character.
Mr. Ackerman (13 Opin., 531) points out the necessity for
an " actual case " by saying:
'' It is on questions of law arising in the actual administration of the Departments that the opinion of the AttorneyGeneral may be required. You will readily perceive the
inconvenience of giving, upon a hypothetical case, an opinion, which, upon the consideration of an actual case, might
require modification on account of circumstances not imagined, and, therefore, not considered in the preparation of an
opinion."
In 18 Opinions, 488, the practice is referred to as follows:
"It must, I conceive, be deemed settled that the AttorneyGeneral can only act on a determinate statement of facts
furnished by the officer asking his opinion." "Where," ays
Mr. Attorney-General Stanbery, "a question of law 'ari es
upon facts submitted to the Attorney-General, such facts
rnust be agreed and stated as facts established." (12 Opin., 205.)
Said Mr. Attorney-General Williams upon the same point:
'' I deem it proper here to remind you, that where an official
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opm10n from the head of this Department is desired on
questions of law arising on any case the request should be
accompanied by a statement of the material facts of the case,
and also the precise questions on which advice is wanted/'
Further discussion of the construction under consideration
appears in 19 Opinions, pages 331, 414, and 696, to which I
beg to invite your attention.
In conclusion, I am constrained to say that, in my opinion,
I am not at liberty to submit, in response to said letter, an
offieial opinion for your consideration upon the questions
that have been decided, or upon those that may arise, under
said enactment of August 1, 1892.
Very respectfully,
CHARLES H. ALDRICH,
Acting Attorney- General.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

CONTRACT-HOURS OF LABOR.
Where on July 28, 1892, a formal acceptance of a bid was given, but
leaving a minor detail to be agreed upon and a formal contract and
bond were afterwards'to be prepared and executed, no contract was
entered into prior to tho passage of the act of A,ugust 1, 1892, chapter 352, within the meaning of the th.ird section thereof.
.A. t imber dry dock is one of the "public works" of the United States
under this eight-hour law.
·
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 19, 1892.
SIR: The communication received from your Department
under date of August 16, req_uesting an opinion upon the
case which is set forth, and which arises under the act of
Au gust 1, 1892, relating to the limitation of the hours of
daily service of laborers and mechanics employed upon the
public works, etc., has received careful attention.
'f he communication recites as follows:
"Under date of May 12, 1892, an advertisement was issued
by the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, in this
Department, inviting proposals for the construction of a
timber dry dock, at the navy-yard, Brooklyn, N. Y. The
proposals received in answer to the above advertisement
were opened on the rnth of July last, and on the 28th of
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that month the Chief of the Bureau of Yard and Docks, in
accordance with the Department's instructions, accepted
by letter, making a formal award, one of the bids, that of
Mr. John Gillies, of Brooklyn, N. Y., being the lowe. t
received for the construction ~f the dock, but the contract
therefor under the forms prescribed by law has not yet been
executed.
"The specifications :furnished for the information and guidance of 'l>'iclders, in connection with the advertisement
above mentioned, contained the following paragraph, under
tbe heading 'Hour of work :'
'''The con tractor shall not be restricted to the·hours of labor
established for Governmeut employe_s, and shall be permitted
to prosecute the work night and day, if desired, and on
Sundays, if deemed necessary by the contractor for the protection of the work.'"
The following paragraph is set forth in the advertisement
for bids upon which the offer and acceptance were based:
"The uccessful bidder will be required, within fifteen.
day after the accept:mce of his proposa.I, to enter into a
formal contract."
The letter of acceptance sent to Mr. Gillies contained tbe
following· clause:
"Considering, however, that the schedule of prices in the
printed specification for the proposed dock for material
uelivered but not worked, and also for material worked in
place, exceeds the amount of your bid, the Bureau desires,
before the cont:ract is consummated, to have you submit a
revi eel ~·ehedule of prices for material and excavation, that
you expect to be paid for a tb_e work advances, and a modified cale of prices for excavation and material worked, in
ord r that the gradual payments under the contract may be
kept within the total amount of the contract price.
"When thi nece ary information is SL1ppliecl to and
agreed upon by the Bureau, a form of contract and bond will
be prepared accordingly, as soon thereafter as practicable7
an l forwarded to your addre s for execution."
Four dtty aft r the date of thi letter the act under conider. ti n became a law.
It do not appear that any action was taken by the bidder meantime.

·ro

THE POSTMASTER-GENERAL.

447

Po stnrn s ter-Surety.

It is manifest that there was no such meeting of the minds
of the negotiating parties as is required by law to constitute
a contract. The bid was not accepted unconditionally. A
further agreement upon a minor detail. thereof wa~ required
to be made, and a formal contract and bond were, afterwards, to be prepared and executed.
It is, of course, borne in mind that section 3744 of the
Revised Statutes requires that all contracts of the character
of this one shall be reduced to writing and signed by the
contracting parties. The Supreme Court has held (Clark v.
United States, 95 CT. S., 542) and(S. B. Iron Co. v. United States,
118 U.S., 38) that contracts contemplated by that section do
not become valid until ~xecuted in accordance with its
requirements.
As this new timber dry dock is intended to be a valuable
and permanent improvement of real estate belonging to the
United States, and is solely for its use and benefit, it is, in
my opinion, to be regarded as one of the" public works" of
the United States under this eight-hour law.
It is my opinion, also, that the advertisement for proposals,
the proposal of Mr. Gillies, and its acceptance as set forth
do not constitute a contract "entered into prior to the passage of the act" within the meaning of the third section
thereof.
Very respectfully,
CHARLES H. ALDRICH,
Acting Attorney-General.
The SECRETARY OF '.l'HE NAVY.

POSTMASTER-SURETY.
Wbere a postmaster's commission is to continue until the end of the
next session of the Senate, and during that session his nomination as
postma ter is sent to the consideration of that body but it adjourns
w'ithont t!3-king action thereon, the responsibility of the sureties on
his official bond will continue for sixty clays under the provisions of
section 3 36, Rev~secl Statutes, if the vacancy is not supplied during
that time; and the sureties can lawfully assume possession of the
po t-office, and the Government property therein, and depute one of
their number ol another person as acting postmaster, to pNf'orm the
dutie of the office until a successor is appointed and takes possession.
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DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE

A ugiist 22, 1 !J2.
Sm: Yours of August 13, 1892, states tµe following fact.:
"Under date of June 2, 1891, James Hill was commissioned
by the President as postmaster at Vicksburg, Miss., his commission under the provisions of the statute to continue until
the end of the next session of the Senate, and no longer.
After the assembling of Congress, in December, 1891, the nomination of Mr. Hill was duly sent to the Senate for consideratiou by that body. The Senate has, however, adjourned
without taking action thereon. Mr. Hill's commission has
therefore expired by limitation of the law, thus creating a
vacancy in the office referred to."
Upon this statement of facts you request my opinion as
follows:
"1. The post-office at Vicksburg having become vacant, as
stated, will the responsibility of the sureties on the official
bond of the said James Hill continue for sixty days under
tbe provisions of section 3836, Revised Statutes, provided
the vacancy is not supplied during that time,
"2. Oan the sureties lawfully assume possession of the
po. t-office and the Government property therein and depute
one of their number, or another person, as acting postmaster,
to perform the duties of tlJe office until a successor is
appointed and takes possession,,,
Article 11, section 2, of the Constitution of the United
States provides that '' The President shall have power to fill
up all vacancies that may bappeu during the recess of the
enate, by granting commis ions which shall expire at the
end of their next session."
Section 1769, Revised Statutes, 1878, repealed by the act
of larch 3, 1887 (24 Stat., 500), provided that "if no
appointment by and with the ad vice and consent of the
Senate i made to an office so vacant, or temporarily filled
during uch next session of the Senate, the office shall
remain in abeyance, without any salary, fees, or emolument
attach d thereto, until it is filled by appointment thereto by
and with the ad vice and consent of the Senate."
Provi ion wa al o made for the discharge •of the duties
of uch office during uch interim. Since the repeal of the

TO THE POSTMASTER-GENERAL.

449

Postmaster-Surety.

tenure of office act, as it was popularly called, no similar
provisions have been reenacted.
In my opinion, while Mr. Hill's commission has expired,
· and he is no longei: postmaster de jure, it by no means follows that his duties are at an end.
Section 3836, Revised Statutes, to wllich you refer, is as
follows:
'' Whenever the office of any postmaster becomes vacant,
the Postmaster-General or the President shall supply such
vacancy without delay, and the Postmaster-General shall
promptly notify the Sixth Auditor of the change; and every
postmaster and his sureties shall be responsible under their
bond for the safe keeping of the public property of the postoffi.ce, and the due performance of the duties thereof, until
the expiration of the commission, or until a successor has
been duly appointed and qualified, and has taken possession
of the office; except that in cases where there is a delay of
sixty days in supplying a vacancy, the sureties may terminate their responsibility by giving notice, in writing, to the
Postmaster-Ge1teral, such termination to take effect ten days
after sufficient time shall have elapsed to receive a· reply
from the Postmaster-General; and the Postmaster-General
may, when the exigencies of the service require, place such
office in charge of a special agent until the. vacancy can be
regularly filled; and when such special agent shall have
taken charge of such post-office the liability of the sureties
of the postmaster shall cease.''
The words "whenever the office of any postmaster becomes
vacant" are general, and, in my opinion, include the case
stated by you. The expiration of Mr. Hill's commission does
not, in my opinion, put him or his - sureties in any different
relations to the Government than is occupied by a postmaster and his sureties where a commission for four years has
expired. While postmaster he was as fully so as if he had
been confirmed by the Senate. The only difference is to be
found in the tenure of the office. The President has the
. ame power to commission him or any other person he may
choo e until the end of the next session of the Senate, as was
exerci ed origina11y in his case.
Until some action is taken by the President or yourself it
is not to be , upposed that the duties of the office are to
,
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remain undischarged, and the public service brought to a
standstill. To avoid this Congress has provided in the ection referred to that "every postmaster and his sureties shall
be responsible under their bond for the safekeeping of the
public property of tbe post-office, and the due perform,ance of
the duties thereof, until tbe expiration of the commission, or
until a successor has been duly appointed and qualified and
has taken possession of the office." The word "or" should,
in my opinion, be read" and." This is made clear by the following words: ''Except that in cases where there is a delay
of sixty clays in supplying. a vacancy, the sureties may terminate their responsibility by giving notice in writing," etc.
This language applies as well to a vacancy caused by expiration of commission as by removal, suspension, resignation,
or death.
This section makes it the duty of the appointing power to
act promptly by requiring the vacancy to be filled "without
delay." It at the same time impliedly recognizes that conditions may exist preventing immediate action. A rea"onable time must elapse in any event, and even if the appointing power failed in any case to act, the public interests are
protected by making the parties responsible for the due performance of the duties of the office, while at the same time
the rights of the suretie are protected against unreasonable
delay by the provision that after sixty days they may terminate that liability by notice.
The case is therefore to be distinguished from the ca e of
the Unit(}d Stcites v. Kirlcpatrick ·(9 Wheat., 720), where it was
held that a bond given for the faithful di charge of the dutie
of his office by a collector of direct taxe and internal dutie
appointed (under the act of July 22, 1813, chapter 16) by the
Pre ident on the 11th of November, 1813, to hold his office
until the end of_ the next session of the Senate, and no longer,
expired at the expiration of . uch Senate, and the suretie
were no longer liable. In that ca e there wa no statute continuing the liability, as in this in tance. This di tinction
ha been recognized in former opinions of this Department.
Mr. Deven ays (15 Opin., 214):
"Whether there i any common-law rule by which a public offic r appointed for a special term may hold office beyond
that term upon a failure of the proper authority to appoint
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or elect his successor has sometimes been deemed a disputed
question. The circumstance, however,- that Congress has
expressly provided that certain officers whose appointments
are for a definite term shall hold until their successors are
appointed and qualified affords the strongest ground for
construing the United States law as one under which no
officer continues to hold his office after the expiration of the
t erm for which he was appointed, unless in the case of those
officers for whom provision is expressly made."
Mr. Brewster says (17 Opin., 649):
" Congress has in terms provided that certain officers whose
appointments are for a definite term shall hold until their
successors are appointed and qualified (see, for example, secs.
1841, 1843, 1875, 1876, _a nd 4778, Rev. Stat.), from which it
is plainly to be inferred that officers not thus authorized can
not lawfully hold over. Expressio unius est exclusio alter·ius.
So that the genera.I rule seems to be that where Congress
h as not authorized the officer to hold over his incumbency
must be deemed to cease at the end of his term, though no
appointment of a successor may then be made."
There are many authorities sustaining this view: Butler
v. S tate (20 Ind., 169); McCormick v. Moss (41 Ill., 352); Kent
v. Mercer (12 Up. Can. (0. P.), 30); State v. jjfinnesota (20
Mo., 303); Dunphy v. Whipple (25 Mich., 10); Placer Co. v.
D ickerson (45 Cal., 12); Wheelingv.Black (25 W. Va., 266),etc.
The test is to be found in the y_uestion :whether the lawm aking power has placed any d:tities upon the officer extendin g beyond the date of his commission. If so, and he has,
as in this case, given bond for the faithful discharge of all
duties, his sureties are liable, as such law enters into their
contr act as fully as if written at length therein.
The case may be stated in this way: Mr. Hill was under no
obligation to surrender the office and turn ov~r the property
until t he expiration· of his commission. These acts followed
necessarily the expiration of his term of office. How long
time can be taken in these necessary acts 1 The act in q uestion h as allowed sixty days in the absence of action by bhe .
President or yourself.
I a m therefore of the opinion that section 3836 applies to
the ca estated.
It may be said that this construction enables the.President
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to fill this and similar offices continuously without the advice
and consent of the Senate. I think not. It is not to be presumed that the duty enjoined upon the President of filling
such a vacancy without delay will be neglected longer than
is necessary to enable him to make the proper selection, or
that he will seek to assume power which belongs to him generally in conjunction with the Senate. Such presumptions
as has been before said (19 Opin., 264), are" incompatible,
with the character of the high office with which the votes of
an intelligent people have illtrusted the President." The
Constitution provides for the expiration of the commission;
it in no way affects the office or provides that its duties shall
cease. Mr. Hill's term was limited, but Congress has provided for the continuance of the business of the office by
providing that the incumbent and his sureties shall continue
to manage it and discharge its functions until the vacancy
is filled or you send agents to take charge thereof.
I therefore answer both your questions in the affirmative.
Very respectfully,
CHARLES H . .ALDRICH,
Solicitor-General.
The POS1'M.A.STER-GENER.A.L•
.Approved:
W. H. H. MILLER.
WORLD'S COLUMBI.A.N COMMISSION-INDIAN TERRITORY.

The President is authorized to appoint commissioners of the World's
Columbian Expo ition only from such Territories as are organized and
have a political status under the acts of Congress. Indian Territory
is not such a Territory.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 24, 1 92.
SrR: By bis letter of August 15 the Acting Secretary of
State a k whether under the act of Congres appro ed
A ril 2u 1 90, ntitled "An act to provide for celebrating the
fi ur ha.ndr <.1th anniv r ary of the discovery of America," etc.,
it i th duty of the tate Department to take any action looking t.o the r I re ent tion of the Indian Territory in the
11d
olumbian
mmi i n.
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Section 2 of that act provides" TlJat a commission to consist of two commissioners from
each State and Territory of the United States and from the
District of Columbia and eight commissioners at large is
hereby constituted to be designated as the World's Columbian Commission."
Section 3 provides" That said commissioners, two from each State and Territory, shall be appointed within thirty days from the passage
of this act by the President of the United States on the nomination of the governors of the States and Territories, respectively, and by the President eight commissioners at large
and two from the District of Columbia. * * *"
The same section provides for the appointment in the same
manner of alternate commissioners, and then says: '' And
in such nominations and appointments each of the two leading political parties shall be equally represented."
Section 4 requires the Secretary of State, immediately after
the passage of this act, to notify the governors of the several
States and Territorie~ respectively thereof and request such
nominations to be made.
The point to be determined, therefore, is whether this act
requires commissioners to be appointed from the Indian Territory. From the other Territories commissioners are to be
appointed only upon nominations by the Governor. From the
District of Columbia they are to be appointed by tbe President without nomination. In all of the States, Territories,
and the District of Columbia, they are required to be made
from the opposite political parties. Within the meaning of
thi law, there is no governor, nor are there political parties,
in the Indian Territory. As a political organization, the Territory has no existence. It is simply a tract of country occupied by various tribes of Indians, under tribal governments
and regulations variant in different parts of the Territory.
If it had been the purpose of Congress to authorize the
appointment of commissioners to represent the people occupying this district .. of country, provisions would doubtless
bave been made for their appointment by the President
direct, as in the case of the District of Columbia, or upon the
nomination of some tribal authority or authorities. ln the
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absence of such provision, it is my opinion that the Pre ident
i authorized to appoint commissioners only from such T r-

ritories as are organized and have a political status under the
acts of Congress, and that no action is therefore required of
the Secretary of State in the premises.
This conclusion is confirmed by the opinion of December
19, 1890, holding that, under the ame act, Alask'1 was entitled to be represented by two commissioners in the World's
Columbian Commission. (19 Opin., 700.)
Re pectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRETARY OF STA'l'E.
0

EIGHT-HOUR LAW.
The act of Augustl, 1892, chapter 352, providing that laborers employed
on public works of the United States shall be limited in service to ight
hours a day, does not apply to the case of a contract for furnishing
materials such as po.st-office lock boxes.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 24, 1892.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
note of yesterday, in which you state that " * * * this Department received and opened proposals on the 11th instant
for the supplying of post-office lock boxes, lock drawer , locks,
pull , plate , etc., for various public buildings throughout
the United States, to be delivered by the contractor at the
freight depot at the point of destination, and placed in
po ition in the building by the Government, and that before
any action can be taken in regard to the acceptance of a propo al, a necessity exists for a formal opinion as to whether or
not a contract for the upply of the above-named arti le
would be em braced within the pro vi ion of the so-ca1led
i 0 ·ht-hour law (approved Augu t I, 1892), under the de igm ion f public work ,' and ther fore I have to requ t you
t 'Ubmi OU.r formal opinion upon aid question."
r b lan °·uag
f th act of ugu t 1, to which you make
r fi ren e
far a pertin nt, i a follows:
That th
ervice and em1 loyment of all laborers and
m •hani who are now or may hereafter be employed by the
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Government
the United States, by the District of Columbia, or by any contractor or subcontractor upon any of the
public works of the United States or of the said District of
Columbia, is hereby limited and restricted to eight hours in
any one calendar day." * * *
From your statement of facts, it does not appear that the
persons who furnish the lock boxes, lock drawers, etc., are to
do any work upon the public buildings. So far as appears,
they simply contract to deliver to the Government, at the
freight depot at the various points of destination, the goods
in question. In other words, their contract is a contract for
the furnishing of materials to be used in public buildings, and
not for the service and employment of laborers or mechanics
to be employed upon such buildings. To hold that in purchasing materials to be used in the erection and :fitting up
of public buildings the requirement that such materials shall
only have been manufactured by persons working eight hours
a day would render this law impossible of execution. If the
law is applicable to the goods you name, it is not seen why
it would not be equally applicable to a purchase of spikes,
nails, lumber, brick, etc., entering into the construction of
Government buildings.
Your que8tion is, therefore, answered in the negative.
Respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

NOTARY.
A notary's authority to administer an oath does not exist by virtue of
his office, but is derived from positive enactment. A notary of AustriaHungary, not authorized by the laws of his country to administer oaths
or take affidavits, lacks the requisite authority to administer the oath
prescribed by section 4892 of the Revised Statutes.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 25, 1892.
SIR: Your communication of the 13th instant, relating to
the taking of the oaths prescribed by section 4892 of the
Revi ed Statutes before notaries of foreign countries, who
are not authorized by the laws of those countries to administer oaths, with accompanying documents, came to band duly.
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Said section reads:
''The applicant shall make oath that he does verily believe
himself to be the original and first inventor or discoverer of
tlte art, machine, manufacture, composition, or improvement
for which he solicits a patent; that he does not know and
does not believe that the same was ever before known or
used; and shall state of what country he is a citizen. Such
oath may be made before any person within the United States
authorized by law to administer oaths, or when the applicant resides in a foreign county, before any minister, charge
d'affaires, consul, or commercial agent, holding commission
under the Government of the United States, or before any
notary public of the foreig:u country in which the applicant
may be."
It is shown by the letter of the Commissioner of Patents,
and otherwise, that some countries have omitted to give their
notaries any statutory authority to administer oaths or to take
affida,v its. This is the case in Austria-Hungary, and only
cases arising there will be considered in this opinion.
The que tion submitted to me for an opinion is, in sub"tauce, whether an oath made by an applicant for a patent,
and worn to before a notary of Austria-Hungary, who has
110 authority by the law of his domicile to administer an oath"
or tc: k an affidavit, is to be regarded as a valid and lawful
oath under aid statute in the procedure of the Patent Office.
It i understood that in many foreign countries, and in all
of the States of the United States, notaries are authorized
by the local statute to perform the acts of administering
oath and taking affidavits. It is scarcely to be supposed
tltat in a minor matter of this kind Congress makes inquiry
a · to the exact tatus of notaries among all the nations.
It may be fairly inferred that Congre intended by the
w rel.' "any notary public" to include those, and only those,
authorized by their local laws to admini ter oaths.
Our ,·tatute require that the "applicant shall make oath,"
an l p rrnit that" uch oath may be made before any per on
"i hin the Unhed State authorized by law to admini ter
ath , '
well a before the pecified United State officer .
l
an h rdly be impli d that it was intended that, out ide
f tbi
untry, per ons not authorized to admini ter oaths
w re t be ailed upon to act for this Government in admin-
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istering oaths. Our Government neither appoints the foreign
notary its officer, nor authorizes him to act; it merely permits
the non-resident applicant, for his own convenience, to make
oath before a designated local officer, supposed to possess
authority to take the affidavit. If a notary public, from the
nature of his office, the practice under the law merchant, or the
rules of international law, could rightfully be regarded as
possessing the right to administer an oath of this character'
that would, doubtless, be sufficient to connect the statute
with any act that tbe notary might perform under it; but an
assumption that he has this power by virtue of his office is
not sustained by the authorities.
Although a notary, or a notary public, is an officer known
to the law of nations, and of great antiquity, he is not,
according to ancient custom or general usage, authorized to
take affidavits, or administer oaths:
"The power to administer oaths is not one of the incidents
of the office of notary public, under the general law merchant,
nor was it, under the Roman law, from which it was derived.
W hen that power is annexed to the office it is so by virtue
of positive enactment.". (Proffatt on Notaries, 165, 178.)
Neither the taking of affidavits nor the administering of
oaths is done by a notary under the law merchant:
"Authority is given in most of the States to notaries to
administer oaths and to take affidavits; but this authority
is one derived from statute law and did not belong to the
officer originally." (16 A. and E. Ency. of Law, 768.)
The act of administering a solemn oath "calling on God to
witness the truth of what is said" by the ·person sworn,
seems of necessity to require the individual officiating to be
clothed by law with an especial authority.
For a private person to assume to administer an oath with
its adjuration would be presumptuous in the highest degree,
to say the least.
Said Lord Coke:
"An oath is an affirmance or denial * * * before one
or more that have authority to give the same, calling
Almighty God to witness that his testimony is true."
An affidavit is defined to be "an oath ·or affirmation
reduced to writing, sworn or affirmed before some officer who
has authority to administer it." (19 Texa,s, 155.)
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It isl stated (Wharton's Law Lexicon, 573) that: ''The
administering of unlawful oaths is an offense against the
Government and punishable by penal servitude."
An extrajudicjal oath js defined to be: "An oath taken
without the direction or authority of law."
ltis added that: "An extrajudicial oath, when false, does
not expose the person to puuishment for perjury." (And.
Die., 720.)
Itis true that Lord Eldon states (6 Vesey, 824) that "a
notary public by the law of nations has credit everyw;here,"
but it may be fairly contended that this credit must be
limited to acts which pertain to the nature of the office, or to
such as he is authorized l>y the laws of bis country to perform.
In Haggett v. Iniff (31 English L. and E., 202) the court
refused to receive affidavits taken before a notary public of
the State of New York until it was shown that, "according
to the law of the United States, a notary public was duly
qualified to administer oaths and take affidavits in any law
proceedings ju that country."
"'
It is also true that the Commissioner of Patents, in a
deci ion dated January 5, 1884, in answer to a suggestion
that a "notary in Germany is not authorized to administer an
oath-tl1at he acts merely as a conveyancer"-says tbat
"such de ignated officials in administering the oath act by
virtue of the authority conferred by the statute of the
p-nited tates and not by virtue of any power or authority
conferred by the foreign government."
The only que tion shown to be before the Commissioner was
whether an affidavit taken before a judge of the royal Pru sian court at Buckan wa sufficient to comply with section
4892. No notarial oath or affidavit is referred to as being
before the Commi ioner. The matter of notarial action and
authori y wa argumentative merely; it wa not before the
ommi ion er for decision and therefore could not have been
de •i d by him. It is not nece ary for me to hold that he
nde to t rmine it.
t i ·l ar that he appJi ations to which you refer, and
re illu r t d by the communications of Consul-Genld bmidt and Mr. Jentzsch, viz, those that are
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signed, or signed and sworn to, in blank, and afterwards
filled in, and those which bear merely a certificate of the

signing, -but no applicant's oath or affidavit, furnish no sufficient ground for official action in the Patent Office.
The practices referred to relate to administrative matters
within the purview of your DepartJ11:ent, and are such as
may well be called to the attention of Congress, but they are
not such as now require an official opinion from me.
In conclusion, it is my opinion that a notary of AustriaHungary, who ·is not authorized by the laws of his country
to _administer oaths or take affidavits, lacks the requisite
authority to administer the oath required by section 4892 of
the Revised Statutes.
Very respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRE'l'.ARY OF THE INTERIOR,

EIGHT-HOUR LAW-ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
~

The act of August 1, 1892, chapter 352, is of general application, and the
limitation as to public works in said act applies only to such person~
as are in the employ of contractors and subcontractors. V~ether or
not specified persons ane such laborers is a question of fact not for the
Attorney-General to determine.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUS'.l'ICE,

.August 27, 1892. •
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the
note of the Acting Secretary of August 12, transmitting a
copy of the act of Congress of August 1, 1892, entitled "An
act relating to the limitation of the hours of daily service of
laborers and mechanics employed upon the public works of
the United States and of the District of co·lumbia."
In "this note you ask my opinion upon the questionsFirst. Does this act apply only to such laborers and mechanics as are employed by the Quartermaster's Department upon public works, or does it include all other laborers
and mechanics employed in the Quartermaster's Department
performing the usual and ordinary service of that character
in that department,
Second. Does it include teamsters, watchmen, engineers,
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and firemen employed in the public service of the War Department, and all engineers, :firemen, deck hands, mates, and seamen on Government vessels in the service thereof¥
The act, which is short, reads as follows:
'' Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the
service and employment of all laborers and mechanics who are
now or may hereafter be employed by the Government of the
United States, by the District of Columbia, or by any contractor or subcontractor upon any of the public works of the
United States, or of the said District of Columbia, is hereby
limited and restricted to eight hours in any one calendar day;
and it shall be unlawful for any officer of the U. S. Government, or of the District of Columbia, or any such contractor
or ~ubcontractor, whose duty it shall be to employ, direct, or
control the services of such laborers or mechanics to require
or permit any such laborer or mechanic to work more than
eight hours in any calenda: day, except in case of extraordinary emergency.
"SEC. 2. That any officer or agent of the Government of
the United States, or of the District of Columbia, or any
coutractor or subcontractor whose duty it shall be to employ,
direct, or control any laborer or mechanic employed upon any
of the public works of the United States, or of the District
of Columbia, who shall intentionally violate any provision
of this act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and,
for each and every offense, shall, upon conviction, be puni bed by a :fine not to exceed one thousand dollars, or by
imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both such
:fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court having
juri diction thereof.
"SEC. 3. The provisions of this act sbaJl not be so contru d as to in any manner apply to or affect contractors
or ubr,ontractor , or to limit the hours of daily service of
laborer or mechanics engaged upon the public works of the
nited tat or of the Di trict of Columbia for which contra t ba e been entered int-0 prior to the pas age of this act."
T e :fir t ue ti n ford i i n i wheth r this Jaw applie
n1y
la r p r£ rme up n public works, or wh th r, a to
Ia r r
hani
m 1 y dir tly by the overnmeut
r th
f
lumbia it i g neral and applicable to
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all cases. Upon the reading of the law the question is QY
no means clear, and one which, without great violence to the
language of the statute, might well be decided either way.
First. In the first place the title, "An act relating to the
limitation of the hours of daily service of laborers and
mechanics employed upon the public works of the United
States and of the District of Columbia," clearly favors the
more restricted meaning. While this is by no means conclusive, it is a circumstance worthy of consideration. ''Where
doubt exists as to the meaning of a· statute the title may be
looked to for ajd in its construction." (Smythe v. Fiske, 23
Wall., p. 380.)
On the other hand, the punctuation of the act supports the
opposite view. If the law were read with a comma after
the word "subcontractor," as first uset in the first section,
then the phrase" upon any of the public works of the United
States or of the said District of Columbia" would qualify all
the preceding part of the section, and it would be clear that
the law should be applied only to labor upon the public works.
If, on the other hand, it be read without such comma, the
opposite conclusion would seem to be correct. In the law
itself, both as enrolleu and printed, there is no such comma.
In the reports of both the Senate and House committees
recommending the passage of the bill, in stating the substancf>: of the bill, such comma, is used, thus favoring a construction apparently at variance with that indicated by the
punctuation of the act itself. It
true, as matter of law,
that "punctuation is no part of a statute," and '' that courts
in construing acts of Parliament or deeds should read them
with such stops as will give effect to the whole." (Hammock
v. Loan and Trust Go., 105 U. S., p. 34.) At the same time,
it is true that by using or omitting the comma after the word
" ~ubcontractor," as above, the grammatical reading of this
statute is changed. Without the comma the clause ''public ·
1oorks, etc.," qualifies only the part relating to contractors
and subcontractors; with the comma it qualifies each of the
three clauses of the series. So far, then, with the title on
the one side and the punctuation on the other, the argument
is perhaps fairly balanced.
But another evidence of the legislative intent, more persuasive than either title or punctuation, must be considered.
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In 1868 Congress passed an act now standing as section
373 , Revised Statutes, as follows :
"Eight hours shall constitute a day's work for all laborer,
workmen, and mechanics who may be employed by or on
behalf of the Government of the United States."
This act, without question, was general, applying to all
"laborers, workmen, and mechanics"in the direct employment
of the United States. In practical administration, however,
this section has been held to be merely directory and has not
been enforced.
In 1888 another act was passed (Supp. Rev. Stat. 582),
containing the following : ·
"And the Public Printer is hereby directed to rigidly
enforce the provisions of the eight-hour law in the department under his charge."
Such was the state M the legis;fa,tion upon this subject when
the act now under consideration was before Congre s. It i
' matter of public history that, ever since the enactment of
the statute of 1868, efforts have been made to procure legi lation from Congres imperatively requiring the enforcement
of that act.
·
An examination of the debate in the House of Repre entatives, which wa quite extensive (Uong. Rec., 6357, etc.),
hows that both the upporter, and opponents of .the bill
under tood it purpo e to · be twofold. Fir t, to render the
act of 1 GS effectual by i mposing penalties for its di regard.
econd, to extend that act to the District of Columbia and
to contractors and subcontractor of the Government and
the Di, trict; in short, that the purpose was to make a workin day of eight hour for all laborer and mechanics in the
mploy of the United States or the Di ··trict of Columbia
wherev r employed, and to make a like clay for contractor
or ub ·ontractor upon the public work , and by proper
penaltie · to enforce th ob ervance of such working day. In
th
enate th bill wa pa ed without any con id rable di n. i n. (Cong. ec., 763 .) But the reports of the committ , of b th Hou e of ConoTe ( enat , 048, find Hou e,
12u'i) , hil 110 directly di. u fog the que tion h r at i . u
·1 rly vin an und r tanding f the cope and purpo e of
th a
, tat cl.
en e r ~tricting and in i roga-
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tion of the common right of parties to contract, is nevertheless remedial, and is entitled to a fairly liberal construction.
In view, therefore, of' the previous legislation upon the subject, of the alleged evils sought to · be corrected, and in
deference to the legislative understanding and purpose apparent in debate and reports of committees while the act was
under consideration, the act itself, without violence· to its
language, being susceptible of either construction, I am constrained to hold that the law; as to laborers and mechanic~ in
the direct employment of the Government and of the District of Columbia, is general; and that the limitation to p'ltblia
works applies only to such persons as are in the employ of
contractors and subcontractors.
Second. As to your second question, pertaining to particular employes, I beg to suggest that its answer depends upon
matters of fact not stated, and not within my cognizance.
If the employes named are ordinary laborers or mechanics,
working for the Government for wages under ordinary con- ·
ditions, the statute would seem to apply. At the same time,
it is quite apparent that, as to some of them, it might frequently happen that they would be within the emergency
exception named in the statute; and as to others, as, for
instance, sailo-rs or others on shipboard, or teamsters, their
employment being peculiar, they might well be held to be,
as a matter of fact, neither laborers nor mechanics within
the meaning of this law.
Respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.
AT'rORNEY-GENERAL.
Where certain contractors whose bid for the performance of certain
work for the Government h as been accepted, state before signing the
contract that they desire to know what portion of the work the eighthour law will affect, the Attorney-General is not authorized to give
an opinion in the case.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

.August 27, 1892.
Sm: I have your letter of August 25, as follows:
" I have the honor to inclose herewith copy of letter of the
17th instant, addressed to this Department by Messrs. A. S.
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Reed & Bro., of Wilmington, Del., in regard to the execution by them of a contract for supplying certain 'stone and
brickwork, roof-covering, approaches, etc., from the line XX
as shown on the drawings, the brick and terracotta or hard.
tile floor and ceiling arches, with concrete :filling and wood
strips, concrete and cement floors of window areas, down
pipes and basement drains, etc., for ·the superstru~ture of the
U. S. court-house, post-office, etc., building at Wilmington,
Del.,' and stating that before they can enter into a contract
for said work they would like to know what portion of the
work the eight-hour law will affect; whether it embraces
those persons engaged in quarrying the stone, sawing the
timber, making the brick, or whether it only affects the work
immediately in and around the building.
"I also inclose herewith for your information copy of letter of the 16th instant, addressed to Messrs . .A. S. Reed &
Bro., by the Supervising .Architect of this Department,
aceepting their proposal for said work.
".As it is desirable that a contract for said work be entered
into, and the commencement of the prosecution of the work
begun at the earlie t practicable date, I have to request
your formal opinion as to the provisions of the so-called
<:ight-honr law, approved .August I, 1892, in relation to the
que tions herein presented."
Section 356 of the Revised Statutes reads as follows:
"The head of any Executive Department may require the
opiuion of the .Attorney-General on any questions of law
ari ing in the admini tration of his Department."
In otller words, the function of the .Attorney-General is to
advi e the several heads of the other Executive Department upon the que tions of law which, in the administration
of their respective Department , they are required to decide.
Such i 11ot the ca e. I know of no law which requires the
e ·retary of the Trea ury to become the legal advi er of a
part propo. ing to enter into a contract with the Governm nt. Th re uest her i made for the benefit of the propo ed ntractors to enable th m to de ide que tion of interh ir bu 'iue , and not to nable the Secretary of the
a ur ' t di harg a public duty. Repeated] a often
a hi u ti n ha be n pre vt d to my predeces ors, it
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bas been decided that the Attorney-Gene~al is not authorized to give an opinion in such a case, and I am constrained
to follow these precedents, in which my judgment concurs.
Respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRE'l'ARY OF THE TREASURY.

ATTORNEY ~GENERAL.
It is not permissible for the Attorney-General to give an opinion except
in a case actually arising in .t he administration of one of the Departments.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 29, 1892.
SIR: I have your letter of August 27, as follows:
'' I have the honor to submit the question whether the act
approved August 1, 189:3, known as 'the eight-hour law,'
applies to the construction of levees on the Mississippi
River.
''I do this at the request of the Hon. T. C. Catchings, and
hand you herewith his views in reference to the subject, to
wit:
"His letter to the ~ecretary of War, dated August 17 1 also
bis letter to the Secretary dated August 24, and also his
letter to the Acting Secretary, dated August 26. I also hand
you herewith the views of the Acting Judge-Advocate-General, dated August 22, and my communication to the Hon.
Mr. Catchings, dated August 24. Will you kindly return
these papers with your opinion upon the question presented.
'' Allow me to suggest that specifications have _already
been prepared with the view to advertising for bids, and it
is important that there should be no delay in the prosecution
of the work."
·
Section 356 of the Revised Statutes reads as follows:
"The head of any E·xecutive Department may require an
opinion of the Attorney-General on any questions of law
ari il)g in the administration of his Department."
Over and over again it has been held by my predecessors,
a well as by myself, that under this statute it is not perm i ible for the Attorney-General to give an opinion, except
upon a case actually arising in the administration of one of
5687-- 'VOL 20-30
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the Departments. (See 19 Opin., 7, 331, 414, 670, 695.) No
uch case appears to be pending in the War Department
at this time touching the subject-matter of the con truction
of levees on the Mississippi River. Indeed, in your letter to
the Hon. T. 0. Catchings, under date August 26, in respouse
to hi request that the question whether such levees are public works within th~ meaning of the act of August 1, instant,
be submitted to me for opinion, you say:
"It is very doubtful whether the Attorney-General would
feel justified in giving an opinion upon so general a question.
The rule of that Department, aR is understood here, is that
no opinion is given, and none should be required, until tllere
is a specific case pending in some Department upon which
the opinion of the Attorney-General is desired. The specific
case does not seem to have arisen; in other words, it probably would not be considered as now pending in this Department."
It is thus evident that the request for this opinfon does
not rest upon an actual case requiring a decision or action
by the Secretary of War. As shown iu the opinions above
referred to, and the citations therein made, it is neither my
duty, nor have I a right, to give an official opinion with a
vfow to the guidance of persons who way propose to enter
iuto contract relation,' with the United States.
Under the circumstances, therefore, conforming to an unbroken line of precedents, I am con trained to decline to
giv an opinion upon the que tion propounded.
I return her with the inclosures mentioned in your letter,
a reque ted.
R ·pectfully,
W. H. H. l\HLLER.
The ECRET.A.RY OF W .A.R .

.ARA TI IB REG LATIONS-REPEALING STATUTE.
Th , 'nrg on- 'en ral of the Marine-Hospital ervice and the S cretary
f the Tr a nry may, with th approval of the President, make needful ml autl r o-ulati n , n t iocon , i tent with the tat law and
r •gnlation.' f r tl.t quarantining of hip comioo- into our he rbor ,
with a vi w to th prot ction of th liv s nncl health of our people.
,, h r • a r p , ling a.ct xpire of i own limitation, t,he act repealed is
r Yiv cl.
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September 1, 1892.
SrR: Answering your question as to the extent of the
powers of the Executive in the matter of quarantii+e regulations, I beg to say:
On the 29th of April, 1878, an act of Congress was approved
(20 Stat., 37), giving to the Executive certain powers upon
this subject.
On the 2d of June, 1879, another act of Congress was
approved (21 Stat., 5), providing for the repeal of many of the
most important provisions of the act of 1878; but the later
act was limited in its duration to the period of four years;
that is, t,he act of June 2, 1879, expired by limitation on the
2d of June, 1883.
It is a well-settled principle of the common law that the
repeal of a repealing act operates to revive the act repealed,
just as the repeal of an act changing the common law
restores the rule of the common law prevailing before such
act was passed. As to the repeal of a repealing act 1 this rule
has been changed by section 12, of the Revised Statutes of
tbe United States, which reads as follows:
"Whenever an act is repealed, which repealed a former
act, such former act shall not thereby be revived, unless it
sball be expressly so provided."
The act of 1879, however, was not repealed, but expired
by limitatiou, and section 12 of the Revised Statutes, therefore, has no application to this case. In Collins v. Smith (6
Whart., 294:) it was decided, Chief Justice Gibson delivering
the opinion, tbat where a repealing act expires by its own
limitation, the act repealed is revived. Accordingly, it was
held by the late Mr. Secretary Folger, an eminent jurist,
that tl1i · particular act of 1878 was revived on June 2, 1883.
The . ame view wa · -taken by my immediate predecessor,
Attorney-General Garland, and was acted upon no doubt
under hi advice by President Cleveland and Secretary Manning in quarantining against mallpox in Canada in 1885.
In tllL view I ·c oncur.
By the law of 1878 it is provided, among other thingsFir t. "That no vesgel coming from any foreign port or
country where any contagious or infectious disease exists, or
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conveying any person or persons, merchandise or animal:,
affected with any contagious disease, shall come into tbe
United States, except in the manner and subject to the r gulatious in that act authorized."
Second.. "The Surgeon-General of the Marine-Ho pital
Service sball, under the direction of the Secretary of the
Treasury, be charged with the execution of the provision of
this act, and shall frame all needful rules and regulations
for that purpose. These rules and regu:Jations shall be ·ubjcct to the approval of the Pr~sident, but uch rule and
regulations shall not conflict with or impair any sanitary or
quarantine laws or regulations of any State or municipal
authorities now exi ting, or which may here.a fter be enacted."
The policy of Congress has apparently been to mainly
leave tbis branch of the public service with the States, and
1110 t of the seaboard States have statutes more or less
elaborate on the ubject.
Tl.le Staite tatutes and regulation , however, may be upp1ementecl by the National Executive. My couclu ion, tlierefore, is tbat the Snrgeon-Genernl of the Marine-Ho p_ital
Servfoe and .t he. Secretary of the Trea ury, with your
8))jll'OYUl, Jnwe authority to make SUCh needful rule and
r guJat,ion , not incon isteut with the State laws. and recruJatiou,, for the quarantining of ships coming into our harbor.·, wit.ha view to the protection of the health aud live of
our people.
V )ry re pectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The PRESIDENT.

A

NTINE REGULATIONS-POWER OF STATE-FEDERAL
PO"\VER.
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DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Septernber 10, 1892.
SIR: By your telegram of yesterday you ask for an opin-

ion as to the extent of the powers conferred upon the Surgeon-General or' the Marine-Hospital Service and the Secretary of the Treasury with your approval to make quarantine
regulations with reference to immigration and infected ports.
In answer, I have to say that every government is under
obligation to take all necessary measures to preserve the life
and property of its citizens not only from foreign invasion,
but to adopt such sanitary measures as are calculated to
protect the people from those pestilences which have been
found nearly if not quite as destructive as war.
This is but another application of the maxim that selfpreservation is the first law of nature, and, it may be added,
of nations.
The right of the State to enact sanitary measures to protect its citizens is conceded. The rightof'the United States ·
to do the same must be admitted. The maxim salits populi
suprerna, lex is as applicable to the one government as to the
other.
The powers granted Congress in Article 1, section 8, of
the Constitution "to regulate commerce with foreign nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes,"
and "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into execution the foregoing powers and all
other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government
of the UnitPid States, or any Department or officer thereof,"
afford ample warrant for legislation by Congress upon this
subject.
This subject is but one of a large number related ·to and
affecting in different degrees the subject of commerce upon
which the States in the exercise of the police power are free
to act and have a-cted from the foundation of the Government. Pilotage, wharfage, quarantine, and inspection laws
are perhaps the most frequent examples of this class of legislation.
There are other instances of concurrent legislation not at
all related to commerce. For example:
The State, in the exercise of its police powers for the regulation of the liquor traffic, requires the payment by a manu-
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facturer or dealer in intoxicants of a license. Without at all
interfering with that State requirement, it is entirely comp tent and the common practice for the Federal Government
to require the payment of an additional licen ·e. So the
Federal Government forbid8, under a severe penalty the
circulating of counterfeit coins, notes, and securitie,. Without at all conflicting with the Federal statutes, the I tate
may and does impose penalties for the same acts. So, coming more closely to the subject-matter, it is belc.l competent
for the State authorities to impose a tax upon ships for the
purpose of paying the expenses of administering her inspection or quarantine laws; and at the same time tbe Gelleral
Government may and does impose a tax-head tax on
immigrants-for a like purpose; and this is not under. tood
to involve any necessary conflict of jurisdiction. (JJforgan v.
Loiiisicinci, 118 U. S., 455.)
-These are ubjects largely local in their character, and
beuce doubtle. s it ha been upposed that they could be
more effectually and atisfactorily managed through local
law.
It can not be doubted, however, that wjth reference to tho e
ubjects confided to the nation that'' Congress has the power
to go beyond the general regulations which it is accustomed
toe tabli ·h and to de cencl to the most minute directions if
it shall be deemed advisable; and tha~ to whatever extent
ground ball be covered by those direction the exerci e of
tate power i excluded. Congress may e tabli h police
r gulations, a well a the States, confining their operation
to the ,'u~ject over which it i given coutrol by the Con ·titution." ( 1 ooley's Constitutional Limitation , pp. 722, 7-3.)
To the exteut that Congress doe act upon the , ubject
within the Con. titution its authority is paramount. In ome
of the a es it i said to be exclusi e. The di tiuction e:tabli. h d by th authoritie. is that it i only ex lu ive wh re the
int ntion of Congre i hown tbat it hall b o or wh u it
ary to be , o to arry out the n a tioual will or pr :erve
th fm1 tion and pow r of the National Government. In
, 11 th r -a.
th re may exi t and b enforced at tb ame
tim fl 1 u1 on h :am . ubject bo h tate and national
law . In · far a th r i ny nfli t the latter I reYail.
ar authoriz d a a part of th pow r
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derived under the commerce clause of the Constitution, which
is held to consist in intercourse and traffic, and includes navigation, transportation, and. transit of persons and property,
as well as the purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities.
(Morgan v. Louisiana, 118 U. S., 455; Mobile 0oiinty v. Kirnball, 102 U. S., 69; fhe Pcissenger Oases, 7 How.; Gibbons v.
Ogden, 9 Wheat., 1.)
The undoubted right of both the Senate and National Government to legislate upon this subject being established, as
well as the sup!'emacy of the ]'ederal authority in case of
conflict, it remains to examine the existing legislation upon
the subject.
From an early period (1799), Revised Statutes 4792 et seq.,
Congress has adopted the State laws upon the subject of
quarantine.
Section 4792 is as follows:
'' The quarantine and other restraints established by the
health laws of any State, respecting any vessels arriving in
or bound to any port or district ther~of, shall be duly
observed by the officers of the customs revenue of the United
States, by the masters and crews of the several revenue
cutters, and by the military officers comma11ding in any fort
or station upon the seacoast; and all such officers of the
United States shall faithfully aid in the execution of such
quarantines and health laws, according to their respective
powers aud within their respective precincts, and as they
shall be directed, from time to t1me, by the Secretary of the
Treasury. But nothing in this title shall enable any State to
collect a duty of tonnage or impost without the consent of .
Congress."
Section 4793 provides for the discharge of the cargo of a
ve sel in quarantine "whenever by the health ·laws of any
State or by regulations made pursuant thereto any vessel
arriving within a collection district of such State is prohibited from coming to the port of entry or delivery by law
e tabli"'hed for such district, and such health laws require or
permit the cargo to be unladen at some other place within or
near to such district," etc.
Section 4794 provides for the purchase or erection of quarantine warehouses.
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Section 4 795 provides for the deposit of goods in such
warehouses.
Sec. 4796 is as follows:
'' The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized, whenever
a conformity fo such quarantines and health laws requires
it, and in respect to vessels subject thereto, to prolong the
terms limited for the entry of the same, and the report or
entry of their cargoes, and to vary or dis'pense with any
other regulations applicabl~ to such reports or entries. No
part of the cargo of any vessel shall, however, in any ca,se
be taken out or unladen therefrom, otherwise than is allowed
by law, or according ·to the regulations hereinafter established."
This law was supplemented by the act of .April 29, 1878
(20 Stat., 37), which is yet, in force. I quote ent1re act.
"Be it enacted by the Senate and Hoitse of Representatives
of the United States of .Anwrica in Oongr(?SS assembled, That
no vessel or vehicle coming from any foreign port or country
where any contagious or infectious disease may exist, and
. no vessel or vehicle conveying any person or persons, merchandise or animals, affected with any infectious or contagious disease, shall enter any port of the United States or
pass t,lle boundary line between the United States and any
foreign country, contrary to the quarantine laws of any one
of said United States, into or through the jurisdiction of
which aid ve sel or vehicle may pass, or to which it is <lestinerl, or except in the manner and subject to .the regulations to be prescribed as hereinafter p.rovided.
"SEC. 2. That whenever any infectious or contagious disea e shall appear in any foreign port or country, and whenever any vessel shall leave any infected foreign port, or, having on board goods or passengers coming from any place or
di trict infected with cholera or yellow fever, shall leave any
foreign port, bonnd for any port in the United States, the
con ular officer, or other repre entative of the United States
at or ueare t uch foreign port hall immediately give information thereof to the Supervi 'ing Surgeon-General of theMarineo pital ervice, and hall report to him the name, the date
f leparture, and the port of de tination of such ve sel; and
hall al. m k the am report to the health officer of the
f d ti nation in th
nited States; and the consular
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officers of the United States shall make weekly reports to
him of the sanitary condition of the ports at which they are
respectively stationed; and the said Surgeon-General of the
Marine-Hospital Service shall, under the direction of the
Secretary of the Treasury, be charged with the execution of
the provisions of this act, and shall frame all needful rules
and regulations for that purpose, which rules and regulations .
shall be subject· to the approval of the President, but such
rules and regulations shall not- c~mflict with or impair any
sanitary or quarantine laws or regulations of any State or
municipal authorities now existing or which may her~after
be enacted.
" SEC. 3. That it shall be the duty of the medical officers
of the Marine Hospital Service and of customs officers to aid
i n the enforcement of the national quarantine rules and regul ations esta,blishecl under the preceding section; but no additional compensation shall be allowed said officers by reason
of such services as they may be required to perform under
t his act, except actual and necessary traveling expenses.
" SEC. 4. That the Surgeon-General of the Marine-Hospital
Service shall, u_pon receipt of information of the departure of
any vessel, goods, or passengers from infected places to any
p ort in the United States, immediately notify the proper State
or mtmieipal and United States officer or officers at the threa,tened port of destination of the vessel, and shall prepare and
t ransmit to the medical officers of the Marine-Hospital Service, to collectors of customs and to the State and municipal
l1ealth authorities in the United States, weekly abstracts of
t he consular sanitary reports and other pertinent information received by him.
"SEC. 5. That wherever, at any port of the United States,
any State or municipal quarantine system may now, or may
h ereafter exist, the officers or agents of such system shall,
upon the application of the respective State or municirial
authorities, be authorized and empowered to act as officers
or agents of the national quarantine system, and shall be
clothed with all the powers of United States officers for quarantine purposes, but shall receive no pay or emoluments from
the United States. At all other ports where, in the opinion
of the Secretary of the Treasury, it shall be ·deemed necessary to establish quarantine, the medical officers or ·other
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agents of the Marine-Hospital Service shall perform such
duties in the enforcement of the quarantine rules and regulations as may be assigned them by the Surgeon-General of
the service under this act : Providecl, That there shall be no
foterference ju any manner with any quarantine law or regulations as they now exist or may hereafter be adopted under
State laws.
"SEC. 6. That all acts or parts of acts inconsistent with
this act be, aud the same are hereby, repealed.
"Approved, April 29, 1878."
In my opinion there is nothing in the act of 1879 inconsistent with this act, except that different persons are cllarged
with its enforcement, and therefore both, with the modification noted, ate in force and constitute, with such reguJations
as are or may be prescribed thereunder, the natiollal law
upon that Rubject.
The intent to aid in the enforcement of the State laws
upon the subject is manifest, or in the language of the act
"there shall be no interference in any manner with any·quarantine laws or regulations as they now exist or may hereafter
be adopted under State laws." Both shall work to the same
end, the keeping awa,y from our lJomes aud people contagion
and pestilence; and, iu the s, me spirit, the State officers may
be~ome clothed with the national power and "authorizea and
empowered to act as officer and agents of the national quaranti11e system," etc.
While thi is true, doe it follow that nothing can be done
except wliat is authorized by the State law f I think not.
The only limitation i ' that tbe Federal re 0 ·ulations mu t
not interfere with the State laws. For instance, the quarantine law for the harbor ,rnd port of :New York, a e tabJi hed by the tate do not pre cribe any q narantine period.
Tbat j left to the health officer. SuPI ose the period named
by him j deemed too hort. I i in my opinion 1 arly
comp tent m1 ler h act of Con°Te above quoted to prerib a 1 ng r period, both for per on ' and cargo, the regulation ar foll provi ling that the F cl .ral juri diction hould
atta h upon th ex1 iratiou of tate a ·tiou.
Th
n r ry f thi prop iti n i not to be uppo ed.
tat mio-ht b w·i h u the ma hiner to nfor e a afe
fii · r micrh through mi taken opinion or
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corrupt motives fail in his duty. It is not to be tolerated
that an entire people possessing a government endowed with
the powers I have enumerated should be exposed to the
scourge of contagion and pestilence through such causes.
Paraphrasing the language of the court in re Neagle (135
U. S., 59) it may be safely asserted that any obligation fairly
and properly inferable from the Constitution or any duty
of any officer to be derived from the general scope of his
duties under the lawR of the United States is a law of the
United States, and it would be a great reproach to the system
of government of the United States, declared to be within
its sphere sovereign and supreme, if there is to be· found
within the domain of its powers no means of protecting the
people from contagion and pestilence brought from roreign
shores. Norean Congress be said to have failed to exercise
its right to so provide for the protection of our people. In
esta,b lishing "the national quarantine system," as it is
denominated in the act of 1878, and conferring upon certain
officers power "to frame all needful rules and regulations for
that purpose," which rules when approved by you have all
the force of law. an intention is shown to vest here a wide
discretion. The only limitation is that such regulations shall
110t conflict with or i'tnpair any sanitary or quarantine regulations of the State or municipal authorities.
In measuring the effect of this limitation it must not be forgotten that the State laws and regulations are in the nature
9f restrictions, and not in the nature of grnnts of authority
to either immigrants or transportation companies. The
authority of immigrants to come and of transportation companies to bring such immigrants is not derived from the
State statutes or regulations. The State by its statute and
regulations, in the exercise of its police powers, simply provides that immigrants shall not come in, except after compliance with such laws and regulations. The State does not
provide, and bas no power to provide, as against Federal
laws and regulations, that upon such compliance such ships
and immigrants shall come in. Hence, consistently with the
State la,vs and regulations 1 it is entirely competent for Federal regulations to impose additional restrictions, and hence
ali::;o the imposition of an additional period of quarantirte or
the total exclusion of all "vessels or vehicles coming from·
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any foreign port or country where any contagious disease
may exist," or "vessels or vehicles conveying any person or
persons, merchandise or animals, affected with any infectious
or contagious disease:' from" any port of the United States,"
js within the powers conferred upon the officers named in
your inquiry acting with your approval.
Yery respectfully,
OH.A.~LES H. ALDRICH,
Solicitor- General.
The PRESIDENT.
Approved :

W. H. H. MILLER.

DISTRICT ATTORNEYS-INSOLVENT BANK-COMPE JSATION.
A receiver of a failed national bank is an officer or agent of the United
States within section 380, Revised Statutes. Suits and proceeclings
instituted by the receiver of a failed bank to enforce the payment of
a debt which may be maintained in a State court as well as in a U.S.
court, fall within the provisions of said section.
The compensation of the U. S. attorney appearing for such receiver is
not regulated by the fee bill prescribed by statute, nor should it be
paid by the Government, and not out of the funds of the trust, but
the amount of fees to be allowed in any given case, -to the district
attorney, is a matter to be adjusted by the Comptroller in the exercise of a legal discr~tion under the advice of the Solicitor of the
Treasury.

DEPARTMENT

JUSTICE,
October 31, 1892.
Sm: The letter of the Acting Secretary of the Treasury
of October 26, inclosing a communication from the 0omptroller of the Currency in reference to the proper construction of section 380 of the Revised Statutes, has been duly
received and considered. In that communication the Acting Secretary of the Treasury asks five questions as follows:
"1. Ras )fr. Frank D. Allen, U. S. attorney, any claim
against the failed Pacific National Bank under the circumstances herein set forth f Should his bill for $420 as rendered be allowed, or should he be paid any sum whatever
out of the assets of said trust~ he having rendered no service to the trust f
"2. Do' suits and proceedings' instituted by a receiver of
a failed bank to euforce the payment of a debt (whicb may
OF
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be maintained in a State court as well as in an U. S. court)
fall within the provisions of said section 380 ¥
''3. Is a receiver of a failed national bank an' officer' or
'agent' of the United States within the meaning of said
section t
·
'' 4. If questions 2 and 3 are answered in the affirmative
and such U. S. attorneys must be employed, is not their compensation regulated by the fee bill prescribed by the U. S.
statute, and should not their compensation be paid by the
Government and not out of the funds of the trust¥
"5. In case their compensation is not so regulated, and
must be paid out of such trust funds, is not the am0tint of ...
such compensation subject to the approval of the Comp- ·
troller of the Currency under the ad vice of the Solicitor of
the Treasury,"
Answering the same in their order, I beg to say that, the
first does not present a question of law, but of fact (at best
of mixed law and fact), upon which I can not give an opinion. (See 19 Opin., 633.)
The second and third are answered in the affirmative, and
tbe fourth in the negative, for reasons quite fully stated in a
communication of Attorney-General Garland te J. 0. Gib~on,
esq., U. S. attorney, Norfolk, Va., under date of December
1, 1886, as follows:
"Your communication of the 11th of October, 1886, with
reference to your duty in the matter of the liquidation of the
Exchange National Bank, of Norfolk, Va., now in charge of
a receiver _appointed by the Comptroller of the Currency,
wa referred to the Solicitor of the Treasury for an expresion of his views, to which, by letter on the 24th of November, he replied.
" It is only necessary to say that your views and his Me
not in entire accord. The want of harmony arises from a difference in the interpretation of section 380 of the Revised
tatutes. That section was originally enacted as section 55
of the act of the 25th of February, 1863, known as 'the general banking act,' which was modified and enlarged by the
act of the 3d day of June, 1864, in which latter act it appears
as section 56. These acts; as a whole, constitute a general
y tern of banking. The section under consideration must
be interpreted with reference to the whole as a system. By
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the system new officers, governmental agents, were provided
for and new duties assumed by the Government, which tlie
legislative power admitted to be of sufficient public interest
to take charge of, in certain events, as public trusts. .Among
others, it was contemplated that in the discharge of the
duties impo ed and the administration of the trusts as. urned
litigation in the courts might arise. That this liti o-ation
might be under the direction of respon ·ible governmental
officers, the section under consideration was enacted in 1 63,
reenacted in 1864, and included in the geueml revision a
section 380, a11d is: '.All suits and proceedings arising out of
the provisions of the law governing national banking as ociations, in which the United States or any of its officer or
agents shall be parties, shall be conducted by the district
attorneys of the eve-ral di~tricts, under the direction and
supervision of the Solicitor of the Treasury.'
''The words 'suits and proceedings' embrace all active legal
steps arising out of the provisions of the acts. Such suits
and proceedings are then defined and limited to those in
which 'the United States or any of its officers or agent' are
parties.' .AU such are to be conducted by the distrfot attorney. The Comptroller of the Currency is an officer of the
United States; the receiver whom be may have appointed i
an agent of the United States. Hence, all suits or proceeding to which they, or either of them, are partie,', by \'irtne
of tlleir official or trust relation to a 11ational bank, come
within the intent of the law, and by its provisions should
be conducted by the . S. attorney of the proper <li trict.
Thi view i fully corrol'oratecl by the opinion delivered by
Solicitor-General Phillips as early a. July, 1874, and i ustai11 d by the Suprem Court of tbe
nited State in the
ca,· of Kennedy v. Gibson et al. ( ,van., 504), which declare
'th receiver i. an agent of the United Stat 'B, arnl, according
to tl.Je fifty-:L-th ection of the act, thL uit, hould bav be n
condu ted by their attorney.' To tlle s, me :ffect i the rule
in h Bank of Bethel v. Pahquioqite Bank (14 Wall., 4 0),
,Yhi ·h tlm · :tat the rule: ' 'nit, and proc ding under the
a· in w11i ·h the TJuit d tai.
r h ir offi r or agent , are
pm ti : "·h th r nun u
b £ l'e or after th app intme t
f th· re i,~ r ar to b, · n u ·t d b
h
i tri · att rney
f tl1 Tr a ury. Thi
ire ·ti 11 f th
T
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section, then, properly interpreted, relieves the Cmnptroller
or receiver of the responsibility of selecting counsel to conduct suits or legal proceediugs under the provisions of the
act, a.nd devolves the duty upon the U. S. attorney, whose
services can not be forestalled by a prior retainer, and who
by law is required to take charge of the business, subject
to such supervision and direction as may be called for in his
action by the Solicitor of the Treasury, who, by the same
action, is charged with the duty and responsibility incident
thereto.
" The question suggested in the correspondence as to
whether section 380 is directory or mandatory is immaterial,
as in either event the law is a rule which should be obeyed."
To the fifth question my answer is that the amount of f~es
to be allowed in any given ca~,e to the district attorney is a
matter to be adjusted by the Comptroller in the exercise of
a legal discretion, under the advice of the Solicitor of the
Treasury.
I think the decision in Gibson v. Peters (35 Federal
Reporter, 721) is instructive in relation to the respective
rights and duties of the district attorney and the Comptroller in the premises.
Respectfully, yours,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

EAST RIVER BRIDGE-SECRETAR): OF WAR.

By section 7 of the river and harbor act of 1892 the Secretar,y of War
i authorjzed to a,pprove or disapprove of the location or plan of a
propo ed bridge, the construction of which is duly authorized by a,n
act of the legislature of the State, when the waters to be bridged are
wholly wjthin the limits of that State.
·
. The ,vaters of the East River comprise navigablA waters of the United
'tates lying wholly within the limits of a State.
DEP AR'l'MENT OF JUSTICE,

Novernber 2, 1892.
SIR: Your request for an official opinion as to your right
to aJ)prove the location and plan of a bridge, authorized by
the legislature of the State of New York at its last session,
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to be built between the cities of New York and Brooklyn
across what is called East River, has been received.
It is assumed that tbe State enactment is sufficient in
terms to conv. y the right to build the bridge if the water in
question is wholly within the limits of the State.
You refer to section 7 of the act of September 19, 1890 (26
Stat., 454), reenacted in. 1892 (Stat.~ 110), and say that the
practice of the Department has been to approve or.. disapprove of the location and plans of bridges across navigable
waters wholly within the limits of a State, when the bridge
is authorized by the laws of that State, and that it has
declined to act upon applications as to bridges across navigable waters not wholly within the limits of a single State unless the bridge is authorized by act of'Oougress. The inquiry
as ubmitted seems to require the application of said section
7 of the national act, and to involve the determination of the
question, whether the channel over wllich the bridge is proposed to be const~ucted is a strait in the State of New York,
and therefore wholly within the State, or whether it is a1)or tion of Long L land Sound and therefore a portion of a body
of water which is not wholly within the limits of the State
of ew York.
Although your inquiry involves, in one view, a question of
fact, and in another, a judicial que tion that may be said to
belong to the courts, yet, a the subject-matter is pending
before you for nece sary Executive action and involves a
que tion of law, it is, perhaps, proper that an opinion should
be given.
·
By section 7 of the river and harbor bill as enacted in
1 no, and also in 1 02, it i declared that "it shall not be
lawful hereaft •r to c mmeu e the con truction of any bridge,
briclo·e draw, bridge pier and abutment , au eway, or otli r
work over or fa any port, road, road tead, haven, harbor
navio-able riv r, or navigable wat r of the United State"
un r an act f the 1 gi lativ a. embly"' of any State until
the 1o ation and plan of ,'uch briclge or other work have
b
ubmi t d to and approv d by he ecretar;y of War:
Pro id d Tha thi,
ction hall not * * •
h
on, tmction of any
abutm nt , r other
f any tate, over or
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in any stream, port, roadstead, haven or harbor, or other
navigable water not wholly within the limits of sue~ State."
East River is "a strait which connects the harbor of New
York with Long Island Sound" (1 McCulloch's Geog. Die.,
797; Darby's Gaz., 139), and is called a river ia contradistinction to the North River. (IV Ency. Americana, 380.)
It is a strait comiecting New~ York Bay with Long Island
Sound and extends fr om Throgg's N eek to said bay. (VI
Am. Uyclo., 380; Lippincott's Gaz., 67 4, 1275.)
11liller v. Ma,yor (109 U. S.), declares the power of .Congress to control the navigable waters of the United States
so far as may be necessary to insure their free na,vigation,
and adds (p. 396), "East River is such a navigable water.
It enters the harbor of New York and connects,itwith Long
Island Sound."
It is quite evident that, in determining your duty in the
premises, Long Island Sound must be regarded as limited to
tlrn "bay" extending from Fishers Island to the head of the
comparatively narrow channel which takes form west of the
west boundary of Connecticut.
It, does not appear from an examination of the maps, or
from a view of the waters constituting this famous passageway, or from the declarations of writers of authority, that
East River is a constituent part of that portion of the Atlantic Ocean which is designated Long Island Sound.
It follows that the waters of East River must be held to
comprise navigable waters of the United States lying wholly
within the limitt of a State.
The State bas local jurisdiction while the Government of
tbe United States must see that navigation is not obstructed.
For a further discussion of related questions, I beg to
refer you to the cases cited and conclusions reached in the
opinion submitted to you under date of May ;11, 1891, relating to the Chicago River.
It is my opinion that·under section 7 of the river and harbor act of 1892 you are authorized! to approve or disapprove
of the locatipn or plan of a proposed bridge, the construction
of which is duly authorized by an act of the legislature of
tbe State, when the waters to be bridged are wholly within
the limits of that State.
It is my opinion, also, that you are not prohibited from
5681-V0L 20-31
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acting on the application under con ideration by the require.
ments of the proviso of aid section.
It is understood that Congre ha given no explicit consent as to the construction of thi bridge.
It seerns proper to note that thi '' river," which is made
from the ocean and which return .. thereto by way of navigable channels, represents in 1t cour e the pathway of a va t
interstate and international commerce and involves Federal
interests of great importance. It llould not be assumed in
the pre ent state of the law that Copgre , by the qualified
perm is, ion to build a bridge, inferred from ection 7, has
waived it right to iu ure free navigation, or has become
e topped from hereafter taking legis\ative action which it
may deem ne essary in the premi es.
Very respectfully,
CHARLES H. ALDRICH,
.Acting .Attorney- General.
'l'he SECRETARY OF WAR.

PURCHASE OE LAND.

Neith r the act of Angnst 19, 1890 (chapter 806), nor the appropriation
in the sundry civil act of March 3, 1 91 (chapter 542), authorize the
pur ha e of land adjoinin•r sp cified routes leading to a pal't of the
Chickam:lUga and Chattanooga Military Park.
DEP .A.R'l'MENT OF JUSTICE,

November 3, 1892.
ation of the 19th ultimo in relation

that call for a
wer to

•
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The highways which are constituted a portion of the park
by section 1 of the act are designated as they then existed,
and it is not shown that Congress contemplated their extension.
Section 11, which makes the appropriation to carry the act
into effect, is not broad enough to authorize the purchase of
lands lying outside of the bounds of the park as establishect.
by the act, and those boundaries do not extend beyond the
limits of the high;ways in question as they then existed. ·
The declaring of an existing road to· be an approach to
and a part of the park'can not be construed into authority
to purchase more land to extend the road, although its use
may demand an extension.
I find no authority granted by the act referred to, or in the
appropriation set forth in the sundry civil act (26 Stat., 978),.
which authorizes the purchase of the lands in question.
In my opinion, the power to reach the result desired rests·
with Congress.
Very respectfully,
CHARLES H. ALDRICH,
Acting A.ttorney-General.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.

COMMISSIONER OF SOLDIERS' HOME.
A. person duly designa'.ted to take charge of the office of Judge-AdvocateGenera1 and to perform its duties pending the suspensi,on from duty
of the Judge-Advocate-General , is qualifiecl to act as a commissioner
of the Soldiers' Home in the District of Columbia.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUS'l'ICE,

Novemb er 10, 1892.
Sm : By your letter of November 8 you ask whether, under
hi a. ignment as Acting Judge-Advocate-General of tlle
Anny, Col. Guido N. Lieber is qualified to act as one of the
Board of Commissioners of the Soldiers' Home in the Distl'ict of Columbia, as provided by section 10 · of the act of
March 3, 1883 (22 Stat., 565). That section reads as follows:
' That the Board of Commissioners of the Soldiers' Home
hall hereafter consist of the General-in-Chief commanding
th Army, the Surgeon-General, the Commissary-General,

~
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the Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General, theJudgeAdvocate-General, and the Governor of the Home, and the
General-in-Chief shall be president of the board, and any
four of them shall constitute a quorum for the transaction
of business."
The order assigning Col. Lieber to duty as .Acting Jud ge.Advocate-General was made in pursuance of section 179 of
foe Revised Statutes of the United States, and is in the following words:
"WAR DEP ATI,TMENT,

"Washington City, July 25, 1884.
"During the suspension from duty of the J udge-.Ad voca,teGeneral U. S. Army, Col. Guido N. Lieber, Assistant Judge.Advocate-General, will, by direction of the President, take
charge of the office of the Judge-Advocate-General and perform his duties.
"ROBERT T. LINCOLN,
"Secretary of War."
In my opinion this Executive order devolved upon Col.
Lieber all of the duties appertaining to the office of Judge.Advocate-General of the Army, including the authority and
the duty to act as one of the board of commissioners in
question.
Respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
Gen. JOHN M. SCHOFIELD,
•
Acting Secretary of War.

SAMOAN ISLANDS-APPROPRIATION.

It is competent for the President to use such p::i,rt of the appropriation
of $500,000, made in the act of 1',ebruary 26, 1889, chapter 278, a he
may deem necessary for the protection of the interests of the United
States in making contracts for the control, whether by lea e or
purchase, of land in Pago-Pago Harbor.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
IR:

] tt 'l'

No emue1· 12 1 92.
I have the bou r t acknowledge the receipt of y ur
f y :t r<lc y a foll w :
lipl
n nJar appropriation act approved.
t t., 699), appr priated for th
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execution of the obligations and the protection of the interests
of the United States, existing under the treaty between the
United States and the Government of the Samoan Islands,
five hundred thousand dollars, or so much thereof as may be
necessary, to be expended under the direction of the President, this appropriation to be immediately available.'
'' The naval appropriation act, approved March 2, 1889 (25
Stat., 814), also appropriated 'For the purpose of permanently
establishing a station for coal and other supplies for the naval
aud commercial marine of the United States, on the shores
of the bay of the harbor of Pago-Pago in the island of
Tutuilla, Samoa, and for the erection of the necessary buildings and structures thereon, and for such other purposes as
may, in the judgment of the President, be necessary to confirm the rights of the United States under article 2 of the
treaty of eighteen 1iundred and seventy-eight, between the
United States and the King of the Samoan Islands, and the
deeds of transfer made in accordance therewith, one hundred
thousand dollars, to be immediately availa,ble.' .
''The treaty to which reference is made may be found in
20 Statutes, page 704, and also in the volume of treaties, page
972.
"About one-half of the $100,000 appropriation for a coaling station in Pago-Pago Harbor has already been u sed for
t he purchase of land from the natives and otherwise, and the
balance is required for docks and necessary improvements.
Of the $500,000 appropriation for the protection of our interests in Samoa only about $30,000 has been expended. The
further purchase of land in Pago-Pago Harbor is now under
con sideration. This land is desired not so much for the
immediate uses of a coaling station as for its general protect ion through the control of strategic points for its defense
and the exclusion from the harbor of conflicting foreign inter,
e. ts.
·
"I have the honor to request an opinion whether or not
the first appropriation above $500,000 is available in the discretion of the President for such purchase."
Article n of the treaty referred to in the act of Congress
of Febmry 26, 1889, so far as pertinent, reads as follows:
" Naval vessels of th~ United States shall have the privilege of entering and using the port of Pago-Pago, and estab-

'
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lishing therein and on the shores thereof a station for coal
and other naval supplies for their naval and commercial
mariue, and the Samoan Government will hereafter neither
exercise nor authorize any jurisdiction wit,h in said port
adverse to such rights of the United States or restrictions
thereof."
The act of Congress, last above referred t.o, making the
appropriation "for the execution of the obligations and the
protection of the interests of the United States existing
under the treaty between the United States and the Government of the Samoan Islands, $500,000; or so much thereof
as may be necessary, to be expended under the direction of
the President, this appropriation to be immediately available," should, in my opinion, receive a Jiber.al construction.
The President is the head of one of the three great Departments of the Government, and is supposed to be endowed wit4
a degree of wisdom and patriotism warranting the exercise by
him of a broad discretion in the execution of powers committed to his bands. .A grant of this character to be exerci ed by the President may well, therefore, receive a more
lib ral construction than a grant in similar language to an
ordinary agent of the Government .
.As I understand the facts presented by you, it seemis that
it i nece ary that this Government should control in the
Pago-Pago Harbor certain property not a pa,rt of the coaling tation it elf, but which is deemed essential for the protection of such coaling station and the other intere ts of the
Goverument in and about the harbor. In other word , that
such property, if it control is not acquired by this Government, i liable to fall into the hand of other foreign pow rs
and be used in ho tility to the interests of the United States.
Upon thi tate of facts, iu my opinion, it is competent
fi r toe Pre ident to use such part of the appr0priation of
- 0,000 in the making and execution of contract for the
control of uch property, whether by leasing or purcha e, as
judg·ment, be neces ary in the language of the
pr t ·tion of the intere t of the United States
r

ur ,
W. H. H. MILLER.

ET.A.RY OF

TATE.

TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

487

Attorney-General.

ATTORNEY-GENER.AL.
Where terms are used in a statute in their ordinary acceptation, and the
duty of applying it to a particular matter is one of administration
merely, that duty can not be devolved upon the Attorney-General.
DEPARTMEN1.' OF JUSTICE,

November 17, 1892.
Sm: Your letter of October 17, 1892, asks an opinion as
to whether various kinds of employes in the service of the
Mississippi Commission are laborers or mechanics within
the meaning of these terms as used in the act of August 1~
1892, entitled'' An act relating to the limitation of the hours
of daily service of laborers and mechanics employed upon
the public works of the United States and of the District of
Columbia."
The terms "laborers and mechanics" must be presumed
to have been used by Congress in their ordinary sense, and
I have no doubt were, in point of fact, so used.
I am asked, therefore, to determine whether some or all of
the classes of employes mentioned in your letter are or are
not laborers or mechanics.
Iu other words, I am requested to give an opinion upon
questions of fact, merely. This I can :µot do, for Congress
bas said, expressly, that the opinions of the Attorney-General must be confined to questions of law (sections 354, 356,
Revised Statutes).
The duty of applying the statute in question to its subjectm.atter, in the particulars mentioned by you, is one of administration only, and can not, in my judgment, be devolved
on the Attorney-General, there being no suggestion that
there is any doubt as to whether Congress used the terms
"laborers and mechanics" in their ordinary acceptation.
I regret, therefore, that I can not comply with yeur request.
A.s desired, the papers that accompanieq. your letter are
returned herewith.
Very respectfully, yours,
W. H. H. MILLER..
The SEORET.A.RY OF WAR.
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BRIDGE-SECRETARY OF WAR.
The authority conferred upon the Secretary of War by section 7 of the
river and harbor act of 1890, chapter 907, is limited to the cases of
bridges authorized by State law to be erected over waters, the navigable portions of which lie wholly within the limits of the State.
He is not authorized to approve or disapprove the location and plan of
the bridge proposed to be erected over the Monongahela River at
Bessemer, Pa.
DEP AR'l'MEN'l' OF JUSTICE,

November 19, 1892.
Sm: Your communication calling for an official opinion
as to whether you are authorized by law to approve or djs.
approve the location and plau of a bridge proposed to be
constructed by the Union Railroad Company across the
Monongahela River opposite Bessemer, Pa., has been duly
c011sidered.
I understand, from your statement of the facts, that the
State has passed an act which purportR to grant perm is 'ion
to build the bridge,but that Congress has taken no action
in the premises.
It is unquestioned that this river is used for the purposes
of interstate commerce and that its present actual navigability extends into West Virginia., and that its water' are
navigable waters of the United States not wholly within the
limits of the State which has given its legislative assent to
the construction of the bridge.
The question to which my attention is directed is whether
section 7 of the river and harbor act of 1890 (26 Stat., 454)
authorizes action on your part a to the location and plan of
a bridge propo ed to be erected over navigable waters of the
United State., which water are not wholly within the limits
of the State that has as urned to ~uthorize the construction.
By aid section 7, which remain unchanged so far as applicable to the question now under con ideration, Congress
enact that" ft hall not be lawful * * * to commence the contru tion of any bridge • * * over or in any * * •
* of the United States, under any
a t f h 1 ·i. Jati e c
mbly of any State until the locati u an 1 plan f uch bridge • • • have been submitted
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* : Probe so construed
as to authorize the construction of any bridge * * *
under an act of the legislature of any State, over or in any
stream, * * * not wholly within the limits of such
State."
lt is held by the courts that it is permissible to recur to
declarations made by legislators while framing a bill-not to
control the construction of the enactment-but" to ascertain
the reason as well as the meaning of particular provisions in
it" (91 U.S., 79; 141 id., 474); and the purposes and intended
scope of the act under consideration may be profitably studied
by tracing the history and the method of the formation of
section 7 of the act referred to.
It appears, historically, that while the power to protect
the navigation of rivers was allowed by Congress to lie dormant, parties, road builders, and transportation companies
placed their bridges over navigable streams without being
subject to supervision or regulation as to the location or plan.
Some bridges were authorized by States and some by Congress, others were built by the legislative assent of 1'oth Congress and the State, but many were built and used without
any authority or supervision on the part of any government
whatever.
From 1816 to 18D0 immense amounts of the public moneys
were appropriated for and applied to . the improvement of
rivers and harbors, and it frequently happened that while the
public were expending money to increase the facilities of navigation of a river some interested party was serving his or its
privateinterest by placing obstructive bridges or other impediments in the way.
Efforts were made from time to time to protect the waters
of the country, and these finally resulted in the general legislation which appears in the river and harbor bill mentioned.
Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of that law are unmistakable assertions of the purpose of the General Government to exert its
power to protect the navigable waters of the United States
and to clothe the Secretary of War with ·the administrative
function of enforcing that purpose.
During the consideration of the said river and harbor

to and approved by the Secretary of War * *
vided, That this section shall not

* * *
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bill in the House a section thereof, then numbered 8, was
read which prohibited the erection of any structure over any
navigable waterway of the United States within the limits
of any State, without first obtaining an approval of the
plans by the Secretary of ·war. This section contained a
11enal clause, and declared an unauthorized structure to be
a nuisance. (Record, 51st Cong., 1st sess., p. 5402.) The subject of bridging streams navigable only within a State, and
as to structures over those not so limited, was debated at
length.
It is distinctly and repeatedly stated that the contemplated
approval of the Secretary must be confined to waters lying
wholly within the limits of one State, and that navigable .
waters extending beyond the limits of a State should not
be bridged without explicit authority from Congress.
The method of procedure ancl the scope of the provision
sought are very clearly shown in the following statement
which was made by Mr. Blanchard, a member of the committee that framed the bill (p. 5403):
"Take the case of a railroad corporation going to the
Secretary of War with the plans of a bridge across a river
lying wholly within the limits of a State. The Secrf~tary of
War ask , "By what authority do you propose to erect thi
bridge, Have you got an act of Oougress f" "No." "Have
you got au act of the legislature 1" "No." Then the Secretary will refuse to approve the plan. Now, if, on the other
hand, the applicant say , "I have not got an act of Oongre s, but I have got an act of the legislature of thi tate'
then the ecretary of War, giving effect to the anthority of
the State legislature to authorize the construction of a
bridge aero. a waterway wholly within the limit of that
State, will examine the plan of the proposed bri<lge, and if
they are ati factory to him and such as will con erve the
int r t f navigation he will approve them; otherwi e not.'
Thi· ecti n wa tri ·ken out of the bill before it pa ed
th
u" , but, as we hall ee, it was placed therein in a
new f. rm b fore the act b cam a law.
l\ r. nator olph introduced enate
r4 1
v nt the ob truction f navi-
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mittee on Commerce (id., p. 98). It was reported from the
Committee with amendments (p. 478), and was amended and
passed by the Senate (p. 1319). After going to the House
it was reported favorably, with amendments, from the Committee on RivP,rs and Harbors, and went to the House
C,1le11dar (3G99). While the river and harbor act was being
considered by the Senate discussion arose as to obstructing
navigable waters and as to bridging navigable rivers (8602
to 8607), and amendments were submitted with a view of
protecting navigation.
Mr. Senator Spooner referred to said Senate bill No. 88 as
one that had been suggested by the War Department and
that bad twice passed the Senate, and stated that there was
no reason to anticipate action upon it at the then existiug
session, and gave notice that he would offer this -bill (No. 88)
as an amendmht to the river and harbor bill (8607).
Said Senator, did offer the bill as an amendment (8684) .
. This amendment consisted of seven sections. Sections 1, 2, ,
3, and 4 thereof are almost identical with sections 6, 7, 8,·and
9, respectively, of the law as finally passed (26 Stat., 453,454).
This amendment was, upon objection, excluded · upon the
ground that it involved general legislation.in violation of an
existing rule (8685).
After the passage of the river and harbor bill by the
Senate it went to a conference committee of the two Houses,
which reported in favor of striking out certain matter co11tained in Senate, amendments and of inserting specified sections to be numbered 6, 7, 8, etc. (9813).
The conference report was adopted by the House and concurred in by the Senate and this section 7, embodying the
principle contended for in the House as shown, and, in substance, ideutical in phraseology with section 2 of Senate bill
No. 88, became section 7 of the law of 1890 to which you call
my attention. ,
A careful consideration of the proceedings taken and dec]arations made in connection with the origin and enactment of
thi legislation leads to the conclusion that it was the intent
of Congress that your authority to act upon_the location and
plan of proposed bridges not expressly authorized by act of
Congress should be limited to those authorized by a State
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law and to be erected over waters the navigable portion
of which lie wholly within the limits of the State.
An examination of the terms of said section 7 leads to a
similar conclusion. ,No general law exists providing for or
permitting bridges to be built over navigable waters which
divide or extend into two or more States, nor does any general legislation confer the power of approval upon the Secretary of War as to bridges over such waters.
Frequent applications were made to Congress both before
and since the passage of the act of 1890 for authority to
' erect such structures, and the custom bas been, almost without exception, to grant the request only upon the obtainiug
of the approval of the location and plan by the Secretary.
The proviso of section 7 taken in connection with the antecedent phraseology, the existing practfoe of legislation, and
tbe decision of the courts, is, itself, well nigh conclusive that
Congress never intenderl to transfer
concerle to the legislatures of the States, even subject to the approval of the
Secretaiy, authority to erect bridges over streams like the
one in questi01 1.
It is trne that the fixing of the limit betTT'een waters
wholly ,vitbin a State and such as extend in fact and uavigaibly beyond its boundaries is arbitrary in its application,
but in protecting navigation the law-making power wa
called upon to declare a general rule a.pplicable to all navigable waters or to establish some classification of the
water . In the exercise of its constitutional power Congress aw fit to place naviga,ble waters lying wholly within
a State in one cb s and those navigable in and beyond a
State in another, and to grant especial facilitie to the State
in connection with tho e waters lying wholly within its
border .
If ,'eriou. incongruities appear in the applications of the
statute to different tream , as may prove to be the ca e it
will re t with Oongre s to provide uch remedy as it shall
tl m prop r .
pon the g neral principle invoh ed, and a to the deci·ion of the ourt upon r lat cl qu , tions I beg to refer you
t the opinion relating to bicago River and to East River,
.·nbmi t l und r dat of fay 11, 1 91, and .1?0 ember 2,
1
·th- ly.
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In conclusion, permit me to say, it is my opinion that you
are not authorized by law to approve or disapprove the location and plan of the bridge proposed to be erected over the
l\1onongahela River at Bessemer.
Very respectfolly,
W. H. H. MILLER
The SECRETARY OF WAR.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
Before rendering an opinion the Attorney-General requires a succinct
statement of the facts and of the question of law arising thereon as to
which an opinion is desired.

DEPAR1'MENT OF JUSTICE,

N oveniber 25, 1892.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of the 23d instant, requesting my opinion in reference
to certain questions arising out of the advertisement for proposals for dredging GowanusBay, in the harbor of New York.
With your letter you send a large bundle of papers, comprising apparently not only all the papers directly involved,
but all the correspondence in reference to this subjectmatter.
Your letter contains no statement of facts, nor does it refer
to any particular paper or papers supposed to set forth such
facts. In other words, it is apparently expected that I will
glean the facts from the papers, and then for myself determine, :first, whether the Government is bound by the action
of the Chief of Engineers in accepting an alleged conditional
bid, and, second, whether a readvertisement is authorized.
The unvarying practice of the Attorney-General, from the
foundation of the Government, has been to require a succinct
statement of the facts and of the question of law arising
thereupon upon which an opinion is desired.
On February 16,1874, Attorney-General Williams, addressing the Secretary of the Treasury, said:
·
"I deem it proper here to remind you that where an official
opinion from the bead of this Department is desired on questions of law arising on any case, the request should be accompanied with a statement of the material facts of the case, and
also the precise questions on which advice is wanted." (14
Opin., 3G7.)
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On July 10, 1867, Attorney-General Stanbery, addressing
the Secretary of the Treasury, said:
"I can only give my opinion on questions of law. Where
a quest.ion oflaw arises upon facts subruitted to the Attorney.
General, such facts must be agreed and stated as facts established." (12 Opin., 207.)
See also to the same effect 10 Opin., 267, and 9 Opin., 82.
The necessity for such a statement of facts and of the que tion or questions of law upon which my opinion is desired
is emphasized in this case by reason of the fact that, in a
personal conversation with you on the evening of the 23d
instant, I understood that the question involved was of a
certain character, and in a conversation with one of the attorneys for a proposed con tractor this morning it was stated
that a very different question was involved.
I-shall, as you know, be very gfad t9 oblige you by answering as promptly as possible any question or questions submitted; but in view of the rule and the circumstances I
think you will readily see that a clear statement of the facts
and of the questions of law to be answered ought to be presented.
I return herewith the bundle of papers, as, when such a
statement is made, very few of them will be of any use to
me in the preparation of the opinion. Of course the briefs
an<l, perhaps, some of the papers will be useful.
Re pectfully, yonrs,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.

INDIAN AGENT-DEPUTY MAR HAL-ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
No statute prohibits a per on from acting as an Inuian agent and a
deputy mar Ital at the ame time. Whether uch au appointment
would be likely to can e any contention or conflict of authority, not
being a 1 gal que tion, the Attorney- eneral is precluded from answering.

DEP AR1'MEN1' OF JUSTICE,
No1:ember .... 9, 1 92.
ommuni ati n bearing late the 25th in tant
app intm nt of an Iudian a 0 ·pnt a a der uty
, r:hal with h vi w of bi p r..fi rmiug p cial p cified
h c be n uly r cei d.
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Yen ask, :first, whether it is permitted by law to appoint
an Indian agent who is on duty at the Sac and Fox Agency,
T·ama, Iowa, a deputy marshal; and, second, in case the
appointment cau be legally made, whether it ''would be
likely to cause any confusion or conflict of authority."
Under ~ection 780, Revised Statutes, every marshal may
a1)poiut one or more deputies, who shall be removable from
office by the judge of the district court, or by the circuit If
court, at the pleasure of either.
By section 788 the marshals and their deputies are given,
in each State, the same powers in executing the laws of the
United States as the sheriff and their deputies in such State
may have, by law, in executing the laws thereof'.
By section 628 marshals and deputy marshals are prohibited from holding or exercising· the duties of the office of
commissioner of any of the courts.
By section 748 they are prohibited from acting as solicitor,
proctor, attorney, or counsel iu any case pending in the
district or circuit courts of their districts or in any district
· in which they are officially acting. These sections are in
Title XIII, which relates to the judiciary.
Section 2052 of Title XXVIII provides for the appointment, by the President, with the approval of the Senate, of
Indian agents, and section 2058 prescribes the duties to be
performed by them.
Section 207 4 of the same title directs that "no person shall
hold more than one office at the same time under this title."
:By section 2064 Indian agents are authorized to take
acknowledgments, and also to administer oaths in investigations committed to them in the Indian country; pursuant
to the rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of
the Interior.
No statute has been called to my attention, nor is any
found by me, which prohibits a person _from acting as an
Indian agent and a deputy marshal at the same time, nor
does it appear that service as such deputy is inconsistent.
with the duties to be performed under sections 2058 and 2004.
It remains, however, with the marshal to decide whether
he deems it proper and desirable to make the appointment
to which you refer.
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Tbe second question which you submit does not callior a
legal opinion, and the rules and precedents of this Department preclude me from making answer thereto.
Very respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

CONTRACT-MODIFICATION IN BID.
Where an advertisement is published calling for proposals for performance of certain work for the Government with the specification that
it be begun on or before October 1, 1892, ancl be concluded on or before
December 31, 1893, and one of the proposals stated that the bid was
tha,t the entire work was to be completed on or before June 1, 1894,
and provided for stopping tbat work in certain contingencies, and
the bidder was informed that bis work was accepted but no formal
contract was signed: Held, that no contract was made under section
3744 of the Revised Statutes; and, further, held, that the modifications
made in the proposals were inconsistent with the specifications aud
with the spirit and intent of section 3709, Revised Statutes, and with
the river and harbor act of 1888.
.

D:EP ARTMENT OF JUS':I.'ICE,

.December 2, 1892.
Sm: Your communication relating to the advertisement
and proposa,ls and to action taken in connection therewith
in the matter of tbe Gowanus Bay improvement in the har·
bor of New York, under the river and harbor act of July 13,
1892, has received due attention .
By Raid river and harbor act (Stat., 90) $100,000 is appropriated for "jmproving Gowanu Bay channel.," "for di tribution between the Red Hook and Gowan us Creek channel ,'
and al o 98,000 for completing improvement of Bay Ridge
channel, in .·aid bay.
In .A.ugu t, 1892, advertisement was made on behalf of the
overnment ca.lling for ' propo als for dredging the channel
in Gowanu Bay,' the ame to be opened at the U. . Engi11
r offk on the 14th of eptember.
The pr p al wer requir d to comply with pecifications
whi h w r fnrni hed by the Governmeut, and were returned
with th bid fil d.
nit d Stat re erves the right
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to reject any and all bids, and to waive any informality in
tb e bids received."
The concluding specification is as follows:
"Time.-W ork must be commenced on or before O~tober
1, J.892, and completed on or before December 31, 1893.
Contractors proposing to build special plant for this work
will so state in their bids, mentioning the date at which tlley
will contract to begin work."
In response to the advertisement, proposals or bids were
received from divers bidders, setting forth prices at which
each would perform the dredging required, respectively,
upon the three several improvements .
. On September 14 the bids were opened, considered, and
recorded.
One of these proposals was Sl!bmitted by the International
Contracting Company. Its bid is, in effect, tllat it will
dredge the channels for 19. 7 cents per cubic yard.
In this bid, under the printed heading of the'form, "The
plant proposed to be used is as follows," these clauses are
written, viz:
"Two combination dredges, each of a capacity of 4,000
cubic yards per day, with sufficient scows for the output.
One of the said dredges with its scows to commence operations within ninety days of the awarding of_the contract,
a11d the other dredge to commence operations nine months
thereafter, and the entire work to be completed on or before
June 1, 1894. In the event of an epidemic prevailing in this
locality, we reserve the privilege of ceasing the work until
prudent to resume." ·
The officer of the engineers in charge at New York came
to the conclusion that the bid made by the company was the
lowest proposal received, and that it was reasonable in its
term . .
The local officer recommended the acceptance of this bid to
the Chief of Engineers, which recommendation was approved
by that officer September 19, and in pursuance thereof said
compa11y was, September 22, informed that its bid was
accepted.
On September 23 the Chief of Engineers was advised by
the .Acting Secretary of War to confer with the Secretary
before awarding the contract to said company.
5087-YOL 20-32
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On September 26 the company protested against the giving
of any part of the dredging in Gowan us Bay to others, and
insisted that the contract should be given to it, and requested
an opportunity to be heard.
The company was afterwards heard at length. After the
hearing, the .Acting Secretary of War decided that the acceptance referred to did not constitute a contract with and was
not binding upon the United States.
The statutory requirements as to advertising for proposals
and as to the making of contrae.ts are as follows·:
By section 3709, Revised Statutes, it is provided, subject
to exceptions not now of consequence, that " all purchases
and contracts for supplies or services, in any of the Departmen ts of the Government, except for personal services, shall
be made by advertising a sufficient time previously for proposaJs respecting the same."
Following· and continuing substantiaIIy the requirements
of a provision of the river and harbor act of 1878 (20 Stat.,
160) the corresponding act of 1888 (25 Stat., 4~3) declares
"That it shall be the duty of the Secretary of War to apply
the money herein and here.after appropriated for improvements of rivers and harbors, other than surveys, estimates,
and gaugings, in carrying on the various works, by contract
or otherwise, as may be most economical and advantageous
to the Government. Where said works are clone by contract,
such contract shall be made after a sufficient public adverti ement for proposals, in such manner and form as the Secretary of War shall prescribe."
By section 3744, Revised Statutes,- it is enacted that
"it hall be the duty of the Secretary of War, * * *
to cause and require every contract made on behalf of
tbe Government, or by officers under (him) appointed to
make uch contract , to be reduced to writing, and igued
by the contracting partie with their names at the nd
thereof." * * *
In th ca

th

TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

499

Contract-Modification in Bid.

If one making proposals is allowed to add five montl.s to
the specified time, it is difficult to state where the limit to
similar liberties shall be placed.
If one bidder may add one-third to the time specified may
not another add one-half, and so forth 1
The fairness of contracts upon advertisement, specifications, and competition requires that all bidders shall, as to
all matters of consequence, those which affect the cost of the
work and the amount of expenditure required to be used in
performing it, be subject substantially to the same terms
and conditions.
My attention has been called to Army Regulation No. 639,
which says that "slight failures on the part of a bidder to
comply strictly with the terms of an advertisement should
not necessarily lead to the rejection of his bid," etc.
The taking by a bidder, without the knowledge of bis competitors, of one-third additional time in which to perform an
important and expensive improvement, which from its nature
must require a long period, is not in any sense the slight failure to comply strictly, intended by this regulation.
The change made in this case is not a mere informality; it
is a radical departure from the proposed terms of the contemplated contract.
Section 3744, Revised Statutes, which comes from the act
of June 2, l 862 (12 Stats., 411), was considered and construed
by the Supreme Court in Olarkv. United States (95 U.S., 539).
The court held that the statute was intended to operate to
prevent reckless engagements and frauds, and that "it makes
it unlawful for contracting officers to make contracts in any
other way than by writing signed by the parties," and adds:
" This is equivalent to prohibiting any other mode of making
contracts." It is also stated that a party who makes a contract without having it reduced to writing aids in the violation of the law.
It i held that the contract is ~ffected and must conform to
tlie requirements of the statute.
In the case of the South Boston Iron Company (118 U. S.,
37), which strongly resembles the one now under consideration, the court again considered the statute in question and
explicitly approved the doctrine that was laid down in
Clark's Case.
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Under these cases it can not be said that the International
Contracting Company has entered into a contract under
section 37 44.
It is my opinion that under the facts stated and the statutes and decisions referred to no legal or binding contract
was entered into between the · International Contrac1ing
Company and the United States.
It is my opinion, also, that the clauses of the proposal
made by said company, which substituted new, different, and
important conditions as to delaying or postponing the work,
are incon istent with the specifications and in contravention
of the pu,rpose, spirit, and iutent of the statutes authorizing
the letting of.contracts upon advertisement.
V ~·y respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRET.A.RY OF WAR.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
The Attorney-General will decline to give au opinion as to whether the
so-called io-ht-hour law is applicable to a certain contracttoperform
public work, for the reason that the contractor and not the Secretary
of the Trna,sury is responsible for a violation of the law.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

December 20, 1892.
By your letter of December 17 you advi e me tbm;,
aft r comp titive bidding, a contract ha been made with the
Yermont l\farble Company, of Proctor, Vt., "for furni bing
all th labor aud materials required for the cut stone and
brick w rJ~ of the uper tmcture, etc., of the U. S. po t-t
oili at Worce ter, Ma ." From a further tat ment in
·our I ter a well as from th paper inclo ed, it appears
tba und r tbi. contract the Vermont farbl Company i not
only to fomi . h the material a a ve but i to I ut u •h
mat .rial · in plc ce in th
trn ture it. If; in other word , i
t furui ·b th mat rial and r ct the ·building o fc r a the
n ·i t. of t n and bri k work, b ve th found tion .
u t fr m a 1 tt ,r from the ic -pr id nt of the
IR:

mpany; of Pr t r
advi e m wh ther
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the laborers and mechanics engaged at the quarries, mills,
and shops of said company-; fn Vermont, in getting out the
materials to be supplied by them under the contract awarded
to them December 5, 1892, for the cut-stone. work and brickwork of the superstru·c ture, etc., of the U.S. post-office, etc.,
building, at Worcester, Mass., come within the application
of the act of Congress approved August 1, 1892, entitled
'An act relating to the hours of daily service of laborers and
mechanics employed upon the public works of the United
States and the District of Columbia.' "
Thereupon you say" In view of the fact that the matter grows out of a contract actually established and existing, I have the honor to
request your opinion in regard to the question submitted in
said letter dated December 13, 1892, by the vice-president of
said company, under said contract."
By a reference to the statute known as the eight-hour Jaw
(27 Stat., 340), it will be seen that, after providing that eight
hours in any one calendar dtt,y shall constitute a day's work
by a laborer or mechanic in the employ of the Government
of the United States, of the District of Columbia, or of a contractor oi; subcontractor upon any of the public works of the
United States, or of said District, it is enacted that,, It shall be unlawful for any officer of the United States
Government or of the District of Columbia or any such contractor or subcontractor whose duty it shall be to employ,
direct, or control the services of such laborers or mechanics,
to require or permit any such laborer or mechanic to work
more than eight hours in any calendar day, except in case of
extraorclin~ry emergency."
The second section proyides a penalty for a willful violation
of the act by any officer or agent of the Government of the
United States or of the District of Columbia, or any contractor or subcontractor.
· It will be observed that the duty prescribed in the first
section, and the penalty imposed in the second, is confined
to those persons, whether officers or agents of the Goyernment or of the District or contractors or subcontractors,
whose duty it is to employ, direct, or control the services of
uch laborers or mechanics. Th~ _Secretary of the Treasury
has no such relati_ons to any of the workingmen to _b e
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employed on this job, whether at the quarries or at the building itself. The duty to employ, direct, or control such
laborers o~ mechanics, and the penalty for their wrongful
employment, is with the contractor, and not with the Government or any of its officers or agents.
Under the circumstances, it is clear that the question propounded by the marble company to the Secretary of the
Treasury is one which the latter is not called upon to answer,
and hence it i~ not, within the language of section 356 of
the Revised Statutes, "a question of law arising in the
adminj~tration of his Department." It is, therefore, not a
question upon which I am authorized to give an opinion.
It is, of course, quite needless that a citation shall be
made of the very numerous opinions of my predecessors, as
well as of myself, upon this point. The rule is as sound in
reason as it is well supported by authority. Were the
Attorney-General to give an opinion upon this question, and
with reference to this contract, with equal reason he could
be called upon for an opinion with reference to any question
of law arising in the execution of any and every otlrnr coutract with the Government at the instance of the contractor, through the Secretary. The effect would be not only
that the time and labor of the Attorney-General would be
occupied with questions unnecessary to be decided by the
heads of the Departments, but whenever by reason of dis[)ntes arisiug in the actual execution of a contract, the same
•questions should be brought in issue in the court', the Gov-ernment might be greatly embarrassed by reason of an uunece sary declaration of the Attorney-General in the premi.·e. .
The papers forwarded with your Jetter are herewith returned.
Re I)ectfully, yours,
W. H. II . .MILLER.
The SE\'~E1'A.RY OF '.I'HE 'l'REASURY.
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ADJOURNMENT OF CONGRESS-VETO.
Where Congress adjourns, not sine die, for a longer period than ten days,
exclusive of Sundays, and certain bills at a time less than ten days
prior to such adjournment are placed in the President's hands for
approval or disapproval, it is competent for him to approve auy bill
during the period of such adjournment. Sernbl~, that bills not signed,
coming to him under such circumstances, would not become a law at
the expiration of the ten days. In view of the uncertainty it is
ad vised that bills coming to the President during a recess of Congress,
or within ten days prior thereto, be signed or vetoed as they meet his
approval or disapproval, and in case of veto, be returned to Congress
when it reconvenes; any question as to their validity can then be
settled by the courts.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

December 28, 1892.
Sm: On the 22d of December, by a concurrent resolution, the two Houses of Congress adjourned until the 4th
day of January next. That resolution reads as follows:
"Resolved, by the Hoitse of Representatives, (the Senate
concurring,) That when the two Houses adjourn on Thursday, December 22, they will stand adjourned until Wednesday, January 4, 1893."
The time covered by this adjournment, exclusive of Sundays, exceeds ten days. Shortly before the adjournment,
certain bills passed Ly the two Houses of Congress having
been placed in your hands for appro.val or disapproval, you
now ask whether it is competent for you to give such
approval or disapproval during the period of such adjournment.
Your right to approve is settled in the affirmative by the
Supreme Court in Seven Biclcory v. Ellery (103 U. S., 423).
That was a case arising under the constitution' of Illinois,
but a to this question that instrument was identical with
the Federal Constitution. The decision goes so far as to
uphold the approval of a bill within the ten days even
though the adjournment be sine die. But the question as to
the effect of the temporary adjournment on unsigned bills
remains.
No formal opinion by any of my predecessors, so far as
the records of this Department show, has been given upon
this question. I find, however, certain memoranda commun>
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icated by .Attorney-General Devens to President Hayes, _as
follows:
'' The circumstances under which any bill not signed by
the President becomes a law are stated in the clause of the
Constitution which is as follows: ' If any bill shall not be
returned bythePresidentwithin ten days (Sundays excepted)
after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be
a law, in like mann·e r as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their adjournment prevent-its return, in which case
it sha11 not be a law.'
'
" I .find no decisions of the courts of the United States in
which this clause bas been construed. Similar clauscs,.bowever, have been construed in three State courts.
"In New Hampshire, where the provision is as follows:
'If any bill shall not be returned by the governor within
five days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been preseutecl to him, ·the same shall be a law in like manner as if
he had sigued it, unless the legislature by their -adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law,'
it was held in the opinion of the justices (45 N. H., 610)
that the last day of the five, which was a day ..when neither
house -wa in session, was to be counted as one of the five
days specified, and that the adjournment referred to in this
provi ion of the constitution of New Hampshire was not
the ordinary rece. s or adjournment from time to time during
the continuance of the session, but the final adjournment at
the clo e of the ession.
"In the a, e of 11.arpending v. Haight (39 Cal., 206) it was
held that the adjournment of either house of the legislature
from day to day was not such a,n adjournment as would
prev nt the governor from returning a bill with his objection within the ten days pre cribed by the constitution of
that tat .
' On he contrary, in the case of The People v. Hatch (33
Ill. 13- 1
153), it wa held that where a bill which ha
pa.·:t d th t, o hou: of the general a embly is pr nted
tll rr v rnor for hi con i<l rati n he i not required to
r turn it, ith hi obj ction within ten day after it i o pre. 11t t him to pre eut it b coming a law unle the genral , · mbly he 11 c ntinue in
i n until the end of that
) ri d · c ud th t und r be pro i i n of the con 'titntion of
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that State which gives him that time in which to determine
upon his course of action, the general assembly must be in
an organized condition, acting as such a body at the end of
that period, if not during the whole time, to require the governor to perform that act. If the members have dispersed,
and the officers are not in attendance, he would not be able
to return the bill to the house in which it originated. The
constitution of that State neither requires nor authorizes him
to return the bill to the speaker of the house, to the clerk, or
to any other officer, but declares that it shall be returned to
the house, and that can only be as a body.
'' In this conflict of authorities it is impossible conclusively
to answer the question whether if Congress should take a
recess after a bill was sent to the President for his signature
so long in duration that he would not have an opportunity to
return the same within ten days with his objections, such bill
having been presented to him at such a time that the ten days
would not be given to him .for consideration previous to the
recess, such bill would become a law in like manner as if he
had signed it. At the same time, the best opinion to which
I can arrive is that 'in the case supposed the bill would. not
become a law at the expiration of the ten days. There is no
mode provided by which the President can during the recess
communicate with the House, and o.rie of two results must
follow: either the bill becomes a law when he has not had
the time prescribed by the Constitution for consideration and
reflection upon it, or else, Congress taking a recess under
such circumstances and thus preventing him from communicating with tbem, the bill does not become a law because by
their own act of adjournment they have prevented him from
having the time for consideration which is intended by the
Con titution.
''An examination of the earlier portions of section· 7,
.Article I, of the Constitution strengthens this conclusion.
If the President shall not approve the bill 'he shall return
it, with his objections, to that House in which it shall have
originated, who shall enter the obje~tions at large on their
journal, ·and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of that House shall agree to pass the
bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the
other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, a'nd
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if approved by two-tbirds of that House, it sball become a
]aw. But in all cases the votes of both Houses shall be
determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the person
voting for and against the bill shall be entered on the journal
of each House re_spectively.'
".All these provisions indicate that in order to enable the
President to return a bill the Houses should be in session;
and if by their own act they see fit to adjourn and deprive
him of the opportunity to return the bill, with his objection ,
and are not present themselves to receive and record the. e
objections and to act thereon, the bill can not become a law
unless ten days shall have expired during which the Pre ident will have had the opportunity thus to return it. There
is no suggestion that he may return it to the Speaker, or
Clerk, or any officer of the Ilouse; but the return must be
made to the House as an organized body."
Hon. George F. Edmunds, President pro tempore of the
Senate, in a note to President .Arthur under date of December 24, 188+, expressing a like opinion says:
".A bill * * * has passed both Houses of Congres and
was presented for my signature after both Houses have
adjourned until 5th of January. This is more than t n day ,
and, if it were now presented to you, you could not return
it with your objections. I do not know wbat the practice
has bee11, but it would eem to me as if the bill could not
become a law con titutionally; but if you think it can I will
send it to you."
TlJis note wa probably not carefu1ly considered, but it i
of valu a the impre ion of a lawyer and legi lator of
great ability and experience.
Tlle act of the President in approving or disapprovin °· a
bill -pa', c~d by Oongre s ha been om time b lcl to be a
1 °·i lative act. (Cooley' Constitutional Limitation , 6th
edition pp. 1 4, 1 .3; Hardee v. Gibbs 50 j_ fi s. 802;. Fowler v.
Pierce, Cal. 165· olom,on v. Oom,'inissioners 41 a., 157.)
Thi. b ino- , , th ame auth ritie r quire that hi. action
xpr .·. ing ,'ll ·h appr ,Tal or di, approval hall take pla e
during th : . ·i n of ono-r '. Thi· I und r tand to be in
fH'C r l, nc wi h th u nal if 11 t uniform, practic with r lai(Jn t I ill pre. nt l t th
r id nt at or n ar the final
a,1j nr11m nt f a .· '·i u of
ut tb qu tion i ~
.:.i
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suggested whether the same rule applies to an adjournment,
or, as it is sometimes called, a "recess" during the session.
Subdivision 4, section 5, .Article I of the Constituti'bn rea<ls
as follows:
".Neitller House, during the session of Congress shall,
without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three
days, nor to any other place than that in which the two
Houses shall be sitting."
·
Recogniziug that this provision applies to a recess, so-called,
it is laid down in the " Constitution, Manual and Digest,
Rules and Practice" of the House of Representatives, second session Fifty-first Congress, page 532, tll.at.-"Where it is proposed to take a recess, by adjournment,
for more than three days, the Senate must consent before it
can be taken; and a resolution for that purpose is held to be
privileged."
In other words, within the meaning of the Constitution, a
recess is held to be an adjournment. .As an original question
I should say that the dispersion of the two Houses of Congress for a definite period, in pursu:1nce of a joint resolution,
such as that under consideration, is an adjournment within
the meaning of subdivision 2, section 7 of .Article I of the
Constitution (quoted at the beginning of the p.aper of
Attorney-General Devens, supra). If a different rule were
to be applied to an adjournment of ten days it might be
applied to an adjournment for as many months. · Suppose
Congress having met on the 1st of December were, on the 1st
of February, to adjourn until the 1st of October. What
would become of a hill presented to the President and not
approved within ten days, It could hardly remain in a state
of suspended animation ufltil Congress should reconvene.
The President could not veto it in the manner provided by
the Constitution; and, this being so, it would appear to follow that if not signed it must fail to become a law.
However, if it has been the practice of the President to
return bi1ls with his objections after the 'lapse of ten days,
not being able to return the same within that time by reason
of the temporary adjournment, that practice might be held
controlling. (Solomon v. Commissioners, 41 Ga., 157; People
v. Bowen, 21 N. Y., 530.) Upon the whole I advise that oills
coming to you during the recess of Congress, or within ten
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days prior thereto be signed or vetoed as they meet your
approval or disapprova,l, the bill, in case of veto, bein ,
returned when Congress reconvenes, and allow any que tions
as to their validity to be settled in court.
Very respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The PRESIDENT,
PRESIDENT-REGISTER OF WILLS AND RECORDER OF DEED BONDS.
It is in the power of the President to require a bond of the register of
wills and the recorder of deeds of the district of Columbia, for the
faithful accounting by them of the fees received by them, and it is
likewise in the power of the President to prescribe periods at which
accountings shall be had and payments made by them into the Treasury of the United States.
DEPARTMEN'l' OF JUSTICE,

January 12, 1893.
Sm: By your letter of the 10th instant you nall my attention to the recent statute (27 Stat., 153) providing salaries
for the register of wills and the recorder of deeds of the
Dtstrict of Columbia, and requiring those officers to account
for and pay into the Treasury, to the credit of the District
of Columbia, all sums received as fees, in excess of the salaries o provided and the necessary clerk hire and incidental
expen es of the offices; thereupon you inquire:
First, whether it is in your power to require a bond from
each of these officers for a proper accounting for such fee ;
Secondly, whether you have the power aud should prescribe the periods at which such accounting shall take place.
The e questions assume, of coµrse, as is .the fact, that the
statute contains nothing in reference to either of these matter.
The Uon titution of the United States, Article II, ection
3, provide that the Pre ident " hall take care that the laws
b faithfully exec1:1-te<l."
Th .tatute under con ideration requires of the e offic r ,
of y ur < pp intment certain dutie , but does not in detail
the manner and time for the performance of uch
the mea ure t b adopted to ecure uch per-
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By authorizing these officers to receive the fees and to
pay the expenses of their offices, and their own salaries, out
of the same, they are made quasi disbursing officers of the
United States. If these or any other disbursing officers of
the United States fail to discharge, or commit a breach of
- dut y , tbe provision of the Constitution above quoted would
require you, if such breach consisted in a misappropriation
of m oneys, to take the necessary steps for recovering and
bringing the same into the Treasury of the United States;
an d if such breach amounted to a criminal violation of the
law, it would be your duty to see that the offender was prosecuted and punished. It being thus made your constitutional
duty to redress a wrong committed by such an officer, it certainly is none t.he less your duty to use all reasonable means
to prevent such wrongdoing.
It is, of course, familiar law that any private person
charged with responsibility for money in the hands of a subordinate, may take from such subordinate a bond for a faithf ul accounting, and such bond will be enforced by the courts,
Very early in the history of the country it was settled
that "the United States have a capacity to enter into contraets, and take bonds within the sphere of their constitutio nal power, although not directly authorized by a statute."
( United States v. Tingey, 5 Peters, 115; United States v.Hodson, 10 Wallace, 395, and United States v. Mora, 97 U. S.,
413.)
B y the same decisions it is established that,, A voluntary bond taken by ~uthority of 'the proper offi·
cers of the Treasury Department to whom the disbursement
of _p ublic money is intrusted, to secure fid elity in official
duties of a receiver or an agent for disbursing of public
moneys, is a binding contract between him and his sureties
and the United States, although.such bond may not be prescribed or required by any positive law." ( United States y.
Tingey, 5 Peters, 115.)
I1r:is doubtful whether such bond should cover any duties
other than the faithful accounting for and paying over of
the moneys; at least, it is not clear that it would be of any
validity as to other duty. (Postmaster-General v. Early, 12
Wheaton, 136.)
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On April 20, 1853, Attorney-General Cushing (6 Opin., 24);
in response to an inquiry from the Secretary Clf' War whether
an officer of the Corps of Engineers, employed in the superintendency of public works and acting as disbursing officer,
was absolutely required to give a bond, said:
"lam of opinion that he is not; and that it is a matter
within the discretion of the President to require bonds in
such case or not, according to his· view of the exigencies of
the public service."
My answer, therefore, to your first question is in the affirmative.
From what has already been said it is also equally clear
that the second question shoul~ have a like answer. In
other words, you may prescribe the periods a,t which accounting shall be had and payments made into the Treasury by
the officers in question, and may require bonds to be given
to the United States to secure such accounting and payments.
Respectfully, yours,
W. H. H. MILLER. ,
The PRESIDENT.

SEAL FISHERIES-RE TAL.
The Secretary of the Treasury has the same authority to make a reduction in the rate per skin to be paid by the lessee of the seal fisheries
at the islands of St. George and St. Paul, tliat he has in the case of the
other stjpuln,ted rental in the lease. (20 Opinions, 51, covers this
question also.)
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Jctnuary 17, 1893.
Sm: By your note of the 16th instant you transmit a copy
of an opinion given to you on May 4, 1892, by the Solicitor
of the Treasury, upon the power of the Secretary of the
Treasury to reduce the rental stipulated for in the lease with
the North American Commercial Company for the right to
take fur seals upon the islands of St. Paul and St. George,
in the Bering Sea. ·
It appears that the lease under which this company i uow
operating provides for a gross rental of $60,000 per annum,
and an additional payment of $7.62½ for each skin.
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Section 1962, Revised Statutes, contains the following:
'' The Secretary" of the Treasury may limit the right of
killing if it becomes necessary for the preservation of such
seals, with such proportionate reduction of the rents reserved
to the Government as may be proper."
You ask whether your authority to reduce extends to the
rate per skin, as well as to the gross rental.
By an opinion rendered to you on Ma:ooh 27, 1891, written
by the Solicitor-General, and approved by me, you were
advised, generally, that the statutes authorized you to
reduce the rental under the current lease in proportion as
you might reduce the annual catch.
That opinion seems to me to cover your present question.
The amount paid per skin is no less a part of the rental
than the gross sum of $60,000. The contract might have
provided that the entire payment should be a gross sum, or
that the entire payment should be so much per skin, or that
it might be paid, as in the present lease, a part one way and
a part the other, provided always that the rental shall not be
less than $50,000 per annum, as required by section 1963.
I know of no reason for holding that you. have not the
same authority to make a reduction in the rate to be paid ver
skin, as in the · other stipulated rental. You are advised,
therefore, that the opinion of the Solicitor of the Treasury
is correct.
Respectfully, yours,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

CONTRACT-ANNULMENT....:...RESERVE PERCENTAGE.

Where a contract with the Government is duly annulled by the Government, pur uant to its terms, and when it is clear that the Government
can not suffer any loss on account of the annulment of the contract
in question, then the contractors are entitled to receive the reserved
moneys.
. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 17, 1893.
Sm: Your communication dated the 5th instant, relating
to a claim made on account of a contract entered into by
th v'. ar Department with ,James A. Mundy & Co., for river
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and harbor improvements in the harbor of Philadelphia, Pa.
has been duly considered.
The contract bore date April 23, 1891, and contained tbe
following provision:
"If, in any event, the party of the second part shall d lay
or fail to commence with the delivery of the material or the
performance of the work on the day specified therein, or
shall, in the judgment of the engineer in charge, fail to
prosecute faithfully and diligently the work in accordance
with the specifications and requirements of this contract,
then in either case the party Of the first part, Or his UC·
cessor legally appointed, shall have power, with the sanction
of -the Chief of Engineers, to annul this contract by giving
notfoe in writing to that effect to the party (or partie , or
either of them) of the second part; and, upon the giving of
such notice, all money or reserved percentage due or to
become due to the party or parties of the second part by
rea on of this contract shall be and become forfeited to the
United States; and the party of the first part shall be thereupon authorized, if an immediate performance of the work
or<lelivery of the materials be, in his opinion,requjr d by the
public exigency, to proceed to provide for the same by op n
purchase or contract, as prescribed in section 3709 of the
Revised Statutes of the United States."
everal exten ·ions of the contract were granted by the
Department from and after December 2n, U~91, and on
D cember 22, 1 o~, the contract was annulled by notice
gi en to the contractors, the ground of such annulment being
that in the judgment of the engineer in charge the ·ontractor had not prosecuted the work diligently, and would
not be able to complete the same within the time limited .
.At the date of •uch annulment the total of the percentao-e
retained by the Government on the payment made to contractor , under aid contract, wa 14,584.52.
The am unt arned by th m previous to the same dat , for
whi ·h no paym nt had be n matle, wa $11,742.3 , 1
co t
of in.p tion (,'517. 0) t be deducted.
I i a urned and
to be conceded tha he contr t r
I rfi rm th ir contract and that
nnection with he work, in
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the nature of accidents and misfortunes, whicl: occurred
~
w ithout fault on their part.
It is alleged that a dredge was burned, and that scows
were sunk, and that other boats and scows were withdrawn
by lessors, and that an unknown third revetment was dis c overed within the scope of the work; all of which occasioned losses and delays, and tended to prevent the contractors from performing the contr~ct according to the terms
t hereof.
I understand that, by reason of the premises, and in view
of such apparent equities as exist in the case, it is the wish
of your Department to pay the contractors the reserved
p ercentage, and for all work performed and materials furnished.
JUy official opinion i8 asked as to whether you possess
lawful authority to direct such payment.
It should be noted in this case, as is stated in the words
of Mr. Justice Miller in Qit·i nn v. United States (99 U.S., 33),
that "the authority of the engineer to terminate the contract did not depend on the value of excuses or the difficulty
of performance."
The moneys sought by the contractors, and above
described, are held by the United States as moneys forfeited
b y the contractors upon the annulment of the contract.
Nevertheless, the amount is not to be considered as liquid ated damages, but as a penalty reserved by the Government for its protection and indemnity.
The position occupied by such a reserve is set forth in
K ennedy v. United States (24 0. Cls., 141), as follows:
'' Forfeitures are recognized, but not favored by the law.
T he due and forfeit of the bond are not to be extended·beyond
the requirement of the technical right. Courts are loath to
enforce penalties or forfeitures, an_d will not do so except in
clear and imperative cases. Forfeitures and estoppels are
n ot favored defenses, aud are always subordinated to the
equity of the right if possible."
In Quinn's Case the United States profited largely o'y the
annulment of his contract.
It was h eld that the contractor was not entitled to recover
for profits that he might have earned if he had kept his contract; but it was also held that he was entitled to a return
5687-V0L ·20-33
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of the percentage reserved, because the Government sustained no pecuniary loss.
· When the fact that the United States could lose nothing
was ascertained, the reserved fund held as security was freed
from the Government claim and became the property of the
contractor ..
In case tbe United States shall suffer damages by reason
of the failure of . James A. Mundy & Co. to carry out and
perform their contract, the fund first in order, and perhaps
the only one in reach to compensate the United States, is
that composed of the reserved moneys under consideration.
It is my opinion that whenever it becomes clear that the
United States can suffer no loss on account of the annulment of the contract in question, then the contractors are
entitled to receive the reserved moneys.
I do not understand that any question connected with the
bond given by the contractors or with any liabiHty of sureties thereon is submitted to me; therefore no such question
•
is passed upon.
Very respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRET.A.RY OF W .A.R.

COMMISSIONER OF SOLDIERS' HOME-ARREST OF CRIMIN.A.LS.
The board of commissioners of the Soldiers' Home can not delegate to the
governor of the Home discretionary police authority for the preservation of good order within its limits. The board can by regulation
duly made invest him with authority to expel from the gr·ounds persons not inmates of the Home offending against good order and decency.
It can not empower the govern.or to arrest, detain, and deliver over to
the civil authorities non-military persons committing crimes less than
capital ,vithin the limits of the Home, except in the cases where any
pernon may make an arrest without warrant or precept.
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expelling from the Home grounds of offensive persons, the .
arrest and detention of those guilty of crimes and their surrender to the civil authorities," I submit the following conclusions:
As its name indicates, the Soldiers' Home is a military
establish\nent. It exists by authority of Congress, and is
the exclusive subject of chapter 2, Title LIX, of the Revised
Sta,tutes of the United States, which ehapter was subsequently amended and added to by the act of March 3, 1883
(22 Stat., 564, chap. 130).
Section 4815, Revised Statutes, as amended by section 10
of the said act, provides for a board of commissioners, to
consist of the General in Chief Commanding the Army and
certain other officers, which is clothed with authority '' to
establish, from time to time, regulations for the general and
internal direction of the institution, to be submitted to the
Secretary of '\Var for approval; and may do any other acts
'necessary for the government and interests of the same, as
authorized by this chapter;" and section 4824, Revised
Statutes, provides that "all persons admitted into the Soldiers' Home shaill be subject to the Rules and Articles of
War in the same manner as soldiers in the Army."
Section 4816, Revised Statutes, provides that the officers
"of each separate site of the Home" shall be a governor,
deputy governor, and secretary, to be appointed by the Secrary of War from the Army, on recommendation of the board
of commissioners, and to be removed by him on like recommendation.
If what I may term as the first question is correctly understood to be whether the board of commissioners may devolve
on the governor of the Horne such "police authority" as that
officer may think advisable to exercise, as occasion may arise~
"for the pre ervation of good order" within the limits of the
ome, my reply is that such an attempted delegation of
di cretionary power would be void, because whatever police
authority the boar_d itself may have to make regulations for
the "pre ervation of good order" at the Home, such authority mu t be exercised by the board alone, and can not be
tran ferred to the governor or any other officer.
Congress has manife ted a clear intention that the institution should be governed by the Rules and A;ticles of War, ·
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and such reg;ulations as the board of commissioners should
properly make, and I can not suppose for a moment that it
was contemplated that the governor should exercise any
authority outside of those rules and articles and regtilations,
even by the consent and direction of the board of commissioners.
In answer to the second question, I am of opinion that it
would be a proper exercise of power for the board of commissioners, by a regulation duly made, to invest the governor with authority to expel from the Home grounds persons, not inmates of the Home, offending against good order
and decency. Such a power must be recognized as reasonable and as necessary for the comfort and well being of the
inmates of the Home.
·
The third question is of ·a graver character than the other
two.
·
The authority of the governor under article 59 of the
Rules and Articles of War, to arrest and detain and deliver
over to the proper civil authority an inmate of the Horne
who bas committed a capital crime, or any offense again t
the person or property of any citizen of the United States,
punishable by the laws of the land, would seem to be ample
of itself, unless I am to understand that it is thought desirable by the board of commissioners to go further and provide by regulation for the surrender to the civil authority of
inmates committing offenses, less than capital, against one
another, instead of trying and punishing them by courtmartial in the usual way.
But in my judgment the power of the board to make regulations i to be exercised in subordination to the Rules and
.Articles of War, and con equently I do not think that what
I J1a,v upposed to be the object of the board could be accompli 'h d by regulation.
It remains to consider whether the board of commis ionr may, by regulation, empower the governor to arre t,
detain and deliver over to the civil authority, non -military
p r:on ommitting crime le than capital within the limits
f th Ilom .
n my ju lgment, th g n ral authority of the board to
mal· r gnlation
an not e under ' tood a involving the
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power to authorize the arrest and detention by military
authority of civilians for crimes committed within the limits
of the Home, except under the special circumstances when,
at common law, any person may make an arrest without warrant or precept. Nothing short of explicit language would
warrant me in holding that Congress intended to bring civiliaus under military authority, in time of peace, even to the
limited extent indicated. I must not suppose, on insufficient
grounds, that Congress failed to respect the prejudice against
the employment of military power against civilians that permeates all classes of the English speaking race, and, there- ·
fore, I am of opinion that the board can not invest the governor with such authority. (Ex pctrte Milligan, 4 Wall., 1.)
This, I believe, disposes of all the questions.
Very respectfully, yours,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRET.A.RY OF W .A.R.

CROW INDIANS OF MONT1\.NA-MODIFIC.A.TION OF AGREEMENT.
The fourth paragraph of the agreement concluded with the Crow Indians,
August 27, 1892, pursuant to the act of July 13, 1892, chapter 164, is
valid and of binding force.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 18, 1893.
Sm: Your communication, upon the subject of the relations now existing between the Government and the Crow
Indians of Montana, was duly received.
You request an official opinion as to whether the fourth
paragraph of the agreement made with said Indians under
the act of July 13, 1892 (27 Stat., 137), moui:fi.es the preexistiug agreement of December 8, 1890, so as to authorize an
allowance and application of interest in behalf of said Indians
a provided in said paragraph.
·
The statutes which appear to bear upon the question under
consideration are as follows:
1. The act of April 1, 1880 (21 Stat., 70), authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to deposit in the Treasury of the United
States moneys then held by him> or thereafter to be received
by him, as Secretary of the Interior and trustee of the v3tri-
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ous Indian tribes, * * * including all sums received on
acco11nt of sales of Indian trust lands, etc., whenever he is
of the opinion that the best interests of the Indians will be
promoted by sncb deposits; and the United States is directed
to pay interest semiannually from the date of deposit, at the
rate per annum stipulated by treaties or prescribed by law,
payment to be made without further appropria,tion by Congress.
2. By section31 of the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1039),
an agreement made December 8, 1890, with the Crow Indians
of Montaua, is set forth at length, and is accepted, ratified,
and confirmed. By this agreement the United States
receives from the Crow tribe a large amount of lands therein
descrjbed.
In consideration of this cession the United States agree
to pay $946,000 in the manner in the agreement set forth.
By subdivision :first, the sum of $200,000 is set apart to
be expended in the building of dams, canals, ditches, and
laterals for the purpose of irrigation in the valleys of Big
Horn and Little Big Horn rivers, and on Pryor Creek and
other streams; but no~ to exceed $fi0,000 shall be expended
annually in this work.
By ·ubdivi fon eighth of this agreement, the sum of
552,000 i et a,' ide a an annuity fund to be distributed as
follows:
' ach Indian of the Crow tribe, male and female, shall
r ceive an annual annuity of twelve dolfar' in cash for th
period of twenty y ar from the dat of aid agreemeut.
aid annuity to b paid semiannually in accordance with
u h rule and regulations as the Secretary of the Interior
may pr scribe."
•
By tb act of July 13, 1 92 (27 Stat., 137) the Secretary
f th Interior is authoriz d "to app int a commi ion to
11 ·o iat with the row Indjan of Montana for a modifica-
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The commissioners were duly appointed and entered upon
the performance of their duties. An agreement was concluded with the Indians August 27, 1892.
By the preliminary paragraph thereof, it is provided that
the agreement of December 8, 1890, shall be amended and
modified as set forth in this agreement.
By the third paragraph of this last agreement it is stipulated that $200,000 may be taken from the $552,000 set aside
as an annuity fund by the eighth section of the agreement of
December 8, 1890, and added to the $200,000 designated by
the first section of said agreement of 1890 to be expended in
building dams, canals, ditches, and laterals, for purposes
of irrigation in the valleys of the streams referred to in said
first s~ction, and that not exceeding $100,000 may be. expended annually for such purpose. Paragraph fourth of the
agreement of1892 sets forth that it is agreed that the balance
of the annuity fund provided for in section eight of the agreement of December 8, 1890, remaining unexpended at the date
of tlie approval of this agreement, shall be placed in the Treasury to the credit of the Crow Indians, and bear interest at the
rate of 5 per cent per annum, and the said interest, together
with a sufficient portion of the principal to give each Indian
an annuity of $12, shall be paid to said Indians, per capita,
in cash semiannually.
It is provided by paragraph tenth that this agreement shall
take effect upon its approval by the Secretary of the Interior.
This agreement was duly executed on the part of the commissioners, and also on the part of the Indians, and was approved by the Secretary of the Interior October 15, 1892.
It is to be conceded that Congress intended by the act of
April 1, 1880, to permit the deposit in the Treasury of
moneys held in trust for Indian tribes, and .to allow interest
thereon at a rate stipulated by treaty or presc1,ibed by law.
This action is for the benefit of the Indians affected, and the
interest becomes payable without further appropriation ...
This enactment, so far as it reaches, is an approval by Congress of the policy of allowing interest to Indian tribes upon
their funds held in trust and deposited in the Treasury.
By the agreement of December 8, 1890, the United States
extinguished the Indian right of occupancy to a large amount
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of the public domain, and entered upon a system of irrigation upon the lands reserved to the Indians, for their benefit,
as detailed in the agreement.
The sum of $200,000 of tribal funds was set apart for
dams, canals, ditches, and laterals, but only $50,000 thereof
was allowed to be expended annually.
By section 8 the sum of $552,000 of the purchase price of
tlle Indian title was set aside to be paid in annuities.
It may be fairly inferred from the enactment of 1892 that
the efforts being made to render the lands reserved to the
Crow tribe in :l\fontana productive needed strengthening.
By the agreement of 1892 $200,000 was authorized to be
taken from the $552,000 annuity fund and used for the purposes of the irrigation fund, and the limit of permitted annual
expenditure from the irrigation fund was raised from $50,000
to $100,000.
It appears that the $200,000 was transferred to the jrrigation fund a.nd that $40)512 of the remaining $352,000 has
been paid to the Indians, arnl that a balance of $311,488
remains in the annuity fund.
It is claimed on behalf of the Crow tribe that this sum
should be placed in the Treasury in trust, upon interest, to
be applied in accordance with the provisions of paragraph
4 of the agreement of 1892.
It may be conceded that the moving purpose of the agreerrie11t of December 8, 1890, was the obtaining of a large
a,mount of land occupied by the Indians.
A large amount of the purchase money to be paid for the
Indians' right of occupancy wa retained in trust; the act
of April 1, 1880, then tood in full force; thereupon the act
of July 13, 1892, authorized a modification of the agr~ement
of 1 90.
The act.ion of the cornrni ioner indicate that an important purpo ·e of their appointment was a readjustment of the
et apart in the former agreement for irrigation and
annui y purr o . An obj ct of their action mu t have been
to att mpt t rend r ' ucc . fnl the irrigation projects which
w re
in(T wr n ht out at the xp n e of the Indian fund.
Ile yin er tbi bj t in i w i wa agr d to trengthen the
irri ati n fond by the trc n fer f the 2 0,000 an the
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annuity fund was correspondingly weakened. Thereupon,
as a part of the proposed modification, it was agreed to
place the unexpended balance in the Treasury at 5 per cent
interest, and to use the interest, to the extent tltereof as it
accrued, in payment of the $12 per capita annuity.
It is plain that a modification of the earlier agreement was
intended by Congress; it does not appear that the modification actually made was not the one that Congress intended.
The payment of interest on the trust fund is in line with
the enactment of 1880 and of the policy then adopted.
Congress recognized that the commissioners were not
required to act within specified lines, as it provided that no
mddi:fication should become valid unless assented to by a
majority of the male adult Indians and approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
The modification was made in terms by the agreement, the
instrument was formally executed, and the modification was
duly assented to by the Indians and was duly approved by
the Secretary of the Interior, and executive officers of the
Interior Department have taken action t~ereunder, while
Congress is not shown to have taken any action in relation
thereto.
In view of the premises, and of the recognized relation
which is occupied by the U .S. Government toward its Indian
tribes, it is my opinion that you are justified in treating paragraph 4 of the agreement of 1892 as valid and of binding
force.
Very respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

ELECTORAL VO'rES-MISSING CERTIFICATES.
The Secretary of State having been notified by the Presid~nt of the
Senate that on the fourth Monday of January he had received by mail
p:tckages purporting to contain the electoral votes for President and
Vice-President from all the States, and had received similar packages
by messenger from all but four States, it is advised that section Hl,
Revised Statutes, as amended October 19, 1888, makes it his duty to
send pecial messengers to the district judges in whose custody one
certificate of the votes from the four above States has been lodged.
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 27, 1893.
Sm: I have your letter of the 26th instant, in which you
state as follows:
"I have been informed by the Preaident of the Senate that
on the 23d instant, which was the fourth Monday of the
month, he had received by mail packages purporting to contain the electoral vote::; for President and Vice-President
from all the Sta.tes of the Union, and that similar packages
had been delivered to him by messengers from all of the
States except Indiana, Montana, Oregon, and Wisconsin."
And you inquire "whether in the foregoing contingency
it is my duty under tbe provis1ons of section 141 of the
Revised Statutes, as amended by tbe act of October 19, 1888
(25 Stat., 613), to send special messengers to the district judges
in whose custody one certificate of the votes from the four
above States has been lodged."
Section 140 of tbe Revised Statutes, first enacted in 1792,
is as follows:
" The electors shall dispose of the certificates thus made
by them in the following manner :
" One. They shall by writing under their hands, or under
the bands of a majority of them, appoint a person to take
charge of and deliver to tbe Pre ident of' the Senate, at the
seat of Governm.ent, before the first Wednesday in January
then next ensuing, one of the certificates.
" Two. They shall forthwith forward by the post-office to
the President of the Senate, at the seat of Government, one
other of the certificates.
" Three. They shall forth with cause the other of the certificate to be delivered to the judge of that district in which
the el ctor hall as emble."
ection 3 of the act of February 3, 1887 (24 Stat., 373), preserv thi requirement in th following language:
"' nd uch ertificate hall be inclo ed and transmitted
by h el cto.r at the ame time and in the ame manner as
i provided by law for ran. mitting by uch elector to the
eat of Goverum nt the U t of all per on voted for as
Pr . i nt nd fall per on vot d for a Vice-Pr . ident."
ti n 41 f the evi
tatut , as amended October
(..,... tat.. , 13) read· a fi 11 ws:
1
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"Whenever a certificate of votes from any State has not
been received at the seat of Government on the fourth Monday of the month of January in which their meeting shall
have been held, the Secretary of State shall send a special
messenger to the district judge in whose castody one certificate of the votes from that State has been lodged, and such
judge shall forthwith transmit that list to the seat of Government."
Thus, during our entire histo~y, the law has provided that
three certificates of the action of the electors shall be made
by them; that two of these shall by different means be seu t
to the President of the Senate, and that the thfrd shall be
deposited with the district judge from whom it may be
obtained if required. The purpose of this legislation was
evidently to prevent fraud, accident, or mistake. It was not
merely designed to bring to the President of the Senate
notice that the electors had voted for President and VicePresident, but to ·make sure that the action actually taken
had been correctly reported and had ·been in no way changed.
If only one certificate were received by him, the possibility
of fraud or mistake en route, or the charge of such, would
be greater than if two certificates brought by different
means were delivered to him. Such dangers, however,
are remote, and in these da.ys of rapid communication it is
improbable that the will of any State a,s .expressed by the
electors could thus be defeated. And yet in reference to an
office so important as that of President of the United States,
and concerning which party strife and passions are at times
so strongly aroused and the people often so evenly divided,
that construction should be given to the laws which is best
calculated to exclude every possibility of mistake or dispute.
I am therefore of the opinion that the language "whenever a certificate of votes from any State has not been
received," etc., is to be construed as though it read "whenever any certificate of votes required by law from any State.
has not been received."
·
Any other construction would render the provisions of section 140 nugatory, so far as one of its purposes is concerned,
or to be di regarded at the will of the electors, while the one
here stated gives effect to every provision of the law.
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Your question must therefore be answered in the affirmative.
I return the inclosure of your letter, and have the honor
to be, very respectfully, yours,
'
CHARLES H. ALDRICH,
Solicitor-General.
The SECRET.A.RY OF S T .A.TE.
Approved:
W. H. H . MILLER.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
The qncstion by whose fault or neglect, if anyone's, a wrongful payment bas been made is a question of fact, ot mixed law and fact, which
only a court can determine, and the Attorney-General should not
xpress an opinion thereon.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

l'

February 1893.
Your communication of December 12, ultimo, presents
for opinion the following case :
011 April 19, 1892, Maj. J . B . Keefer, a paymaster in the U.
rmy, tatio11ed at the city of New York, drew bis check
on the a ·:i taut trea urer at that place for $78.44 in favor
of James II. Yardley, or order, n iug for that pLrrpo ea blank
from the b k of blank check furnished him by the Treasury
Department and, a nothing appears to the contrary, you
a , ' ume that the ch ck wa drawn in the u ual manner.
ardl y, th paye indor d the check, in blank, and then
i\'.Iaj. Keef r al o indor edit, in blank, adding his official desj ·na ion of payma ter, U . S .•Army, which, you say, "was
int n d to identify the signatme of Yardley," but the check
it If d
not tat what was the purpo e of the indor ment.
ft r he lrawing and iudor ing of the check the writing
in th
dy f it wa
all removed' and the check filled up
fi r ·' 7 .44, p, ya I t
he order of th ame pay e, and it
aid in hat fi rm by the a 'i tant tr a urer on April
2.
IR:

T
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forgeryi and that his account should be credited by the sum
of $800, the fraudulent excess, with which request tl1e assistant treasurer refused to comply, and the question submitted
is, whether the loss caused by the forgery shall fall on the
})aymaster or the assistant treasurer.
After due consideration I have reached the conclusion that '
the question before me is one that I can not decide without
stepping beyond the limits of my authority as Attorney-Gen- _
eral and invading.those of the judicial department. It is the
courts alone that can make an authoritative deter1i1ination
of this question of liability, for I have no power to employ
judicial methods, bul am limited to giving opinions upon
statements of fact laid before me by those entitled to call for
my opiniQn, and I am as strictly bound by these statements
as a court is by a special verdict.
After stating the facts as above set forth, you say:
"The Paymaster-General of the Army remarks in this matter that if Maj. Keefer is at fault be should be called upon
at once to make his accounts conform to those of the assist- .
ant treasurer at New York by a deposit of $800 in the subtreasury in that city to meet the checks alreauy drawn as
above mentioned and now outstanding. Before acting on
this suggestion I have the honor to request your opinion
whether, in view of the facts stated, the $800 loss occasioned
by the erroneous payment by the assistant treasurer at New
York to Yardley, must, under the law~ be borne by Maj.
Keefer or by the assistant treasurer of the United States at
New York City."
In other words, the vital question is by whose fault or negligence, if of any one, has the wrongful payment come about,
Tl.tis is a question of fact or of mixed law and fact, which
only a court can determine (19 Opin., 672, 696).
It is manifest, then, that the sureties of the assistant
treasurer and t~e paymaster, who, it is to be remembered,
are bonded officers, would have good reason to complain if I
should attempt to decide the question of their liability, not
upon my own investigation into the facts, but upon an ex
parte tatement made by you for the purpose of requesting
an opinion for your guidance as the head of the War Department.
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In Strong's Gase (19 Opin., 450), where this subject received
careful cousideration, I refused to consider the conflicting
clreims of Strong and certain of his creditors to a particular
fund in the Treasury, and advised the head of that Department to hold on to the fund in dispute until all the claims to
it had been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction;
and, however much it would gratify me to accede to your
request for an opinion, I am, in like manner, constrained to
refer you to the courts for an answer to the question submitted. ·
Very respectfully, yours,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
Where no statement of facts is presented the Attorney-Genera.~ can not
render an opinion.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICJE,

.
February 7, 1893.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
lett r of 1 obruary 3, as follow :
"I have the honor to inclose herewith a letter addressed
to this Department by Me rs. A. Adler & Co., dated New
Orl an , La., D_e cember 31, 1892, inclosing two communication re ived by them in the nature of protests against the
propo ed building of the 'Rebecca Levee,' under the proi ·ion of the river and harbor act, approved July 13, 1892.
' ccom.panying the communication from Me rs . .Auler &
o. will be found the report of the Chief of Engineers, U.
. .Army, dated the 31 t ultimo thereon, and the papers
th r in referr cl to; and thi Department has the honor to
r CJ.U t your opinion wheth r the levee referred t can be
uilt not with tanclino- the prote ts, and without renderin 0th
it d tat · liable fi r damage .
i h your r ply her turn of the paper i reque ted.'
·om , nying th Jett r i a con i<l. rable bundle of paper
fr m whi h it i 11 ar u ly xp t d that I will glean the
ud th n gi e he e 'ired pinion. I am very orry
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that, under the uniform rulings of this office, I am unable
to comply with this request.
Mr . .Attorney-General Stanbery, in 12 Opinions, page 208,
says:
"Where a question of law arises upon facts submitted
to the .Attorney-General, such facts must be agreed and
stated as facts established."
So in 14 Opinions, page 367, .Attorney-General Williams
says:
"I deem it proper here to remind you that where an official
opinion from the head of this Department is desired on questions of law arising on any case, the request should be accompanied with a statement of the material facts of the case,
and also the precise questions on which advice is wanted.
By the observance of this simple rule the real point of difficulty in the case will be at once pe,rcetved, much inconvenience avoided, and more practicable and satisfactory results
obtained.".
Without further quotations, it is sufficient to say that
without, so far as I know, a single exception it has been
held that under section 356 of the Revised Statutes it is permissible for the .Attorney-General to give an opinion only
upon a case succinctly stated; that is, to answer specific
questions of law arising upbn facts set forth. (19 Opin., 396,
465; 18 Opin., 487.)
I trust you will appreciate that the failure to respond to
your request is not a matter of inclination but of obedience
to the law.
The inclosures of your letter are returned.
Respectfully, yours,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRET.A.RY OF WAR.

LICENSE-POWER TO REVOKE.
An instrument purporting to convey the use of a strip of land belonging
to the Government, although c_o ntaining the term "lease," held merely
a license which could be terminated at the pleasure of the Department giving it, and the licensee could be properly removed from the
land by the Government if he refuses to move out on proper notice.
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DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 7, 1893.
SIR: It appears by your communication of February I,
instant, that your predecessor in office, on August 28, 1890,
gave, or attempted to give, to the Delawa,r e Bay and Cape
May Railroad Company, for a term of :five years, "the use of
a strip of land 50 feet wide through the light-house reservation at Cape May, N. J." Coupled with this grant, as the
~ousideration for it., the railroad company contracted to pay
an annual rent of $5; to build and keep up a good, strong,
and secure picket fence on both sides ·of the strip of land
during the whole term of occupancy; to furnish "in perpetuity" free passage on the road to all officers and employ es
of the U. S. Light-House Establishment; and on failure of
the company to observe and perform each and every of these
stipulations the Secretary of the Treasury is empowered to
declare the "lease" void, and it is provided that such declaration shall operate to render it null.
It appears that the railroad company is delinquent with
regard to its duty under the "lease," and the question submitted is whether the Secretary of the Treasury, after he
shall have declared the "lease" void, will have authority to
direct the company to remove its property from the reservation~
I am of tlrn opinion that the Secretary of the Treasury has
no authority to make a contract of the kind above stated., in
the absence of au act of Uongre authorizing him to do so.
What is called a "lease," in this case, amounts, in my
iudgment, to no more than a li.cense, to which the Secretary
<!an put an end whenever he see :fit.
The Pre ·i<l.ent and the Secretary of War have long exerci d the authority of giving revocable license, to individuals
and corporation to enter and make u e of designated part
of military re 'ervation ·, where uch u e brings with it some
b n fit o the United tat . Und r a revo able authority
f thi kin , the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company,
· ·u1 ied with it tra k,, for many year , a part of the Govrnm ut r nT, tion , t IInri er i erry, and, in 1 64 Pre id nt incoln o-, Y" • imilar 1i en e to th Lono- ranch and
I ailr a
mpany t u ~ part of the Go ernm nt
k and in 1
; he gav .the ame om-
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pan y a similar license to use the same property in the same
way.
On August 4~ 1890, I gave an opinion, that, in view of this
long- continued practice of the President and Secretary of
War to grant such licenses, it was competent for the Secretary of War to give a revocable license to one Llewellyn to
construct and maintain an irrigating ditch, of a certain
depth and width, and along a certain line, on the military
reserva,t ion, at Fort Selden, N. Mex., it being made a con.
dition of the license that the water flowing through the
ditch might be used· for the purposes of the fort, a manifest
advantage to men and animals living in that arid region.
(19 Opin., 628.)
Following now, that precedent, and also the opi:r;iion of
Attorney-General Devens of November 22, 1878, I am of
opin ion that the instrument called a ''lease" only operated
as a revocable license, if it had any legal effect, and did not
convey any estate in· the strip of land now occupied by the
Del a ware Bay and Cape May Railroad Company, and that
the Secretary of the Treasury has power to revoke the license
at p leasure, and to remove the property of the company from
the reservation upon its failure to do so, after reasonable
notice. The company, having entered and occupied under
the license and authority of the Secretary of the Treasury, is
in n o condition to question that authority. It is, therefore,
unnecessary for me to express any opinion on the question
of t h e Secretary's power to give licenses to persons to use
light -house reservations.
·
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
.
W. H. H. MILLER.
T he SECRE'l'ARY OF THE TREASURY.
5687-VOL 20-34
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ATTORNEY-GENER.AL.
Whether various schemes are " dependent on lot or chance" within the
meaning of the lottery law, is a mere question of fact upon which the
Attorney-General is not authorized to give an opinion.
DEPARTMENT OF JUS'.l'ICE,

February IO, 1893.
SIR: Your communication of January 19, 1893, asking my

opinion as to whether the various schemes therein referred
to are schemes "dependent upon lot or chance," within the
meaning of the lottery law, presents no question of law, but
a mere question of fact, upon which I am not authorized to
give any opinion . . The meaning of the words of the lottery
law, which you quote, is perfectly clear, and the only question for solution is whether the schemes mentioned are, in
point of fact, "dependent on lot or chance¥"
Very respectfully, yours,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL.

REMI

ION

OF

PENALTY-CONTRACT
PROMISE.

LABOR LAW-COM-

eotion 2 of the act of March 3, 1891, chapter 551, does not of itself give
authority to anyone to settle or compromise judgments entered under
the coutract-labor act of February 26, 1885, by section 3 of said act,
nor does any previous law referred to in s·ection 2 of the act of March
3, 1891, confer that power. (19 Opins., 345, adhered to.)
A mi taken opinion of the legislature concerning the law does not
make the law.
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On November 11, 1892, "an order of court" was entered
by the district judge (Blodgett), presumably holding the
circuit court of the district, reciting that Hess bad offered
to pay $50 of the said judgment and the costs, amounting
to $173.15, as a compromise; that Hess bad no· property:
subject to execution; that he appears to be a sober industrious man, and in other respects a law-abiding citizen,
and that the U. S. attorney believes that the interests of
the United States will be subserved by accepting the offer.
It is then '' ordered that the consent of this court be, and i£
is hereby, given to the compromise and settlement of the
said judgment upon the terms of the said offer for the aforegoing reasons."
As you say, that order of the court was entered, apparently, under section 2 of the act of March 3, 1891 (26
Stat., 1084), entitled "An act in amendment to the various
acts relative to immigration and the importation of aliens
under contract or agreement to perform labor." That section provides as follows:
"That no suit or proceeding for violations of said act of
February 26, 1885, prohibiting the importation and migration of foreigners under contract or agreement to perform
labor, shall be settled, compromised, or discontinued without
the consent of the court entered of record with reasons
therefor."
Upon this state of facts, the following questions are submitted for opinion:
1. Whether the section in question confers the power of
it elf, independent of any other statute, to settle or compromise the judgment in said case 1
2. Whether the said section is such a legislative construction of section 3469, or of any other statute, as confers the
power to settle the case in question¥
3. Whether the word "proceeding" in 'this section is such
a broad term as will authorize the compromise, settlement, or
discontinuance of the action after judgment¥
4. Whether, in view of the enactment of said section 2 by
Congress, you still bold to the opinion given by you in the
Church of the Holy Trinity (19 Opin., 345), that it is doubtful
whether the Secretary of the Treasury has power to com pro-
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mise, settle, discontinue, or remit a,n y :fine or judgment for
penalty rendered by the U. S. courts for the violation of the
act of February 26, 1885 (23 Stat., 332), entitled "An act prohibiting the importation and migration of foreigner and
aliens under contract or agreement to perform labor in the
United States, its Territories, and the District of Columbia f"
It is unnecessary to answer these questions with any particularity, as I am of opinion that section 2 of the act of
Ma,rch 3, 1891 (supra), does not, of itself, give authority to
anyone to settle or compromise judgments entered under the
act of February 26, 1885 (supra), and furthermore, that no
other previous law, to which Congress can be deemed to have
referred fa section 2, confers the power in question. The only
previous law which might be supposed to contain such a
power is section 3469 (Rev. Stat.), but I have held, in a previou opinion, to which you refer (19 Opin., 345), that it is
extremely doubtful whether that section gives authority to
tbe Secretary of the Treasury to compromise a judgment for
the :fine imposed by the act of February 26, 1885, which is
the law under which the judgment in this case, against Hes ,
wa rendered. To that opinion I still adhere.
If we are to infer that Congress supposed, when section 2
wa enacted, that the power to compromise judgments for
the :fine prescribed Ly the act of February, 1885, resided
omewhere, under previous law, the supposition was, in my
,iu<lgment, mistaken, aud can not be accepted as equiYalent
to a legislative act, or as indicating a purpose to enlarge
tile scope of section 3469 (Rev. Stat.). As Chief Justice
Mar hall remarked in Postmaster-General v. Early (12 Wlieat,
1 6, 148), "a mistaken opinion of the legislature concerning
the law does not make law." See al ·o United States v. Claflin (97 U. ., 546, 548); Tou·n of South Ottawa v. Perkins (94
U. ., 260, 270); nistrict of Columbia v. Hutton (143 U. S.,
18 .,,7, 28).
· '.rhe ca e cited fully establish the propo ition that the
qu" tion, whether power exist d under previous law to com.
promi e judgments like the one here, before section 2 of the
a t of 18 - wa enacted, i not a legislative but a judicial
u tion, which the court or officer called on to interpre the
ection mu t decide for him elf. As the remission of these
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penalties is within the pardoning power of the President,
the inability of the Secretary in the premises entails no hardship.
This seems to dispose of all the questions.
Very respectfully, yours,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRETARY

OF

THE TREASURY.

CUSTOMS-REVENUE CASES-CERTIORARI.
The question whether or not the writ of certiorari should be applied for
in the customs-revenue cases, decided by the circuit court of appeals,
depends upon the extent and value of the -importation, the loss to the
Government by reason of the adverse decision, the degree of doubt as
to the proper construction, the fact that different circuit courts of
appeal have reached opposite conclusions upon the same question, and
other like considerations.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 16, 1893.
SIR: I have your letter of February 3, in which you request
my opinion "whether, in all customs-revenue cases, decided
by the circuit courts of appealsi the question of review by
way of certiorari is to be considered and determined as a
condition precedent to the settlement of the ca.ses."
In reply, I have the honor to say that, broadly stated, your
inquiry must be answered in the affirmative. Under th~
construction thus far given by the Supreme Court to the act
in que~tion, the test ju each case is whether the subject of
the controversy is of sufficient importance in itself, and there
is also sufficient doubt as to how it should be determined.
(Lau Ow Bew, Petitioner, 141 U.S., 583; La'u Ow Bew v.
United States, 144 U. S., 47. j In the first of these cases (p.
589) the court declares that this branch of jurisdiction should
be exercised sparingly and with great caution; and in the
latter case it declares that it has the puwer to issue a certiorari to a circuit court of appeals in any case except one
that can be brought up from such court by appeal or writ of
error. In In re Woods (143 U.S., 202), however, the court
refused a writ of certiorari to a circuit court of appeals on the
ground that the questions involved were not important.
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With reference to the particular case which has caused this
inquiry, and all similar cases, I can only say that the question wbet,h er or not a writ of certiorari should be applied for
depends, in my opinion, upon the extent and value of the
importations, the loss to the Government by reason ot' an
ad verse decision, the degree of doubt as to the proper construction, the fact that different circuit courts of appeals
have reached opposite conclusions upon the same question,
and other like considerations.
Very respectfully,
CHARLES H. ALDRICH,
Solicitor- General.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

Approved:
W. H. H. MILLER.

TEN PER CENT TAX O

CIRCULATION OF NOTES.

A national bank paying out on checks and otherwise notes of a bnnk
chartered in a foreign country is subject to tax of 10 per cent upon the
total amount of all notes it has received and used as a circulating
medium.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 17, 1893.
SIR: I have your letter of February 6, 1893, and in closures.
It appears that the Calais National Bank, of Oalais, Me.,
received from its depositors and others, and paid out on
check and otherwi e, in the ordinary course of business,
note is ued by the Bank of St. Stephen, a corporation in the
Province of New Brunswick, Canada, issuing its own bills
and circulating and paying them out as currency. It is
~tated that these bill are redeemable in gold and silver, and
ar in good credit and tanding as a circulating medium, and
that large quantities of them get into circulation along the
northern border of the United States. You request an
opinion whether the bank of Calais is liable for tbe tax of 10
per ent on the amount of the notes so circulated, under the
pro i ion of ection 19 and 2 of the act of February 8,
1875 (18 at., 311). The ection referred to read as follows:
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"SEC. 19. That every person, firm, association, other than
national bank associations, and every corporation, State
bank, or State banking association, shall pay a tax of 10
per centum on the amount of their own notes used for circulation and paid out by them.
"SEC. 20. That every such person, firm, association, corporation, St,a te bank, or State banking association and also
every national ban.k ing association shall pay a like tax of 10
per centum on the amount of notes of any person, firm, association other than n~tional banking association, or of any
corporation, State bank, or State banking association, or of
any town, city, or municipal corporation, used for circulation
and paid out by them."
It was decided in Veazie Bank v. Fenno (8 Wall., 533),
construing section 9 of the act of July 13, 1866, amendatory
of prior acts upon the same subject, that Congress had
thereby undertaken to provide a currency for the whole
country, and that the tax of 10 per cent, although restrictive in its character and not calculated to secure a revenue
for the Government, was a legitimate exercise of constitutional authority. The sections under consideration were
enacted in furtherance of the same end, and by virtue
thereof bills and notes of every kind other than those of
national banking associations, when used for circulation, are
subject to this tax. As declared by the Supreme Court in
HoUister v. Mercantile Institution (111 U. S., 62), "it was no
doubt the purpose of Congress in imposing this tax to
provide against competition with the established national
currency for circulation as money." Within the limits of
the decisions aJready named, if the notes deposited under
the circumstances described in your communication, and
herein stated, had been those of a bank of the State of Maine
there could be no doubt that they would be subject to the
tax provided by the statute referred to. In my opinion the
fact that the notes were those of a bank chartered by~ foreig·n province or state can make no difference, nor does the
fact that they are not redeemable in any way in the United
States. Such notes are equally within the prohibition
intended by Congress by the legislation referred to.
You are therefore advised that the bank of qalais is sub-
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ject to a tax of 10 per cent upon the total amount of all note
of the Bank of St. Stephen that it has received and used as
a circulating medium. (National Bank v. United States, 101

u. s., 1.)

Respectfully,
CHARLES H. ALDRICH,
Solicitor- General.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

Approved:
W. H. H. MILLER.
.A.'rTORNEY-G ENER.A.L.

The Attorney-General is neither requireu nor authorized to give an
opinion to the head of a Department except in cases actually pending
for decision by him in such Department.
DEP .A.R'l'MENT OF JUSTICE,

ll'ebritary 24, 1893.
I have the letter of the Acting Secretary of the
Interior of February 21, in which he transmits a copy of a
communication from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
and a copy of "an act of. the Creek Council, approved
November 5, 1892, in tructing the delegates of said nation
to r ent to tbe .Attorney-General of the United State , for
·his official o inion as to the construction of the second article
of he Or ek tr aty of .Augu t 11, 186G (14 Stat., 785), extendincr to freedmen the ri 0 ·ht to return within one year after the
ratification of aid treaty, whether or not it included tho e
c lor d per on who were held a,c slaves in the nation but
w re ·old and removed beyond the limits of the Creek
ation prior to the commencement of the civil war."
ction 356 of the Revi ed Statutes read a follows:
Th b ad of any ~ xecutive Department may require the
opmrnn f the .A ttorn y-General on any question of law
ari ·in°· in the admini tration of his Department."
i r m th
foundation of the Go ernment it has been held
that h .Attorn y- en ral i n ither required nor authorized
t O'i an 01 inion to th head of a Department except in
a:
ually p ndin for de i ion by him in such Departut. (1 Opi . 7 · Ibid., 331.)
IR:
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As this question is asked not to aid the Secretary of the
Interior in the solution of a question to be decided by him,
but for the use of the Creek Council, I must, in obedience to
the rule of law, decline to give an opinion in the premises.
Respectfully, yours, .
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRETARY

OF

THE INTERIOR.

LICENSE-GOVERNMENT PROPERTY.
Where the Secretary of the Treasury gives to a company "the use of a
strip of land 50 feet wide through the light-honse reservation at Ca.pe
May, N. J. ," and the company contracts to payanan.,1ual rent, to keep
a strong picket fence on both sides of the strip of lancl, and to furnish
"in perpetuity"free passage on the road to officers and employes of the
U.S. Light -Honse Establishment, and on failure of the company to
perform each and every of these stipulations the Sooretary of the
Treasury is empowered to declare the "lease" void, and where the
property covered by the "lease" was occupied by the Government at
that time, and therefore not "unoccupied and unprotected property,"
Helcl, that what is called a lease in the case amounts to nothing but a
li cense revocable at the pleasure of the Secretary of the 1'reasury,
and that the property of the company can be removed if it fails to.
remove it after reasonable notice.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

]J,f arch 2, 1893.
Sm: It appears by your communication of February 1,
instant, that your predecessor in office on .August 28, 1890,
gave or attempted to give to the Delaware Bay and Cape
May Railroad Company, for a term of five years, "the use
of a strip of land 50 feet wide through the light-house reservation at Cape May, N. J." Coupled with this grant, as
the consideration for it, the railroad company contracted to
pay an annual rent of $5 to build and keep up a good, strong,
and secure picket fence on both sides of the strip of land
durillg the whole term of occupancy, to furnish "in perpetuity" free passage on the road to all officers and employes
of the U. S. Light-House Establishment, and on failure of
the company to observe and perform each and every of these
stipulations, the Secretary of the Treasury is empowered to
declare the ''lease" void, and it is provided that such declaration shall operate to render it null.
It appear that the railroad company is delinquent with
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regard to its obligations under the " lease," and the question
submitted is whether the Secretary of the Treasury, after he
shall have declared the ''lease" void, will have authority to
direct the company to remove its property from the reserva
tion.
In reply to my letter of the 17th February, instant, asking
to know" whether the part of the reservation through which
the right of way runs was occupied or unoccupied at the time
the lease was made," you say, in your letter of the 20th February, instaut, " that one pa.rt of the Cape May reservation is
occupied by the buildings of the Light-House Establishment,
the other part by those of tile life-saving station," from
which I undeTstand that'the land covered by the "lea,se "was
occupied by the Government at the.time the "lease" was made,
and therefore not within the terms of the provisions of the .
act of March 3, 1879 (20 Stat. 383), authorizing the Secretary
of the Treasury to make leases of "unoccupied and unproductive property.'' I am of opinion, therefore, that the Secretary of the Treasury has no power to bind the Government in
this case by the contract called a lease:
·
What it called a "lease" in this case amounts, in my judgment, to no more than a license, to which the Secretary can
put a,n end whenever he sees fit.
The Pre ident and the Secretary of War have long exerci ed the authority of giving revocable licenses to individuals
and corporations to enter and make use of designated parts
of military reservations, where such use brings with it some
beueiit to the United States. Under arevocableauthorityof
thi kind the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company occupied
with its track , for many years, a part of the Government reservation at Harpers Ferry, and in1864 President Lincoln gave
a imilar license to the Long Branch and Seashore Railroad
Company to u e a pa.r t of the Government land at Sandy
ook, and in 1869 he gave the same company a similar license
to u the ame property in the same way.
n Angu t 4, 1 90, I gave an opinion that, in view of this
Jong-continued practice of the President and . Secretary of
War to rant uch licen, es, it was competent for the Secretary of War to give a revocable license to one Llewellyn to
con truct and maintain an irrigating ditch of a certain depth
an 1 idtb and along a certain line, on the military re erva-
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tion at Fort Selden, N. Mex., it being a condition of the
license that the wa.ter flowing through the ditch might be
used for the purposes of the fort, a manifest advantage to
men an<l animals living in that arid region (19 Opiu., 628).
Following now that precedent, and also the opinion 9f
Attorney-General Devens of November 22, 1878, I am of
opinion that the instrument called a" lease" only operated
as a revocable license, if it had any legal effect, and did not
convey any estate in the strip of land now occupied by the
Delaware Bay and Cape May Railroad Company, and that
the Secretary of the Treasury has power to revoke the
license at pleasure, and to remove the property of the company from the reservation upon its failure to do so, after
reasonable notice. The company, furthermore, having
entered and occupied under the license and au.t hority of the
Secretary of the Treasury, is in no condition to question
that autho;rity.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
W. H. H. MILLER
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE. TREASURY.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL-DISCLAIMER BY THE UNITED ST.A.TES.
The facts of a controversy reviewed and decided not to warrant a disclaimer on behalf of the United States of the existence of any power
or jurisdiction to interfere with the proceedings of a railroad company
to extend its lines.
The Attorney-General will not· answer a question purely judicial in its
nature.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 3, 1893.
SIR: Your communication relating to the interests of the
United States in Holston street from Broad street to the
northeast corner of the national cemetery at Knoxville, in
the State of Tennessee, has been duly considered.
The principal questions involved are essentially judicial
questions, and are not such as I am authorized to determine.
It appears that by the act of July 28, 1886 (24 Stat., 159-),
Congress appropriated $6~000 "for the purpose of constructing a macadamized road from the intersection of Broad and
Holston streets, thence along the line of Holston street to
the intersection of said street with Munson street, at the
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northeast corner of the national cemetery at Knoxville.,
Tenn.: Provided, That the right of way not less than 50
feet in width shall first be secured -to the United States
to any part of the ground over which said road shall run not
now owned by the United States."
· It appears that the "board of mayor and aldermen of the
city of Knoxville," September 3, 1886, passed an ordinance
reciting the aforesaid action of the General Government} and
continuing:
"Therefore be it ordained, * * * that full power and
authority be given to the U. S. Government to go upon said
Holston street, construct and improve the same for the purposes indicated in said act, and when so constructed to have
jurisdiction of, control, and manage said street to the limit
above recited: Provided, however, The rights of the public to
the free use and enjoyment of said street be in nowise
restricted or impaired."
It also appears that Mr. J. A. McOampbell, county road
commissioner for the county where said street is situated,
diu, under a statute of the State which granted "full power
control, and authority with the right to open, close, lay out,
and cla sify all the public road , and to grade, graduate, aud
improve the ame," a sume to grant unto the United States
full power and authority to go upon said street, to grade and
otherwi e improve the same, and when improved to exerci e
dominion over, control of, and supervision of said street in
the same manner and to the s~me extent that he, the aid
commi sioner, might do by law. But it is .not clear that the
"aid "board of mayor and aldermen" was authorized by any
statnt of the State to secure to the United States the right
of way peci:fied in the act of Congress, or that the said county
commis. ioner was empowered by Jaw to grant or convey any
uch right of way. I understand that the road was macadamized by the use of the money appropriated as afore aid,
and that afterward the city of noxville passed an ordinance
pur rt,ing to grant to the ountain Head Railroad Coma,ny, a orporation organized under the laws of the State in
1 7, a right of way ver ai i ol ton street, the same" to
v t d a d ontinued in aid ompany, it ucces 'ors and
fifty y ar ,' with the right to the company to build
rate a team or electric rail way-the ordinan "e to
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have the effect of a written contract executed by the city and
the railway company.
It is further represented that said company also obtained
further privileges in connection with its contemplated railroad, and that April 21, 1890, the company sought, obtained,
·a11d accepted from the Secretary of War a license, revocable by the terms thereof, to lay its tracks along said Holston
street.
It is represented that after said April 21 said company
constructed a railroad, at large expenditure of money, upon
and beyond said streets, and operated ~nd still continues to
operate the same.
On May 19, 1892, said license was formally r~voked by the
:Acting Secretary of War.
Said company now seeks to extend its tracks by ad.ding a
switch 200 feet long on Holston street.
On one hand, protests are made against the use of the
street by the railroad company, and on the other, the company claims that said ordinance of September 3, 1886, and the
grant assumed to be made by · the county commissioners
referred to, give to the United States no authority to interfere with the use and enjoyment by the company of its
·claimed right of way alleged to have been received from the
city of .Knoxville .
. Said company also asks the War Departmeut to expressly
disclaim, on behalf of the United States, the existence of any
power or jurisdiction to interfere with its acts or proceedings in the premises.
It is my opinion that it does not appear tbat an occasion
exists that requires you to make the renunciation asked for.
In relation to such other questions as may · be involved, I
find it necessary to say that it is not within the scope of my
official authority, as prescribed by statute, to determine the
respective rights of the Fountain Head Railroad Company
and the United States.
Such questions are judicial in their nature, and if a determination thereof shall be required they should be submitted
to the decision of the courts.
Very respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The SECRET.A.RY OF W .A.R.
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PUBLIC DOMAIN-REMOVAL OF TIMBER.
A rail way company which has obtained a grant from the United States
of every alternate section of the public land, not mineral, designated by
ocld numbers, to the amount of 20 alternate sections per mile on each
side of its railroad, possesses no authority to select and locate its sections and to despoil the sections it has selected. Any suneys made
by the company are without legal effect and do not authorize the
company to cut or remove timber.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 6, 1893.
SIR: Your letter of the 20th ultimo, relative to tbe removal
of timber from unsurveyed public lands within the primary
limits of the grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company in Montana, has, with the accompanying document ,
been carefully considered.
It may be adri1itted at the outset that the United States
granted to the company every alternate section of the public
land, not mineral, designated by odd numbers, to tbe amount
of 20 alternate seetions per mile on each side of the railroad
line through Montana; that the words of the act constituted
a grant in prresenti; that the road was constructed and is
now being operated; and that the lands bearing the timber
in u tion are located along the line thereof.
It appears also that the Government has caused but a
small portion of the lands lying along said road-those
granted and those not granted-to be surveyed.
mo t of this land remains unsurveyed it is impossible
to point out or specify the sections which will be designated
by oil number and which belong to the company or
di tingui h tho e which are still portions of the public
domain.
It i reported that in many ca e the timber constitutes
th hi f alue of the lands, and it removal will leave them
c mr arativ ly valuele .
y th
ct of March 3, 1891, which amend the law in
r la i n t timber culture, forbidding the cutting of timber
th u Ii land etc. (26 Stat., 1093), it i provided that:
r tary of th Interior may make uitable rule and
r gulati n to carr out tile pl'Ovi ion of this act, and he
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may designate the sections or tracts of land where timber
may be cut, and it shall not be ]awful to cut or remove auy
timber except as may be prescribed by such rules a~d regulations;" but the Secretary is not authorized to issue permits to cut timber upon the lands in question still belonging
to the United Stace~, because no legal surveys have been
made and no sections can be specified and described. (14
L. D., 126.)
It appears to be unquestioned that considerable amounts
of timber have been cut upon and removed from these Government and railroad lands which are undistinguishable from
each other.
It is officially reported to the Department that the managers of the Northern Pacific Company give opportunity and
encouragement to those who remove timber from unsurveyed
lands aforesaid; that it places side tracks and switches so
as to reach their mills and accommodate them, and furnishes
cars and facilities for the removal of the timber to market.
It is reported, also, that the railroad company has cause.a
surveys of its own to be made of the lands lying along the
line of its road, and has thus designated certain lots as oddnumbered sections, and assumes to claim such sections and
the timber thereon under this private survey, and has permitted the cutting and removal of the timber found on such
sections, and has employed agents to ascertain the stumpage
and estimate the amount of lumber removed, and collects
pay for the stumpage at current rates, and afterwards transports, aR freighting .agents, the manufactured lumber.
It is represented that the unauthorized surveying of these
lands· by the company, in which trees are blazed, corner
posts set, and bearing trees marked, will tend to occasion·
confu ion in relation to the Government survey when made,
and to cause injury to intending settlers, who may be misled
by the unauthorized lines so made.
It has been suggested that the decision in United States v.
Northern Pacific R. R. Co. (6 Montana, 351) is controlling,
and that it holds that no power exists in the United States
to pro ecute civil or criminal actions against those unauthorizedly severing and removing timber from lands, portions of
which have been granted but have not become segregated
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or capable of designation, and other undefined portions of
which still remain parts of the public domain.
In that case suit was brought by the United States against
tl1e railroad company for an accounting to recover $1,100,000,
for timber and lumber alleged to have been converted by the
defendant from unsurveyed lands set forth as belonging to
plaintiff and defendant as tenants in common, and for a
perpetual injunction restraining the defendant from further
similar taking and converting.
The complaint had been dismissed upon demurrer.
The opinion (p. 360) states the question involved as
follows:
"The foundation of appellant's action rests upon the
l)ropositiou-:first, that the United States and the Northern
Pacific Railroad Company are tenants in common of the
lands from which the trees and timber in question are
alleged to have been taken, and, second, that an accounting
as between such tenants in common is a proper reinedy."
The court held that the parties were not tenants in common; that each as to the other was the owner of alternate
ection ·; tba.t neither had any interest in the lands of the
other; that each had full title to its respective lands, and
that therefore a suit for an accounting would not lie, and
that the complaint was properly dismissed on demurrer.
It can not be aid that; by thi holding the court decided
that the nited State i without ascertainable rights or
legal remedie · as to it iuterests in this great domain.
It i. true the cour.t says (p. 369) that the Government can
not make it failure to perform its duty in perfocting the
mvey "the foundation of an action against the company
whi ·h a urvey in accordance with the requirements of section 6 would have rendered irnpos ible," but this conclusion
mu t be limited to the ca e before the court and can not
prop rly be held to cover other cases involving other remedi

.

t an not be that the railroad company because of the
trnd fin d location an 1 boundaries of the respective sections
p
e. e a right to cut timber from and denude the whole
.., . <
000 acre of lan . Neither has it authority to select
all(l locate i
e ·tion and then de poil the sections it has
1 ted. The nited tate make it. own ·surveys.
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Upon judicial investigation it may be determined that
the delays in completing the surveys have suspended the
est.abJishm_ent of the full rights of the company, and it may,
equitably, be entitled to some compensation therefor; but it
is not to be permitted to make its own surveys and to
enforce them upon the public, nor is it to be justified in
removing timber not shown to be upon · 1ands both owned
and possessed by it.
It does not appear, in relation to any of the lands where
the timber in question has been removed, or is being taken
off, that the identification of a granted section has become
so far complete as to authorize the grantee to take possession.
In Deseret Salt Co. v. Tarpey (142 U. S., 249) it is sa~d
that words importing a grant in prresenti vest a present title
in the grantee '' though a survey of the lands and a location
of the road are necessary to give precision to it and attach
it to any particular tract." .And see · (id.) p. 250, 139 U.S.,
5; and 143 U.S., 58.
Itis to be noted that by the act of July 31, 1876 (19 Stat.,
121), it is enacted: "that before any land granted to any
railroad company by the United States shall be conveyed to
such company, * * * unless such company is exempted
by law from the payment of such cost, there shall be first
paid into the Treasury of the United States the cost of surveying, selecting, and conveying the same by the said company or persons in interest." (See 124 U. S., 127; 142 U. S.,
253; 43 u. s., 58.)
It must be noted, also, that considerable portions of the
territory affected consist of mountainous country supposed
to contain valuable mineral lands, none of which would go
to the company.
It is my opinion that the private surveys in question, made
by the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, neither entitle
the company to the possession of land nor authorize the company to cut or remove timber.
Such surveys are without the authority of law and without legal effect. ·
The questions of the liability of said company, or of others
claiming to act in subordination to the grant made to the
company, in cutting timber upon unsurrnyed lands lying
5687-VOL 20-35
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within the primary limits of the grant and in removing lumber therefrom, are judicial questions to be determined by the
courts, and I recommend that measures, to be initiated by
you, be promptly taken to fully test and determine the same,
and to protect the Government.
Very respectfully,
W. H. H. MILLER.
The

SECRETARY OF THE lN'.1.'ERIOR.
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OF

HON. RICHARD OLNEY, OF MASSACHUSETTS.
APPOINTED MARCH 6, 1893.

RIGHT 01'' APPEAL-STIPULATION.
While no legal objection would exist if the right of appeal from judgments of the Court of Claims in the direct-tax cases be waived by
both parties by stipulations on the record to the payment of such
claims prior to the expiration of the ninety days within which appeals
may be taken, the Department of .Justice deems it unwise to adopt
any general rule of giving such stipulations.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 17, 1893.
Srn: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of the_13th instant, iuclosing a communication from
Hon. William Efliott, of March 7, 1893, which is herewith
returned.
You are right in the suggestion, that if the right of appeal
from judgments of the Court of Claims in the direct-tax
cases be waived by both parties by Rtipulations on record,
no legal objection would exist to the payment of such claims
prior to the expiration of the ninety days within which
appeals must be taken. An opinion to that effect, in a somewhat analogous case, was given by this Department in 1889,
J\1r. Attorney-General Miller adding: "The question remains
of administration, and is so referred to the Secretary of the
Treasury."
Since that time, however, it has not been the practice of
this Department to make such stipulation~. For the purpose of enabling the Secretary of the Treasury, in his estimates for appropriations, to place before Congress the
amount of judgments by the Court of Claims against the
547
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Government, the only certificate given has been to the effect
that it was not the present intention of the.Attorney-General
to take appeals from such judgments; .And the appropriation bills of recent years have expressly provided that judgments of the Court of Claims therein provided for shall not
be paid until the right of appeal shall have expired.
It is true that the appropriation for the refunding of the
direct tax is made under the act of March 2, 1891 (26 Stat. L.,
822), and not in a general appropriation bill, and that this
statute does not contain the restrictive clause above referred
to. The direct-tax cases are transmitted to the Court of
Claims by the Secretary of the Treasury under section 1063
of the Revised Statutes, and section 707 of the Revised
Statutes specifically provides for an appeal to the Supreme
Court without reference to the amount involved.
In my judgment, however, this Department should pursue
with reference to the direct-tax cases the policy indicated in
the general appropriation bills above referred to. Ninety
days is not an unreasonable length of time .for the Government to take in determining whether or not a judgment of
the Court of Claims should be appealed from, especially
as after rendition of judgment by that court and consicleratio:µ of the ground upon which such judgment is founded,
new a pect of the law are not infrequently presented.
The sugg tion that all matters of law ari ing in the directtax ca 'e have been already adjudicated i not correct.
Variou important questions ham been argued in cases now
pending and have not yet been lecided.
On the e ground it doe not seem to me wise for this
Depar ment to adopt any other general rule in the direct-tax
ca
than the one now in force. Of cour e there may be
exceptional ca
in which, for pecial rea on , the application of the general rule might work peculiar hard hip, and
in which it would be proper that the ruJe hould be waived
u I pli ·ation by the claimant and re ommendation by the
r t ry f th Trea ury. But uch a
mu t be rare
a h hould be on idered n it own fact and decided
p
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BRIDGE-DUTY OF SECRETARY OF WAR.
By the act of :February 28, 1891, chapter 382, it is made the duty of the
Secretary of War not to select or approve of the exact location of the
bridge to be built, but to approve tht3 plans, specifications, and materials used and the manner of construction. If in his o}Jinion the place
designated by the company for the location of the bridge is, under all
the circumstances, a reasonable compliance with the terms of the act,
he has authority to relocate it there if requested to do so.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 18, 1893.
SIR: Your letter of March 16, 1893, requests my opinion
upon the following points connected with the location of a
bridge of the Washington and Arlington Railway Company
across the Potomac River:
'' 1. As to wl;lether it devolves upon the Secretary of War
at all to select or approve the exact location on which the
said bridge shall be built.
"2. If it does, whether he .may relocate it, as requested.
"3. If it does not, whether the company has authority
to build it at the said terminus of M street without the
approval of the Secretary of War as to exact location, but on
plans approved by him."
An act to incorporate the Washington and Arlington Railway Company was enacted February 28, 1891 (26 Stat., 789).
By its terms the company was authorized ''to construct and
lay down a single or double track railway * * * by the
foUowing route, namely: Beginning on Sixth street near B
street northwest; along B street and Virginia avenue no:r;thwest to Twenty-sixth street; along Twenty-shth street to M
street; along M street and Canal road to a point on the Potomac River at or near the point known as ' The Three Sisters,'
where the said company is hereby authorized to construct
and maintain a bridge across the Potomac :River on such
plans as the Secretary of War may approve; and from thence
by, on, and over such lines as may be selected by the said
company, with the approval of the Secretary of War, to the
northwest entrance of the Arlington Cemetery, and thence
through the Arlington estate outside of the cemetery grounds
to the south or west line thereof, in the State of Virginia:
Prov·ided, That said road shall cross the Chesapeake and
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Ohio Canal on a bridge that shall be so constructed as not to
interfere with the use of the bed or towpath of the canal as a
waterway or as a railway, and in a manner satisfactory to
the Secretary of War.
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
~'And provided, That no work shall be done on said road in
the District of Columbia, until the plans a.nd specifications
for the proposed bridge on the Potomac River at or near
'The Three Sisters' shall have been approved by the Secretary of War, and the construction of said bridge actually
commenced.

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

"And said company is hereby authorized to run its said
railway through the United States reservation know!). as Fort
Myer and such other land of the United States in'the State
of Virginia, excepting the .Arlington Cemetery grounds, as
may be necessary to construct tb e rail way between the points
named in this bill; only if the Secretary of War shall deem
the same promotive of the public interest and always subject
to such conditions and regulations as the Secretary of War
may from time to time impo e.
"SEC. 2. That the railway hereby authorized and lying in
the. District of Columbia and on the bridge shall be constructed by said company of good materials, and in a substantial manner, with grooved rails of the best pattern, and
of a uitable gauge, all to be approved by the Commisioners
of the Di trictof Columbia and the Secretary of War jointly."
By the act of July 29, 1892 (27 Stat., 327), it is provided
that-
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Canal road in approaching the place where the bridge
across the Potomac shall be located. In this connection it
may be observed that upon the information derivable from
the papers I infer that no place on the shores of the Potomac oppo·s ite "The Three Sisters" can be reached, either
from M street or the Canal road, without the condemnation or acquisition of intervening property.
As the legislation now stands the company is authorized
to go along M street to its terminus and to build a bridge
across the Potomac at or near "The Three Sisters." This,
in connection with section 11 of the act of incorporation,
gives the company the right to acquire by any ordinary
means the intervening property.
The words "at or near" are not, when used in such a connection, words of definite location. They are relative, and
the requirements of the statute will be satisfied, if, all circumstances considered, the bridge is located as near to the
point named as is practicable. In other words, a wide discretion is conferred upon a road when it is authorized to
lpcate its terminus or a bridge '' at or near" a given point.
· As was said in Fall River Iron Works Oo. v. Old Oolony
and Fall River Railroad Company (5 Allen, 221-227):
"If we look to the language of the statute, it is impossible
to :find in that clause, which empowers the defendants to
establish the point of departure of the road, any fixed or
definite rule or standard of measurement or distance by
which they are to be governed. They are authorized to com. mence at a given point or near it. If they embrace the latter
alternative, a wide range is necessarily left open to them . .
The word "near" as applied to space, can have no positive
or precise meaning. It is a relative term, depending for its
signification on the subject-matter in relation to which it is
used and the circumstances under which it becomes necessary
to apply it to surrounding objects. One of the definitions
which lexicographers give to it is 'not distant from,' a paraphrase which serves to illustrate the vagueness of its meaning. It may be appropriately used to designate distances,
which, of themselves, widely differ. A town may be properly
said to be near to another town or city, if it is within a distance of a few miles; but if a house is spoken of as near to
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another, it signifies that it is within a few feet or rod , if
within the limits of a city or thickly settled village, or
within a fraction of a mile if in the country where the population is more sparse. So an article of furniture is said to
be near to a person or object in the same room, if distant
therefrom only a few inches. These illustrations serve to show
that the word appropriately expresses a different measure
of distance according as it is applied to different objects or.
subjects."
· This rule is illustrated in Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Hall
(91 U. S., 343, 348); Bartlett v. Jenkins (2 Foster, 53); The
State, The West Jersey R. R. Co. v. Receiver of Taxes of Camden (38 N. J. L., 290,302); The Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Oo.
v. Key (3 Cranch C. C., 599, 604); Rio Grande R.R. Co. v.
City of Brownsville (45 Tex., 88, 94, 95);' Hazelhurst v. Freeman (52 Ga., 244).
·
An examination of these and other cases that might be
cited shows that the question whether the requirements of
such a provision with reference to the location of a structure
are complied with depends entirely upon the circumstances
of the case. In this instance the proposed location is near
Georgetown or " the Three Sisters," as compared with its
proximity to the Great Falls or other places on the Potomac
River. Whether such proposed location is as near to the
point designated as it might reasonably be is not a legal
question, but a question of fact, for your determination, and
concerning which I have no right to express an opinion.
An wering your question specifically, yon are advised that
it is not your duty to select or approve the exact location
upon which the bridge shall be built. (14 Opin., 254,
256.) Your duty is concerned with the approval of the
plan and specifications, and the materials and manner of
con traction. It is not to be inferred from this that you
have nothing to do with the location. On the contrary
while the railroad company has a discretion, as we have
seen, it is to be exercised within reasonable limits, and it
would manifestly become your duty to refuse to approve
plans for the construction of a bridge at a place so far
removed from the point indicated in the act of Congress as
to be plainly beyond its scope.
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If in your opinion the place designated by the company
is, under all the circumstances, a reasonable compliance with
tbe terms of the act, you are advised that you have authority
to so relocate the bridge as requested.
Your third question is answered by the above.
I have the honor to be, yours, respectfully,
CHARLES H . .ALDRICH,
Solicitor- General.
The SECRETARY OF W .A.R •

.Approved:
RICH.ARD OLNEY.
SAMOAN ISLANDS-APPROPRIATION.
The construction of a pier required in providing a naval and coaling
station for the United States in the harbor of Pago Pago is within the
intent of Congress as expressed in the paragraph of the sundry civil
appropriation act of August 5, 1892, containing the following provision:
" For providing naval and coaling stations, $250,000, to be expended
under direction of the President;" and such portion of the $250,000 as
may be needed for building the pier may be lawfully used whenever
the President shall so decree.
DEPARTMEN'.I.'_ OF JUSTICE,

March 18, 1893.
Sm: Your communication of the 13th instant relating to
the application of certain moneys approprjated by the three
several acts of Congress specified has received due consideration.
By the first paragraph of Article II, of the treaty of friendship and commerce concluded between the United States and
tbe Government of the Samoan Islands January 17, 1878, and
proclaimed February 13, 1878 (20 Stat., 704), it is agreed
that" Naval vessels of the United States shall have the privilege of entering and using the port of Pago Pago, and establishing therein and on the shores thereof a station for coal,
and other naval supplies for their naval and commercial
marine, and the Samoan Government will hereafter neither
exercise nor authorize any jurisdiction within said port
adverse to such rights of the United States or restrictive
thereof."
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The diplomatic and consular appropriation act of F ebruary
26, 1889, contains the following paragraph (25 Stat., 699) :
"For the execution of the obligations and the protection
of the interests of the United States, existing under the treaty
between the United States and the Government of the Samoan
Islands, $500,000, or so much thereof as may be necessary, to
be expended under the direction of.the President, this appro_priation to be immediately available."
The naval appropriation act passed March 2, 1889, contains the following paragraph (25 Stat., 814):
" For the purpose of permanently establishing a station
for coal and other supplies for the naval and commercial
marine of the United States, on the shores of the bay of the
harbor of Pago Pago in the island of Tutuilla, Samoa, for
the erection of the necessary buildings and structure
thereon, and for such other purposes as may, in the. judgment
of the President, be necessary to confirm the rightR of the
United States under article second of the treaty of eighteen
hundred and seventy-eight, between the United States and
the King of the Samoan Islands, and the deed of transfer
made in accordance therewith, one hundred thousand dollars, to be immediately available."
The sundry civil appropriation act of August 5, 1892, contain the following appropriating provision (27 Stat., 349) :
"For providing naval and coaling stations, two hundred
and fifty thousand dollars, to be expended under direction
of the Pre ident."
Your communication informs me that $42,639.17 of the
100,000 appropriated by the quoted paragraph of the act of
March 2, 1889, has been paid out, leaving $57,360.83 unexpended.
It appears, also, that advertisement has been made by the
Government inviting proposals for the construction of an
iron and steel pier at the United States coaling station in
the harbor of Pago Pago, Samoa, in response to which everal proposals were received, the lowe t of which propo ed
t p rform the work for $78,700, or $21,339.17 less than the
bal n e of that appropriation.
It is t ated that all bid were rejected, and that a new
ad erti ement in the premises is in contemplation.
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My opinion is requested as to whether moneys other than
those constituting the remaining balance of the $100,000
appropriated by the act of March 2, 1889, may be lawfu1ly
applied to the construction of a pier at the United States
coaling station in the harbor of Pago Pago, Samoa.
It may be noted that $36,041.87 of the deficiency existing
in said $100,000 appropriation was for expenses incurred in
purchases, shipment, and discharge of coal for the naval
station at Pago Pago, the application thereof being approved
by a paragraph of the urgent deficiency act of April 4, 1890.
(26 Stat., 39.)
But no indication appears of any change of intent on the
part of Congress as to establishing the naval and coaling
station referred to, or as to the erection of the buildings and
structures authorized by the act of March 2, 1889.
It is understood that the United States has from time to
time acquired and now holds valuable interests and rights on
the shores of the bay in the harbor of Pago Pago.
It is evident that the clause of Article II, above quoted,
constitutes an important element of the treaty of agreement
entered into by the high contracting parties.
The appropriation of February 26, 1889, is a significant
recognition by Congress of the obligations of the Government arising out of the t.reaty, and of the interests of the
United States coming into existence thereunder.
The paragraph of the act of March 2, 1889, under consideration, declares the purpose of permanently establishing a
coaling and supply station for the naval and commercial
marine of this country on the shores of the bay of the harbor
of Pago Pago, and no subsequent legislative expression is
found which modifies this declaration.
The provision of the act of August 5, 1892, appropriates
250,000 "for providing naval and coaling stations," the
same "to be expended under the direction of the President."
In making this appropriation it must be inferred, necessarily, that Congress did not lose sight of the enactments
of March 2, 1889, and April 4, 1890, or of the treaty of 1878,
or of the rights and interests of the United States obtained
thereunder.
The employment of the moneys specified is only limited to
the uL\es of providing naval and coaliug stations, and the
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direction of the President is the only condition prescribed
to authorize the application.
It has been held that grants of authority of the nature of
that contained in this item of appropriation, made to the
President, are to be liber:1lly construed.
The character and scope of the paragraph show the intent
of placing the moneys in the hands of the Executive subject
only to the most general directions, so that be may, upon
occasion, and subject to the limitations of the clause, make
use of the specified portion of the public funds for the nation's
benefit as he shall deem :fit.
In this connection permit me to invite your attention to
an opinion submitted to the Secretary of the Navy, under
date of October 8, 1890, and to one submitted to the Secretary of. State, under date of November 12, 1892, by my predecessor in office.
It is my opinion that the construction of a pier required
in providing a naval and coaling station for the United States
in the harbor of Pago Pago is within the intent of Uongress,
a expressed in the paragraph of the act of .August 5, 1892,
under con ideration.
It follows, that such portion of the $250,000 appropriated
by that paragraph as may be required to secure the building of the pier may be used lawfully in providing the same,
whenever the President shall direct such portion to be applied
to the purposes of uch construction.
In view of the conclusion reached, as stated, I d9 not deem
it of con equence to consider whether moneys carried by the
quoted paragraph of the act of February 26, 1889, might lawfully be added to the remainder of the appropriatfon of March
2, 1889, in order to provide a fund to construct the contemplated pier.
Very respectfully,
RICH.ARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE NAVY.
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CIVIL SERVICE COMMU3SlON-PRODUCTION OF RECORDS.
The boards of civil-service examiners, though subordinate to the Commission, may be regarded as officials of the respective Department& in
connection with which they act. 'l'heir application and examination
papers are official records, or papers of the President, or of a h ead of
a Department, and the production of those papers can not be compelled whenever the general.public interest is paramount to the interest of private suitors, and the President or head of a Department
having the legal custody of such records must determine when the
public interest forbids such production.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 31, 1893.
Sm: I have your communication of the 22d instant, made
at the instance and for the use of the Civil Service Commission, requesting an opinion upon this question:
Can a court require, on subpama, the production of any
application or examination papers or other records of the
boards of civil-service examiners 1
I assume that what is desire_d is a statement of rules to
be acted upon in the practical conduct 'o f affairs rather than
a discussion of the principles and precedents upon which
such rules are founded, and, in that view, have the honor to
aubmit the following conclusions:
1. The general power of_appointment to office being in the
President, qualified only by the right of Congress to vest
the appointment of inferior officers in him in the courts of
law, or in. the heads of Departments, th-e Civil Service Commission is to be regarded as an advisory board subordinate to
the President, reporting to him, and clothed with the function of aiding the President or any head of Department in
the exercise of the appointing power.
2. The boards of civil-service examiners are selected by
the Civil ·service Commission, and, though subordinate to
the Commission, may properly be regarded as officials of
the respective Departments in connection with which they
act.
3. The application and examination . papers or other records of the civil-service examiners are therefore the official
records or papers Qf the President or of the head of a
Department.
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4. Being records and papers of the character described,
their production Gan not be compelled by the courts whenever the g·eneral public interest must be deemed pa.ramount
to the interests of private suitors.
5. Whether such general public interest forbids the production of an official record or paper tn the courts and for
the purposes of the administration of justice, is a question
not for the judge presiding at the trial in aid of which the
record or paper is sought, but for the President or head of
Department having the legal custody of such record or
paper.
And such question may be determined either as and when
arising in each particular case and upon its own peculiar
facts and merits, or in advance, by general rules applicable
to all records and papers, or by special rules applicable to
special classes of records or papers.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The PRESIDENT,
DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU-APPOINTMENT-REMOVAL.
'rhe ecretary of State of the United States is authorized to appoint
the director of the Bureau of American Republics without the assent
of the other countries contributing to the support of the Bureau, and
to remove such direetor and appoint another in his place without
such assent.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 4, 1893.

I have your communication of the 30th of March
last, ubmitting for an official opinion, the following question :
"Your opinion is requested as to the authority of the Secretary of State to appoint the director of the Bureau (of
American Republics) himself without requesting the assent
of the other countries contributing to the support of the
Bur au."
S cond. Whether after the e. tablisb ment of the Bureau
a d th appointment of the director as stated, for the benefit
of the ev ral republics represented, the Secretary of State
has authority to remove the director and appoint another in
1R:
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his place without the consent of the other governments represented in the Union."
The report of the International American Conference submitted to Congress by the President June 2, 1890 (Senate
Ex. Doc., 135), shows that the conference intended that the
Bureau should be and remain under the supervision of the
Secretary of' State of the United States. (Par. 2, Title "II,
Bureau of Information.")
It is provided (par. 11) that the maximum expense of the
annual maintenance of the Bureau shall be $36,000, and a
detailed estimate of the organization of the Bureau, "subject to such changes as prove desirable," is presented, which
includes one director, one secretary, translators, and other
assistants.
The United States is to advance annually the $36,000, or
so much thereof as may be required, and the other governments belonging to the conference are to contribute their
respective portions annually, which are to be transmitted to
the Secretary of State, who is .r equested to organize and
establish the Bureau.
By the diplomatic and consular appropriation act passed
July 14, 1890 (26 Stat., 275 J, an appropriation of $49,750 is
made to enable the President to carry the recommendations
of the conference into effect so far as he shall deem it
expedient, and it is directed that the same "shall be
expended under the direction an!! subject to the approval of
the Secretary of State."
Said act also contains the following paragraph:
"For the organization and establishment, under the direction of the Secretary of State, of 'The International Union
of American Republics for the prompt collection and distribution of commercial information,' thirty-six thousand dol- .
lars, and the sums contributed by other American Republics
for this purpose, when collected, shall be covered into the
Treasury."
The corresponding acts passed July 16, 1892, and March 1,
1893, also make appropriations for the support of the Bureau
and provide for the covering of the contributions of other
nations into the Treasury.
The Bureau having been thus established with a director
and other officers and employes, as recommended, the first
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bulletin is ued by the Bureau, dated January, 1891, refer to
such recommendatious and adds (p. 6):
"In accordance with this recommendation the Congress of
the United States, at its last ses ion, authorized the establi hment of the Bureau of American Republics, and made
an appropriation to sustain it during the current year."
On the foregoing facts I answer the specific questions submitted as follows:
(1) In my judgment the Secretary of State of the United
States was undoubtedly authorized to appoint the director
-0f the Bureau referred to without calling for the as e11t of
tlle other countries associating as "The International Union
of American Republics for the collection and distribution of
-0ommercial information."
The recommendations of the International American Conference are for the establishment of a Bureau "under the
upervision of the Secretary of State," who is requested by
it" to organize and establi h" such Bureau.
The language of the act of Congress of 1800 appropriating money for the organization and establishment of uch
Bureau i equ::iUy explicit and declares, in so many word ,
that it i to be done "under the direction of the Secretary
-0f tate."
Th rea on of the thing is in accord with the language
employed. By tl.e scheme for the establishment of the
Bur au, an a ociate neither surrenders any rights or powr nor acquir s any. One of them is simply selected to perform an onerous duty iu the interest of all, and, if it would
a c pt the burden, might, for obvious reason~, be ju tly
~xpected to have complete and unlimited authority as to the
•')rganization and e tabli hment of the Bureau and all detail
c nnected th •rewith.
The ugge tion that, as all the associates contribute to
the xpeu e of the BurP-au, all might be expected to have a
voice in it organization and e tablishment, is without force
wh nit i con id .r d that the United State advance in the
fir tin tance all the money required for the expenses of the
Bureau, contributing a· much as all the rest put together
and an rely for it partial reimbur ement only upon their
v luntary pay ent.
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(2) In my j ndgment the power of the Secretary of State
of the United States to remove the director is as clear and
unqualified as is his power of original appointment.
That the Bureau was meant to be a continuing institution,
that is to be maintained as well as to be organized and established is unquestionable.
It inevitably results that the Secretary of State has the
power to remove the director whenever in his judgment the
interests of the Bureau require, just as he would have the
like power if the office became vacant by the resignation of
the incumbent or by his death or other disability.
In the cases named and every like case, such power in the
Secretary of State is necessarily implied: First; because
unless such power exists somewhere, the Bureau can not possibly be maintained; and, second, because no construction
can be put upon the report and recommendations of the
International American Conference or upon the acts of Congress, which locates the power elsewhere than in the Secretary of State.
If it is not granted to him, it is not granted at all, and the
object of the conference in its recommendations, and of Congress in endeavoring to giv~ them effect is inevitably
defeated.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF STA.TE.

DISBURSING OFFICER-FALSE VOUCHER.
Where an Indian agent's account contains a receipt roll which is not
an original paper at all but merely an abstract of several subvouchers which accompany it, and where the voucher on which one false
item rests is confined to that item and has no relation to any other
matter in the account to which it belongs, the penalty of section 8 of
the act of July 4, 1884, chapter 180, reaches no further than to take
away the agent1s right to credit for any part of that item.
A.nd where a fal e item occurs in a printed form entitled "pay roll of
regular employes," and is signed by 12 persons, each stating opposite
to his name the kind of work done by him, the receipts so taken are
so many separate and distinct vouchers within the meaning of the
proviso of the above section.
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DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUS'l'ICE ,

April 4, 1893.
Sm: It appears by the letter of the Second Comptroller
of the Treasury of March 17, 1893, addressed to you, that
certain questions of law have arisen in the Comptroller's
office with reference to the accounts of J. Lee Hall, Indian
agent at the Kiowa, Comanche, and Wichita Agency, for the
second quarter of the fiscal year 1886, and for the fourth
quarter of the same year. That letter has been referred to
me by you for an opinion upon the questions therein stated.
Two questions are presented, and they both arise under
section 8 of the act of July 4, 1884, chap. 180 (23 Stat., 97),
which is as follows:
"That any disbursing or other officer of the United States,
or other person, who shall knowingly present, or cause to be
presented, any voucher, account, or claim, to any officer of
the United States, for approval or payment, or for the purpose of securing a credit in any account with the United
tates, relating to any matter pertaining to the Indian servi e, which shall contain any material misrepresentation of
fact in regard to the amount due or paid, the name or character of the article furnished or received, or of the service
rendered, or to the date of purchase, delivery, or performance of service, or in any other particular, shall not be
entitled to payment or credit for any part of said voucher,
account, or claim; and if any such er.e dit shall be given or
received, or payment made, the United States may recharge
the same to the officer or person receiving the credit or payment, and recover the amount from either or from both, in
the same manner as other debts due the United States are
collected: Provided, That where an account contains more
than one voucher the foregoing shall apply only to such
ouch r as contain the misrepresentation: And provided
further, That the officers and persons by and between whom
th bu ine s i tran a ted shall, in all civil actions in settle m nt of account , be presumed to know the facts in relation
to the matter s t forth ·in the voucher, account, or claim:
Ancl pro ided further, That the foregoing shall be in additiou
t the I enalti now pre cribed by law, and in no way affect
pro ee lin · und r exi ting law for like offenses. That
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where practicable this section shall be printed on the blank
forms of vouchers provided for general use."
The facts, together with the questions growing out of them,
as stated by the Comptroller in his letter already referred
to, are as follows:
".A 'receipt roll' constitutes one of the vouchers in the
account of Mr. Hall for the second quarter of the fiscal year
1886. It contains a caption: 'We, the subscribers do hereby
acknowledge to have received of J. Lee Hall, Indian agent,
* * * the surµs set opposite our names respectively, being
in full of our pay for the objects herein expressed,' etc. vV.
C. Morrill is among the sixteen persons who signed this roll.
He thereby acknowledges to have received $319 for doing
certain work therein mentioned. The item, as is the case
with every other item on this roll, is supported by a voucher.
The voucher in support of this item is as follows:
THE UNITED STATES TO W. C. MORRILL, DR.
1886.
Apr. 10. For breaking 56 acres of land, at $2.75 per acre ...•...... $154May 26. For breaking 60 acres of land, at $2.75 per acre.......... 165

319

"Received at K. C. and W. Agency August 26, 1886, of J.
Lee Hall, Indian agent, three hundred and nineteen dollars
in full of the above acc·o unt.
"W. U. MORRILL.
'' I certify on honor that the above account is correct and
just, and that I have actually, this 26th day of August, 1886,
paid the amount thereof.
"J. LEE HALL,
"Indian Agent."
"As it is known to this office that this voucher co·ntains a
'material misrepresentation of fact in regard to the amount
* * * paid,' the question arises whether under section 8
of the act of July 4, 1884 (23 Stat., 97, 98), credit shall be
refused in the settlement of Mr. Hall's account for the second
quarter, 1886, for this entire 'receipt roll,' or only for the
item contained in it supported by Mr. Morrill's receipt, above
quoted.
"In the account of this same agent for the fourth quarter,
18 6, there is a 'pay roll of irregular employes' containing
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a caption similar to the one on the' receipt roll,' above mentioned. Thomas Woodard is one of the twelve who sign thi
pay roll. By his signature it is indicated that J. Lee Hall
U. S. Indian agent, paid him $16 for eight days' work in
December, 1886, on grist mill. As at present advised this
office believes that this statement is untrue-that it contains a
'material misrepresentation of fact in regard to the * * *
service rendered,' and the question arises whether under the
section of the act of Congress above mentioned credit shall
be refused Mr. Hall for the amount of the whole pay roll,
wbich is $225.75, or for the amount only of the payment to
Woodard, $16, there being in this case no receipts or subvouchers from any of the persons who sign this roll.
"In both cases the roll itself is styled in the account of
the agent as the voucher, but in the case ~f the 'receipt roll'
in the second quarter's account there are receipts or subvouchers, and in the case of the ' pay roll ' in the fourth quarter's account, none."
Through the kindness of the Comptroller, I have before
me the 'receipt roll' that forms part of the agent's account for
the second quarter, and from which the Comptroller makes
au extract in his letter. It seems to be all in the same handwriting, aud I am satisfied is not an original paper at all, but
merely an ab tract of the several subvouchers which accompany it, and so is not a voucher, in any proper sense of the
t rm. In thi view, I am at liberty to say, the Comptroller
entirely concurs.
Thi make it easy to determine the effect of the f.raud
suppo ed to exi tin the item of $319, for which Agent Hall
claim credit in the account for the second quarter.
Section of the act of 1884, after declaring that" any disbur ing or other officer of the United States or other person
who hall pre ent any voucher account or claim * * •
r lating to any matter pertaining to the Indian service:
which h all contain any material misrepresentation of fact
* * * hall not be entitled to payment or credit for any
part of aid voucher, account, or claim, * * * then
provide a we have een, "that where an account contain
more than one vou her the foregoing shall apply only to
u · oucher a coutain the mi repre entation."
The oucher, inaptly termed a '• ubvoucher,' on wbich the
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item of $319 rests, being confined to that item, and having
no relation to any other matter or thing in the account to
which it belongs, I am of opinion that the penalty of the
statute reaches no further than to take away the agent's right
to credit for any part of that item.
The other question presented relates to the small item of
$16, for which the agent claims a credit in his said account
for the fourth quarter as money paid to Thomas Woodard,
for eight days' work on a grist mill, in December, 1886.
The pay roll, in which this item occurs, is a printed form,
and entitled "Pay roll of irregular employes," and begins in
this way: "We, the undersigned, irregular employes, hereby
acknowledge to have received from J. Lee Hall, U.S. Indian
agent, the amount set opposite to our respective names, being
in full payment for services rendered at the K. C. and W.
Agency, during the month of July, August, and September,
1886, signed in triplicate."
The roll is signed by 12 persons, and opposite the name
of each one is a statement of the kind of work done by him,
the number of days he was employed, and at what rate per
day, and the amount paid him. This roll, like the "receipt
roll," is referred to as a voucher by the agent in his account,
and is so styled at the foot of the roll and in the printed
titling on the back of it.
The aggregate of all the payments receipted for in this roll
is $221.75, and the roll is referred to in the agent's account
as a single voucher supporting a credit for that amount.
The item of $16, alleged to have been paid Thomas Woodward, turns on t to be false, and the question arises whether
its presence on the pay roll destroys the effect of the whole
roll as a voucher for the credit of $221.75, under section.8 of
the act of 1884, or whether the law operates only on the
particular item tainted with fraud.
It seems clear that the agent might have taken receipts
on separate pieces of paper from the employes who signed
the pay roll, and that, under section 8 of the act of 1884,
fraud in any of the receipts so taken would not have destroyed
the effect of the others as vouchers. I am unable to see,
then, how it can make a material .difference that the agent
bas, for convenience, taken all the receipts on one piece
of paper, and in a way to keep them as distinct from one
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another, in every material particular, as though they had
been written on separate piec:es of paper. It seems to me,
therefore to be a reasonable interpretation of the proviso
placing a restriction on the penal effect of section 8 of the ·
act of 1884, to hold that the receipts thus taken are so many
separate and distinct vouchers within the meaning of the
proviso, and consequently, that under the statute the fraud
said to exist in the receipt for $16 only operates to deprive
the agent of the right to acredit for any part of that sum,
leaving the other receipts unaffected as vouchers.
This, I believe, disposes of the whole subject submitted.
Very respectfully, yours,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TRE.A.SURY.

WORLD'S FAIR-APPROPRIATION.

The various acts and sections of acts appropriating money for the
World's Columbian Exposition, viz, section 6 of the act of April 25,
1890, chapter 156, the act of August 5, 1892, chapter 381, and the paragraph ju the sundry civil bill of March 3, 1893, chapter 208, construed
and interpreted.

JUSTICE,
April 10, 1893.
SIR: By your letter of April 6, 1893, you ask my opinion
a to the interpretation of the following section of the act
making appropriation for the sundry civil expenses of the
Govern men tfor the fiscal year ending June 30, 1894, approved
March 3, 1893 :
''To enable said commission and the Board of Lady Manager to give effect to and execute the provisions of ection ix
f th act of Congre approved April twenty-fifth, eighteen
hundred and ninety, authorizing the World's Columbian
~ xposition, and appropriating money therefor, relating to
committee , judge , and examiners for tile exposition, and
th granting of awards, five hundred and seventy thousan<.l
eight bundrecl and eighty dollars, or so much thereof a in
the judgment of the lady managers may be nece sary of
whi h um twenty-five thou and dollars ·hall be immediately
a ailable: Pro ided, That of this um one hundred thousand
d 11ar hall bed voted to the payment of judges, examiner
DEP.A.RTMENT OF
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and members of committees to be appointed by the Board of
Lady Managers, as authorized by said section. .And provided further, That said sum of five hundred and seventy
thousand eight hundred and eighty dollars shall be charged
against the World's Columbian Exposition, and that of the
moneys appropriated for the benefit of the World's Columbian Exposition, amounting to two million five hundred
thousand dollars, under the act of August fifth, ejghteen
hundred and ninety-two, fiv·e hundred and seventy thousand eight hundred and eighty dollars shall be retained by
the Secretary of the Treasury until said World's Columbian
Exposition shall have furnished to the satisfaction of the
Secretary of the Treasury full and adequate security for the
return and repayment by said World's Columbian Exposition to the Treasury of the sum of five hundred and seventy
thousand eight hundred and eighty dollars, on or . before
October first, eighteen hundred and ninety-three; and until
such security shall have been furnished by said World's
Columbian Exposition, this appropriation, or any portion
ther.eof, shall not be available."
You also quote section 6 of the act of Congress, approved
April 25, 1890, referred to in the section cjted above, which
reads as follows:
"That the said commission shall allot space for exhibitors,
prepare a classification of exhibits, determine the plan and
scope of the exposition, and shall appoint all judges and
examiners for the exposition, award all premiums, if any, and
genera1ly have charge of all intercourse with the exhibitors
and representatives of foreign nations. And said commission is authorized and required to appoint a board of lady
managers of such number and to perform such duties as may
be prescribed by said commission. Said board may appoint
one or more members of all committees authorized to award
prizes for exhibits, which may be produced in whole or in part
by female labor."
·
Also the act of August 5, 1892, which provides:
''That for the purpose of aiding in defraying the cost of
completing in a suitable manner the wol'k of preparation for
inaugurating the World's Columbian Exposition, authorized
by the act of ConO'ress approved April twenty-fifth, anno
Domini eighteen hundred and ninety, to be held at the city
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of Chicago, in the State of Illinois, there shall be coined at
the mints of the United States silver half dollars of the legal
weight and fineness, not to exceed five million pieces, to be
known as the Columbian half dollar struck in cornrnemoration of the vVorld's Columbian Exposition, the devices and
designs upon which shall be prescribed by the Director of
the Mint, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury;
and said silver coins shall be manufactured from uncurrent
and subsidiary silver coins now in the Treasury, and all provisions of law relative to the coinage, legal-tender quality,
and redemption of the present subsidiary silver coins shall
be applicable to the coins issued under this act, and when so
recoined there fa hereby appropriated from the Treasury the
said five millions of souvenir half dollars, and the Secretary
of the Treasury is authorized to pay the same to the World's
Columbian Exposition, upon estimates and vouchers certified by" the president of the World's· Columbian Exposition,
or in his absence or inability to act, by the vice-president,
and by the director-general of the World's Columbian
Commission, or in his absence or inability to act, by. the
president thereof, and the Secretary of the Treasury, for
labor done, materials furnished, and services performed in
prosecuting said work of preparing said exposition for opening as provided by" said act app.r oved April twenty-fifth,
eighteen hundred and ninety; and all such estimates and
vouchers shall be made in duplicate, one to be filed with the
Secretary of the Treasury, the other to be retained by the .
World's Columbian Exposition: ]?rovided, however, That
before the Secretary of the Treasury shall pay to the World's
Columbian Exposition any part of the said five million silver coins, satisfactory evidence shall be furnished him. showing that the sum of at least ten million dollars has been collected and disbursed as required by said act: And provided,
That the said World's Columbian Exposition shall furnish a
satisfactory guaranty to the Secretary of the Treasury that
any further sum actually necessary to complete the work of
aid Expo ition to the opening thereof has been or will be
provided by said World's Columbian Exposition, but nothing herein shall be so construed as to delay or postpone the
preparation of the souvenir coins hereinbefore provided for.
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And there is hereby appropriated, out of any moneys in the
Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum of fifty thousand dollars, or so much thereof as may be necessary to
reimburse the Treasury for loss on the recoinage herein
authorized.
'' SEC. 2. That the appropriation provided in section one
of this act shall be upon condition that the said World's
Columbian Exposition maintain and pay all the expenses,
costs, and charges of the great departments organized for
the purpose of conducting the work of the Exposition, said
expenses, costs, and charges to be paid out of the funds of
the said World's Columbian Exposition."
And state that you desire to be advised upon the following
points:
"First. .After authorizing by act approved .August 5, 1892,
cited above~ the coinage of 5,000,000 pieces, to be known as
the Columbian half-dollar, and the delivery of the same to
the W orJd's Columbian Exposition upon certain conditions
named in the act, which have been in the main complied
with to the satisfaction of the Secretary of the Treasury,
and who by reason of the observance of said conditions has
delivered to the said World's Columbian Exposition 3,858,240
pieces of said coins, has Congress the power to impose new
conditions upon the World's Columbian Exposition unless
the said World's Columbian Exposi1ion furnish adequate
security that it will return and pay the sum of $570,880
appropriated by the section of the act under consideration.
"Second. In the event that the World's Columbian Exposition decide not to furnish security for the return and repayme~t of the $570,880, referred to in section 1, quoted above,
can the Secretary of the Treasury pay out said $570,880, or
any part thereof~ for the purposes named in said section,
"Third. If you are of the opinion that on the failure or
refusal of the World's Columbian Exposition. to furnish adequate security for the return and repayment of said $570,880,
and that it is the duty of the Secretary of the ~rreasury to
withhold ,payment of the whole of said appropriation, shall
the Secretary of the Treasury tLlso withhold the payment or
delivery of the souvenir coins known as the Columbian halfdollar to the amount and value of $570,880'"
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Your first question must be answered in the affirmative.
The World's Columbian Exposition is to be regarded as a
national undertaking, the Illinois corporation of that name
being simply an agency of the United States for the purpose
of carrying out. that undertaking, and subject to certain
restriction and conditions as to the expenditure of the money
which thosecomposingit, as a State corporation, have undertaken to provide in part, with a view of haviug the Expo ition located at a certain place. Any amounts of money appropriated 'by Congress must be held to have been appropriated
in furtherance of this purpose and in the nature of a bounty
upon which Congress may at any time impose new conditions.
Your second and third inquiries may be answered together.
The entire third paragraph of the act of March 3, 1893, indicat s haste or carelessness in its preparation or enrollment.
Nevertheless, taken in connection with the other sections to
which my attention is called, it is my opinion that the intention of Congress is reasonably plain.
.
The pmpose to have a Bureau of Awards, who should dispen e the medals and diplomas, prepared. under the direction
of the ecretary of the '.I1rea ury, had been declared by the
earlier act referred to. Provision is al o made with reference to these medals and diplomas by the act of March 3,
1 93.
It i evident that by the first section quoted Congres did
not int nd to make a I ermanent appropriation beyond the
$2,500,000 of ilver coin, provided for by the act of Oongre
of Augu t 5, 1892. Therefore, as security that the amount
h re appropriated, to wit, 570,880, shall be repairl, it euact
that ither, fir t, that amount hall be retained from the
.,,,500,000 referred to in th act, and of which a um in exce
of the amount appropriat d for judge i under tood to be
subje t to the control of the ecretary of the Treasury, or,
cond, ~ ecurity may be giv ,n by the World's Columbian
Expo i ion for the r turn and repaym nt of the sum of
570 80 on or b fore cto er 1, 1893.
Iu th latt rev nt both th -'-',500,000 appropria,tecl by the
earlier a t and the -10, 0 are to be ubject to payment a
in tb a t · provid d.
ut in the vent that the World
ian Expo i ion neglects or refu
to furni h the
nt mplated by th act, you are advised that the
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appropriation of the amount named in the act under consideration is, nevertheless, in my opinion, provided for. It will
then be your duty to retain a like amount from the appropriations under the act of August 5, 1892.
It is not to be supposed that Congress -intended that a
default in furnishing such security shall both make the
amorint named in the act a lien against the fund named and
also make the amount of the appropriation unavailable.
Such a construction would amount simply to a demand for a
bond and a withdrawal of aid already given in default of
compliance with such demand. Instead of aiding what must
be ~eemed a national enterprise, it would amount to a withdrawal of aid therefrom. This does violence to the known
intention of Congress.
Again, $25,000 of the amount appropriated, it is provided,
'' shall be immediately available," which negatives the idea
that no part is available unless security by the vVorld's
Columbian Exposition shall have been furnished.
In this connection I would state that I am informed that
the words "or so much thereof as in the judgment of the
lady managers may be necessary, of which sum $25,000
shall be immediately available," are properly a part of the
first proviso, which should read:
'' Provided, That of this sum one hundred thousand dollars
shall be devoted to the payment of judges, examiners, and
members of committees to be appointed by the Board of
Lady Managers, as authorized by said section, or so much
thereof as in the judgment of the lady managers may be
necessary, of which sum twenty-five thousand dollars shall
be immediately available. "
The language, "until such security shall have been furnished by said World's Columbian Exposition, this appropriation, or any portion thereof, shall not be available,"
must, in my opinion, be limited to the amount of prior appropriation of August 5, 1892, retained as security for the payment of the awards.
It is not my opinion that yon should withhold payment of
the whole of the unexpended 11ortion ol the appropriation
of August 5, 1892, but only an amount equal to the amount
appropriated by the act of March 3, 1893.
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It i also my opinion tb at you can pay out the um of
570,880, or any part thereof, for the purposes named in aid
section.
You also direct my attention to a letter from Edwin
Walker, chairman of the Committee on Legislation, World .
Columbian Exposition, and ask:
"1. If the World's Columbian Exposition would fu.rni h
the security and receive the amount of the appropriation
withheld by the Secretary of the Treasury by direction of
the last act of Congress, could the World's Columbian
Exposition assume the payment of the entire cost of the
Bureau of A wards, and thereby relieve itself of the indemnity which it is required to :file~
"2. If the World's Columbian Exposition. decline to file
the security required by the act of Congress which you are
asked to construe, can the Secretary of the Treasury pay
the cost and expenses of the Bureau of A wards out of the
$2,500,000 appropriation reserved by the Department under
the last act of Congress "
The :first inquiry must be answered in the negative. It
was not intended by this act to allow the World' Oolum bian
Exposition to make any profit through the amount appropriated for the Bureau of A wards. The only conditions
upon which the World's Columbian Exposition can obtain
control of the expenditure of the money are to be found in
th act.
The an wers to the e inquiries may be summarized in this
way: I r gard the a t of March 3, 1893, as an appropriation
of a p ci:fic amountofmoney, devoted to certain purposes, and
to be delivered to the World's Columbian Exposition, under
the ondition stated in the act, as I have construed the act
in this opinion. Th expen es of the Bureau of Awards
are to be paid out of this appropriation ami not out of the
2,5 0 000 provided by the act of August.5, 1892, of which
la -nam tl sum an .amount equal to this appropriation is, in
my or inion, in ·the defa.ult of ecurity by the World's Columbia Exposition to be retained in the Treasury, and, by
ub
u nt legi lation or proper proceedings, to be covered
ba k into the Trea ury fi r the benefit of the Government, and
to ec pen e the Government to the extent of the actual
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expenses on account of the Bureau of Awards. It is held
simply as a reserve fund for that purpose, and any unexpended balance, in the present state of legislation, would
doubtless apply to the World's Columbian Exposition.
I havP- the honor to be, respectfully, yours,
CHARLES H. ALDRICH,
Solicitor- General.
The

SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

Approved:

RICHARD OLNEY.

HEAD OF DEPARTMENT-APPROPRIATION-DETAIL FOR
DUTY-PROMOTIONS-SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE.
The heall of a Department incurs no personal liability by executing an
instrument which should not have been executed if he acts in reliance
upon :properly chosen subordinates whose ability and good faith he
has no reason to question.
The expense of printing and binding such Animal Industry Reports as
the Secretary of Agriculture is authorized to publish, may, under his
direction, be paid out of the $850,000 appropriation approved July 5,
1892, for the use of the Bureau of Animal Industry in his Department;
it was not intended that such expense should be paid out of the
$75,000 appropriated and placed in the hands of the Public Printer for
use in the Department of Agriculture.
The Secretary of Agriculture may detail a person now in the classified
service of his Department to duty elsewhere within the classified service of his Department provided his compensation be not increased.
In the Department of Agriculture it is permissible to promote from
class 1 to class 3 and from class 2 to class 4, without regard to intermecliate steps.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 12, 1893.
SIR: I have your communication of the 27th of March,
submitting for my official opinion four several questions.
1. The first is as foilows:
"Is the Secretary of Agriculture justified, at any time, in
approving, by bis signature, vouchers or other instruments
in writing, involving the expenditure of public moneys,
merely because such voucher or other instrument has first
been approved, in writing, by the chief of division
accounts, who has given bond to the United States in the sum
of 50,000 for the faithful'performance of his duties 1"

of
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It is assumed that the question thus stated is a que tion
not of ethics but of law, and calls for an opinion as t o the
Jegal re ·pon ibility of the Secretary for signatures to instrument given under the circumstances named. Also that the
chief of the di vi ion of accounts is an officer selected with
due care and charged with the duty of verifying the validity
and correctness of such instruments, and that the Secretary
i'' without knowledge or notice of any facts impugning the
competency or validity of such officer.
Under such circumstances the signatures of the Secret ary
do not, in my judgment, involve him in any personal liability,
even if it should turn out that the instruments signed by
him ought uot to have been executed.
The head of a D epartment like that of Agriculture must
of cour e exerci e due care in every .official act connected
t1 1erewith. But as bis personal investigation of every detail
i in the nature of things impossible, he has a right to act
in r eliance upon properly chosen subordinates whose ability
and good faith h ha no reason to question.
2. Your econd inquiry, including it preliminary tatem nt, i as follows :
''Ther i appropriated for the present :fiscal year (approved
July 5, 1892), $850,000 for the use of the Bureau of Animal
Iudu try, under thi Department. The language of t he act
mak:in °· this appropriation is a follows :
'' n<l. tl1
ecr tary of Agriculture is hereby authorized
any part of thi
um as he may deem nece sary or
xpedient, and in such manner as he may think best, * * *
for printin g an<l. pnbli hing such reports relating to animal
iudu.· try a he may direct. '
" ge1ieral D part ment printing fund of $75,000 is appropriat~d and placed in the hand of the Public Printer for
u e of the Department of Agriculture, 'of ·w hich $10,000 is
re rved for the u ·e of the Weather Biueau.'
' It i · within the province of the Secretary of Agriculture
to dir ct, in hi · di cretion, as against which one of these two
a1 propriation
lwuld be charge<l. the expense of printing
, nd in liug p r taining to the Bureau of Animal Industry
( eport on be Sheep Industry of the United States,' for
xam 1 ". )"
In my ju lgment thee pense of printing and binding such
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animal industry reports as the Secretary of Agriculture is
authorized to publish may, under the direction of ,the Secretary, be paid out of the $850,000 specified; but, in my
opinion, Congress did not intend that the expense of printing and binding should be paid out of the $75,000 above
specified.
3. The third question submitted is as follows:
"Is the Secretary of Agriculture at liberty, under the law,
if he deems it best for the public service, to detail a person
from any position that such person may fill (in the Department of Agriculture), whether such position be statutory or
not, to duty elsewhere in the Department, provided the compensation for such detailed service be the same as that
received by the person detailed while in the position to which
he was appointed,"
As no positions are specified in this inquiry, some uncertainty necessarily exists.
I make answer, however, that in my judgment a person
now in the classified service may be detailed to duty elsewhere witbin the classified service in the Department under
the conditions set forth in the foregoing i1;tquiry; but I do
not decide that a person within the cla,ssified service may be
detailed to perform duties outside of such service, or that one
not within such service may be detailed to serve in a position
in the classified service.
4. The fourth question submitted is:
"Can the Secretary, without violating· tlie civil-service
rules or the law, promote an employe in the classified service
from, say, class 1 to cla~s 3, or froni class 2 to class 4, or must
promotions in said service be made only one step at a time~,,
In response to this question I make answer, that it may
be fairly inferred from the enactments applicable and the
rule of procedure established thereunder that in the Department of Agriculture it is permissible to promote from class 1
to class 3 and from class 2 to class 4, without regarding
intermediate steps. In this connection your attention is
re pectfully called to subdivision 6 of General Rule III and
to Departmental Rule IX, of the revised civil-service rule~.
Very respectfully,
RiqHA.RD OLNEY.
The ECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE,
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MAHINE CORPS-DETAIL FOR DUTY.
·The Secretary of the Navy has authority to detail men to guarcl and
protect property of the Government placed on exhibition at the
·world's Columbian Exposition . The cost of transportation and sustenance of such detail must be paid from the fund provided for the
Marine Corps and its subsistence, and is only limited by the consideration of the question whether there are sufficient funds available
for that purpose, as to which the Secretary of the Navy is the sole
judge.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 19, 1893.

Sr:a: From yours of April 7, 1893, it appears that the
·" Navy Department has sent a large amount of valuable
stores and other property to Chicago for exhibition, as
.authorized by the act of April 25, 1890 (26 Stat., 62)." You
.s tate that in your opinion it is important that at least 50
men be detailed for duty to guard and protect the property
thus placed on exhibition.
You ask my opinion whether you have the power to make
uch detafl: and if this shall be answered in the affirmative,
from what fund the cost of the transportation and subsist-ence of the men thus detailed is to be paid.
ection 1621, Revised Statutes, provides:
"The Marine Corp shall at all times be subject to the
1aw and regulations established for the government of the
Navy, except when detached for service with the Army by
-0rd r of tlle President; and when so detached they shall be
ubject to the I ule and Articles of War prescribed for the
_government of the Army."
our fir t que tion must therefore be answered in the
affirmative.
The co t of such detail must be paid from the fund proided for the Marine Corps and its subsistence, and is only
limited b y the con, ideration of the question whether you
ba e uffici nt funds available for that purpose, of which you
ar the ol judge.
I i, perhap proper to direct your attention to the followin()' laugua ·e found iu the act of Ma,rch 3, 1893, making
-a1 r priati n for the naval er-vice for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1894 to wit: '' nd no law shall be construed to

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

577

Marine Corps-Detail for Duty.

entitle enlisted marines on shore duty to any rations or commutation: therefor other than such as now are or ma:y hereafter be allowed to enlist ( 1) men in the Army."
Very respectful1y, yours,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY

OF

THE N .A.VY.

MARINE CORPS-DETAIL FOR DUTY.
The Navy Department is authorized to pay for the actual subsistence of
the enlisted men of the Navy.employed in taking care of and preserving the stores and other Government property placed on exhibition at
the World's Columbian Exposition under thesupervisjon of the Navy
Department in pursuance of law. The expenses necessarily accruing
out of the transportation and subsistence of the marines detailed for
that purpose may be paid from the fund provided for'the Marine Corps
and its subsistence.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

.April 25, 1893.
SIR: By your comrp.unication bearing date the 8th instant
two questions, placed before you by the honorable Second
Comptroller, are submitted to me for an official opinion
thereon.
· ·
It is stated that the Navy Department has sent valuable
stores and other property of the Government to Chicago for
exhibition, as authorized by the act of April 25, 1890 (26 Stat.,
62), and that it is determined ~hat 50 men from the Navy
Department will be needed to take care of and preserve the
same.
Attention is called to the provision of section 2 of the act
of August 5, 1892 (27 Stat., 389)~ in this connection.
The first question submitted is understood to be: .
Whether the Navy Department will be authorized to pay
the actual subsistence of enlisted men of the Navy employed
as indicated, or any part of such subsistence, from the regular naval appropriations,
Second. It is also stated that the Secretary of the Navy
has detailed a number of marines for the Navy Department
exhibit at the World's Columbian Exposition; and the second question is:
5687-VOL 20-37
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Whether the expen e growing out f th . tran. p rta i n
and subsistence of these men so detailed to p cial rvi ·
may be paid out of the appropriation de i nat d Trau ..
portation and recruiting, Marine Corps," and " rovi ·ion .
Marine Corps¥"
In my judgment section 2 of the act of .Augu t 5. 1 ·nt.
referred to, has no application to the expenditures occurrin
in either of the two c::.t.ses involved in the foregoin g qu .
tions.
1. In response to the first question, I answ r that in my
opinion, the Navy Department is authorized to pay th
actual subsistence of enlisted men of the Navy employed
in taking care of and pre._ erving the tores and other o,·.
ernment property placed on exhibition at the expo itiou.
under the supervision of the Navy Department an l in 1mrsua1 :ce of law.
2. In respon e to the second question ubmitte<l~I make answer that, in my opinio11, the expen es nece arily growinrr
out of the transportation and subsistence of the marine d .
tailed as indicated may be paid from the fund provided forth
Marine Corps and it subsistence.
Permit me to call to your attention an opinion ubmitted
by me to the honorable Secretary of the Navy, under dat f
.April 19, 1893, which applies to a closely related que tion.
and which I respectfully request the reading of in connection
herewith.
Very respectfully,
RICH.ARD OL TEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE '11REAS RY.

AS IG MENT OF CLAIM-DI TRIBUTION.
The bead of a Department is prohibitecl by section 3477, Revised
nte ·, from cooperatmg with a contractor having a, balance due Llm
in he Trea ury in a igning thi bal:.ince to an outsider before the i - ing of a warrant or warrants .for payment of the amount propo ed to
b a signed. The proper ourse is not to pa)' the balance overto om
d signated per on to be cli ·tributed among all the creditors under th
clire ·tion of the ourts, but to keep the cu tody of the balance un ·
the re pective right of various claimants to it have been determined
by the decree of a competent court.
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 3, 1893.
SIR: It appears by your letter of March 24, ultimo, that on
October 2, 1888, P.H. McLaughlin & Co., of this city, entered
into a contract with the United States, through the Secretary
ofthe Navy, to build the new Naval Observatory, and that
they brought the work nearly to completion, when they
became so seriously in default that the Secretary declared the _
cont ract forfeited, by virtue of one of its provisions, aud made
a new contract with SamuelM. Plumley, of this city, to finish
t h e work.
A ft~r debiting the account of McLaughlin & Co., with what
was chargeable to them, including the amount paid Plumley
under his contract, there stands to the credit of the firm in
th e Treasury about $13,488.33.
In the hope, no doubt, of intercepting in the hands of the
United States whatever might be found due and unpaid to
McLaughlin & Co. on the final accounting, certain individu als h ave :filed in the Navy Department, from time to time,
claims amounting to about $90.500 for labor and materials
furnished for the work whilst it was being carried on by
McLaughlin & Co.
McLaughlin & Co. have assigned, or' propose to assign,
about $12,300 of the balance to their credit in the Treasury
to one J. B. Hammond, to pay himself what is due for
materials furnished by him and used in the Observatory
building, and to pay others for labor expended on the same
work ; and your cooperation is Tequested in carrying out this
agreement, Hammond proposing to give you satisfactory
security for the due application of the money to be thus placed.
in his bands to pay the labor claims.
Passing by the general inquiry as to what disposition shall
be made of the balance due McLaughlin & Co. as presenting
no definite question of law, I proceed to consider the questions (1) whether the Navy Department can recognize the
proposed assignment and pay Hammond according to its
terms, or (2) whether the whole balance should be turned
over " to some designated person, to be distributed among
all the creditors, under the djrection of the courts."
The arrangement proposed by McLaughlin & Co. being
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the as ignment of a claim again ·t the United tate would
be in violation of section 3477, Revised Statute , if entered
into before the issuing of a warrant or warrant ' for the payment of the arriount proposed to be assigned, it being ou f
the purposes of that section, a say the Supreme CoUI't t
prevent "the introduction of a party who wa a tran(Ter t
the original transaction.'' ( Goodman v. Niblack, 102 U. .,
556, 5(30.)

It follows, therefore, that you can not coo1 erate with
McLaughlin & Co. in carrying out the propo ed arraH"ement without disregarding the law.
The next question is whether you should turn over the
balance due McLaughlin & Co. to some person for di tribution ' 4 amoug all the creditors under the direction of the
courts."
This question was probably ugge ted by the eventh
clause of the contract, which provides that "the partie: f
the :first part (McLaughlin & Co.) * * * hall be re pousible for and pay all liabilities for labor and material
iucurred in the pro ecutiou of the work, it b ing expre.; I;
under tood, covenanted~ and agreeu that the Seer tary ofth
Navy may retain a sufficient sum of money from payment
that may become due under this contract to 1neet all liabil'ties incurred by the parties of the fir t part (McLaughlin ~ .)
on account of work done or materials furnishecl 'Until atis.fie
that ettlement hrts been made therefor."
The power thus given to retain an amount ufficieut to
pay claims of the character mentioneu doe not how Yer
carry with it authority to determine the right of th ~
claiming an interest in the amount withheld. If they ar
unable to agree a to tho e ri ·ht· the court mu t determin
them and not the Department. Thi. i the e tabli l '
practice. (19 Opin., 450, Strong' Ca e.)
To be ure, neitller you nor the fund in the Trea:ury an
be ubjected to the juri ' diction of any court in a nit£ r th
purpo e of ettling the right and prioritie of all P< r i
a rting claim in the premi e , but as you occupy very
mu h the ame relation to the matter in controver ya
ordinary receiver or takeholder, you and the Trea ury mi<Th·
sa fi ly, respect and conform to the deer e of a om pet
eourt in a suit of the character mentioned (19 Opin.: -
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for it can not be doubted that payment, in obedience to such
a decree,. would be payment to McLaughlin & Co. or order,
as provided in the contract.
As the fund can be nowhere so safe as in the Treasury, I
see no reason for changing the custody of it, as suggested,
if, indeed, that could be done "lawfully, about which I express
no opinion.
Very respectfully, yours,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

TELEGRAPH SERVICE-RIGHT OP COMPENSATION.
Where the Government has the power to send telegraph meseages either
by a bond-aided rail way's telegraph system or by an independent company system located over the bond-aided railway company's route,
and delivers them to the independent company's system without
requesting that they be forwarded over the bond-aided railway route,
payment must be made at the rate prescribed by the Postmaster-General.
Sernble, it is not improper to delay payment of the claim until the case
involving the point now soon to be argued in the Supreme Court of
the United States is decided.
DEP ARTMEN'l' OF JUSTICE,

Ma,y 5, 1893.
A communication from the Treasury Department
dated April 29, 1893, r~quests my opinion respecting an
account for $1,482.02 presented by the Western Union Telegraph Company for the transmission of special messages for
the Department of Agriculture over wires on routes of bondaided Pacific Railroad companies. The que~tion is thus
stated:
'' Th~t is, conceding that on the routes of the bond-aided
railroads there were at the time the service was rendered two
lines of telegraph, one owned and operated by the roads, and
the other owned and operated by the claimant, on the routes
of the roads, under somp, arrangement authorized by the
nineteenth section of the act of July 1, 1862; and conceding
further, that the messages were delivered to the claimant in
the city of Washington, to be sent to San Francisco without
direction from the Government over what line to forward
SIR:
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·them; and further, that they were sent over the lines of
the claimant, located on the bond-aided railroad routes;
the question is, whether payment shall be made to the
claimant, at the rates :fixed by the Postmaster-General in the
full amount of the messages over the whole line or distance,
or whether credit shall be given the roads as provided by the
several statutes on the subject, on their indebtedness to the
United States growing out of their construction, at a rate
not exceeding the rate charged private parties, for the portion of the distance the several messages were sent over the
Western Union lines, located on routes of the roads, and
payment of the balance made to the claimant at the rate
fixed by the Postmaster-General."
In my judgment, the principle involved in the question
thus stated must be regarded as already determined by the
circuit court of the United States for the southern district of
New York iu the case of the United Statesv. The Union Pacific
R.R. Co. and others (45 Fed. Rep., 221). When the Government has the power to send its messages by either one of two
t elegraph systems, a bond-aided railway company's system
on the one hand, or an independent company's system, located
over the bond-aided railway company's route on the other,it
must choose between them and indicate its choice by some overt
act. If such independent company, like the Western Union
Company, has accepted the act of Congress of July 24, 1866,
there is not even a presumption that the Government intends
to employ the rail way company's telegraph line because,
though, in the latter case it has the advantage of retaining
the price of the transmitted messages towards its own debt,
in the former it has the advantage of paying for the messages at rates :fixed by itself through the Postmaster-Gener al. As it is conceded that the messages covered by the
account in question were forwarded exclusively over Western
Union lines, and were delivered to the Western Union Company for that purpose without any request that they should
be forwarded over the railway company's lines, either for the
whole or any part of the distance, the Western Union Oompany's right to be paid for the transmission for the whole distance at the rates fixed by the Postmaster-General is directly
affi:med by the rule laid down by the circuit court of the
U mted States in the case above cited.
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That case, however, has been appealed to the Supreme
Court of the United States,where it will probably be argued at
the term beginniug in October next. It is possible, too, that
the final result of another case between the United States
and the Western Union Telegraph Company (see 50 ·Fed.
Rep., 28) may be found of importance in connection with the
question now under discussion. Unless serious considerations of convenience or justice prevent, therefore, it would
seem not to be improper to defer payment of the accouut
under discussion, and of any other accounts involving the
like questions, until the final determination by the U. S.
Supreme Court of one or both of the cases above referred to.
Respectfully, yours,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY

OF

THE TREASURY.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
The Attorney-General is prohibited from. giving an opinion unless an
occasion has actually ariflen requiring the action of the head of a
Department.

DEPARTMENT

JUSTICE,
Ma,y 5, 1893.
Sm: Your letter of March 25 ultimo requests an opinion
upon the question, "whether the Washington Loan and
Trust Company has the right to do a general :fidelity insurance business under its original West Virginia charter, as
affected by the provisions of the act of Congress approved
October 1, 1890 (26 Stat., 625; Supp. Rev. Stat., 2d ed.,
870).
The question thus submitted is referred to by the Comptroller of the Currency in his letter to you of March 24
ultimo, a copy of which accompanied your letter, as "having been mooted," and not as a question that had actually
arisen in connection with a matter requiring the action of
your Department; and I am unable to discover in your letter or its inclosures that any official action depends on the
solution of the question propounded.
If this supposition is correct the restriction contained in
section 35G, Revisrd Statutes, limiting tl.te authority of the
OF
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Attorney-General to give opinions, on request of the head
of Departments, "to que~tions of law arising in the administration" of their re$pective Departments .prevents me from
having the pleasure of furnishing the opinion reque ted.
My predecessors have uniformly declined to give an opinion
on a question not calling for the action of the Department
submitting it. (6 Opin., !34; 14 ibid., 178; 18 ibid., 108.)
Very respectfully, yours,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF 'l'HE TREASURY.

CIVIL-SERVICE RULES.
The President's order of January 5, 1893, amending postal rule No. 1
(under the civil-service act of January 16, 1883, chapter 27), went into
effect 'at once, in so far as it called for classification by the Postmaster
General and for the provision of examinations by the Civil Service
Commission; otherwise, it went into effect at each free-delivery postoffice as soon as the classification was completed and :first examination
provided at that office.
Extensions of the civil-service rules to new offices do not operate as
restrictions upon the right of · appointment until examinations have
been provided for such offices by the Civil Service Commission. It is
not material, however, whether or not such examination produces
candidates eligible for the office. In case of failure_, non-competitive
examinations may at once be clt'manded.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 5, 1893.
SIR: I am in receipt of your communication of April 26,
asking my official opinion upon. the construction of postal
rule No. 1, as amended by the President's order of January
5, 1893.
The rule is promulgated under authority of the civil-service
act of January 16, 1883 (22 Stat., 403). Section 6 of that act,
aft r providing that the Postmaster-General, within sixty
lay after its passage, should separately arrange in classes
th employes at certain described post-offices, further provided that thereafter, "from time to time, on the direction of
he Pre ident, it shall be the duty of the Postmaster-General
to arrange in like classes the clerks arnd persons so employed
in th postal service in connection with any other post-office.'
It al o provides for revising the classification of any post-
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office under like_direction. Under this section the President
gave the direction contained in the amended rule above
mentioned, which reads as follows:
"The classification of t;he postal service made by the Post- ·
master-General under. section .6 of the act of January 16,
1883, is hereby extended to all free-delivery post-offices; and
hereafter, whenever any post-office becomes a free-delivery
office, the sai<l. classification or any then existing classification
made by the ]?ostmaster-General under said section and act
shall apply thereto; and the Civil Service Commission shall
provide examinations to test the fitness of persons to fill
vacancies in all free-delivery post-offices, and these riiles shall
be inforce there-in; but this shall not include any post-office
made an experimental free-delivery office under the authority
contained in the appropriation act of March 3, 1891. Every
revision of the classification of any post-office under section
6 of the act of January 16, 1883, and every inclusion of a
post-office within the classified postal service. shall be reported
to the President."
The "rules" referred to as to "be in force therein" are
those contained in the general code of ''revised civil-service
rules," of which postal rule No. 1 forms a part. The first
clause of this amended rule, read in connection with the
statute, is the equivalent of a direction to the PostmasterGeneral to arrange the clerks in each free-delivery post-office
in classes, according to the rules of classification observed
in the post-offices previously qrought under the civil-service
act.
The question submitted for my opinion is whether the
amended rule took effect and became operative on the date
of its promulgation at all of the free delivery offices, or
whether it was in abeyance at each such office until the
classification of the of.flee had become complete and an eligible register had been established through examinations by
the Civil Service Commission.
There can be no doubt that the amended rule became
operative upon the date of its promulgation, in so far as it
called for classification by the Postmaster-General and for
the provision of examinations by the Civil Service Commis ion; nor that it required the classification to be made
an d the examinations provided as soon as practicable in
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view of the magnitude of tb.e work and the other call upon
the working force of the Post-Office Department and the
Commission.
The practical question, therefore, I understand to be,
whether t·he "revised civil-service rules," as a body, are in
force at all of the free-delivery post-offices pending the
completion of the work aforesaid; a period, as I am informed,
which will amount necessarily to several months in the case
of the last offices to be classified.
Examination of the rules and of the statute show that
appointments thereunder can not have been intended to be
made until the first examinations had been provided. The
civil-service act (section 7) enacts that no person not specially
exempt "shall be employed to enter or be promoted in either
of the said classes now existing, or that may be arranged
hereunder pursuant to said rules, until he has passed an
examination." It also directs (section 2) that the examination shall be open and competitive, with such "necessary
exceptions" as'' shall be set forth in connection with such
rules." General Rule III provides that "no person shall be
appointed or employed to enter the civil-service classified,"
etc., "until he shall have passed an examination" unless
spe ially exempted by the civil-service act or by an exceptance " et forth in connection with the rules regulating
admi sion to the branch of the service he seeks to enter.
There is no such exception in the case of ordinary post-office
clerk or letter-carriers. Nor in the case of these officials is
th.ere any provision for non-competitive examinations except
in the ca ·e of failure to obtain eligibles by competitive
examination "after due notice;" in case of certain promotions
and transfers; and "when the exigencies of the ervice
require such examination * * * for temporary appointment for not exceeding thirty days." (General Rule III;
Po tal Rule II.)
In my judgment, the revised civil-service rules, as amended
January 5, I 93 are, with reference to the time when th y
become perative in free-delivery post-offices, divi ible into
two portion,, each dealing with a distinct ubject-matter.
o far a th y overn the creation of certain machinery they
are effec i . at once; o far a through the working of that
achiner r he qualify the exerci e of the appointment
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power, they are necessarily effective only when the machinery is created and is in working order, that is, when the
Postmaster-General has completed the required classification and the Oivil Service Commission has provided the
required examination.
But the removal power is only a part of the appointment
power-is its mere incident rather (Blakev. United States, 103
U. S., 227)-and as such part and incident and not otherwise,
is the subject of the amended rules. It follows that both
powers remain intact and unaffected until the time above
specified, that is, until the Postmaster-General and the Civil
Service Commission have respectively completed the work
required of them. Any other conclusion is legally impossible in the absence of any expressed provision in the order
of .January 5, 1893, distinguishing between the appointment
and the removal power in respect to the time wheu the order
shall apply to them respectively.
The past practical.construction of the act and of the rules
confirms the view that as to appointments at least no
restriction is imposed by an extension of the rules to any
new office until examinations have been provided. Except
iu its application to free-deli very post-offices, the language
of the clause now under consideration is not new. It has
come down with phraseology almost unchanged from January, 1885, in connection with previous extensions of the act.
(Second Annual Report of the Civil Service Commission,
pp. 63, 69; Fourth Annual Report, p. 149; Eighth A:enual
Report, p. 39.) The language was therefore familiar to the
Civil Service Commission when the new rule was promulgated on January 5, 1893. The slight change in wording
from the prior rule does not affect its construction in the
present connection. The Commission on January 9 issued
a circular stating that "as soon as eligible registers
have been established at any ·office the rules will go into
effect at that office;" and as to appointments, this construct ion has continued.
It is not, however, necessary, in my opinion, that eligible
regist ers should alway~ be established before the rules go
into effect. It may be that the first competitive examinations noticed produced no eligibles. Neither the language
of the rule nor its intent require that this accident should
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postpone the application of the civil-service act, a noncompetitive examinations may at once be demanded.
The question submitted is therefore answered as follow :
In so far as postal rule 1 required the Postmaster-General
to classify the employes at the free-delivery post-offices and
required the Civil Service Commission to provide examinatious, it went into effect on the day of its promulgation, and
required the work to be done ip. accordance with the revi ed
civil-service rules; otherwise the revised civil-service rule
come into force at each free-delivery post-office, in my opinion,
as soon as its classification shall have been completed by the
Po tmaster-General and the first examination shall have
been provided by the Uivil Service Commission, whether or
not such examination shall result in an eligible register.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
The power of the Attorney-General to give an opinion on request of the
head of a Department is confined to questions of law, arising in the
administra~ion of the Department calling for the opinion.

DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTIOE,
May 6, 1893.
SIR: It appears by your letter of April 5, 1893, that between
February 25, 1862, and February 1, 18661 certain building
belonging to A. H. Herr., and situated on Herrs Island, Jeffer on County, W. Va., near Harpers Ferry, were occupied
by the U. S. Army; that a board of survey convened on February 28, 1866, fixed the rent due Mr. Herr for the use and
occupation of this property at $17,288.53; and that thi
finding was approved by the Secretary of War on March 16
1874.
The accounting officers of the Treasury, however, rejected
the claim on April 7, 1874,on the ground thatitcamewithin
the act of Congre s of February 21, 1867 (14 Stat. 397, chap.
57) prohibiting the ettlement of any claim "for the occupation of or injury to real e. tate," etc., by the military autboritie or troop of the United States where such claim origi-
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nated during the late war in a State declared to be in rebellion
by the proclamation of the President of the United States
of July 1, 1~62.
It appears by the papers that the contention of the claimant's· counsel is that the action of the Secretary of War of
March 16, 1874, fixing the amount due the claimant is, by
virtue of section 219, Revised Statutes, a final adjudication
of the matters of law and fact involved and, consequently,
that the accounting officers had no authority to go behind
this action of the Secretary of War.
Upon this state of facts you submit two questions,-w!lich
may be succinctly stated as follows : (1) Whether the claim
in question is within the act of February 21, 1867 (supra),
and (2) whether the authority vested in the Secretary of War
by section 219, Revised Statutes, was sucli as to make his
action in the premises conclusively binding on the Government. ··
It is quite evident that these questions have no relation to
a matter before your Department for action, since the subject out of which they have grown was disposed of finally
by the Secretary of War as long ago as March 16, 1874,from
which it follows, I regret _to say, that I have no authority
under the law to comply with your request, for you will see,
on turning to section 356, Revised Statutes, that the power
of the .Attorney-General to give an opinion, on request of
the head of a Department, is confined to "qestions of law
arising in the administration" of the Department calling for
the opinion. My predecessors have uniformly' declined to
give an opinion on a question not requiring action by the
Department submitting it. (6 Opin., 24:; 14 ibid., 178; 18 ibid.,
1?8.)
Very respectfully, yours,
RICH.ARD OLNEY.
'fhe SECRET.A.RY OF WAR.
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CRIMES IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES.
No Federal court has jurisdiction to try persons ,vhether or not claiming
to be American citizens for crimes committed in foreign countries.
There are no common law offenses against the United States.
DEP .A.RTMEN'.l' OF JUSTICE,

JJ1ay 8, 1803.
Sm : I am in receipt of your communication of 1\Iarch 17,
in relation to the case of James S. Proctor.
I am informed that said Proctor, claiming to be a citizen
of the United States, is charged with murdering a natire
upon land in one of the New Hebrides Islands ; that sai<l
islands are under the domain of no civilized power, except
that Great Britain exercises some jurisdiction over them
through a high comrni sioner, who, however, declines to
exercise Jurisdiction over this ca e ; and that the i lands are
not within the jurisdiction of any con ular officer of thi ·
Government.
My official opinion is asked as to whether any Federal
c urt would have jurisdiction to try Proctor upon this
charge if he should be brought before it under section 730
of the Revi ed Statute , which provides that"The trial of all off n es committed upon the high eas or
elsewhere out of the jurisdiction of any particular State or
di trict hall be in th district where the offender is found,
or int which he i :firt brought."
nt th word "offen e " mean '' offen e again t the
nit d tate ." Tb re are no common law offeu e~ again t
th U nitell Stat and Cong re has not placed wrong done
u foreign oil in thi category.
am l li o· d to au w r the que tion iu the negative.
V ry r pectfully
RICHARD OLNEY.
Th
OF T TE .

.A.TTO

on
ivil

ter-

TO THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE.

591

Attorney-General.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 8, 1893.
SIR: By the act of Congress approved July 5, 1892, chapter 147, entitled "An act making appropriations for the
Department of Agriculture for the fiscal year ending June
thirtieth, eighteen hundred and ninety-three" (Pamphlet
laws, first 'session, Fifty-first Congress, p. 82), an appropriation is made, amongst other things, "for invm,tigations on
the relations of climate to organic life."
By virtue of the authority conferred by this appropriation, as I am informed by your letter of April 13 ultimo, the
then Secretary of Agriculture appointed expert compilers
"for a temporary .period, at $1,000 per annum, to make this
investigation." These compilers were selected from persons
in the Census Bureau or other branches of the public service "who had had experience in the work of compiling,''
and, as I read your letter, were not subjected to the examination prescribed by the civil-service rules, it being supposed tha,t the persons so appointed were exempt from such
examination by the following provision of paragraph 7 of
special departmental rule No. 1 (Rules and Regulations of
the Civil Service Commission), namely :
"Scientific or professional experts to be employed in investigations specia1ly authorized by Congress, but not to include
any persons regularly employed in that Department, nor any
person whose duties are not scientific or professional, and
who are not experts in the particular line of scientific or professional inquiry in which they are to be employed."
The answer to the question propounded by your letter, '' as
to whether the Secretary of Agriculture was justified, under
tlie authority in the rule quoted above, in making these
appointments," seems to involve one or more of the following
inquiries, namely, whether the compilers in question are "scientific or professional experts," or whetb,er their duties are
'' scientific or professional," and whether they are" experts
in the particular line of scientific or professional inquiry" in
which they are employed, in the sense of paragraph 7.
But I am not able to discover a question of law iu any of
these inquiries, which, it seems to me, relate entirely to matters of fact, namely, wheth_e r the compilers in question belong
to any of the descriptions of persons named in paragraph 7.
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Such being the case, I regret that I must decline to answer
your question, as the authority of the Attorney-General to
give opinions is limited by Congress to "questions of law."
(See sec. 356, Rev. Stat., and 19 Opin., 673, and the citations
therein.)
Very respectfully, yours,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY

OF

AGRICULTURE.

'

INFORMERS' COMPENSATION-DEPARTMENTAL PRACTICE.
'The anti-moiety act of June 22, 1874, chapter 391, takes away the right
of Treasury officials to receive moieti es under Revised Statutes, section 4233.
·
When the meaning of a statute is clear it can not be affected by departmental practice.
DEPAR'.l'MEr T OF JUSTICE,

JJ[ay 8, 1893.
SIR: I am 'in receipt of your communication of April 24,
.asking my official opinion upon the act of June 22, 1874, chapter 391, entitled "An act to amend thB customs-revenuelaws
.and to repeal moieties."
The econd ection of that act repeals '' all provisions of
law under which moieties of any fines, penalties, or forfeiture
und r the u tom -r venu e laws, or any share therein, or
commi ion · thereon, are paid to informer or officers of cu. toms or other officer of the United Stat s." The fourth ec-
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of fines received for detection of violations of certain of the
navigation laws (sec. 4233, Rev. Stat.). I am asked whether an
officer of the U. S. Revenue-Marine Service is not debarred
from receiving a moiety or informe1~'s share of a fine paid for
violation of said section 4233.
In my opinion the statute of 1874 is so clear to the contrary that its meaning can not be affected by departmei.1ta1
practice; and therefore the officer is debarred from receiving any share of the fine.
Very respectfully, yours,
RICHARD OLNEY.

The

SECRET.ARY OF THE TREASURY.

OFFICES EST.ABLISHED BY A.PPROPRI.ATION A.C'l:.

The act of March 1, 1893, chapter 186, "making appropriations for the
support of the Military .Academy for the fiscal year ending June 30,
1894," appropriated $2,000, "the pay of one assistant professor," and
in the same para.graph provided for the appointment of such a professor in addition to the professors theretofore authorized by law:
Held, that the term of such new office did not commence until July 1,
1893.
Accepting an appointment to an office, the term of which is to commence in futuro does not, until such term actually commences, affect
an office previously held by the appointee.
DEP .ARTMEN'l' OF

Jus·ricE,

Ma.y 10, 1893.
Sm: I am in receipt of your communication of April 5,
asking my official opinion as to the construction of that clause
of the Military Academy appropriation act of March 1, 1893,
wbfoh provides for an additional associate professor of mathematics at West Point.
The act is entitled as follows:
"An act making appropriatfons for the support of the
Military Academy for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth
eigllteen hundred and ninety-four."
It enacts:
"That the following sums be, and the same are hereby,
appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otberwi e a,ppropriated, for the support of the Military Amufomy
5687-VOL 20-38
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for the :fiscal year ending Julie thirtieth, eighteen hundred
and ninety-four:

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

" For pay of one associate professor of mathematics, two
thousand dollars; and there shall be appointed at the Military Academy from the Army, in addition to the professors
authorized by the existing laws, an associate professor of
mathematics, who shall receive the pay and allowances of a
captain mounted,'' etc.
No other provision of law exists as to this office, nor is
any appropriation made f~r its salary prior to the next fiscal
year'.
It appears that under this law .First Lieut. Wright P.
Edgerton has been nominated, confirmed, and commissioned
as associate professor, has filed the oath of office and entered
upon his duties as such. I am asked whether this appointment and acceptance vacated his position or commission in
the Army.
In view of the wording and location of the provision
e tablishing this office, it is my opinion that Congress did
not intend the office to commence until the beginning of the
next fiscal year, on July 1, 1893.
.
I am therefore of the opinion that, since Lieut. Edgerton's
term of office as as ociate professor does not commence until
July 1 he is still without doubt a first lieutenant in the
Army.
Very re pi3ctfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF WAR.

APPROPRIATION.
Th appropriation of the sundry civil act of March 3, 1893, chn.pter 208,
for the Worlds ColumlJian Expo ition is not in ubjection to the provi o f the appropriation of Augu t 5, 1892, chapter 381, for the sama
ubj ct.
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Board of Lady Managers," and you ask to be informed
whether this appropriation is affected by the proviso of the
appropriation for the w ·o rld's Columbian Commission contaiiied in the sundry civil act of August 5, 1892 (Pamphlet
Laws, 1st sess., 52d Cong., p. 363), that "all expense .of
administration and installation in the Woman's building
shall be paid by the World's Columbian Exposition."
It is to be remembered that this appropriation of August ·
5, 1892, was declared to be '' in full of the liability of the
United States" on account of the World's Columbian Exposition, that is to say, it was the last and final installment
of the Government subsidy promised by the act of April 25,
1890, chapter 156 (26 Stat., 62).
Congress, believing itself to have done with the World's
Columbian Exposition so far as appropriating money was
concerned when the said appropriation of the act of August
5, 1892 (suprci), was made, it is impossible to suppose that
when the said proviso was atta.ched thereto it was intended
that it should apply, by implication, to any future donation
of money that' Congress might possibly be induced to bestow
on the Board of Lady Managers as a branch of the World's
Columbian Commission. I know of no rule of statutory interpretation that would justify me in placing the appropriation
of March 3, 1893, in subjection to the said proviso of the
appropriation of August 5, 1892.
Very respectfully, yours,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

SECRETARY OF CHILEAN 90MMISSION.
There is nothing in the treaty concluded by Chile with the UnitAd Stutes
on August 7, 1892, or i,n the appropriation for carrying it into effect,
which preveuts the PrP-sident from rnqniring service under the treaty
from the American secretary or agent,, or from maldng compensation
tlierefor, at any time before the organization of th e commission provided for in said treaty.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

1vfoy 1~, 1893.
Sm: Your commnnication of April 25, ultimo, brings to my
attention for an opinion the following case:
By a treaty concluded between the United States and the
Republic of Chileou August.7, 1892, it was agreed(Article I),
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that claims of a certain description by the citizens of either
country against the Government of the other should be submitLed to the :final determination of a commission to co11 'ist
of three members, to be appointed. in a prescribed way.
It i also provided (Artiele .V) that the commission shall
be bound ''to bear, if required, one person ou each side whom
it hall be competent for each Government to name as its counsel or agent to present and support claims on its behalf, on each
and every separate claim."
The treaty also contains a stipulation (Article X) that "the
Government of the United States and of Uhilc uwy each
appoint and employ a secretary versed in the languages of both
countries."
The treaty went into operation on January 28, 1893, by the
proclamation of President Harrison, an<l. by the act of March
1: 1803, entitled "An actmakingappropriationsforthe diplom, tic and consula.r ervice ofthe Unitecl States for fiscal year
endiug June thirtieth, eighteen hun<l.red and ninety-four"
(public act No. 100), Congress made the following appropriation for defraying the expenses to be borne by the United
Stat s in ex cutiug the treaty, that is to ·say:
· "To carry into effect the convention between the United
tat and Chile for the settlement of certain claims of the
citizen of either country against the other, signed at Santia o on the seventh day of August, eighteen h11ndred . and
ninety-two, twenty-five thou and dollars, or so much thereof
a may be nece ary, thi appropriation to be immediately
ayai1able and to be expended under the direction of the
re ident, in such manner as he hall deem reasonable and
prop r, fort.he compen ation of the commissioner, secretary,
and agent; on the part of tbe United. States, and for the
coutiiw nt expen e of the commission, including the moiety
f the compen ation of the third commf sioner and the takin of te.-timouy on behalf of the United States: Proiided,
That the ornp n ation of the commi, sioner on the part of
nit d tat .. hall not exceed the rate of five thou and
h
cl Har a y ar, that of the secretary on the part of the United
t, t , two th u and :five hundred dollar a year, and that
ao· nt of he nited tate , four thousand dollars a
y ar · and hat the ratable deduction on the amount of the
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sums awarded by the commissioners, not exceeding the rate
of five per centum on the sums so awarded, which, in accordance with the provisions of the teuth article of said convention, is to be retained in reimbursement of the expenses of
the commission, shall be covered into the Treasury."
·
President Harrison, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate, appointed a secretary and agent, under the convention.
By direction of your predecessor, the secretary tb us
appointed entered upon an examination, to some extent, of
the records of the Department of State appertaining to
claims which, it is supposed, will be brought before the commission when it shall have organized and met for business.
You ask to be informed whether, upon this state of facts,
there is any duty or service to be performed by this secretary
or this agent " by way of examination of records or otherwise,
in advance of the organization of the commission, and
whether any compensation can properly be paid him prior to
such organization."
Considering the urgency of the treaty and particularly
its requirement (.Article VIII) that "every claim shall be
presented to the commissioners within a period of two months
reckoned from the day of their first meeting for business," it
was, in my judgment, competent for the President, in the
absence of any regulation on the subject, to appoint the
secretary and agent or counsel for this Government at such
time after the treaty went into effect as be might think
proper, regard being bad, it may be presumed, to the character and importance of the business to be brought before
the commission by t,his Government.
The appropriation to carry the treaty into effect having
been placed at the disposal of the President, and having
been made immediately available, it is, I think, for the President to say whether the agent and .Secretary, or either of
them, shall begin work now or wait until the organization of
the commi!-:Sion before doing so.
Both of them are at the service of the President for the
preparation of business against the meeting of the commission. The secretaries are the officers of the Government
authorized to "appoint and employ" them, and not of the
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comm1ss10n, and they are required to be "versed in the
languages of both countries," to enable them to render the
proper assistance to the agents or counsel.
It follows, therefore, in my judgment, tbat there is nothing
in the treaty or in the appropriation for carrying it into
effect which prevents the President from requiring service
under the treaty from the s_e cretary or agent, or from making
compensation therefor at any time before the organization
of the commission.
This, I believe, disposes of the question submitted.
Very respectfully, yours,
R.I0HARD OLNEY.
The SE CRET.A.RY OF ST.A.TE.

WORLD'S FAIR.
H eld, construing together the acts of April 25, 1890, chapter 156; July
13, 1892, ch apter 165; August 5, 1892, chapte~ 380, that the brauch
post-offi ce at the World's Fair of 1893 must be closed on Sundays.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 13, 1893.
SIR: I am in receipt of your communication of May 8 relativ to opening on Sundays the branch post-office in the
Government building at the World's Fair.
y the act of April 25, 1890, the Executive Departments
of the Government were directed to make exhibits of their
work at the World's Fair. I understand that such exhibits
h av been prepared and are all contained in one building
devoted exclu 'ively to that purpose and known as t he Govrnment building, and that among them, as one of the
exhibit of the Post-Office Department, the Postmaster-General de i 0 ·nated a model working post-office.
By
·tion 4 of the act of July 13, 1892, chapter 165, Congr
nacted as follows:
' That the Postma ter-General is hereby authorized to
tabli h in the Government building, upon the ground of
t h World' olumbian Expo.'ition, a branch station of the
Obi ag Illinoi po t -office; and there is hereby appropriated th um of forty thou and dollars for clerk , lettercarrier , Jind incidental expenses nece ary to maintain the
a , and a further sum of twenty-three thou and dollars
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for transportation of mails by railroad and mail-messenger
service, the branch office herein to begin not earlier than
January first, eighteen hundred and ninety-three."
I understand that the branch post-office thus established
is identical with the Post-Office Departm·e nt exhibit above
mentioned, and I assume that in its character as a branch of
the Chicago Post-Office it would, in the absence of legislation to the contrary, be opened on Sundays. I assume
further that its opening, involving the opening also of the
Government building in which it is located, would to some
extent throw open other Government exhibits as well.
By a later act, approved August 5, 1892 (chapter 380,
page 363), Congress enacted as follows:
'' And thesums herein appropriatedfor the World's Columbian Exposition shall be in full of the liability of the United
States on account thereof: Provided, that the Government
exhibits at the World's Columbian Exposition shall not be
opened to the public on Sundays."
By another act of the same date (chapter 381, sec. 4) Congress showed its general intent to use every means in its
power to close the Fair on Sundays altogether.
The question presented is whether chapter 380, above
quoted, requires the closing on Sundays of the branch postoffice, as well as of the other Government exhibits. It is my
opinion that this question must be answered in the affirmative.
Very respectfully,
RICH.ARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

PERMANENT SPECIFIC APPROPRIATIONS .
.A.n appropriation to enable the Secretary of Agriculture to prepare certain property for an experiment station and to remove a previous experiment station to the new site, is a permanent specific appropriation
within the act of June 20, 1874, chapter 328, section 5.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 16, 18!)3,
SIR: I am in receipt of your communication of May 9 concerning the appropriation of $20,000 made by Congress
on July 14, 1890, to enable the Secretary of Agriculture to
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prepare portions of the Arlington estate as an experimental
station, and for expenses incurred in removing the present
e~perimental station bf the Bureau of Animal Industry to
said estate.
My adv.ice is asked as to the present availability of this
appropriation in view of section 5 of the act of June 20, 1874,
chapter 328, provid.ing for the covering into the Treasury of
unexpended balances of appropriations which shall have
remained upon the books of the Treasury for two fiscal years.
The section you refer to contains the following proviso:
"Tha,t this provision shall not apply to perrnanent speoific
appropriations, appropriations for rivers and harbors, lig·hthouses, fortifications, public buildings, or the pay of the
Navy andMarine Corps; but the appropriatiousnamedin this
proviso shall continue available until otherwise ordered by
Congress."
I am informed that the appropriation above mentioned
come within the term "permanent specific appropriations"
in the above proviso, as that term has been construed by the
Treasury Department; and that accordingly the necessary
funds are now being held there to meet the appropriation.
In my opinion the departmental construction is the correct
one, aud the moneys are available for the purpose specified.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The

SECRET.A.RY OF AGRICULTURE,

APPROPRIATION FOR BRINGING HOME FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIE PER ONS ACCUSED OF CRIME.
Th re i no impropriety in reimbursing the French Government from the
$5,000 appropria,tecl in the act of July 16, 1892, chapter 19i, in the
words "actual expense in bringing home from foreign countries peron charged with crime'' for its expenses incurred in taking charge
on hip board of five American seamen charged with thecrimeofmurder
au cl arrested on the request of the U S. consul.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 18, 1893.
Sm: Your letter and its inclo ures bring to my attention
h ·a eoffive eamenoftheAmericanvessel,Hesper, charged
h be crime of murder, who were arrested by the order of
h go ernor of Tahiti, a, dependency of France, on the requi-
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sition of the U. S. consul, and sent to San Francisco by the
American ship Tropic Bird inclrnrgeoftwoFrencb gendarmes.
The Tropic Bird arrived at San Francisco on March 18
ultimo, and the accused seamen were there transferred to
the custody of the United States.
You ask to bf\ informed whether the expenses incurred. by
the French authorities in the premises, amounting to the
sum of 413 francs, can with propriety be paid out of the
appropriation for bringing: home from foreign countries persons accused of crime.
The appropriation supposed to be referred to is contained
in the act of July 16, 1892, chapter 197, entitled '' An act
making appropriations for the diplomatic and consular service of the United States for the fiscal year euding June
thirtieth, eighteen hundred and ninety-tllree" (Laws 5~<1
Congress, 1st sess., p. 226), and in tlle words, "actual
expenses incurred in bringing home from foreign countries
persons charged with crime, five thousand dollars.''
The object contemplated by Congress in making the above
appropriation having been practically accomplished in this
case, there is, in my judgment, no impropriety in r eimbursing the French Government from that appropriation the
expenditures incurred by it, which are conceded to be reasonable and moderate.
Very respectfully, yours,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF ST.A.TE.

SALARIES-SERVICE OF AGENTS.
Probably it is within the power of the head of a Department to comp ensate agents employed by the Depar-tment by stated salaries in full
for all traveling expenses as well as for services.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 26, 1893.
Sm: I have yours of the 17th instant inquiring whether
the Secretary of Agriculture can legally compensate agents
employed. for the Department by stated salaries which shall
be in full for all traveling expenses as well as for services.
The inclination of my judgment 'is that the Secretary has
that power.
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At t"4e ame time I feel bound to add that the unifi rm
r ractice of the varjou Department , and the poli y of th
nited State a evinced by numerou tatut make tb
matter one of considerable doubt and uncertainty.
ou, of cour e, realize that the validity of the cbang pr 1)0 ed, if it were actually made, would be ur to be chal1,.nged both in and out of Cougre becau e involviu g a ubtantial increase of the salarie of many person , and thu.
eming to make, unles and until explained, a considerable
addition to the fixed charges of the Government.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD Ofa.TEY.
The

SECRET.A.RY OF AGRICULTURE.

CHINESE-ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
The owner of a restaurant is not necessarily a laborer within themeanin('/' of the Chine e acts of May 6, 1 82, chapter 126, also Jul y 5, 1
chapter 220, and October 1, 188 , chapter 1064.
The Attorne.y-General can not be asked in advance to give a li t of th
occupations employments in which would con titute ''laborer.''
within the meaning of said acts. He can only answer a to ea h ca
when it arises.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 26, 1 03.
,IR : I am in receipt of your communication of th 19th

a kin my official opinion as to whether one Youn()' Hon a
Chinaman, i a Chinese laborer within the meaning of the law
of 1 2, 1 4, and 18 8, prohibiting uch per on from enterincr
the ni.ted tate . Tlie only information afforded me concerning this man is that he i the owner of a Chine e re taurant
in New York. It is my opinion that he i not a laborer within
the meaning of the laws referred to.
To your 0 ·eneral que tion concerning my view a to the
la. e of per. on who e occupations would place them within
th
ategory of labor r , I do not feel that I can ·ive , n
an w r which can be made the basiR of departmental action.
I can only an wer a to each ca e when it ari es.
Very re pectfnlly,
RICH.A.RD OL...TEY.
Tbe E RETA.RY OF THE TREASURY.
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RESERVATION-PRIVATE CLAIM-OWNERSHIP OF BUILDINGS.
Where land established as a, military reservation includes the private
claim of an individual, which was subsequently discovered and the
use of the reservation discontinued, and upon the land are erected
some twenty-two buildings, but in the patent issued to the claimant
there was a clause reserving to the United States its rights to ownership in the buildings. Held, that the ownership of the buildings
was in the United States.
DEP .A.RTMEN'l' OF JUS'l'ICE,

May 27, 1893.
Sm: It appears by your letter of May 13, instant, and its
inclosures, that the now abandoned Fort Craig military
reservation, New Mexico, was established by an executive
order, dated September 2::3, 1869, and that about one-half of
its area of 24,895 acres lay, as sul>sequently discovered,
within the limits of the private claim of Pedro Arrnendaris.
On March 3rJ.885, the United States discontinued the use
of this reservation, .·and it was regularly transferred to the
Department of the Interior~ to be disposed of under the aet
of July 5, 1884 ( 23 Stat., 103), together with "twenty-two
buildings, consisting of officers' quarters, storehouse, guardhouse, hospital, corral, etc." These building& are all situated
on that part of the reservation which is covered by the
Armendaris claim, and in the patent issued to the claimant ·
by the United States on September 17, 1878, embracing the
lands on· which the buildjngs stand, there is a clause reserving to the United States its rights touching these buildings,
and the United States have recently given further evidence
of relinquishment of all claim to the lands on which the
buildings are situated by dismissing the suit which had
been instituted by it for the purpose of establishing some
supposed right to those lands.
In view of these facts my opinion is requested on the
following questions:
"Do the buildings connected with the Fort Craig abandoned military reservation, wHhin the limits of the patented
private claim of Pedro Armendaris, No. 34, belong to the
United States, or do they belong to the owners of the land
upon which they are situated,"
·
In my judgment, the huildings referred to belong to the
United States. A question involving precisely the same
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point was decided the same way by my predecessor, .Attorney-General Miller, in the case of the Fort Union military
reservation. A copy of tl.utt opinion is herewith in closed.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY

OF

THE INTERIOR.

CALIFORNIA DEBRIS COMMISSION-CIVIL OFFICE.
The mem lJers of t,b e California Debris Commission, established by the act
of March 1, 1893, chapter 183, do not hold civil office within the meaning of the Revised Statutes, section 1222, nor does Revised Statutes,
section 1224, necessitate their withdrawal from. the Engineer Corps.
DEP AR'.I.'l\IBNT OF JUSTICE ,

May 29, 1893.

SIR: By your communication of May 24, you request an
official opinion as to the status of the commissioners appointed
under the California debris act of .M:arch 1, 1893, chapter 183.
That act establishes a commission of three members, to be
known as the California Debris Commission, for the purpose
of regulating hydraulic mining in the territory drained by
the Sacramento and San Joaquin river systems and preventiu g injury from tbe debris resulting therefrom. Its
enforcement ;requires -peculiar engineering skill.
The act provides that "the President of the United
States hall, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint the commission froru officers of the Corps of
Engineers, U. S. Army. Vacancies oc·c urring therein shall
be filled in like manner. It shall have the authority and
exercise the powers hereinafter set forth, under the supervision of the Chief of Engineers and direction of the Secretary
of War."

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

"The members of said commission shall receive no greater
compen ation than is now allowed by law to each, respectively, a an officer of said Corps of Engineers." (Sections
1, 2.)

Tb.e annual report of the commission is to be transmitted
to ongre -·s through the Chief of Engiueers and the Secretary of War. (Section 7; see also sections 23, 24.) The act
eem to contemplate that the commission's work, so far as
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not done by the commissioners personally, shall be performed
by members of the Engineer Corps '' attached" to the commission for that purpose, and "assigned to duty under its
orders." (Sections 14, 20.)
Section 1222 of the Revised Statutes provides that "no
officer of the Army on the active list shall hold any civil
office, whether by election or appointment, and e-yery such
officer who accepts or exercises the functions of a civil office
sha11 thereby cease to be an officer of the Army and bis commission shall be thereby vacated."
Section 12.24 provides that '' no officer of the Army shall
be employed on civil works or internal improvements, or be
allowed to engage in the service of any incorporated compn.n y, or be employed a~ acting ·paymaster or disbursing
agent of the Indian Department, if such extra employment
requires that he shall be separated from his company, regiment, or corps) or if it shall otherwise interfere :with the
performance of the military duties proper."
Col. G. H. Mendell and two other officers of the Engineer
Corps have been, during the recess of the Senate, appointed
by the President as a commission to hold until the adjonrnmei1t of the next sessioh of Co11gress.
The question submitted is whether, should Col. Mendell
accept the appointment and act thereunder, he would thereby
cease to be an officer of the Army and his commission in the
Army would be vacated.
I am of the opinion that the sections above quoted from
the Revised Statutes have no application to this act. They
could not operate as a restriction upon subse·q uent legislation by Uongress, and the later act therefore, if inconsistent
with the Revised Statutes in any respect, is to be construed
as an exception. to that extent. I do not think, however,
that there is any inconsistency. The California Debris Commissioners act under the direction of the Secretary of War.
They belong to the War Davartment. They do not, within
the meaning of the Revised Statutes, bold any civil office or
neglect any military duty proper.
Looking at the act of 1893 as a whole, and construing it
in accordance with the legislative intent, I do not think that
it contemplates a withdrawal of the new commissioners from
the Corps of Engineers. (See 10 Opin., 378.)
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In my opinion the commissioners remain members of that
Corps, merely detailed upon special duty, although the detail
is to be effected by the President and Senate instead of by
any lesser authority. Your question is therefore to be
answered in the negative.
Very respectfully,
LAWRENOE MAXWELL, J R .,
Acting .A.ttorney- General.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.

STATES NOT CORPORATIONS.
The State of Rhode Island is not a person, corporation, or nssociation,
withiu the meaning of the river and harbor appropriation act of
September 19, 1890, chapter 907.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 31, 1893.
Sr~: I am in receipt of your communication of May 16, in
which you ask my official opinion in relation to removing a
bridge over the Sakonnet River in the State of' R~ode Island,
which is found to he an obstruction to_navigation.
It apvears that _this bridge, although originally built by
some private person or corporation, is now the property of said
tate; that the preliminary steps have been taken under the
river and barhor act of 1890 Jook.in'g toward its removal; but
that the State, wbile willing that any alteration may be made
by the Federal Government, declines to go to any expense in.
the matter itself.
Secti011s 4 and 5 of said act amend prior provision s of law
o a to provide that when the Secretary of War bas good
rea on to believe such a bridge to obstruct navigation it shall
be his duty, "first giving the parties reasonable opportunity
to be heard., to give notice to the personti or corporations
owning or controlling such bridge so to alter the same a to
reuder navigation through or under it reasonably free, ea y,
and unob tructed; and in giving such notice be shall specify
th hanges required to be made, and shall prescribe in each
·a ea r easonable time in which to make them. If at the end
of ' uch time the alteration has not been made, the Secretary
of War shall forthwith notify the U. S. District attorney
for the di ' trict in which uch bridge is situated, to the end
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that the criminal proceedings mentioned in the succeeding
section may be taken.

*

*

*

*

"That if the persons, corporation, or association owning
or controlling any railroad or other bridge shall, after receiving notice to that effect as hereinbefore required from the
Secretary of War and within the time prescribed by him, ·
willfu11y fail or refuse to remove the same, or to comply with
the lawful order of the Secretary of War in the premises,
such persons, co~·poration, or association shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor/ for which a suitable punishment is
to be inflicted.
You ask me whether it is the duty of your Department to
serve such a notice upon the State of Rhode Island, and
whether the General Government has the right or authority
to enforce such notice or order if given.
In my opinion the words "persons~ corporation, or associa,tion,'' in the statute do not include a sovereign State. Your
question must therefore be answered in the negative.
Very respectfully,
RIOHA~D OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.

ABSENCE ON PAY.
The appropriation act of March 3, 1893, chapter 211, section 5, prohibits
any further leave of absence on pay where the employe has before
July 1, 1893, been absent for a longer period than ninety days during
the calendar year 1893.
DEP A.RTMEl'{T OF JUSTICE,

Jie,ne 2, 1893.
Sm: You submit the following question under section 5
of the act of March 3, 1893, making appropriations for the legislative, executive, and judicial expenditures of the Government:
"vVhere an employe of this Department has been absent
for a period longer than ninety days during the current calendar year previous to July 1, 1893, will it be allowable to
grant any additional leave after the first day of July, when
the act referred to goes into effect1"
I am of opinion that, in the case stated by you, no further
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leave, with pay, can be granted during the current calendar
year.
The general rule of service prescribed by the appropriation
.act of March 3, 1893, is the same as that prescribecl by the
appropriation act of 1883. The only object and effect, tbersfore, of section 5 of the act of 1893 is to limit the power
which the heads of Departments had under act of 1883 to
grant sick lec1ve with pay. Whether this limifa,tion take
-effect, as you suggest, only from July 1, 1893, or whether it
has been in force since the passage of the act, is immaterial
to the question put by you, for in either view the limitation
is express, and forbids the extension of sick leave with pay
beyond sixty days "in any one calendar year."
The act applies to the current year, and no exception is
made with respect to cases in which the total allowance of
leave permitted by the act in "any one calendar year" may
have already been exhausted.
Very respectfully,
LAWRENCE MAXWELL, JR.,
Solicitor-G eneral.
The SECRE'rARY OF THE TREASURY.
Approved:
RICHARD OLNEY.
ATTORNEY-GENERA L-COMMl SSIONER OF PATENTS.
The Attorney-General should not give an official opinion except to the
Pre i<l.ent or to the hea.d of an Executive Department, with reference
to matters in the direct or supervisory control of the head; accordingly h e ought not, at the present time, to answer the question as to
whether in an inquiry instituted by the Commissioner of Patents
unuer section 467 of the Revised St~tutos the commissioner has the
:power to appoint a referee to take testimony and report the testimony
take n, and hiH conclusions thereon, to the Commissioner of Patent ,
subject to revision by the Commissioner of Patents and afterwards
by the Secretary of the Interior.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 7, 1893.
SrR: The Attorney-General has referred to me your communication of May 27, addressed to him, inclosi~g a letter
f~om the Commis"ioner of Patents, in which the commi 'ion r request you to obtain the Attorney-General's ans'1er
to the following question:
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"In an inquiry·instituted by the Commissioner of Patents
under section 467, Revised Statutes, has the CommiRsioner
of Patents the power to appoint a referee who is not an
officer of the Patent Office, to take testimony and report the
testimony taken and his conclusions thereon to the Commissioner of Patents, subject to revisi~n by the Commissioner
of Patents and afterwards by the Secretary of the Interior 1"
In ca.se of a negative answer to the above question, the
Commissioner further asks for what purpose and with what
powers a referee may be appointed in the proceedings.
Section 487 of the Revised Statutes is as follows:
'' For gross misconduct the Commissioner of Patents may
refuse to recognize any person as a patent agent, either generally or in any particular case; but the reasons for such
refusal shall be duly recorded and be subject to the approval
of the Secretary of the Interior."
It has been held frequently that the statutes prescribing
the duties of the Attorney-General (Rev. Stat., secs. 354 and
356) do not authorize or require him to give an official opinion except to the President or to the head of an Executive
Department; and it would seem to follow that the opinion
should be needed for the guidance of the head of a Department, and should relate to some matter calling for action or
decision on his part. The reasonableness of this limitation
upon the authority of the Departments to call upon the
.Attorney-General for official opinions is manifest wheri we
remember that the .Attorney-General must personally pass
upon every question so submitted to him; for although he
may, under Revised Statutes, section 358, refer the question
to a subordinate for a written opinion, the action of the subordinate must be examined and approved by the AttorneyGeneral to give it effect.
For the guidance of the heads of bureaus and other officers
of the Departments in the discharge of their.duties, provision
is made, by section 361 of the Revised Statutes, for assistance from the officers of the Department of Justice, under
the direction of the Attorney-General; and an assistant
attorney-general and law clerks have accordingly been
assigned to the Department of ·the Interior, to whom, it
seems to me, the Commissioner of Patents should submit
his question.
5687-VOL 20--39
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The power of disbarment given by section 487 is conferrecl
upon the Commissioner of Patents. It is only after be ha
made a decision that his opinion is submitted to review by
the Secretary of the Interior. In determining whether he
shall make a reference, and if so to whom, he acts in the
first instance upon his ow:n responsibility, and not under the
supervision or direction of the Secretary of the Interior.
An answer to the question submitted by the Commissioner
of Patents can not, therefore, at the present . stage of the
proceeding, be required for the guidance of the Secretary of
the Interior; and the Attorney-General, if he should make
an answer, would not only overstep the boundaries which
appear to be prescribed for him by a long line of decisions
and by uniform practice, but would commit himself upon a
question which may be properly submitted to him hereafter
by the Secretary of the Interior, if the action of the Commissioner of Patents shall come under his review.
It is not meant by this opinion to deny the authority or
duty of the A.ttorney-General to answer questions of law
submitted to him by the head of a Department, although at
the instance of the head of a bureau, where the que tion
relates to matters within the direct or supervisory control of
the head, and is deemed by the head to be of such difficulty
or importance as to require the personal attention of the
Attorney-General.
It may not be out of place, however, to call your attention
to the following statutes which forbid the acceptance ofvoluntary service by the Government,. or the employment of
officers whose compensation is not specifically provided for,
or the application to such a purpose of moneys appropriated
for contingent expenses or for general purposes: Rev. Stat.
secs. 171, 3G82, sec. 4 of the legislative, etc., act of Auga t
5, 1882, chap. 389; the defi.cienc;y appropriation act of May
1~ 1884, chap. 37.
Very respectfully,
LAWRENCE MAXWELL, JR.,
Solicitor-General.
The SECRETARY

OF

THE INTERIOR .

.Approved:
RICHARD OLNEY.
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LAND FOR PUBLIC BUILDING-CONSENT OF STATE.
Where a State's consent to the purchase of land by the United States
provides that the 8tate shall forever retain concurrent jurisdiction
over any such place to the extent that all legal and military process
issued under the authority of the State may be executed anywhere
on such ulace or in any building thereon or any part thereof, and
that any offense against the laws of the State committed on su?h
place may be tried anll punished by any competent conrt or magistrate of the State, it does not satisfy the provision of section 355,
Revised Statutes.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 7, 1893.
SIR: I herewith return a letter of the Chief o:( Engineers
addressed to you under date of the 10th ultimo, together
with the certificate of the governor of Wisconsin therein
mentioned, and other papers, all of which were transmitted
to me by you on the 20th ultimo with a request for an
opinion upon the question hereinafter stated.
It appears by these papers that a certain piece of land in
Wisconsin, needed for the site of a lock-tender's house,
warehouse, and workshop in connection with the Fox River
improvement, was condemned in proceedings lately instituted on behalf of the United States under the act of April
24, 1888, entitled ''An act to facilitate the prosecution of
works projected for the improvement of rivers and harbors;"
and that upon application subsequently made to t,he State
authorities for a cession of jurisdiction over the premises,
the aforesaid certificate w;-1,s iss\rnd by the governor in conformity to chapter 1., section 2, of the Revised Statutes of
Wisconsin, 1878.
The question presented for consideration is substantially
this: Whether such certificate satisfies the provision of section 355, Revised Statutes, United States, which requires
that, before any public money can be expended upon lauu
purchased by the United States for the purpose of erecting
thereon (inter alia) a public building of any kind, the" consent of the legislature of the State" wherein the land lies
to such purchase shall be given.
By the statute of Wisconsin, cited above, the consent of
the legislature of that State is given to "the purchase by the
United States of any place or places within the State for the
erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock yards, or other
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needful buildings, under authority of any act of Congre
upon certain c·ouditions therrin ';et forth. It also pro-vides
for the execution by the governor of a certificate of uch
consent, which certificate is declared to be sufficient evidence thereof. Among other conditions in this statute,
coupled with the consent thereby granted, is the following:
'' That the Sta.te shall forever retain concunent jurisdiction
over every such place to the extent that all legal and military process issued under the authority of the State may be
executed anywhere on such place or in any building thereon
or any part thereof, and that any ojjense against the laws of the
State cornmitted on such place may be tried and punished by any
competent court or magistrate of the State, to the same extent as
if such place had not been purchased by the United States."
This condition is embodied in the certificate of the governor
herein before mentioned.
In acts of the different State legislatures giving consent to
the purchase of lands by the United States, as well as in
their acts expressly ceding jurisdiction over _such lands, it is
usual to reserve to the State the right to serve on the la.nd
purchased its civil and criminal process, and a reservation
of jurisdiction to that extent has always been regarded a
consistent with the requirements of the provision in section
355 referred to above. Thus in Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co.
v. Lowe (114 U.S., 525) it is observed by the court: "The
reservation which has usua1ly accompanied the consent of
the States, that civil and criminal process of the State courts
may be served in the places purchasedci is not considered as
interfering in any respect with the supremacy of the United
States over them, but it is admitted to prevent them from
becoming an asylum for fugitives from justice."
But the Wisconsin act, already adverted to, goes still further. Besides the right to execute "all legal and military
process issued under the authority of the State," it reserve
a concurrent jurisdiction over offenses against the law of
the State committed on the place, to the same extent a if
uch place had not been purchased by the United State .
Where an act ceding jurisdiction contained a reservation
imilar to the latter, Attorney-General Cushing regarded the
reservation as insuperably objectionable, declaring jt to be
' altogether inconsistent with any possible construction of
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that-'exclusive' jurisdiction w hi,..,h, according to the letter
and intent of the Constitution, are in such cases to be vested
in the United States." (8 Opin., 419.)
The above-mentioned provision of 355 is reproduced from
the joint resolution of September 11, 1841 (5 Stat., 468), which
was in force when lVlr. Cushing was Attorney-General, and
which, as interpreted by him, demands that a transfer of
jurisdiction in order to satisfy its requirements must be coextensive with that contemplated by .Article I, section 8, of the
Constitution. In this view of the requi_rements of said provision I fully concur.
I may remark here that in numerous cases, e,specially in
acts authorizing the acquisition of sites for public buildlngs,
Congress has latterly required from the States a cession of
jurisdiction for all purposes, excepting '' the administration
of the criminal laws of the State and the service of civil process therein." (See 21 Stat., 142; 22 ib., 94, 152, 161; 23 ib.,
282; 24 ib., 544; 25 ib., 444; 26' ib., 724.) In these cases, by
force of the exception, there is left to the State the administration of its criminal laws over the -premises acquired by the
General Government, and consequently the cognizance of
offenses against its laws committed thereon, as fully as the
same existed before such acquisition.
But the case under consideration is governed wholly by
the provision of section 355, to which reference is above
made; and as the consent of the State of Wisconsin to the
acquisition by the United States of the land in question,
which is evidenced by the certificate of the governor, is
coupled with an express retention of jurisd1ctiou over offenses
against its laws committed on the premises, this qualification of the consent is such as, in my opinion, renders it
insufficient to satisfy that provision.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
RICH.ARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF WAR.
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ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
The Attorney-General can not give an official opinion except upon a
qnestion of law which has already actually arisen and which is snlJ. mittecl upon a definite statement of facts, and not leaving it to him
to draw inferences of fact from correspondence or documents.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ,

June 9, 1893.
Sm: I am in receipt of your letter of June 3, inclosing
copies of various correspondence concerning the occupancy
by the Peunsylvania Railroad Company, as lessee of the
Cleveland and Pittsburg Railroad Company, of a Government pier in Cleveland, Ohio, together with a copy of the
agreement under which the pier is occupied, and an opinion
thereon bytheActing Judge-Advocate-General. I am asked
for my official opinion as to the the proper action which
should be taken in the·case to secure the fun compliance with
the terms of said agreement by the railroad company, and
_w hether it should be taken by yourself or the Secretary of
War; and in the hypothetical case of the railroad company
failing to comply fully with the agreement, I am also asked to
advise generally with relation -to the proper action that should
then be taken.
I am unable to see how, under the circumstances, I am
authorized to give an official opinion upon this request.
Section 356 of the Revised Statutes reads as follows:
"The head of any Executive Department may require an
opinion of the Attorny-General upon any question of law
arising in the administration of his Department." It has
been held from a very early date that an official opinion can
be required and given only when the question submitted
is a question of law; that to obtain this opinion the reque t
therefor should embody a statement of the facts in the nature
of an agreed case in an action at law, not leaving it to the
Attorney-General to draw interferences of fact from correspondence or documents; and that the question for decision
must be one which has already actually arisen, and not a
question upon a hypothetical case which may or may not
arise in the future. I may call your attention !!:pon the e
points to the following recent opinions, among others (18
Opin., 487; 19 Opin., 414, 465, 672, 6)6.) In these opinions
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the prior rulings of this Department are fully cited and set
forth.
Until, therefore, a present question of law is submitted
upon a definite Htatement of facts, I do not see that I am
able to assist you in the matter.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

APPOINTMENTS IN NAVY.
Under the act of March 2, 1889, chapter 396, the vacancies in the lowest
grade of commissioned officers in the Line and Marine Corps, must be
filled from the final graduates of the line and marine corps at Annapolis; so also as to vacancies in the Engineer Corps. Vacanciee in the
Line and Marine Corps can not be filled from the engineer corps division, or vice versa.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 10, 1893.
SIR: I am in receipt of your communication of yesterday,
asking my official opinion in relation to filling existing
vacancies in the Engineer Corps of the Navy.
The act of March 2, 1889, chapter 396, directs that the
naval cadets at Annapolis in their fourth year shall be divided
into two divisions, one assigned to the "line and marine
corps division," and the other assigned to the "engineer
corps division," and provided that the two divisions should
pursue, to some extent, separate courses of study arranged
to fit them for future service in the above-named corps of the
Navy respectively. The act· further provided that "from the
final graduates of the line and marine corps division, at the
end of their six years' course, appointments shall be made
hereafter as it shall be necessary to fill vacancies in the lowest grade of commissioned officers of the line of the-Navy
and Marine Corps; and the vacancies in the lowest grades
of commissioned officers of the Engineer Corps of the Navy
shall be filled in like manner by appointment from the final
graduates of the engineer division at the end of their six
years' course." Provisos are added to the effect that no
greater number of appointments "into the said lowest grades
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of commissioned officers" shall be made each year than there
are current vacancies to fill; that the appointments shall he
made from the fi.na,l graduates of the year according to their
order of merit; but that there shall not be less than twelve
appointments each year to the line, two to the Engineer Corps
or one to the Marine Corps.
From the above provisions it is clear that the intent of the
act is that no appointments shall be made either to the Line
or Marine Corps or to the Engineer Corps except fro m graduates of the cadet division whose studies are directed to such
appointments respectively.
A final proviso fo the. act is that "if the number of vacancies in the lowest grades aforesaid occurring in any year
shall be greater than the number of final graduates of that
year, the surplus vacancies shall be filled from the :final
graduates of following years as they shall become available.'
It appears that in the present year there are more vacancies in the Engineer Corps than can be filled from the graduates of the six years' course of the engineer corps division,
I am aisked whether. these vacancies can be filled by graduates of the line and marine corps division by authority of
this proviso.
I do not think that the proviso in question authorizes any
appointment during the year in which the deficiency of graduates occurs. It authorizes appointments only from the :final
graduates of following years. That is its plain language
and I do not perceive any warrant for giving~ it a. more
extended construction. In my opinion if in any year there
are more vacancies in the Line and Marine Corps than there
are final graduates of the six years' course in the line and
marine division, the vacancies must remain unfilled until the
following year; and the same rule applies to vacancies in the
Engineer Corps. Your question must therefore be answered
in the negative.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The

SECRE'r ARY OF THE NAVY.
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GUNBOAT-APPROPRIATION.
The act of March 3, 1893, chapter 212, contemplates construction of
light draft protected gunboats of steel, and does not authorize the
building of such gunboats on the "composite plan," a vessel of which
some other material than steel forms a substantial integral part. If
it be the fact that in naval architecture the term "steel," as descriptive
of a vessel, has a special meaning, and includes a vessel built on the
composite plan, as well as a steel vessel proper, an opposite conclusion
might be reached.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUS'l1ICE,

June 15, 1893.
Srn: By the act of Congress of March 3, 1893, chapter 212,
entitled ".An act making appropriations for the Naval Service for .the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, and for other purposes" (Laws 52d
Cong., 2d Sess., 731), it is provided as follows:
"That for the purpose of further increasing the Naval
Establishment of the United States, the President is hereby
authorized to have constructed, by contract, three light-draft
protected gunboats of about one thousand two hundred tons
displacement each, to cost, exclusive of armament, not more
than four hundred thousand dollars each, excluding anypremiurn that may be paid for iucreased speed and the cost of
a.rrnament. The contract for the construction of either of
said gunboats shall contain such provisions as to speed and
premiums and penalties affected by speed as may iri. the judgment of the Secretary of the Navy be deemed proper and
:fitting. In the construction. of said vessels all the provisions
of the act of August third, eighteen hundred and eighty-six,
entitled' .An act to increase the Naval Establishment,' as to
materials for said vessels, their engines, boilers, and machinery, the contract under which they are built, the notice of
and proposals for the same, the plans, drawings, specifications
therefor, and the method of executing said contracts, shall be
observed and followed, and said vessels shall be built in compliance with the terms of said act, save that in all their parts
said vessels shall be of domestic manufacture."
The act of March 3, 1886, chapter 894, entitled '' An act to
increase the naval e8tablishment" (24 Stat., 215), referred
to in the above-quoted provision declares that the vessels
therein authorized to be constructed "shall be built of stee·l
of domestic manufacture."
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Your letter of May 29, 1893, asks for an opinion upon the
question whether you can legally direct the construction of
one or more of the · light-draft protected gunboats authorized by the above act of March 3, 1893, on what is called the
'' composite" plan, that is to say, the hull framing to be of
steel but the outer covering of the hull to be of wood planking sheathed with copper, instead of steel plates.
In my judgment, the act of Congress of March 3, 1893,
contemplates the construction of light-draft protected gunboats of steel and does not a,u thorize the buildin g of such
gunboats on the '' composite" plan, by which phrase "composite" is described, as I undersand, a vessel of whlch some
other material tban steel forms a substantial and integral
part.
A different conclusion might be reached if it were shown a
a fact that in naval architecture, or by commercial usage, the
term teel, as descriptive of a vessel, bad a special meaning
and designated a vessel built on the "composite" plan as
well as a steel vessel proper.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
TbA SECRET.A.RY OF THE NAVY.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL.

'rhe Att orney-General can give official opinions only upon questions of
law a ctually arising in the administration of the Department, which
are a t the time pending, and which must be determined in order that
the work of the Department may be properly administered; he is
r eluctant to pass upon any question whose answer may bring the
D epartment of Justice into conflic.t with a judicial tribunal.
A judge of a State court refused a claim of employes of the War Departm ent t o exemption from jury duty; he notified the Department, however , that h e would excuse the men from such duty if, in the opinion of
the Department, not to do so woulu seriously prejudice t he public
inter•:st : H eld, th a t no such serious occasion had yet arisen :i s should
j u i:;tify the At torney-General in r~viewing the ruling of the State judge.
DEP .A.R'rMEN'r OF JUSTICE,

June 15, 1893.
I am in receipt of your communication of the 13th
in t ant, reque ting my official opinion upon the question
whether artificers and workmen employed. in the armorie
SrR:
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and arsenals of the United States are exempt from jury duty
in State courts under section 1671 of the Revised Statutes.
It appears that one of the workmen in the arsenal at Rock
Island, Ill., has been summoned for jury duty in the circuit
court of Rock Island County, and that the judge holding that
court refuses to recognize his claim for exemption, construing that section as applicable to Federal co·u rts only.
Section 356 of the Revised Statutes of the United States
provides "that the head of any Executive Department may
require the opinion of the Attorney- General on any question
of law arising in the administration of his Department."
lt has-always been held by successive Attorneys-General
that such opinions should be rendered only in cases where a
question has actually arisen, and is at the time pending,
which must be determined in order that the work of a Department may be properly administered. Moreover, my predecessors have always exhibited great and, it seems to me,
proper reluctance to · pass upon any question whose answ·e r
may bring this Department into conflict with a judicial
tribunal.
I learn from the pa,p ers transmitted to me with your
request, that while the statutory provision above referred to
has come down from the year 1800, no claim has ever before
been raised by a State judge that workmen employed in
arsenals of tbe United States are liable to jury duty. I do
not perceive that even in this case the question is so raised
as to require me to give an opinion upon it. The same judge
who now disputes the legal exemption of Government workmen from jury duty closes his letter with the following
words:
'' There is lodged with the court the power to excuse persons called upon to render this service if any serious inconvenience is likely to be suffered in consequence of rendering
this service; and if, in your opinion, the public interests are
likely to be seriously prejudiced, this will be a sufficient
statement for me to excuse the gentleman named in your
note."
From this it appears . that the exemption, while not formally re,cognized, will be practically allowed in case of any
serious inconvenience to your Department from loss of services to the workman summoned, and that your Departmen~
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·will itself be the judge of the seriousness of the inconvenience.
I think you will agree with me that under the circumstances no such serious quest.ion has arisen in the administration of your Department that I should be called upon to
review the ruliQg of a State judge at the present time. If
the claim of right to jury duty from Government workmen
shall in the future be so far pressed as to cause serious inconvenience in your judgment, of course I can not then hesitate
to meet the question.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF W .AR.

DISTRICT ATTORNEYS-ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
Under the Indian appropriation act of March 3, 1893, chapter 209, district attorneys are not required to represent Indians in suits brought
by them in States where they do not reside, founded on claims of
inheritance from white persons not members of their tribes. The
Attorney-General has no authority to give an opinion upon the reasonableness of fees demanded by persons proposing to act as attorneys
for Indian litigants.
DEPARTMEN'l' OF JUS'l'ICE,

June 19, 1893.
SIR: I am in receipt of your communication of June 14
asking my official opinion concerning the suit about to be
brought by certain Ogalalla Sioux Indians to recover property in the city of Denver, Colo.
It appears that one Joseph Richard, residing in Denver,
Colo., and owning real property there, died in 1863, leaving a
widow and children; that this widow was an Ogalalla Sionx
Indian, to w horn he had been married according to the
Indian laws and customs, and who, upon his death, returned
with her children and rejoined her tribe on Pine Ridge Re·ervation, Shannon County, S. Dak.; and that this widow and
children are now about to institute an action in the State of
Colorado to recover the property aforesaid.
The Indian appropriation act of March 3, 1893, chapter
209, contains the following provision (27 Stat., 631):
"To enable the Secretary of the Interior, in his discretion,
to pay the legal costs incurred by Indians in contests initi-
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ated by or against them, to any entry, filing, or other claims,
under the laws of Congress relating to public lands, for any
sufficient cause affecting the legality or validity of the entry,
:filing, or claim, five thousand dollars: Provided, That the
fees to be paid by and on behalf of the Indian party in any
case shall be one-half of the fees provided by law in such
cases, and said · fees shall be paid by the fJommissioner of
Indian Affairs, with the approval of the Secretary of the
Interior, on an account stated by the proper land officers
through the Commissioner of the General Land Office. In
all States and Territories where there are reservations or
allotted Indians the United States district attorney shall
represent them in all suits at law and in equity."
I am asked whether the U. S. district attorney is required
under this act to represent the cla.imants in the proposed suit.
In my opinion he is not required to do so. Whatever may be
the precise scope of the statutory_ provision, I do not think
that it applies to a suit of this kind, prosecuted in a State in
which the Indians do not reside, and founded upon a claim
of inheritance from a white person, who 'js not even claimed
to have been an adopted member of the tribe.
I have no authority to give an official opinion upon your
further questiop, whether the fees demanded bythe Indians'
proposed attorneys are or are not reasonable. This is not
one of the cases in which the .Attorney-General is made the
judge of the reasonableness of legal expenses, nor am I possessed of sufficient information to make a proper decision on
this point.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE INTERIOR.

DUTY-FEATHER-STITCHED BRAIDS.
The interpretation acquiesced in hitherto by the Department of Justice
by a letter to the Secretary of the Treasury, of date January 26, 1893,
that "feather-stitched braids" are dutiable as braids under paragraph
354 of the tariff act of 1890, shoulu also be applied to the term "braids"
as used in p aragraph 324 of the tariff act of October, 1883. Pending
cases of ptotest against a, different ruling should be settled in accordauce with this settled practice.
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DEPARTMENT OF J - "l'I 'E

Ju,ne 21 1, . 3.
SIR: Your letter of May 22, 1 93, with the in lo ure f a
letter from Messrs. Comstock & Brown, of New York dated
May 15, 1893, brings to my atteution the ruling of the cir uit
court of the United States for the southern di trict of ... w
York, that a certain importa,tion of "feather- titche<l. braid _..
by Dieckerho:ff, Raffloer & Co. was dutiable a 'braid.,··
and not as "trimmings," under paragraph 354 of the tari '
act of October 1, 1890 (26 Stat., 567), and you refer me to my
pre<l.ecessor's letter to you, dated January 26, 1893, in which
he declined to appeal from the said deci ion of the circuit
court, and furthermore, iuform me that, accordiu gly, the·
collector of customs of the port of New York wa instructed
to refund the excessive duties exacted, and to apply the
in tructions then given to similar case pending at hi port.
It seems, however, that under paragraph 325 of the tariff
act of 1\1-a,rch 3, 1883 (22 Stat., 488), merchandi e an weriu
to the description of '• feather-stitched braid " was cla ified
as '' trimmings" under the decision of your Department of
February 9, 1888 (S. 8664), and the decision of the Board of
General .A.pprai ers of October 15, 1890 (G . .A. 61 and .
10, 340), and held dutiable at 40 per cent ad •valorem.
As a conviction on your part that the ruling afore aid
under the tariff act of 1883 are erroneous could not be carried
into effect, to the prejudice of the Government, without tbe
concunence of the Attorney-General, as required by ecti n
2 of the act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat., 469), you a k whether
the pending cases under the act of March 3, 1 3, awaitiucr
aclju tment or suit of protest against the cla ification f
and a e ment of duty on "feather-stitched braid · a
"trimmings," should be di ·posed of in accordance with the
aid ruling of the circuit court under the tariff a t of 1 9 .
a being qually applicable to the tariff act of 1 3.
Paragraph 324 of tbe tariff of 1 3 lays an advalorem
duty of 35 per cent on "braid ," and paragraph 325 ot
the, ame tariff place~ a duty of 40 per cent ad valorem on
'' trimmino- . '
aragraph3- ofthetari:ffofl 90make 'braid dutiable
' I r c nt ad valorem and paragraph 373 make
trimdutiable at 60 per eut ad valorem.
T
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Not being ad vised of the existence of any conditions of
fact, proper to be considered in interpreting the said paragraphs of the tariff of 1890, which did not also exist while
the tariff of 1883 was in operation, I am of opinion that the
interpretation, expressly acquiesced in by this Department,
by a letter to the Secretary of the Treasury of J amrnry 26,
1893, that "feather-stitehed braids" are dutiable as" braids,"
under paragraph 354 of the tariff of 1890, should also be
applied to the term ''braids" as used in paragraph 324 of the
tariff of 1883, and that pending cases of protests against a
different ruling should be settled in accordance with this
settled practice.
Very respectfully, yours,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The

SECRE'.l'ARY OF THE TREASURY.

WORLD' S FAIR.
Appropriations contained in the ~wt of August 5, 1892, chapter 381, for
the World's Fair, are still available notwithstanding the fact that
t he Fair is open on Sundays.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 23, 1893.
Sm: I have your communication of June 15, asking my
official opinion upon the question whether the several appropriations made by acts of Congress approved August 5,
1892, in aid of the World's Fair at Chicago, including the
appropriations in aid of the Government exhibit, have been
rendered unavailable by what has taken place at Chicago in
the matter of the opening of the Fair on Sunda:ys.
In my judgment, the appropriations referred to are as
available now as before the decision of the circuit court of
appeals permanently opening the World's Fair on Sundays,
with the single exception that no more money ought to be
paid to the Illinois corporation known as the World's Columbian Exposition.
The grounds for this opinion, briefly stated, are as follows:
While the statutes relating to the subject are confused
and obscure, yet, regard being bad to their manifest objects
and purposes and to the relations of the United States to
the Fair as exhibitor, donor, and medium of intercourse
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with foreign nations and foreign exhibitors, the intent of
Congress can hardly be mistaken. Congress meant and
explicitly enacted that the Government exhibits should be
closed on Sunday. It also meant that the Exposition a
a whole should be closed on Sunday. It did not, however,
undertake to pass a law to that effect but contented itself
with making certain appropriations conditional, not upon
the fact of Sunday closing, but upon the Illinois corporation
agreeing to the proposition of Sunday closing, so that regulations to tliat effect might be made by the Government representative, the World's Columbian Commission. The Illinois corporation did agree to the proposition, the proper rules
were made by the Columbian Commission, and the condition
upon which the appropriations referred to were made must
be regarded as fully satisfied. The rights of the United
States and the liabilities of the Illinois corporation consequent upon the latter's violation of its agreement are matters for future consideration and settlement. But such violation, except as it should prevent the payment of any more
money to the IlJinois corporation, can not be allowed to render the appr.opriations referred to unavailing, for the most
cogent reasons. It would result in great waste because,
while only one-third of the term of the Fair has yet elapsed,
the Government has already erected a building at a cost of
$400,000 and has expended other large sums of money in
gathering and installing exhibits, fa defraying the expenses
of Commissioners and Lady Managers, and in compensation
of necessary agents and employes. Further, it would almost
amount to bad faith as regards foreign .nations and foreign
exhibitors, because not merely the awards of medals and
diplomas, but their preparation and distribution, have been
a sumed by and belong exclusively to the United States,
acting through the Columbian Commission. Results of tbi
sort can not possibly have been within the contemplation of
Congress, which must therefore be regarded as having conditioned its appropriations not upon Sunday closing in fact,
but upon an agreement for Sunday dosing, which it assumed,
however rashly, would not be broken.
Very respectfully,
RICH.A.RD OLNEY,
The SECRE'l'ARY OF THE TREASURY.
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LOUISIANA LEVEES-MISSISSIPPI RIVER COMMISSION.
· The State of Louisiana is the owner of a servitude or interest in the land
of all riparian owners along the Mississippi River for the purpose of
building levees to restrain its waters within definite limits during
flood times. The United States having undertaken to share in the
task, the State bas for that purpose surrendered to the United States
it s servitude in lands to be occupied by levees of the Mississippi River
Commission. The United States will not, therefore, be subjected to
liability to persons who~e land is taken by the commission for such
levees.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 23, 1893.
SIR: I am in receipt of your communication of February
17, 1893, to my predecessor, asking an official opinion from
this Department as to the right of the United States to build
a levee on land of a citizen of Louisiana. The proposed levee
has been recommended by the l\lississippi River Commission
under the appropriation of 1892 for the next fiscal year, and
I assume tllat it is one authorized under the Federal Statutes
and Constitution. The recommendation has been approved
and bids received by the u ·n ited Stateg for the proposed
work.
One of the riparian landowners, across whose land the
levee would be l>uilt, has protested in writing to your
Department. I am not informed that the protesting landowner cla.ims that there are any peculiar circumstances
distinguishing . his case from • those of the numerous other
landowners along the Mississippi River, whose lands have
been, appropriated without compensation for the building
of levees by the United States since the establishment of
t h e Mississippi River Commission, or by the State of Louisiana, since the earliest times.
I assume, therefore, that there are no exceptional circumtan ces to take him out of the general rule.
The State of Louisiana is the owner of a servitude or interest in the land of all riparian owners for the purpose of
building levees to restrain the waters of the Mississippi
River within defined limits during flood times. The United
Stat es, deeming this work to further the interests of interstate commerce, bas undertaken, through the Mississippi
River Commission~ a share in the ta8k. The State of Louisiana, by the Constitution of ;I.879, has for that purpose
5687-YOL 20-40
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surrendered to the United States its servitude in the land
to be occupied by the commission's levees.
It is my opinion, therefore, that the protesting landowner
is without foundation for his protest; for he, or his ancestor,
purchased his land subject to the right to place thereon precisely such a levee as your Department proposes to build;
and therefore, by building it, you will not render the United
States liable to him for damages.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.

SET-OFF-SALARY OF FEDERAL JUDGE.
The salary of a Federal judge should not be withheld as falling within
the act of March 3, 1875, chapter 149, to meet a judgment recovered
against him•as surety for a former Government employe.
DEPAR1'MENT OF JUSTICE,

June 27, 1893.
Sm: It appears by the letter of the First Comptroller of
the Treasury of May 27, ultimo, addressed to you, that the
United States has recently recovered a judgment_in the
supreme court of the District of Columbia against the Hon.
Nathan Goff, as surety on the official bond of J ames M.
Ewing, formerly disbursing clerk of this Department, for the
sum of $ 9,000, with interest and costs, and you have referred
the letter to me for an opinion upon the following questions
presented therein:
"1. Does the act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat., 481), authorize
and require the Secretary of the Treasury to witbbokl the
salary due a public officer who is indebted to the United
States ~
'' 2. If so, is there any exception in the case of a Federal
judge¥'}
As I may not, however, give an opini9n on a hypothetical
question without exceeding my power as defined by law, I
must, in complying with your request, con.fine myself to the
case calling for the action of your Department, and shall
accordingly proceed to consider whether the act of March 3,
1875, chapter 149 (18 Stat., 481), authorizes and requires the

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

627

Set•Off-Salltry of Federal Judge.

Secretary of the Treasury to withhold Judge Goff's salary as
a circuit judge of the United States for the Fourth circuit,
until the judgment recovered against him as aforesaid shall
have been satisfied in that way.
The act of March 3, 1875, is entitled "An act to provide
for deducting any debt due the United States from any judgment recovered against the United States by such debtor,"
and provides as follows:
''That when any :fi.nal judgment recovered ag·ainst the
United States, or other claim duly allowed by legal authority,
shall be presented to the Secretary of the Treasury for payment, and the plaintiff or claimant therein shall be indebted
to the United States in any manner, whether as principal or
surety, it shall be the duty of the Secretary to withhold payment of an amount of such judgment or claim equal to the
debt thus due to the United States." * * *
It would be, in my judgment, to abandon the ordinary sense
of language and to adopt an unlooked-for interpretation to
hold that it was in the contemplation of Congress to include,
under the expression "claim duly allowed by legal authority,"
the right of a Federal judge to have his salary paid to him
out of money in the Treasury appropriated by law for tha)t
purpose.
The allowance of a claim against the united States, involving a discretion which partakes of a judicial character, but
it is apparent that there is no room for the exercise, by any
'' legal authorit,y;" of such a discretion with refere11ee t o the
salary of a judge) which the law requires to be paid, if there
is money in the Treasury applicable to it, and failure to pay
which is an official delinquency which may be summarily
correctoo by mcindam,its.
Without going into the constitutional question and the
question of policy suggested in the First Comptroller's letter,
I content myself with saying that this is not a case where
the ordinary sense of the language of the statute should be
extended by construction.
Very respectfully, yours,
WM . .A. M.AURY,
Acting Attorney- Generctl.
The

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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GETTYSBURG-INJUNCTIO ".
The Secretary of War is authorized to take conclemnation proceedings
to acquire land over which a trolley railroad is being constructedthat is a portion of the battlefield of Gettysburg-'-an<l may apply to
the court for an injunction to restrain the construction an<l operation
of said proposed railroad.

DEP AR1'MENT OF JUSTICE,
J ulJJ 7, 1893.
Sm: By the act of March 3, 1893, chapter 208 (27 Stat.,
599, 600), "making appropriations for sundry civil expenses
of the Government for the fiscal year ending June tllirtieth,
eighteen hundred and ninety-four, and for other purposes,"
it is, among other things, provided, as follows:
"MONUMEN'.l'S . AND TABLETS AT GETTYSBURG.-For the
purpose of preserving the lines of battle at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, and for properly marking with tablets the posit10ns
occupied by the various commands of the armies of the Potomac and of Northern Virginia on that field, and for opening
and improving avenues along the positions occupied by troops
upon those liues, and for fencing the same, and for determining the leading tactical positions of batteries, regiments, brigades, divisions, corps, and other organizations, with reference
to the study and correct understanding of tbe battle, and to
mark the same with suitable tablets, each bearing a brief
historical legend, compiled without praise and without censure, the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars, to be expended
under the direction of the Secretary of ,var."
Upon taking steps to carry out the provisions of this act,
you say that you find a company known as "The Trolley
Company," a corporation under the Jaws of Pennsylvania
already in possession of a considerable portion of the field,
constructing a railroad along and across some of the mo t
important lines of battle and through some of the most hotly
contested portions of the field, removing bowlders, tree ,
and other well-known and historic marks; that the said company has secured a right of way on certain streets inside and
certain roads outside of Gettysburg, and the fee or right of
way to the lands over which the railroad is being constructed;
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and that the construction of this road where and in the manner it is being done is a serious interference with · and an
obstruction to the work contemplated by the act of Congress;
and you submit the following questions:
" 1. Whether there is any legal remedy or means to prevent
the further construction and operation of the railroad, and
if so, what1
"2. Whether the Government can proceed to condemn the
land over which said railroad is being constructed and take
possession of the same under condemnation proceedings, or
of that portion of said land where the construction of the
railroad is the most seriously interfering with the carrying
out of the act of Congress P
By an act of the general assembly of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania, approved May 7, 1889 (Laws of Pa., 1889,
No. 113, pp. 106-108), the consent of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania is given to the acquisition by the United States
of Sl~ch pieces and tracts of land _situated upon and in the
neighborhood of the battlefield of Gettysburg as may be
selected by the Secretary of War, or such officer as he may
direct, for the purpose of erecting monuments or tablets for
the proper marking of the positions of each of the several
commands of the .Army of the United States in the battle of
Gettysburg, for opening and constructing roads and avenues
in connection with the positions occupied by the Federal and
Confederate forces engaged in said battle, for the preservation of the grounds covered by said battlefield for historical
and other purposes, and for making snch other improvements
in connection with said battlefield. as the Government of the
United States may from time to time deem proper. The act
cedes jurisdiction to the United States over any lands that
may ue acquired by it under the act, and provides for the condemnation of lands tp.at can not be acquired.
·
The provisions of law seem to be ample to enable you by
condemnat~on proceedings to acquire such pro1:,erty and
rights as may be·necessary to carry out the act of Congress.
If you commence such proceeding you would be justified in
applying to the court for an iujunction to prevent further
construction and operation of the railroad pending the condemnation. 'l'he proceedings should be bad in the United
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States court, under the provisions of the act of Augu t 1
1888, chapter 728 (25 Stat., 357, and Supp. Rev. Stat., 2 ed.,
p. 601 ).
Respectfully, yours,
LAWRENCE MAXWELL, JR.,
Acting Attorney-General.
The

SECRET.A.RY OF WAR.

EXEMPTION FROM DUTY-FOREIGN-MADE BAGS.
ection 2 of the act of October 1, 1890, chapter 1244, is exhaustive upon
the subject of free entry of goods, so that an article not mentioned in
said section can not be held to be non-dutiable because of any previous
law granting it exemption from duty; consequently, a provision of
section 7 of the act of February 8, 1875, chapter 36, admitting foreignmade b ags free of duty "after having been exported from the United
States filled with grain and returned empty" was repealed by section
55 of the said act of October 1, 1890.

DEP A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 20, 1893.
SrR: Your letter of July 10, instant, asks an opinion a to
whether there is any existing provision of law under which
foreign-made bags are entitled to free eµtry "after bavincr
been exported from the United States :filled with grain and
returned empty;" in other words, the question is, whether
the provisiou of section 7 of the act of February 8, 1875 (1
Stat., 307), "that bags other than of American manufacture
. in which grain shall have been actually exported from the
United States may be returned empty to the United States
free of duty, under regulations to be prescribed by the ecretary of the Treasury," remain still in force an<l. unrepealed
by subsequent legislation 1
I am of opinion that section 2 of the act of October 1.
1890, chapter 1244 (26 Stat., 567), entitled "An act to reduce ,
the revenue and equalize duties on imports, and for other
purposes," which provides that" On and after the sixth day
of October, eighteen hundred and ninety, un1ess otberwi e
p cially provided for in this act, the following article when
imported shall be exempt from duty," was clearly intended
by Congres to bP- exhaustive of the subject of free entry. .:;o
that an article not mentioned in said section can not be held
to be non-dutiable because of any previous law granting it
exemption from duty.
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In the case of In re Strauss et al. (46 Fed. Rep., 522), it
waR held by the circuit court of the United States for the
southern district of New York that, so far, at least, as laying
duty was concerned, the tariff act of October 1,· 1890, "as a
whole and in its entirety, from beginning to end" was
intended. to be substituted "in the place of all prior tariff
legislation," and I am of opinion that, in the matter of providing for the free entry of merchandise, said act was ·
intended to take the place of all prior tariff legislation.
It follows, therefore, that the provision of section 7 of the
act of February s, 1875, quoted in your letter, is repealed by
the subsequent act of October 1, 1890, which, by section 55,
repeals "all laws and parts of laws inconsistent with this
act," it being inconsistent with the intention of Congress, as
expressed in that act, that any previous law shall regulate
the subject of free entry in any particular whatever.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, yours,
LAWR.MN OE MAX WELL, JR.,
Acting Attorney- General.
The

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

REMISSION OF PENALTY FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT.
Where a contract for the construction of a vessel for the Government
contains a clause imposing a penalty for each day's delay beyond a
stipulatecl time for· .finishing the Yessel, and further provides that any
question as to liability for the infliction of said penalty should be
referred to the Secretary of the Navy for decision, and provides that
his decision shall be conclusive upon all parties to the contract, it is
not -proper for a subsequent Secretary of the Navy to remit the
amount of penalties imposed by his predecessor and pay that suni to
the contractor.
DEPAR'l'MENT OF JUSTICE,

.A ug1tst 4, 1893.
SIR: Under the contract of February 11, 1887, between
the Pneumatic Dynamite Gun Company and the United
States, for the construction of the U. S. S. Vesuvius, it was
provided by the sixth clause as follows:
"~he ves~el shall be completed, equipped, armed, and ready
for mspect10n for the purpose of delivery to the United
States on or before twelve months from the date of the contract. * * * In case the completion of the vessel and
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machinery and her equipment and armament shall be delayed.
beyond the said period of t~·elve months, penalties shall be
imposed upon the parties of the first part for each and every
day (except Sundays) in excess of said period, and until the
vessel, including her machinery, equipment, and armament
is complete and ready for inspection," at certain prescribed
, increasi11g ra,tes per diem. The contract provided that all
penalties thus incurred should be offset from time to time .
against any payment or payments falling due under the contract, provided that the delay was not caused by the act of
_ the United States.
The contract further provided that: ·
"In case any question shall arise under the provisions of
this contract concerning penalties, as to the liability of the
contractors to the infliction of any such penalty, such que tion, with all the facts relating thereto, shall be submitted
to the Secretary of the Navy for consideration, and his
decision thereon shall be conclusive and binding upon all the
parties to this contract."
There was a delay of four hundred and thirty-four working
days in the completion of the ve~sel, for which the Secretary
of the Navy assessed penalties amounting to $39,700, which
sum h e deducted from the contract price upon final settlement. The date of this settlement is not stated by you, but
from the other dates given by you I infer that it occurred in
the summer of 1889, four years ago.
In the Fifty-second Congress a bill for the remission of the
penalties was passed in the Senate and favorably reported in
the House by the Committee on Naval .Affairs, but not pa 'sed,
because, as it is said, it was not reached. The Gun Company
in a communication addressed to you, dated June 24, 1893,
now makes application to you to pay it the amount of the
_p enalties assessed and deducted by your predecessor, and you
submit to me the following questions:
I. Whether under the contract between the Pneumatic
Dynamite Gun Company and the United States,the Secretary
ofthe Navy had the power, under the circumstances above
stated, to impose the penalties imposed by the sixth clause of
aid contract, and
II. If aid penalties were legally imposed, has the pre ent
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Secretary of the Navy the power to remit such penalties and
pay the amount thereof to the claimants~
In vfow of the express provisions of the contract, I have
no clou bt of the porrer of the Secretary of the Navy to impose
the penalties.
The contractors claim that the delays in tbe com111etion of
the vessel were due to certain changes which were authorized by the Department and which resulted in increasing her
speed and coal capa,city and the effectiveness of her armament; but the letter of the Secretary of the Navy approving
these changes contained this provision: '' It being, however,
understood that this provision and authorization will not in
any manner affect or impair the responsibility of the contractors or relieve them from any requirement, either express or
implied, under any clause or condition in said contract contained."
The contractors also insist that no damages were in fact
suffered by the United States, and that the penalties i-;hould
not therefore have been imposed by your predecessor. But
that wa,s the very qu~stion which, by the express terms of
the contract, was submitted to the dec~sion of the Secretary
of the Navy, and the contract declares that his decision
thereon shall be conclusive and binding upon all the parties
to the contract.
The contract provides that
penalties thus incurred and
declared by the Secretary of the Navy shall be offset against
any payment or payments falling due under the contract.
Accordingly the penalties declared by your predecessor were
deducted by him from the contract price in making final settlement for the vessel when she wa,s accepted. '11 his action
on the part of your predecessor, declaring the amount due
the contractors on final settlement and acceptance, settled
the rights of both parties to the contract and fixed a,nd
determined the amount payable to the contractors. It was
the '' decision" which, by the terms of the contract, was to
be conclusive and binding upon both parties. As the result
of that <lecision, the contractors became entitled to the sum
awarded by your predecessor, to no more and to no less; it
wa · paid to them, and, in my opinion, you have no authority
in law to pay any further sum.

all
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The cases referred by counsel for the Gun Company, such
as Bowman's Case (6 Opin., 680), where it was held competent
for the Secretary of the Interior to reexan:iine the claim of an
officer for pay, which the Secretary had formerly disallowed,
and the similar decision in Chorpenning's Case (9 Opin., 3 7)
do not seem to me to be in point. The declaration of the
head of a Department on one day t.hat he will not allow, a
in Bowman's case, the demand of a person claiming to be a
creditor of the Government, presents no insuperable obstacle
to his reconsidering the claim and afterwards allowing it.
Bur in the case presented by you there was a contract
between the United States and the Gun Company, wliich
provided in express terms that any claim for penalties should
be submitted to the Secretary of the Navy for decision, and
that his decision should be conclusive and binding on all
parties. To the decision made by your predecessor ~our
years ago, in pursuance to this clause, I must give the effect
which the contract, volutarily entered into by the partie ,
declares that it shall have 7 and hold it to be conclusive and
binding upon all the parties. ·
Very respectfully,
LAWRENOE MAXWELL, JR.,
Acting .Attorney-General.

The

SECRET.A.RY OF THE NAVY.

RENT Ol!, SEAL FISHERIES-ABATEMENT OF RENT BY THE
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
The Secretary of the Treasury has no power under the law now in force
to abate the r ent provided for in the lease of March 12, 1890, to the
orth American Commercial Company, nor has he the right to reduce
the :tmount of the bonus of $7.62½ provided for in said lease to be
p aid upon each skin taken and shipped; the abatements hith erto made
were without authority of law, and the balance of the annual rental
and of the bonus of $7.62-½ per skin not heretofore paid by the ]e ·ee,
is still due to the United States and recoverable by it.
Wh ere the meaning of the Revised Statutes is obscure or ambi,ruon ,
re£ r ence may b e had to the original acts to assist in determining the
r evision, but when the meaning is clear and free from doubt, no such
reference is necessary or permissible. (20 Opinions, 51 aud 510 dis;
en ted from.)
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 7, 1893.
Srn: In 1870 the Secretary of the Treasury, in pursuance
of the authority conferred upon him by the act of July 1,
1870 (16 Stat., chap. 180, 189), made a lease to the Alaska
Commercial Company of the right to engage in the business
of taking fur seals on the islands of St. Paul and St. George
for a period of twenty years. When the Revised Statutes
were adopted this lease was outstanding, and they provided
(sec. 1963) that "When the lease heretofore made by the
Secretary of the Treasury to 'The Alaska Commercial Company' of the right to engage in taking fur seals on the
islands of Saint Paul and Saint George, pursuant to the aet
~f July one, eighteen hundred and seventy, chapter one
hundred and eighty-nine, or when any future similar lease
expires, or is surrendered, forfeited, or terminated, the Secretary shall lease to J1roper and responsible parties, for the
b~st advantage of the United States, having due regard to
the interests of the Government, the native inhabitants,
their comfort, maintenance, and education, as well as to the
interests of the parties heretofore engaged in trade and the
protection of the :fisheries, the right of taking fur seals on
the islands herein named, and of Rending a vessel or vessels to the islands for the skins of such seal for the term of
twenty years, at an annital rental of not less than fifty thousand dollars, to be reserved in such lease and secured by a
deposit .of United States bonds to that amount; and every
such lease shall be duly executed in duplicate, and shall not
be transferable."
Accordingly, on March 12, 1890, tbe Secretary of the
Treasury made a lease to the North American Commercial
Company of the. exclusive right to engage in the business of
taking fur seals on the island!, of St. George and St. Paul
for a term of twenty years from May 1, 1890. The lessee
agreed "to pay to the Treasurer of the United States each
year during the said term of twenty years, as annual rental,
the sum of sixty thousand dollars, and in addition thereto
agrees to pay the revenue tax, or duty, of two dollars la.id
upon each fur-seal skin taken and shipped by it from said
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islands of St. George and St. Paul, and also to pay to said
Treasurer the further sum of seven dollars and sixty two
and one-half cents apiece for each and every fur-seal skin
taken and shipped from said islands, and also to pay the
snm of fifty cents per gallon for each gallon of oil sold by ·it
made from seals that may be taken on said islands during
the said period of twenty years." The lessee also agreed.
"to obey and abide by any restrictions or limitations upon
the right to kill seals that the Secretary of the Treasury
sball judge necessary, under the law, for the preservation of
the seal fisheries of the United States; and it agrees that it
will not kill, or permit to be killed, so far as it can prevent,
in any year a greater number of seals than is authorized by
the Secretary of the Treasury." The lease also contains this
stipulation: '' It is understood and agreed that the number
of fnr seals tu be taken and killed for their skins upou said
islands by the North American Commercial Company during
the year ending May first, eighteen hundred and ninety-one,
shall not exceed sixty thousand."
You say that the Secretary of tlle Treasury, in settling
with the company for the seals taken during the first year of
tlie lease, made an abatement of rent, collecting from the lessee, instead of the stipulated rental of $60,000 only the sum
of 12,597, being at the rate of 60 cents .for each skin tal~n,
the lessee paying also the $7.62½ for each skin taken and
shipped by it from the islands during the year. In making
settlement for the second year of the -lease the Secretary of
the Treasury not only abated the $60,000 in accordance with
his first year's settlement, but for the bonus he ·accepted
$9,547 instead of $7.62½, A similar course was followed in
making the settlement for the third year cf the lease.
You now ask me- •
1. Whether the Secretary of the Treasury has the power
under the law now in force to abate the rent under the said
contract.
2. Assuming that he bas the power to abate the rental proportionately, wliether he has as a matter of law tbe nower
to reduce the amount of the bonus of $7.62½ which the compa11y agreed to pay upon each skin taken and shipped.
3. A suming that the action of the Secretary of the Treas-

TO THE SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

637

Rent of Seal FisJieries-Abatemeut of Rent by the Secretary of the Treasury.

ury remitting the sums mentioned in the contract was
without authority of law, whether the Government has now
any remedy by .whicb it can recover from said company the
amount actually due the United States.
Neither the lease itself nor section 1963 of the Revised
Statutes, authorizing the lease, contains any suggestion of a
right on the part of the Secretary of the Treasury to abate
the rent stipulated in the lease. But it is said 'that section
1963 of the Revised.Statutes is but pn,r t of a revision of the
act of July 1, 1870; that in order to understand the meaning
of the section we must therefore refer to the original act;
that, so referring, we :find that the Secretary of the Treasury
bad power under the original act to abate the rent not only
with respect to the first lease of twenty years authorized by
the act, but with respect to any subsequent lease; and that
therefore section 1963 of th~ Revised Statutes, although not
giving the power in terms, must nevertheless be construed as
conferring it.
I understand the rule to be that where the meaning of the
Revised Statutes is obscure or ambiguous, reference may be
had to tb~ original acts to assist in interpreting the revision,
but when the meaning is clear and free from doubt, no such
refereuce is necessary or permissible. (Dwight v. Merritt,
140 U. S., 213; Unitecl States v. Bowen, 100 U.S., 508-513.)
Applying this rule, it seems to me that no doubt arises umler
section 1963 which requires us to refer to the original act to
ascertain the meaning of the section. We are at lea~t not
at liberty, under the guise of interpretation, to adu to the
section an important term. It may be true-although I
doubt it-that under the act of July 1, 1870, the Secretary of
the Treasury would have been authorized to abate rerit not
only under the first lease, but with respect to any subsequent
lease made l>y him under that act, but when the Revised
Statutes came to be adopted the lease with foe Alaska Commercial Company had been executed. Congress recognized
that fact, referreu to it in terms, and provided that the Secretary of the Treasury should, upon the expiration of that
lea e, make a further lease for twenty years at an cinnucil
rental of not less than $50~000, and there is no suggestion of
power on his part to abate the rental so prescribed under
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any ciTcumstauces. The subsequent se~tions of the chapter
proyide in detail for the other terms of the lease.
:N"or do I think that power to abate the rent can be derived
from section 1962; because that section refers to the period
of twenty years from July 1, 1870, and not to the period
covered by the lease made to the North American Commercial
Comprwy. It is as follows:
"For the period of twenty years from the first of July,
eighteen bunclred and seventy, the number of fur seal which
may be killed for their skins upon the island of Saint Paul
is limited. to seventy-fl. ve thousaud per annum; and the number of fur seals which may be killed for their skins upon the
island of Saint George is limited to twenty-five thousand
per annum; but the Secretary of the Treasury may limit the
rjght of killing, if it becomes necessary for the preservatiou
of such seals, with such proportionate reduction of tbe rents
reserved to the Government as may be proper; and every
person who knowingly violates either of the provision , of
this ection shall be punished a provided in the preceding
section."
But if it were lawful for the Secretary of the Trea ury to
abate rent under an ordinary lease executed und~r Revi ed
Statute8, section 1963, it seems to me that the terms of the
lease made to the North American Commercial Company
preclude the notion that any such right was :reserved with
re,·1)ect to the gross annual payment of $60,000. That um
eem to be payable in any event~ and the interests of the
lei,.,. ee dependent upon regulations of the Secretary of the
'Irea nry, affecting the amount of the catch, are protected
by the provision of the lease which calls for $7.G2½ per seal,
but only for seals which are actually taken and shipped. It
mu t be remembered that the limit of 100,000 seals placed
by Congre
upon the right to take under section 1962
· evi ed Statutes, expired July 1, 1890; and that the right
of thi le,._ ee would therefore be unlimited except by regulation pre CI ibed by the Secretary of the Treasury. In view
of thi ch.an °·e in the condition of affairs it is easy to account
for a lea e which provided for a rental of $60,000 in any
event and fixed a method of adju ting the further um·
I ayable on the basis of the actual catch.
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But if the Secret.ary of the Treasury were authorized to
abate the rent under this lease I do not see upon what ground
the aLatement for the first year was made so as to charge
the lessee only 60 cents for each seal taken; for the lease
provided that no more than 60,000 seals should be takeu
that year, and the rental being $60,000 the proportionate
rate per seal would be $1 and not 60 cents.
Nor am I able to understand how the express provision for
the payment of $7.62½ "for each and every fur-seal skin taken
and shipped" is suscrptible of abatement. It is a dethiite
aucl fixed sum to be paid for each and every seal taken and
shipped, and only for those actually taken and shipped.
How can the number taken justify a change in the rate,
which, according to the expresH agreement of the parties,
is to be the same for ''each and every" seal taken, and without reference to the number taken¥
I am aware that this opinion is not in accord with the
opinions of Mr. Solicitor-General Taft of March '27 and April
1, 1891, and of Mr. Attorney-General Miller of January 17,
18!)3, a,n d it is naturally with much diffidence that I vei1ture
to express views contrary to those of gentlemen for whose
professional attainments I entertain such high regard, but I
must state the case as it appears to me.
Assuming, as it appears from the correspondence to be
claimed by the lessee, that the lease was made on a basis of a
standard catch of 100,000 seals per year, and that the $60,000
payment w~s therefore meant to represent a rate of 60 cents
IJer skin, that, added to the bonus of $7.62½ per seal, would
give us $8.22-~ as the least cost contemplated by the lessee
as payable by it for each seal taken, whereas the Government, in the settlements made by your predecessorJ received
only $1.55-ilo per skin for the second year. I can not believe
that a construction of a lease, on its face apparently so clear
and explicit, is permissible, which leads to such results, especially in view of common knowledge as to the value of s.ealkins.
If I am correct in my conclusions the abatements made by
your predecessor were without authority of law, and the balance of the annual rental and of the bonus of $7.62½ per seal
not heretofore paid by the lessee, is still due to the United
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States and recoverable by it, and is secured by the bond of
the United States deposited by the lessee with the Secretary of the Treasury as a guaranty.
Very respectfully,
L.A.WRENCE MAXWELL, JR. ,
Solicitor-General.
The

SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY •

.A. pproved:
RICHARD OLNEY.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
The Attorney-General can not be asked to authorize an investigation to
be wade in order that an official opinion may be· rendered by him
based on the result of such investigation.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE ,

.August 11, 1893.
SIR: I am in receipt of your communication of August 1,
asking my official opinion upon questions which have arisen
in connection with the contract of J olm Gillies for th e construction of a timber dry dock at the Brooklyn navy-yard.
You state that you have been informed that a court bas
held "that another person is interested in the work with
Mr: Gillies as his partner," and you ask me to authorize
investigation and examinations into the matter, and upon
such investigation and examination, to give you my official
opinion upon the sufficiency of the bond; and you also ask
my official opinion whether it is competent for your Department to make payments under the contract in accordance
with a certain power of attorney given by the contractor.
It h as been settled by rulings of my predecessors since
the earliest days that the Attorney-General can not properly
give an official opinion except upon questions of law arising
upon facts stated by the official requesting the opinion. The
Attorney-General is not authorized to examine evidence and
make :findings of fact upon which his opinion is to be based.
(19 Opin., 672; id., 696.)
The facts upon which I am asked whether or not the bond
i good and sufficient are not stated in your letter, nor can I
find from any of the papers inclosed therewith any informa-
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tion tending to show that the court has made the determination above stated, except a letter from the district attorney, in which he expresses a doubt as to whether "an or~er
of the court establishing that Gillies has a partner does
not release the sureties on the contract." An order of the
court is inclosed, but the order contains no such determination or even recital. Nor is ·the power of attorney upon
which you desire my opinion contained with the papers.
I transmitted to fOU yesterday a copy of a letter received
by me from the district attorney, relating to this matter, and
I inclose herewith a copy of the contract therein referred
to; and I would can your attention to the case of Palmer v.
Bagg (56 N. Y.; 523), and ·to the fact that said contract bears
date March 14, 1893, whife the contract between your Department and Gillies bears date November 17, 1892.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The

SECRE'.l'.A.RY OF THE NAVY.

REMOVAL FROM OFFICE.
By the act of April 25, 1890, chapter 156, the President was authorized
to appoint World's Fair Commissioners on nomination of the governors
of the States and Territories. The term of office was not fixed. Its
duties were executive in nature: Held, that commissioners were removable by joint action of the governor and President, and that an appointment" to succeedR. M. W., removed," was sufficient evidence of such
removal.
DEP.A.RTMEN'.I.~ OF JUSTICE,

.August 14, 1893.
SIR: I am in receipt of your communication of August 5,
asking my official opinion as to the rights of J.M. Webster
and Richard M. White, rival claimants to position as World's
Columbian commissioner from New M;exico.
The act of April 25, 1890, chapter 156, establishing the
World's Commission, provides that the commissioners repre~ ·
senting the respective States and Territories shall be
appointed by the President, on the nomination of the governors of the States. and Territories, respectively; and that
vacanciesin the commission maybe ·:filledin the .same manner.
No express provision is made· as to the removal of these
5687-VOL 20-41
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officers. Their term of office is not :fixed. Their duties are
executive in connection with the World's Fair at Chicago.
It appears that Mr. White was appointed a, member of
the commission fa 1890. On June 5, 1893, upon the nomination of the governor of the Territory of New Mexico, Mr.
Webster was appointed by the President commissioner from
that Territory, "to succeed Richard Mansfield White,
removed."
.
It is to be inferred that the removal was ma<le by the
appointing power, namely, by the concurrent act.ion of the
governor and President. It is my . opinion that a vacancy
was thereby created, and that Mr. Webster's appointment
was legally made.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.

The

SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

EXTENSION OF TIME TO WITHDRAW REIMPORTED WHISKY
IN BONDS.
No officer of the Government has power to extend for one year the time
for the withdrawal of certain reimported whisky now in a bonded
warehouse.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 15, 1893.
SIR: I have yours of August 12, inclosing a letter from
Messrs. George Herzog & Oo., of Cincinnati, in which they
ask the extension for the period of one year of the time
allowed by law for the withdrawal of certain reimported
domestic wLisky now in bonded warehouse at that port.
Your inquiry is whether the time for such withdrawal can
be extended. In my judgment, there is no power in the
Secretary of the Treasury or any other officer of the Government to make the extension applied for.
Very r espectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE TRE.A.SURY.
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SURETIES UPO"N GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS.
A surety upon the bond of a Governwent contractor is not discharged
from liability thereon by the contractor's thereafter agreeing to pay
the moneys received by him to some third person, or entering into any
partnership or being served with an injmiction order restraining him
from paying out any of such moneys except to the plaintiff in the
injunction suit, the Government not recoguizing any of such proceedings in any way.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

.A. ugust 17, 1893.
Srn: I am in receipt of your communication of August 16,
asking my official opinion upon questions which have arisen
in connection with the contract of John Gillies for the con&truction of a timber dry dock at the Brooklyn navy-yard.
It appears that Gillies was requir~d to give and did give
a bond, with three sureties, to secure the performance of his
contract; that Edward Freel, one of the sureties, subsequently on March 17, 1893, entered into a subcontract with
Gillies, by which he was to receive from the latter all moneys
paid by the Government under the contract; that on J un'e
21, 1893, in consideration of certain advances, Gillies gave
one Alfred J. Murray a power of attorney to receive all
moneys becoming due to him under said con tract; that on
July 14, 1893, said power of attorney was duly filed with the
Second Comptroller of the Treasury; that on July 17, 1893,
in an action commenced in the city court of Brooklyn on or
shortly after June 21, 1893, brought by Edward Freel against
John Gillies, the court appointed one Charles J. Patterson
receiver of all moneys received or to be received by John
Gillies from the U.S. Government under such contract, with
the customary incidental injunction against Gillies; aud that
the pay inspector of your Department now holds approved
vouchers for over $13,000 due Gillies from tibe United States.
It further appears tbat the power of attorney to Murray has
been filed with the Second Comptroller, while Freel has made
no claim that the Government should pay him persona,lly.
You ask me whether the Navy Department is" legally
bound by the injunction against Gillies;" second, whether a
refusal to pay Murray would give the sureties on the contract
other than Freel the ~ight to claim that, they were relieved
from their responsibility by reason of the failure of the Gov-
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ernmen t to comply with its contract to make payment to
Gillies as such payments become due; third, whether pay.
ment to Murray would ''violate or deny any of the equities
of Freel;" ·fourth, "whether the Department of Justice can
suggest any method by which this Department can bring the
contending parties, Freel, Murray, and Gillies, before the
courts to implead."
Answering your first question, I do not think that your
Department is affected by the proceedings in court. The
paper you refer to is merely an interlocutory order in a suit
to which the Government is not a party, and in which the
court does not attempt to interfere with the operations of
your Department. It does not enjoin Gillies from collectiug
his moneys from the Government, nor does it purport to give
the receiver power over the moneys until after their collection. He is appointed receiver ''of all moneys hereafter to
be received by said Gillies on said contract," and Gillies is
directed "as often as money is hereafter received by him
from said Government,'' to pay it ove·r. What he is enjoined
·from doing is "paying out except to said receiver." Nor does
the or<ler, so far as appears from the papers submitted by you,
establish "that Gillies had a partner." It is not necessary
to con ider whether the agreement of March 14, 1893, had such
effect. The agreement was not intended to affect the action
of the Government in any way. It gives Freel no rig·ht of
possession of any moneys payable by the Government to
Gillie until they are "received by him." Whether or not he
i to b e regarded as havin·g any partner to help him in the
work and share his profits is entirely immaterial to the Government, as long as it does not recognize the alleged partnership in any way. (Palmei· v. Bagg, 56 N. Y., 523.)
Answering your second and third questions, I would say
that, as the moneys are admitted to be due to Gillies, I see
no rea on why they should not be paid to him by his attorney in fact constituted for that purpose. As far as appears
Freel makes no claim that such payment would violate any
rights of his own. He has filed no protest with the Departmen t. He has not even filed a copy of the agreement of March
14, of which you would have had no information but for its
mention by the U.S. attorney. He has given no notice of his
claims except to leave a copy of the order above mentioned

TO THE SECRETA~Y OF THE TREASURY.

64&

Quarantine-Supervision of State Officials.

with the pa.y inspector. An answer to your fourth question
does not, therefore, seem to be required.
You refer in your letter to an enlargement of the work
required under the contract involving additional compensation of $45,556, and an extension of time for the completion
of the dock. This matter has no bearing upon the questions
asked with relation to the subsequent dealings with Freel and
Murray, and I do not understand that my opinion as to its
legal effect is desired.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The

SECRET.A.RY OF

THE NAVY.

QUARANTINE-SUPERVISION OF ST.A.'J'.E OFFICIALS.

Under the quarantine act of February 15, 1893, chapter 114, a regulation
ma,y pr_(.)perly be made requiring the inspection by Federal authorities
of States and local maritime quarantine to ascertain whether the
national quarantine regulatio~s are being complied with.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 24, 1893.
SIR: I am in receipt of your communication of this date,
asking an official opinion as to the legality of the proposed '
additional quarantine regulation to be promulgated by your
Department.
The question you ask is whether the proposed regulation
is authorized by the act of Congress approved February 15,'
1893, chapter 114, entitled "An act granting additional
quarantine powers and imposing additional duties upon the
Marine-Hospital Service." Section 3 or.'this act provides:
'' That the Supervising Surgeon-General of theMarine-Hospital Service shall, * * * under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, cooperate with and aid State and municipal boards of health in the execution and enforcement of the
rules and regulations of such boards, and in the execution and
enforcement of the rules and regulations made by the Secretary of the Treasury to prevent the introduction of contagious
or infectious diseases into the United States from foreign
countries. • * * A.ndall rules and regulations made by the
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Secretary of the Treasury shall operate uniformly, and in no
manner discriminate against any port or place; and at, uch
ports and places within the United States as have no quarantine regulations under State or municipal authority where
such regulations are, in the opinion of the Secretary of the
Treasury, necessary, * * * and at sncb ports and place
within the United States where quarantine regulations exist
under the authority of the State or municipality which, in the
opinion of the Secretary of the Treasury, are not sufficien~
* * * the Secretary of the Treasury shall, if in his judgment
it is necessary and proper, make such additional rules and
regulations as aTe necessary to prevent the introduction of
such diseases into the United States from foreign countries.
* * * .And when said rules and regulations shall have
been made, they shall be promulgated by the Secretary of tlle
Treasury and enforced by the sanitary authorities of tlle
States and municipalities where the State or municipal health
authorW es will undertake to execute and enforce them; but
if the State or municipal authorities shall fail or refu e to
enforce said rules and regulations, the President sh all execute
and enforce the same, and adopt such measures as in bis judgment shall be necessary to prevent the introduction or spread
of such diseases, and may detail or appoint officers for that
purpose."
The proposed regulation is confined to maritime quaran- ·
tin s, and is as follows:
"In the execution of the duties imposed upon him by the
act of :February 15~ 1893, the Supervising Surgeon -General
of the Marine-Hospital Service shall, from time to time, personally or through a duly detailed officer of the MarineHospital Service, inspect the maritime quarant ine of the
United States, State and local, as well as national, for the
purpose of ascertaining whether the quarantine regulation ,
pre cribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, have been or
are being complied with. The Supervising Surgeon-General,
or the officer detailed by him as inspector, shall at his di ·
cretion visit any incoming vessel or any vessel detained in
qua rant ine, and all portions of the quarantine e tablishment,
for the above-named purpose; and with a view to certifying,
if need be, that the regulations have been, or are being
enforced."
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The right to oversee the enforcement of the regulations of
your Department is essentia1, both that you may modify or
add where experience shows imperfection to exist, and that
you may ascertain whether the State or municipal authorities are, or are not, carrying them out. It will be the duty
of the President himself to execute your regulations if ever
the State or munfoipality shall fail to do so. From the nature
of the case, the decision of the question whether or not thi~
time has come must rest with the President; and that he may
decide promptly and advisedly the inspection provided by
the proposed regulation is essential. Nor, without such
inspection, can the Surgeon-General intelligently cooperate
with the local boards of health.
Other provisions of the same act show that inspection of
local quarantines by officers of your Department is conteJnplated. Thus, section 6 provides as follows:
"That on the arrival of an infected vessel at any port not
pro-,. .ided with proper facilities for treatment of the same, the
Secretary of the Tr~asury may remand said vessel, at its own
expense, to the nearest national or quarantine station, where
accommodations and appliances are provided for the necessary disinfecting and treatment of the vessel, passengers,
and cargoes."
The intent of this section could not be properly carried
out without constant inspection by your Department of the
facilities afforded by local authorities.
In my opinion, the proposed regulation is therefore lawful
and in accordance with the act.
Very respectfully,
EDW.A.RD B. WHITNEY,
Acting Attorney- General.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.
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ATTORNEY-GENERAL-BOARD OF GENERAL APPRAISERSBICYCLES AS PERSONAL EFFECTS.
While the Treasury Department may accept decisions of the Board of
G~neral Appraisers as a rule of action to be followed in the classification uf other importations, it is not compelled by law to do so.
Official opinions of the Attorney-General should be followed by other
Departments.
The opinion of Attorney-General Brew&.ter (17 Opin., 679), as to exemption from duty of bicycles, that they are '' personal effects," adhered to.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 28, 1893.
SIR: I am in receipt of your communication of August 24,
respecting a conflict between rulings of this Department and
of the Board of General .Appraisers in construing the tariff'
law of 1883.
The conflict arose ·in relation to bicycles. It appears that
in May, 1884, they were held to be "personal effects," within
the meaning of that law, by an official opinion of AttorneyGeneral Brewster (17 Opin., 679), which opinion was concurred in and officially adopted and promulgated by Secretary Folger on April 9, 1884 (Syn. of Dec. Treas. Dept. No.
63 4); but that, in November, 1890, the Board of General
Appraisers held to the contrary. It does not appear that
any expre ' S ruling has been made under the tariff act of
October 1, 1890.
My opinion is a ked as to whether your Department would
be ju tified in following the opinion of Attorney-General
Brewster, notwithstanding the ad verse decision of the Board
of General Appraiser . I concur entirely in the opinion
expre eel by you, with relation to the decisions of the board,
that while your Department may accept such decision as a
rule of action to be followed in the classification of other
importations, it is not compellecl by law to do so. On the
other hand, while the Attorneys-General have never claimed
for their official opinions the force of law, it ha alway been
reg rd cl a the proper practice to follow their guidance (5
pin. 7; 6 Opin., 34; 7 Opin., 699; 9 Opin., 37), and Conwhile never directly legi lating upon this point, eems
nt mplate that they are to be given practical effect.
v. tat., 35 .)
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I understand your question, therefore, substantially to be
whether, in view of the decision of the Board of General
Appraisers, and of the changes in statutory phraseology
made by the act of 1890, the opinion of 1884 is still adhered
to by this Department. I would answer, after careful consideration, that I see no reason to change it, and that in my
opinion bicycles are ~xempt from duty under the act of 1890
in like cases with other "personal effects."
Very respectfully,
EDWARD -B. WHITNEY,
Acting Attorney-General.
The

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION-ATTOR,NEY-GENERAL.
The construction 0f r~gulations of the Civil Service Commi8sion is a
matter ~ntirely within the province of the Commission, and should
not be attempted by the Attorney-General.
Uncfor the civil-service act of January 16, 1883, chapter 27, and the legislative apriropriation act of July 11, 1890, chapter 667, any person may
apply to be examined for appointment in the departmental service
who is and has been for six months an actual, bona fide, resident of
the county of which he claims to, be a citizen. The President and
Civil Service Commissioners can make all reasonable regulations as
to the nature of the testimony required to establish these facts; but
th~ Commission can not by regulation annul the definition of the
statutory language as by requiring six months' continuous physical
presence in the county as well as residence.
·
The Attorney-General can not properly attempt to frame a definition of
statutory language to cover all future cases.
DEPARTMEN'.l' OF JUSTICE,

August 29, 1893.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of August 19, inclosing a request submitted to you by
the Civil Service Commission, and asking me to furnish an
opinion thereon.
The civil-service law, January 16, 1883, chapter 27, provide substantially that the rules promulgated by the President for carrying it into effect shall have the force of law.
It provides further that appointments to the departmental
ervice " shall be apportioned among the States and Terri-
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torie and the Di trict of Columbia upon the ba iR of population a a certaiued at the la. t preceding cen us. Every
applicatiou for an examination shall contain, among other
things, a statement under oath setting forth hi or her
actual bona fide residence at the time of making the application, as well as how long he or she has been a re ident of
such place."
General Rule III, promulgated by the President in accordance with this act, provides as follows:
"Every applicant for examination for the classified departmental service and the classified Railway Mail Service
must support the statements of his application paper by certificates of persons acquainted with him, residents of the
State, Territory, or district in which he claims bona fide residence, and the Commission shall prescribe the form and
number of such crrtificates."
General Rule VIII provides as follows:
"The Commission shall have authority to prescribe regulations ullder and in accordance with these general rule and
the rules relating ~pecially to each of the several branche of
the classified service."
By tlle legi lative appropriation act of July 11, 1890, Congre further provided:
"That hereafter every application for examination before
the ivil Service Commis ion for appointment in the departmental ic: ervice in the District of Columbia shall be accompanied by a certificate of an officer, with his official eal
attached, of the county and State of which the applicant
claim to be a citizen, that such applicant was at the time
of making such application an actual, bona fide re ident of
said county, and had been such re ident for a period of not
les than six months n xt preceding; but thi provision hall
not apply to person who may be in the ervice and eek promotion or appointment in any other branches of the Government."
With intent to effectuate the intent of this law the Civil
Service ommi ion, on March 7, i 93, made the following
order:
"That on and after the fir t day of April next no application hall be a cepted for an examination for the departm nta,l rvice where tbe appointment would be charged to
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the apportionment, unless it shall be shown to the satisfaction of the Commission that the applicant is at the time and
has been for the six months next preceding actually living and
resid·ing and having his or her place of abode in the State in
which residence is claimed, or that he or she is employed in
the public service of said State or of the United States, or
that the applicant pays poll tax or is a voter in said State,
or is the wife or minor child of a person who is then in the
pu-blic service of the State or of the. United States as aforesaid, or the wife o~ minor chi1d of a person who is such voter
or pays such poll tax."
Further regulations were then also made as to the form of
proof in the four excepted cases. ·
The question presented for my opinion is, whether the
order of March 7, 1893, is a regulation within the power of
the Commission to make. This depends upon the construction given to the words "actually living and residi11·g and
having his 01· her place of abode." If such construction does
not involve narrowing the statutory requirement of ·" actual
bona fide residence" there is no serious question for my consideration. If, however, the words are construed to require
continuous physical presence of the applicant in the county
of his residence for six months next before his application
then the regulation is in the nature of a statute of frauds
and demands careful consideration .
Section 2 of the civil-service law provides for "open competitive examinations." I think that this phrase implies the
privilege of competition in every citizennot specially excepted
by law. If this view be correct, then if an applicant can
show ''actual, bona fide residence" at the time of applying,
for the period required, and can obtain the required ·certificates to that fact, he "is entitled to demand an examination.
The President and commissioners can make all reasonable
regulations as to the nature of the testimony required. If a
question of fact is presented by the papers the decision of
the Commission is conclusive; but I do not think that the
Commi. sion can narrow the definition of the statutory phrase.
It would not be proper for me to attempt here a definition
of the words "actual, bona fide residence." As stated by
.Attorney-General Miller, in his opinion rendered to your
predecessor on April 1, 1891, it involves "a mixed question of
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law and fact, to be determined in each instance upon it own
peculiar facts. A general rule applicable to all ca e can
not be formulated." To attempt such a formulation to cover
ca es that may arise in the future is beyond the sphere of
this Department. (18 Opin., 414.) Nor would it be proper
for me to attempt the construction of the regulation. That
is a matter entirely within the province of the Civil Service
_
Commission. (18 Opin., 321.)
My answer to the question submitted must therefore simply
be that, if the words "living and residing and having his or
her place of abode," in the order of March 7, 1893, are construed as equivalent to the words "bona fide residing," the
or<l.er is a lawful regulation; but that if they are given any
more restrictive construction the order is to that extent
unauthorized.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The PRESIDENT.
E RETARY OF THE INTERIOR-FREEDMEN'S HOSPITAL AND
ASYLUM.
The relations of the Secretary of the Interior and the Freedmen's Hospital and A, ylum are unchanged by the act of March 3, 1893, chapter
199, save tlrnt the Commissioners of the District of Columbia are given
tho upervi ion and control of expenditures for the Freedmen's Hospital and A ylum.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

A iigiist 31, 1893.

Srn : I have yours of the 28th instant, which in effect calls
for my opinion respecting the relations of the Secretary of
the Interior to the Freedmen's Hospital and Asylum, since
the pa ·sage of the act of March 3, 1893 (27 Stat., fi37), which
contains the following: "And hereafter the expenditures for
the Freedmen' Hospital and Asylum shall be under the
upervi ion and control of the Commissioner, of the Di~trict
of olumbia."
In my judgment, the opinion of the attorney for the Di trict of Columbia contains a, correct statement of the law.
ith th exception that the Commissioners of the Di trict
of olumbia are giv n the supervision and control of expenditure for the Freedmen's Hospital and Asylum, the powers
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and duties of the Secretary of the Interior are unchanged by
the act of March 3, 1893, and remain the same as before its
enactment.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRE'.].'ARY OF 'l'HE INTERIOR.

APPROPRIATION.

Under the terms of the joint resolution of Congr1?ss approved February
25, 1893, the Secretary of State can, not lawfully authorize the construction of a wharf different in character from that specified in the
resolution, even if from a change of circumstances the construction of
that s:>rt of wharf with that appropriation has become impracticable.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

September 4, 1893.
Srn: Yours of the 31st ultimo asks my opinion upon the
question whether, under the terms of the joint resolution of
Congress approved February 25, 1893, the Secretary .of State
can lawfully authorize the construction of a wharf different
in character from that specified in the resolution, which
'iescribes the structure as a wharf "of cast-iron screw piles,
with timber deck, and · planned and estimated for by Col.
Thomas L. Casey."
The language of the resolution is too clear and explicit to
leave room for difference of construction. The Secretary of
State is not empowered to build any wharf which will answer
the purposes ·congress may be supposed to have in view.
He is empowered to accomplish those purposes, or to aim to
do so, by a wharf of a particular design and built of certain
specified materials. He can lawfully apply the appropriation made by the resolution only to that sort of wharf, and
he gets -no additional power in the premises because, from a,
change of circumstances, the construction of that sort of ·
wharf with that appropriation has become impracticable.
For that state of things the only a,ppropriate remedy is in
additional legislation by Congress.
Respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF STATE.
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DI TRICT ATTORNEY-EXTRA COMPEN ATION.
The opinions of Attorneys-General Garland and Miller (18 Opin., 192;
19 Opin., 354) followed as to con truction of Revised Statutes 27,
relating to extra compensation of the district attorn y for the southern district of New York.
DEP AR'.l'MENT OF JUSTICE,

September 7, 1893.
SIR: In your communfoation of September 2, you ask my
official opinion as to whether the district attorney for the
outbern district of New York is entitled to compensation,
under section 827 of the Revised Statutes, for appeariug in
customs cases in. his district, in addition to the salary of
$6,000 which is provided "for all his services" in section
770.
Departmental service has al ways alloweu additional compensation in the ca es referred to, notwithstanding the
restrictive words of section 770. This practice was not
adopteJ. inadvertently, but received careful consideration
from the Solicitors of the Treasury and Commissioners of
Ou tom . Tbe question was also ubmitted to my immediate predecessor , Attorneys-General Garland and Miller
ach of whom, in an official opinion, held that the practice
wa correct. (18 Opin., 192; 19 Opin., 354.) I see nothiug
which would warrant me to reverse their decisions. Your
question is therefore answered in the affirmative.
Very respectfully,
RIUHARD OLNEY.

The

SECRE'fARY OF '.l'HE TREASURY.

COMPTROLLER-SOLICITOR OP THE TREASURY-ATTORNEYGENERAL.
The Comptroller am\ Commissioner of Customs have no legal statu. as
atlvi ·ers of the ecretary of the Treasury upon legal q ue tion . Their
01Jinions are purely extra official and r endered by courtesy only.
Tho opiuion of tile Solicitor of the Treasury may be a ·ked upon any
qu tion of pure law or of mixed law and fact arising in the Trea ury
Dcy,artruent except question involving the con truction of the Contitution ofth
nitecl tates. His opjnions have, however no bindin...,. fur e .
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Questions of pure law actually arising in the admjnistration of the Treasury Department, and requiring the personal _c onsideration of the Secretary, may be referred to the Solicitor of the Treasury or to the Attorney-General. If referred to the latter, however, his answ~r should ue
regar<lecl uy the Department as law until withdrawn by him or overruled by the courts.
·
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

·

. September 8, 1893.
Sm: I am in receipt of your communication of August 30,

in closing reports from the First and Second Comptrollers, the
Commissioner of Customs and .the Solicitor of the Treasury,
in relation to the extent of their respective jurisdictions and
the extent to which they are customarily called upon to give
legal opinions. You ask me to advise you what I consider to
be the limits of the j urisdictiou of each of the said officers in
this matter.
l d.o not think that the First or Second Comptroller or
the Commissioner of Customs has any legal status as an
adviser upon legal questions. These gentlemen are accounting officers holding great power, but their function is to take
action, not to advise others how to act. Each is the trial
judge within bis own sphere, and, as provid~d by section 191
of the Revised Statutes, the balances certified by him upon
the settlement of public accounts "shall not be subject to be
changed or modified by the heads of Departments, but shall
be conclusive upon the Executive branch of the Government, and be subject to revision only by Congress or the
proper courts." It is, however, customary to ask their opinions on questions of law, and this custom is a convenient
and proper and even necessary one within· certain limits.
The custom doubtless arose from the importance of knowing beforehand when expenses were to be incurred what the
decision of the Oompti·oller would be afterwards when the
question of legality should come up upon the settlement of
accounts. In form the Uomptro1ler is asked for legal advice;
in fact, what is desired is information as to bis future action.
He is in uo way bound. in settling accounts to follow his own
unofficial opinion previously formed. He Joes, however, do
so on the principle of sta,re decisis. I should .infer from the
1 eports of the Comptrollers that their advice is often asked
on other points of law which are not anticipatory of future
decisions by themselves. Answering such questions is a
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merely voluntary matter, and the answers are, of course,
purely extra-official. The advice thus given is doubtless
intrinsically most valuable, but otherwise it differs in no way
from ad vice on the same subject by any outsider.
The Solicitor of the Treasury is, however, an adviser
recognized by the law. Section 349 of the Revised Statutes
provides that "there shall be in the Department of Justice
Solicitor of the Treasury.'' Section 350 provides that
"the officers named in the preceding section sh~ll exercise
their functions under the sup~rvision and control of t.he
head of the Department of Justice." Section 360 provides
that "the Attorney-General may require any solicitor or
officer of the Department of Justice to perform any duty
required of the Department or any officer thereof." Section
361 provides that "the officers of the Department of Justice,
under the direction of the Attorney-General, shall give all
opinions and render all services requiring the skill of persons learned in the law necessary to enable the President
a nd h eads of Departments and the heads of bureaus and
-0tber officers in the Departments to discharge their respectjve duties."
The Solicitor of the Treasury had been, prior to the act of
June 22, 1870, establishing the Department of Justice, an
officer of the Treasury Department. It had, as I am informed,
been the custom, long prior to that time, for him to give legal
advice to the Treasury Department. That statute provided
that he, with the Solicitor of Internal Revenue and other officers, '' shall be transferred from the Departments with which
they are now associated to the Department of Justice." I
have not found any general instructions in writing from the
Attorney-General to the Solicitor of the Treasury in relation
to t he performance of his duties subsequent to the taking
effect of the act of 1870. This is, perhaps, due to the fact
that at that time t he two officers occupied adjoining rooms
in the Treasury Department, so that communication between
them was oral. The Solicitor of the Treasury, however, has
ever since continued to ad vise the Secretary of the Treasury
and heads of bureaus subordinate to him; and such advice
ha ' been regarded as rendered by him in the character of
a istant to the Attorney-General and in accordance with the
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provision of section 361 above quoted. His advice may be
asked upon any question of pure law or of mixed law and
fact arising in the Treasury Department, with the single
exception of questions involving the construction of the Constitution of the United 8ta~es, which should be submitted to
the Attorney-General for his personal opinion. (Rev. Stat.,
358.) The Solicitor's opinions, however, have in noway binding force, nor ate they distinguishable from those rendered
by the Comptr_ollers, except by the fact that the advice of the
Comptrollers is purely voluntary, while it is the Solicitor's
duty to render legal assistance. This is one of the duties for
which he receives compensation, while to compensate the
Comptrollers for such work would be a violation of law.
(Rev. Stat., 189.)
The Solicitor of the Treasury is the only person from whom
legal advice. can be required by the Treasury pepartment,
except upon questions of p'u re law actually arising in the
administration of the Department and requiring the personal
consideration of the head of the Department, as distinguished
from mere questions of administration arising in its subordinate bureaus. The advisory relation of the Solicitor to the
Secretary of the Treasury is precisely that of the Assistant
Attorney-General, appointed in pursuance of the act of February 25, 1871, to the Secretary of the Interior. This Assistant Attorney-General is not expressly endowed by statute
with any advisory relation to the Interior Department, but
he performs there, by assignment of the Attorney-General,
under section 361, the same general duties which the Solicitor of the Treasury performs in the Treasury Department by
like assignment. As illustrative, therefore, of the functions
of the Solicitor of the Treasury in your Department, I may
quote from an opinion rendered to· the Secretary of the
Interior on June 7, 1893, by Solicitor-General Maxwell and
approved by myself. In that case the question was whether
the C :m1missiouer of Patents could legally appoint a referee
to take testimony in a disbarmentproce_ediug before him. He
was advised that this question was not a question of law
arising in the administration of the Department such as
could properly be submitted to the Attorney-General for an
official opinion. The following language was used:
5687-V0L 20--42
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"It has been held frequently that the statutes pre cribing
the duties of th~ Attorney-General (Rev. Stat., 354, 356) do
not authorize or require him to give an official opinion except
to the President or to the head of an Executive Department;
and it would seem to follow that the opinion should be
needed for the guidance of the head of a Department, and
should relate to some matter calling for action or decision on
his part. * * * For the guidance of the heads of bureau
and other officers of the Departments in the discharge of
their duties, provision is made by section 361 of the Revised
Statutes for assistance from the officers of the Department
of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney-General; and
an Assistant Attorney-General and law clerks have accordingly heen assigned to the Department of the Interior, to
whom, it seems to me, the Commissioner of Patents should
submit bis question. * * * It is not meant by this
opinion to deny the authority or duty of the Attorney-General to answer questions of law submitted to him by the head
of a Department, although at the instance of the bead of a
bureau, where the question relates to matters within the
direct or supervisory control of the head, and is deemed by
the head to be of such difficulty or importance as to require
the personal attention of the Attorney-General."
There is thus, in the matter of rendering opinions, an
exclu ive jurisdiction of the Attorney-General, an exclusive
jurisdiction of the Solicitor of the Treasury, and a concurrent jurisdiction in both. Whether questions arising
in the concurrent jurisdiction (that is, questions of pure Jaw
actually ari ·ing in the administration of the Department
and relating to matters within the direct or supervisory control of its head) shall be referred to the Attorney-General,
to the Solicitor of the Treasury, or to both, is entirely within
the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury. I do not
feel that I can intelligently advise as to the exerci e of thi
di cretion, nor would it, indeed, be proper for me to do o
(17 Opin., 332). Any suggestions made by me must be considered extra-official and as coming from one whose lack of
practical knowledge of the administration of the Department makes bis opinion on this point far inferior in value to
your own. I would, however, call attention to one point in
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which the opinions of the Attorney-General differ from
those of the Solicitor of the Treasury.
The act of 1870, section 4, establishing the Departmrnt of
Justice, provided tbat written opinions prepared by a subordinate in the Department rnay be approved by the AttorneyGeneral, and that" su~h approval so indorsecl thereon shaU
give the opinion the same force and effect as belong to
the opinions of the Attorney-General." This provision is
embraced in substantially the same language in section 358
of the Revised Statutes. Evidently, therefore, Congress
contemplates that the official opinions signed or indorsed in
writing by the Attorney-General shall have some actual and
practical force. Congress's intention can not be doubted
that administrative officers should regard them as law until
withdrawn by the Attorney-General or overruled by the
courts, thus confirming the view which generally prevailed,
though sometimes hesitatingly expressed, previous to the
establishment of the Department of Justice. (5 Opin., 97;
6 Opin., 334; 7 Opin., 699,700; 9 Opin., 36, 37.)
Instances have recently come to my notice where official
opinions of former Attorneys-General have been practically
overruled by the Solicitor of the Treasury or administrative
boards. These cases were probably due to inadvertence, yet
I would suggest that questions of great importance and
involving the future course of practice ·should be referred to
the Attorney-General, and that the fact of such reference .
and the opinion when received should be brought to the
notice of the gentlemen whose advice is customarily asked
in your Department, that uniformity of rulings may be
secured.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY

The

SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

660

HON. RICHARD OLNEY.

"Additional Duties"-Penn.lties-Remission of Forfeiture.

"ADDITIONAL DU'rIES "-PENALTIES-REMISSION
FEI1'URE.

OF FOR-

The "additional duties" provided for by the customs administrative
act of June 10, 1890, chapter 407, are penalties within the meaning of
Revised Statutes, sections 5292 and 5293, and the anti-moiety act of
June 22, 1874-, chapter 391.
The Secretary of the Treasury may, therefore, remit such additional
duties, but has no power to remit any part of the duties strictly so
called, however erroneously they may have been assessed.
The law looks at facts, not names.
A construction which would make the results of a law unreasonable
should be avoided.
DEP.A.R'.I.'MENT OF JUSTICE,

September 9, 1800.
Sm: I have given careful consideration to the questions
raised by your communication of August 11, relating to the
remission of penalties by the Treasury Department. I understand that you deoire no opinion as .to the case of the Madison Square Garden Company. This leaves two questions to
be answered.
First. The first question you ask is whether the so-called
"additional duties" provided for by section 7 of the customs adminstrative act of June 10, 1890, chapter 407, are
penalties within the meaning of sections 5292-3 of the Revised
Statutes, and sections 17-20 of the antimoiety act of June
22, 1874, chapter 391.
Although this question was substantially decided in the
affirmative by the Attorney-General under prior acts of like
import as long ago as 1843, yet recent rulings of the Secretaries of the Treasury have been to the contrary, supported
by an opinion of the ·Solicitor of the Treasury rendered in
1886. While these rulings have not established a practiclj so
continuous as to govern the statutory construction, yet, as I
adhere to the opinion expressed by my predecessor, they call
for a more extended discussion of the subject than is usual
in opinions rendered by this Department.
Section 7 of the act of 1890 provides as follows:
"And if the appraised value of any article of imported
merchandise shall exceed by more than 10 per cent the value
declared in the entry, there shall be levied, collected, and
paid, in addition to the duties imposed by law on such merchandise, a further sum equal to 2 per cent of the total
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appraised value of each 1 per cent that such appraised value
exceeds the value declared in the entry; and the additional
duties shall only apply to the particular article or articles in
each invoice which are undervalued; arid if such appraised
value shall exceed the value declared in the entry more than
40 per cent, such entry may be held to be presumptively
fraudulent, and the collector of customs may seize such merchandise and proceed as in cases of forfeiture for violations
of the customs laws/;
The sections above cited from the Revised Statutes and
the anti-moiety act of 1874 provide procedure by which" any
:fine, penalty, or forfeiture" may be remitted in a proper case
by .t he Secretary of the Treasury. This system of remission
has come down with some changes of detail from the act of
March 3, 1797, chapter 13. The power of remission applie~
by section 5292 of the Revised Statutes to "any person who
shall have incurred any :fine, penalty, forfeiture, or disability
* * * by authority of any provisions of law for imposing
or collecting any duties or taxes * * *;" by section 5293
to '' a fine, penalty, or forfeiture"; by section 17 of the act
of 1874 to "any person who shall be charged with having
incurred any :fine, penalty, forfeiture, or disability other than
imprisonment.'' The act of 1797, under which the opinion
of my predecessor above referred to was given, relates to
''any person- or persons who shall have incurred any :fine,
penalty, forfeiture, or disability * * * by force of any
present or future law of the United States for the laying,
levying, or collecting any duties or taxes * * *." There
is no doubt that if the "additional duty" ·is a penalty, these
provisions apply to the case, as they are to be construed as
forming, with the act of 1890, one complete system of tariff
legislation.
On principle, it is clear that the so -called "additional
duty" is a penalty. It is not provided for the purposes of
revenue. It is no less a penalty because proof of fraud or
other willful misconduct is not a necessary preliminary to its
infliction. It is in its essence a :fine inflicted to promote
honesty; nor is it' less a penalty because it is called something else. The law looks at facts, not names. As will be
shown, it was in fact called a penalty when it :first appeared
in the statute book. The results of the contrary construe-
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tion would be most unreasonable and therefore to be avoided
if possible. One result would be that the Secretary of the
Treasury could remit when fraud was charged; otherwise, not.
If the increase of valuation on the appraisement amounts to
40 per cent, the goods may be seized for presumptive fraud,
according to the express provisions of the law, and then the
Secretary's power of remission attaches. If, however, the
increase in valuation by the appraisement is between 10 and
40 per cent only, then, according to the construction adopted
by the Treasury Department, no seizure can be made unless
there is some l)Ositive indication of fraud. If there are iudications of fraud, a seizure can be made, followed by a remission. If there are no indications of fraud, there can be no
remission, because there can be no seizure. Such intent
should not be imputed to Congress except in a very clear
case.
It now remains to trace the history of the statutpry provisions and consider decisions of the courts and opinions of
the Attorney-General under the language of the older statutes.
The" additional duties" of the act of 1890 originated as
early as the act of April 20, 1818, chapter 79. Section 11 of
that act, after providing for appraisal of goods subject to
ad valorem duties on suspicion of undervaluation, enacts
that "if the value at which the same shall be appraised shall
exceed by 25 per cent the invoice prices thereof, then in
addition * * • there shall be added 50 per cent on the
appraised value; on which aggregate amount the duties on
such goods, wares, and merchandise shall be estimated."
In this and other early acts the penal duty was arrived at
by the method of enlarging the basis on which the ad
valorem duty was computed, not as now by simply increas ing the percentage of the duty.
Section 25 of this act enacted: '' That all penalties and
forfeitures incurred by force of this act shall be s1ted for,
recovered, distributed, and accounted for in the manner prescribed by" the act of March 2, 1799, '' and may be mitigctted
or remitted in the manner prescribed by" the act of March
3, 1797. .Attorney-General Wirt, in his opinion of February
19, 1821 (5 Opin., 730), ruled that the 50 per cent could not be
remitted; but this was because he thought Congress to
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have "confined the mitigating and remitting power of the
Secretary of the Treasury to such penalties and forfeitures
as are, according to the provisions of the act, to be recovered
by suit." This construction would have prevented the distribution of moieties out of this 50 per cent among the customs officers; it seems either to have been retracted or disregarded, with the subsequent approval -of the Supreme
Court (Bartlett v. Kane, 16 How., 263,274).
The act of March 1, 1823, chapter 21, section 13, repeated
the language quoted from section 11 of the former act, adding
the following words: "Pro ,vided, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to impose the said penalty of 50 per
cent for a variance between the bona fide invoice of goods
produced in the manner specified in the proviso of the fifth
section of th.is act, and the current value of the said merchandise in the country where the same may have been originally
manufactured or produced." The fifth section referred to
"the penalty provided for in the thirteenth section of this act."
The tariff act of May 19, 1828, provided in section 8 for anappraisal in all cases of goods subject to ad valorem duties,
or to any other duties regulated according to the value of the
artjcle, and enacted in section 9 that where the appraised
value "shall by 10 per cent exceed the invoice value thereof,
in addition to the duty imposed by law on the same, if they
had been invoiced at their real value, as aforesaid, there shall
be levied and collected, on the same goods, wares, and merchandise, 50 per cent of the duty so imposed on the same
goods, wares, and merchandise, when fairly invoiced: Provided, always, that nothing in this section contained shall be
construed to impose the said !~st-mentioned duty of 50 per
cent for a variance between the bona fide invoice of goods produced in the manner specified in the proviso to the eighth
section of this act, and the current value of the said merchandise in the country where the same may have been originally manufactured or produced: And, further, that the penalty of 50 per cent imposed by 'the act of 1823' shall not be
deemed to apply or attach to any goods, wares, or merchandise which shall be subject to the additional duty of 50 per
cent, as aforesaid, imposed by this section of this act."
It will be noticed that this first proviso is substantially
a copy of the proviso in the act of 1823, only changing the
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word" penalty" to '' duty;" but that in referring to the
former act it still retains the word "penalty." The change
of wording was probably made, in accordance with the
extreme hjgh-tariff policy of the framers of this famous act,,
to prevent a strict construction iu favor of the importer.
This purpose failed, as we shall see, if it ever existed, for
the Supreme Court looked through the name at t he ubstance of the thing, and found it to be still a penalty, as
unconsciously confessed by the legislators in this second
proviso.
The tariff act of August 30, 1842, chapter 270, section 17,
repeated the language of section 9 of the act of 1828, but
without the provisos. By section 26 prior laws as to "the
recovery, collection, distribution, and remission of all fines,
penalties, and forfeitures," were continued as if r eenacted.
It was under this act that the opinfon of .Attorney-General Legare was asked by the Secretary of the Treasury
whether he had power to remit the 50 per cent as a penalty,
·w ithin the meaning of the act of 1797. This question was
answered in the affirmative on June 7, 1843 (4 Opin., 182),
the Attorney-General stating that he was "very clear that
the 50 per cent * * * is a penalty."
The " act relative to collectors and other officers of the
cu toms" of February 11, 1846, chapter 7, impliedly recognized the correctness of tbi8 opinion by providing that "no
portion of the additional duties provided by" the act of
1842, section 17, "shall be deemed a fine, penalty, or forfeiture for the purpose of being distributed to any officer of the
citstomsj but the whole amount thereof, when received , shall
be paid directly into the Treasury."
· The tariff act of July 30, 1846, chapter 74, section 8, after
providing for entry and appraisement of imported goods,
enacted that if the appraised value thereof shall exceed by
10 per cent or more the value so declared on the entry, then,
in addition to the duties imposed by law on the same, t here
shall be· levied, collected. and paid a duty of 20 per cent ad
valorem on such appraised value." This act was held not to
repeal the administrative provisions of customs law not
expressly reenacted (Ring v. 1lfaxwell, 17 How.; 147).
In Greely v. Thompson, 10 How., 225, and Maxwell v. Griswold, id., 242, a strict construction was placed by the Supreme
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Court on these provisions of the acts of 1842 and 1846,
respectively, on the ground that they were penal in nature.
In Bartlett v. Kane, 16 How., 263, 274, the court callecl the
20 per cent under the latter act an "amercement," and held
that, not being a duty in the true sense of the word, its
return could not be demanded upon reexportation. Speak.ing of these "additional duties," Mr. Justice Campbell said
that'' they were enacted as discouragements to fraud, -and
to prevent efforts by importers to escape the legal rates of
duty. In several of the acts this additional duty has been
distributed among officers of the customs upon the same conditions as penalties and forfeitures. .As between the United
States and the importer, and in reference to the subject of
drawback and debenture, it must still be regarded in the
light of a penal duty." (See also Ring v. ]ltfaxwell, 17 How.,
147, 150, 151; Sta,irs v. Peaslee, 18 How., 521, 527-529; Belcher
v. Lawrason, 21 Huw., 251, 256; Tappan v. United States, 2
Mason, 393, 40~; Swanston v. Morton, l Curt., 294; Kriesler
v. Morton, 2 Curt., 239; 17 Opin., 268; id., 436).
The act of June 30, 1864, chapter 171, section 23, in terms
reenacted the provision above quoted from the act of 1846;
and section 22 continued all existing laws. Section 23 was
repealed, but reenacted in this particular, by the act of
March 3, 1865, chapter 80, section 7, and its language was
incorporated in section 2900 of the Revised Statutes, which
remained the law until the enactment of the customs administrative act of 1800 now in question. Under the latter, as
under its predecessors, the so-called " additional duty " is
recognized by the Supreme Court to be a penalty (Passavan
v. United States, 148 U. S., 214, 218, 221, 222).
I am, therefore, constrained to hold that, being a penalty,
it is subject to remission like other fines, penalties, and
forfeitures.
Second. The second question presented by yon relates to
the seizure of the paintings of Mr. E. Roberts for alleged
undervaluation. It appears that Mr. Roberts had paid
. dut;ies upon part of his importation and entered the remainder
free as "antiquities." .After the seizure, the importer failed
to take the proceedings provided for the case of persons dissatisfied with the appraisement or classification of their merchandise. Instead, he brought a proceeding under section
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5292 of the Revised Statutes and the act of 1874 for a remi .
sion of the forfeiture. A summary investigation wa had
before the United States commissioner, who certifies the
evidence to you and finds that the pictures entered as
"antiquities" were entitled to free entry as such, and that
the value of the other articles as declared in the invoice is
greater than their true market value in the country of production. You ask to be advised as to the weight and effect
of this proceeding and of the findings of the com missioner,
and as to any action which it is incumbent for you to take
under the circumstances. I can only answer this question
so far as it relates to your power to remit in the premises.
I do not understand that you question your own power to
remit the forfeiture upon payment of the proper duties as
estimated upon the appraised value of the pictures. Your
doubt concerns the right to remit also in this proceeding the
difference between the duties actually paid at the time of
importation and the duties as they would be assessed were
the appraisement and classification by the custom-hou 'e
authorities assumed to be correct. It is evident that such a
remission would be equivalent to a reappraisement by a U. S.
commis~ioner and the Secretary of the Treasury instead of
in the manner provided by the customs administrative act.
Were such a practice established, importers would substan. tially have a choice of forum. They could appeal either to
the Board of General Appraisers or to yourself through the
U. S. commissioner in remission proceedings. I do not think
that any snch position is tenable. The _sums assessed by the
custom-house authorities (exclusive of the amercement u nder
section 7 of the customs administrative act) are in no sen e
penalties, but are duties in the strict sense of the t erm, however erroneously arrived at. I therefore advise that you
have the power to remit the forfeiture, but only on payment
of the duties as so estimated.
Very resI?ectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
A Chinaman resident of the United States asked the Secretary of the

Treasury whether, ifhe shou1drevisit his native country, he could lawfully return to the United States afterwards: Held; that this was not
a question a.rising in the administration of the Treas1;1-ry Department,
and. therefore the official opinion of the Attorney-General could not
b e asked upou it.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

September 13, 1893.
SIR: In your communication of September 9 you ask my

official opinion as to whether a certain Chinaman is or is not
a Chinese laborer within the meaning of the legislation of
Congress. It appears that.the Chinaman in question, through
his attorney, has asked to be advised by you on the point,
because be desires to visit bis· native country, if that will not
cut off bis future residence here.
Section 356 of the Revised Statutes authorizes me to give ·
an official opinion only upon questions arising in the administration of one of the Executive Departments. I am unable
to perceive that this case comes within the statutory provision. The time within which certificates can be granted to
Chinamen~under the act of M~y 5, 1892, under your supervision, has expired. I do not see that any question can arise
from your Department with relation to this particular Chinaman until bis return to this country, if he shall decide to
depart. .An unofficial opinion upon the present law would b~
of no greater value than the opinion of his owil legal adviser,
who has evidently given the question careful attention; nor,
if the law should happen to be changed during his absence,
would anything said or done now protect him ( Chinese Exclits ion Gase, 130 U. S., 581). I do not think, therefore, that
it would be proper for me to give the opinion requested.
Very respectfully,
RICH.ARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TRE.A.SURY.
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PRESI.DENT'S PARDOr ING- POWER-AMNE 'TY .
The President's constitutional pardoning power covers the case of the
offense in Utah of unlawful cohabitation. The pardoning power of
the President is absolute, and not a subject of legislati~e control.
DEPARTMENT OF

J STICE,

Septernber 20, 1893.
Sm: I return herewith the papers in the ca e of David A.
Sanders, of Utah, applicant for "amnesty" for the offen e
of unlawful cohabitation, which papers have been referrecl
to me for an opinion as to the power of the President in the
premises.
Though the- application is for what is called "amnesty,"
and though the same term is used in the ·reference to me for
an opiuion, the applicant intends to ask-indeed his application expressly so states-for the exercise in his favor of
the President's constitutional p_a rdoniug power, so that I
as ume the real question to be whether that power includes
the applicant's particular case.
In my judgIJ?-ent it does include bis case beyond all que tion. The only suggestion to the contrary is that the
Edmunds law, so called, operates as a limitat'ion of the
Pre ident's pardoning power by confining the "amnesty"
therein authorized to ·offenders who were such before a
designated time.
But, in the fir t place, if any intent of the sort could be
imputed to Congress, it must necessarily fail of effect,
because the pardoning power granted to the President is
ab olute, and. is not a subject.of legislative control. In the
second place, no such intent can fairly be a cribed to
Congress, which undoubtedly u ed the word '' amne ty"
aclqsedly, and only meant to indicate by the whole
": mne ty" clause that if the Pre ident, in bis di cretion,
dtW fit., by act of executive clemency, to embrace a whole
cla s of offenders instead of dealing with the case of each
separately, uch a cour e would not be inconsistent with the
purpo e and objects Congre s bad in view.
Re pectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
Tb

TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

669

Parade-Employ es Absent From Duty.

PARADE-EMPLOYES ABSENT FROM DUTY.
Employes of the United States who are members of the National Guard
are not entitled to leave of absence from their respective duties without ]oss of pay or time in order to engage in rifle practice, even
although in the general orders of the commanding general of the
militia such rifle practice may be called a parade.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

· September 29, 1893.
Sm: Your letter of the 21st September, 1893, asks my
opinion upon the following questions, viz: Are the men in
t he employ of the War Department who were absent from
t heir duties in the Department to attend the rifle practice
under General Order No. 9, from the headquarters of the
District of Columbia militia, of June 28, 1893, entitled to
t hat absence without loss of pay or time,
In the order referred to it was announced inter alia" The troops of the ~ational Guard will parade for rifle
p ractice as follows, etc.

*

*

*

*

*

"Government employes will be given certificates for one
day of duty performed under the requirements of this order."
Section 49, chapter 328, Statutes at Large, volume 25, page
779, provides '' that all officers and employes of the United
S t ates and of the District of Co1urnhia, who are members
of the National Guard, shall be entitled to leave of absence
from their re.spective duties, without loss of pay or time, on
all days of any parade or encampment ordered or authorized
under the provisions of this act."
The inquiry involves the ascertainment of the sense in
which the term parade is employed in the act of Congress.
From the dictionaries we learn tbat etymologically it is
formed from paratus, and was applied to the ground prepared
for the assembly of troops, and, that a secondary meaning
w as the assembly itself that was held on the ground. In
the military art it bas acquired varied but definite significations.
For the present purpose it is important to .ascertain rather
what the term does not tbau what it does embrace.
Section 41 provides "That the commanding general shall
p rescribe such stated drills and patades as he may deem nee-
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ce ary; ·* * * tbat be may order out any portion of the
Natio11al Guard for such drills, inspections, parades, escort, or
other duties as he may deem proper; that the commanding
officer of any regiment * * * may also assemble his
command, or any part thereof, in the evening for drill
instruction or other businessj * * * but no parade sh:tll
be performed * * * without the permission of the commanding general."
From which it would seem to be clear that to the terms
drill, parade, inspection, and instruction distinct and separate meanings attach, and that parade can not be held to
embrace the service or duty signified by either of the other
terms.
"Rifle practic-e" is certainly embraced within the ter.::ns
"drill" or -' instruction," or else it falls within the general
expression of " other duties." It can not, with any regard to
propriety of expression, be termed a parade or an encrirnpmentj
and hence I am of the opinion tbat employes of the United
States wbo are members of the National Guard are not
entitled to leave of absence from their respective duties
without loss of pay or time in order to engage in rifle practice, even although in the general orders of the commanding
general of the militia such rifle practice may be called a
parade.
Very respectfully,
RICH.ARD OLNEY.
The SEORE'.I.'.A.RY OF WAR.

EMPLOYES ABSENT ON PAY.
Under section 5 of the legislative, executive, and judicial appropriation
act of March 3, 1893, chapter 211, the heads of the Departments seem
to have no authority to grant leave with pay for more than sixtydays
in any one ca e in any calendar year. The act applies to the curreut
year, and absences prior to July 1, 1893, must be taken into account
in computincr the total leave to which an employe may be entitled
during the calendar year ending December 31, 1893.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

October 12, 1893.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of the 10th in tant, in which you a k the following
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1. Whether section 5 of the legislative, executive, and judicial appropriation act, passed March 3, 1893 (chap. 211, 27
Stats., 675), "is retroactive, in that leave of absence prior to
July 1, 1803, should be considered in the present calendar
year ·~"
.
2. Whether, "when an employe o{ the War Department
has been granted a leave of absence for thirty days on
account of sickness, the case being an 'exceptional and meritorious' one, 'when to limit such sick leave would work
peculiar b~rdsbip/ the head of the Department has in his
discretion the power to extend such sick leave for a period of
sixty days, thus makip.g a total of ninety days' absence with
pay on account of sickness,,,
Prior to the passage of the act referred to, the subject
was governed by sectfon 4 of the legislative, executive and
judicial act passed March 3, 1883, chapter 128 (22 Stat.,
531), under which the heads of the Departments had authority to grant sick leaves with pay in their discretion and
withcut limit as to time. In all other respects the provisions of the two acts are identical. The only purpose,
therefore, of the act of 1893 was to restrict the unlimited
discretionary power which the heads of the Departments
then enjoyed of granting sick leaves with pay. · The restrictions i~posed are two. The first relates to the nature of
the illness; the second to the time for which the leave may
be granted. The provision is that no such leave with pay
can be granted, even for a day, except in case of personal
illness of the employe, or when some member of his
"immediate family is afflicted with a contagious disease and
requires the care and attendance of such employe, or where
his or her presence in the Department would jeopardize the
health of fellow-clerks;" and in all ordinary cases the leave
thus permitted is limited to thirty days in any one calendar
year. But "in exceptional and meritorious cases, where to
limit such sick leave would work peculiar hardship, it may
be extended, in the discretion of the bead of the Department, with pay, not exceeding sixty days in any one case
or in any one calendar year." I read this provision as
authorizing, even in the exceptional . and meritorious cases
mentioned, a total allowance on ,account of sickness of not
more than sixty days in any one calendar year in any one
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case. It has been urged that it authorizes the extension of
an original leave of thirty days for sixty days additional,
.S() as to make ninety days in all. The language is not
-entirely free from doubt, l;m t it occurs as a proviso to a
statute which directs "the heads of the several ·E xecutive
Departments, in the interest of the public service, to require
-0f all clerks and other employes, of whatever grade or class,
in their respective Departments, not less thau seven hours
-o f labor each day," except Sundays and holidays, and must
therefore be strictly construed. I do not read the proviso
-as being confined to cases in which original leave is extended
in the sense of being enlarged, but as authorizing the head
of a Department to extend, in the sense of to grant, sixty
days' sick leave in any one calendar year where it would
work peculiar hardship to limit the leave to thirty days.
Tlie act applies to the current year; uo exception is made
with respect to absences prior to the 1st of July, 1893, and
these absences must therefore be taken into account in computing the total leave to which an employe may be entitled
-d uring the calendar year ending December 31, 1893. I n this
view the act is not retroactive, because it does not affect the
ca e of one who has had sick leave of more than sixty days
prior to July 1, 1893, except to provide that such person shall
have no further sick leave with pay during the rest of the
year. ·The rule adopted by Congress was furthermore known
as early as March 3, the date of the pas. age of the act, and
-employes were in position from that time on to regulate their
.applications for leave with reference to its provisions.
I appreciate the merit and the hardship of the ca es to
which you r efer, but relief ·must be sought, if at all, from
·Congress. The heads of the Departments seem to bave no
authority to grant leave with pay for more than ninety days
in any oue case in any calendar year.
Respectfully,
LAWREN0E MAXWELL,
Solicitor- General.
The SECRETARY OF W.A.R .
.Approved:
RICHARD OLNEY.
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ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
In answer to the general question whether "building, i~an, and savings
associations" are "corporations doing the business of bankers, brokers, or savings institutions" within the meaning of Revised Statutes,
section 5243: Held, That an official opinion should not be given on the
question, as the name of the association does not alone affor(l him
sufficient information, and as the question was one belonging rather
to the judicial than to the executive branch of the Government.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

October 24, 1893.
Sm: I am in receipt of your communication of October 17,
asking my official opinion as to the question whether it is a,
violation of section5243 of the Revised Statutes for" building,
loan, and savings associations" to use the word "national"
as a " part of their title." The statutes prohibit the nse of
this word " as a portion of the name or title" by " person~ or
corporations doing the buMness of bankers, brokers, or savings institutions." Prima facie a savings association is the
same as a savings institution and would, therefore, . come
under the wording of the act. Whether building or"loan
associations are subject to the act can not, in my judgment,
be ascertained without more information than the mere name
affords. I do not see, therefore, that I can give an opinion
in the matter without knowing the circumstances of each
case under consideration.
For another reason, also, I do not see that an official opinion
can properly be given by this Department, which bas always
been eluctant to pass upon questions which properly belong
to the judicial rather than the executive branch of the Government. (19 Opin., 56; id., 670.) In the opinion first cited
Attorney-General Garland said:
" It seems to me, therefore, that as the only way to settle
the questions submitted is by judicial proceedings it would
be hardly proper for me to express an opinion on them."
Your request is substantially a request for advice ~s to
whether or not a prosecution had better be instituted.
My opinion would not bind a court in any way; it could as
well be asked before instituting every civil suit,or prosecution
5687-V0L 20--43
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for ~rime. I do not, think that the statutes, in providin g for
offi~ial opinions by the Attorney-General, intended to cover
such a case.
Very respectfully,
RICH.A.RD OLNEY,
.Attorney-General.

The

SECRET.ARY OF THB TREASURY.

COMMON CARRIERS OF MERCHANDISE.
Section 3 of the act of June 10, 1880, chapter 190, authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to modify the form of the contraet made with
common carriers so as to pe~mit them to remove the goods from a
vessel and place them in a warehouse or other secure place, provided
care be taken to stipulate that the liability as common carriers shall
' continue until custody and possession of the merchandise has beendelivered to and accepted by the collector.
DEP .ARTMENT OF JUS'l.'ICE,

November 13, 1893.
Srn: I have the honor to acknowledge your letter of
November 9, 1893, referring to section 3 of the act approved
June IO, 1880, entitled "An act to amend the statutes jn relation to immecliate transportation of dutiable goods, and for
other purposes."
This section provides for the delivery of merchandise to
common carriers; that such carriers shall be responsible to
the l l uited States as common ca~riers for the safe delivery of
such merC'handise to the collector of the port of its destination; and that ''they shall become bound to the United
States in bonds of such form and amount and with such
condition , not inconsistent with law, and uch security as
the Secreta,ry of the Treasury shall require."
It appear that the common carriers have asked permission
to remove the goods from such ve sel and place them in warehou e, or other secure place, at their risk, .u ntil delivery is
made.
It i within the power of the Secretary of the Trea ury,
under the authority given him by thi section, to so modify
the form of the contracts made by him with the common carrier a to allow them to remain in custody and po ses iou
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of the merchandise, after the unloading of the conveyance or
vehicle in which it· had been carried, and to store the same
in a depot or warehouse of the c3,rrier until custody of the
same has b~en assumed by the collector, care being taken
to stipulate in the bond th.at the li~bility of the common carrier shall continue as such until custody and possession of
the merchandise has been delivered to and accepted by the
collector.
Very respectfully,
RICH.A.RD OLNEY.
The

SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

CHIEF m~FICERS OF THE CUSTOMS.
Neither inspectors nor general agents are" chief officers of the custom&,"
within the meaning of our tariff legislation.
The phrase "chief officers of the customs''. refers to the collector or acting collector of each collection district, including the surveyor of any
district in which there is no collector, aud also to the officer legally in
charge of any statutorily recognized port1 not being the headquarters·
of a collection district.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

November 17, 1893.
Sm: Your communication of October 28 asks my official
opinion upon the meaning of the phrase" chief officer of the
customs," as used in the anti-moiety act of June 22, .1874,
chapter 391, section 4. It appears from the papers that compensation is asked under that act by one claiming to have
furnislled information to the U. S. inspector of customs at
Vancouver, British Columbia, and to a special agent of the
Treasury, which information .related . to the seizure of some
smuggled opium.
The act referred to repeals "all provisions of law under
which moieties of any fines, penalties, or forfeitures under
the customs-revenue laws, or any share therein or commission thereon, are paid to informers or officers of customs, or
other officers of the United States." It provides, however, .
compensation from the proceeds of the seizure for "any offiuer of the customs, or other person," who '' shall detect and
seize goods, wares, or merchandise in the act of being smuggled, _or which have been smuggled;" and it authorizes also
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that compensation may be given when '' any person not an
officer of the United States shall furnish to a district attorney
or to any chief officer of the customs, original information
concerning any fraud upon the customs revenue, perpetrated
or contemplated, which shall lead to the recovery of any
duties withheld, or of any'fine, penalty, or forfeiture incurred,
whether by importers or their agents, or by any officer or person employed in the customs service."
The special agent above referred to was appointed under
section 2649 of the Revised Statutes "for the purpose of
making the examinations of the books, papers, and accounts
of collectors and other officers of the customs, and t o be
employed generally under the.direction of the Secret ary in
the prevention and detection of frauds on the customs revenue." The inspector referred to I understand to have been
a person appointed under section 2606, and specially detailed
for work in the foreign port. The question is whether either
of these persons was a "chief officer of the customs."
It is evident that the act of June 22, 1874, discriminates
between "o_fficers of the customs" in general a.nd a " chief
officer of the customs." It does not appear from the actwbat
is the scope of the latter phraseology. This, however, is
made evident by an examination of prior tariff legisla tion.
From the beginning of this legislation, in the act of July
31, 17 9, chapter 5, is found the present system by which the
country is divided into various collection di tricts, many containing more t,han one port each, by which a distribution is
made of collectors, deputy collectors, surveyors, and naval
officers among the various districts, with directions as to the
port at which they should reside; and by which it is provid d for ome of the districts that deputy collectors or surveyors should be stationed at specified ports other than the
main port of the dist.rictwhere the collector's office is it uated.
The phra es "chief officer of the customs of the di trict"
and ' chief officer of the cu toms at the port" date from our
second tariff law, the act of Aug·ust 4, 1790, chapter 35, ection 13, 16. Thi act contains the present provision that in
ca. of cl ath or di ability of the collector of the district hi
pla
hall be filled by the deputy·collector, naval officer, or
UrY yor, in the order m ntioned.
It provides for forfeiture
of g od unladen without authority, except in case of unavoid
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able accident, necessity, or distress, proved '' before the collector or chief officer of the customs of the district within the
limits of which such accident, necessity, or distress shall
happen," etc.; and it provides that every vessel arriving at
any recognized port of the United States shall be reported
"at the office of the chief officer of the customs at such port."
Th€se provisions were reenacted in the "act to regulate the
collection of duties on imports and tonnage" of March 2,
1799, chapter 22, and are at present found. in the Revised
Statutes as sections 2867 and 2774, respectively.
In my opinion, therefore, the phrase "chief officer of the
customs" in the act of June 22, 1874, refers, first, to the collector or acting collector of each collection district (including
the surveyor of tbe district of Pittsburg, where there seems
to be no collector provided by law); and, second, to the officer
IegaUy in charge of any statutorily recognized port not being
the headquarters of a collection district, including such officers as the deputy collector at Calais, Me., the surveyor at
Greenport, N. Y., and the assistant collector at Jersey City,
N. J. (Rev. Stat., 2518, 2536.) I do not think, therefore, that
either the inspector at Vancouver or the special agent of the
Treasury is a chief officer of the customs within the meaning of the statutes, and I do not think that the information
claimed to have been imparted to them entitled the informer
to any compensation.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

POSTMASTERS' ACCOUNTS-AUDITOR FOR POST-OFFICE
DEPARTMENT.
The Auditor of the Treasury for the Post-Office Department and the postmasters' account in his custody are to be deeme<l papers in the Treasury Department within the meaning of Revised Statutes, section 1076.
The history of the Auditor's Office since 1789 discussed.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

November 17, 1893.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication
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dered and audited, are under the control of the Postmaster.
Genera.I or the Sixth Auditor of the Treasury for the Post0 ffice Department."
The question appears to arise upon a call for information
by the Court of Claims, under section 1076 of the Revised
Statutes. The law is clear that the Sixth Auditor is the
custodian of all accounts arising in the Post-Office Department, or relative thereto, with the vouchers necessary to a
correct adjust·m ent thereof. This custody, however, is subject to the .con~rol of the head of the Department to which
the Sixth Auditor belongs; and it is necessary definitely to
. fix his status in this connection because, by section 1076
aforesaid, ''the head of any Department may refuse and omit
to comply with any call for information or papers when in
· his opinion such compliance would be injurious to the public
interest." It is no~ necessary, therefore, to a&certain whether
the Secretary of the Treasury or the Postmaster-General is
the judge as to the propriety of the information demanded.
The status of the Sixth Auditor is not clearly defined by
the Revised Statutes. The main provisions relating to his
office are comprised in Title VII, under the heading "Depart·ment of the Treasury." He is· appointed and his duties described in sections relating also to the five other auditors.
( ecs. 276, 277.) The Auditors are not, however, like the
Comptrollers, stated to be "in the Department of the Treasury" (sec. 268); they are merely stated to be" connected with
the Department of°the Treasury." (Sec. 276.)
In fact, the Sixth Auditor occupies an entirely anomalous
position, being to a large extent a comptroller as well as an
auditor, and being in part the subordinate to the Postmaster.
General as well as of the Secretary of the Treasury. The
five other auditors certify the balances ascertained by them,
with the vouchers and certificates, t9 the First or Second
Comptroller, as the case may be. The First Comptroller examines the accounts settled by the First and Fifth Auditors,
certifies the balances to the Register, and uperintends the
pre ervation of these accounts. (Sec. 269.) The Second Comptroller examines all accounts settled by the Second, Third,
and Fourth Auditors, certifies the balances to the Secretary
of War, or the Secretary of the Navy, as the case may be,
.and superintends the. preservation of these accounts (sec.
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273); which he is obliged to do, however, by returning them
to the Auditors. (Sec. 283.) The Sixth Auditor; however,
certifies the balances direct to the Postmaster-General, and
preserves the accounts and vouchers himself. He reports
both to ·the Secretary of the Treasury and to the PostmasterGeneral in manner provided by statute; and he reports,
further, to ·either as either may require. His decisions are
not subject to review, except in rare cases where an appeal
is taken ·to the First Comptroller. (Sec. 270.) He is, and
for sixty years has been, actually located in the building of
the Post-Office Department. His clerks, however, are "in
-~he Department of the Treasury." (Sec. 235.) In cases of
litigation with the Post-Office Department, be communicates
with the Department of Justice direct. (Sec. 296.) The
question is so difficult, that while the Assistant AttorneyGeneral of the Post-Office Department regards the Sixth
Auditor as belonging to that Department, the Sixth Auditor
himself claims to belong to the Treasury.
· It is necessary under these circumstances to go behind the
Revised Statutes and trace the history of the Auditor's
.office from the beginning.
In the original organization of the Treasury Department
by the act of September 2, 1789, chapter 12, one ·Comptroller
and one Auditor were provided. It was made "the duty of
the Auditor to receive all public accounts, and after examination to certify the balance, and transmit the accounts, with
the vouchers and certificate, to the Comptroller for his
decision thereon." By subsequent statutes accountants
were provided in the War and Navy Departments, and a
portion of the jurisdfotion of the Auditor thus taken away
from him. By the well-known "act to provide for prompt
settlement of public accounts" of March 3, 1817, chapter 45, .
tliese new offices were abolished, and it was provided that
'' all claims and demands whatever by the United States or
against them, and all accounts whatever in which the United
States are concerned, either as debtors or as creditors, shall be
settled and adjusted in the Treasury Department." By this
act the Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Auditors and the
Second Comptroller were created; and the act provided
tbat '' it shall be the duty of the Fifth Auditor to receive
all accounts accruing in or relative to the Department of State,
;

.
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the General Post-Office, and those arising out of Indian affairs
and examine the same, and thereafter certify the balanc~
and transmit the accounts, with the vouchers and certificate>
to the First Comptroller for his decision thereon." The
"General Post-Office" thus referred to corresponds to the
present Post-Office Department (.Act of ..April 30, 1810,
chap. 37). The act of March 3, 1825, chapter 64, "to
reduce into one the several acts establishing and r~gulating
the Post-Office Department," ·directed, in section 1, that the
Postmaster-General " shall once in three months render to
the Secretary of the Treasury a quarterly account of all
the receipts and expenditures in the said Department, to be
.adjusted and settled as other public accounts." A process
of adjusting the Postmaster-General's accounts seems by
section 31 of the act to have been established in the PostOffice Department; but the same act provides that, if the
accounts shall have been '' lodged in the Treasury," certified
copies are to be furnished when necessary by the Register.
Up, therefore, to 1836, the accounts of the Post-Office
D epartment seem to have been finally settled in the 'l'reasury
through the Fj fth ..Auditor and First Comptroller, like acaccounts of the other Government Departments. The act of
July 2, 1836, chapter 270, section 8, created "an Auditor of
the Treasury for the Post-Office Department," with the
present right of appeal from his decision to the First
Comptroller. .A.sat present, he was directed by that act to
keep and preserve the accounts. and vouchers, and report
both to the Secretary of the Treasury and to the Post masterGeneral. Section 21 of the same act provided that his clerks
and messengers " shall be employed by the Secretary of the
Treasury * * * in lieu of the same number of clerks now
employed in the office of the Fifth Auditor of the Treasury,
in adjusting the accounts of the Post-Office Department;''
and bis clerks and messengers have ever since been, and
still are, employed by the Secretary of the Treasury.
I tb~k that, in view of this history, the former "Audito1
of the Treasury for the Post-Office Department" (now "Sixth
..Auditor") must be regarded, as an officer of the Treasury
Department, and the accounts in his possession, like the
accounts of other·Departments in the custody of other Auditors or Comptrollers, are to be regarded as in the Treasury
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Department; so that the Secretary of the Treasury is the
person whose judgment is to control in case of application
from the Court of Claims.
In coming to this decision I have not overlooked the provisions of the appropriation acts, or the apparently conflicting enactments regarding the disposition of waste papers
referred to by the Assistant Attorney-Gen_eral for your
Department. That too great weight can not be put upon
such Congressional legislation will be recognized by the
learned Assistant Attorney-General, who is himself an officer
of the Post-Office Department, appointed by the PostmasterGeneral (sec. 390), while his salary is appropriated for every
year under the head of "Department of Justice." In fact, I
:find that by the first appropriation act after the establishment
of the Sixth .Auditor's Office (act of March 3, 1837, chap. 33),
he is called "the Auditor of the Post-Office" and classed with
other officials of that Department. His appropriations have
now for a long time, however, been classed with those of the
other Auditors under the Treasury Department.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL.

TAX ON STATE BANK CIRCULATION.
The tax on State banks imposed by the act of February 8, 1875, chapter
36, section 19, applies only to promissory notes and not to other negotiable or quasi negotiable paper.
If there is any doubt as to the meaning of a statute imposing this tax,
the doubt must be resolved in favor of exemption.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

NO'l,ember 21, 1893.
Srn: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of November 15, asking my official opinion
as to whether certain papers inclosed are notes within the
meaning of the act of February 8, 1875, chapter 36, section
19, which reads as follows:
"That every person, :firm, association, other than national
bank associations, and every corporation, State bank, or
State banking association, shall pay a tax of ten per centum
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on the amount of their own notes u ed for circulation and
paid out by tbem."
The section referred to is contained in an act entitled ''An
act to amend existing customs and internal-revenue laws,
and. for other purposes." It is "to be construed in connection with those Jaws. It is also part of the system adopted
by Congress to provide a currency for the country, and to
restrain the circulation of any notes not issued under its
own authority." (Hollister v. Mercantile Institution, 111
u. s., 62, 63.)
If there is . any doubt as to the meaning of tbe statute
imposing this tax, the doubt must be resolved in favor of
exemption. (U'fl,ited States v. Isham, 17 Wall., 196.)
Comparing the statute in question with tbe other statutes
referred to in Hollister v. Mercantile Institution, supra, it
evidently applies only to the case of a promissory note, and
does not cover other negotiable or quasi negotiable paper.
For the Revised Statutes in force when the act of 1875 was
passed provided for a tax upon bank circulation ·,,including
as circulation all certified checks and all uotes and other
obligations calculated or intended to circulate or to be u ed
as money" (sec. 3408); and they made it unlawful to "make,
isime, circulate~ or pay out any note, check, memorandum,
to] en, or other obligation for a le~s sum than one dollar,
intended to circulate as money or to be received or used in
lieu of lawful money of the U~ited States (sec. 3583)."
· Three of the instrument submitted by you are plainly
not notes, but checks, and may be left out of consideration.
The two other papers are substantially alike, one of them
being a follows:
ALBANY

CLEARING-HOUSE CERTIFICATE,

$10.

ALBANY,

GEORGIA.

No.-.]
ALBANY, GA., Augu ·t 29, 1893.
Thi certifi.e that the First National Bank of .A.lb any,
Ga., ha depo ited with the undersigned officers of the
Albany cl aring hou.
ecuritie:s of the value of twenty
dollar for the payment of the , um of ten dollars to .,aid
bank or bearer in lawful money of the United State , at
ix month from date, or earlier, at option of aid bank.
But no rtifi. at i to be i u d bearing date later than Jan-
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nary 1, 1894. This certificate will be received on deposit by
any bank or banker belonging to the Clearing House Association of Albany at par at any time before its maturity.
- - - - - - , President.
- - - - - - , Secretary.
Indorsed: "The following banks compose the Albany
Clearing House Association: First National Bank, Commercial Bank, Exchange Bank."
The paper is not signed anywhere by the First National
Bank. It is plainly not an instrument upon which either that
bank or the Clearing House Association could be sued in an
acti0n at common law and a money judgment recovered by
proving and introducing the paper alone without further
evidence. In my opinion, therefore, the paper is not a note
within the meaning of the statute; and it is unnecessary to
answer the further question asked by you.
Very respectfully,
·R ICHARD OLNEY.
The SEOR:V,TARY OF THE TREASURY.

CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATIVE ACT.
Forfeitures provided for by the customs administrative act of June 10,
1890, chapter 407, section 9, are not confined (except as to the general
clause coveri11g every "willful act or omission") to cases in which the
United States bas been actually depriv~d of lawful duties.
DEPARTMENT OF J°USTICE,

November 21, 1893.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt qf your
communication of November 18, asking me whether ·under
section 9 of the customs administrative act of June 10, 1890,
'' such cases as are referred to where there has been no loss
of duty should be reported to the district attorney for forfeiture or other proceedings."
Seetion 9 of that act, so far as necessary for consideration,
is as follows:
"That if any owner, importer, consignee, agent, or ~ther
person shall make or attempt to make any entry of imported
merchandise by means of any fraudulent or false invoice,
afhdavit, letter, paper, or by means of any false statement,
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written or verbal, or by mean~ of any false or fraudulent
practice or appliance whatsoever, or shall be guilty of any
willful act or omission by means whereof the United States
shall be deprived of the lawful duties, or any portion thereof,
accruing upon the merchandise, or any portion thereof,
embraced or referred to in such invoice, affidavit, letter,
paper, or statement, or affected by such act or omission,
such merchandise, or the value thereof, to be recovered from
the person making the entry, shall be forfeited," and the act
has made it an offense punishable by fine or imprisonment,
or both.
In my opinion, the section down to and including the
word "whatsoever" is not conditional upon loss of duty;
but the words " by means whereof the United States shall
be deprived," etc., qualify only the words "or shall be
guilty of any willful act or omission." This being the legal
construction of the act, executive officers should govern
themselves accordingly.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SR0RET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY,

REENLISTMENT.
Under the act of February 27, 1893, chapter 168, service in the Navy can
not be counted, and a man can not be reenlisted as a private unless he
has already served as such in the Army for twenty years.
DEP.A.RTMEN'.l.' OF.

JUSTICE,

November 23, 1893.

Sm: I have yours of the 22d instant, ,c alling for my opinion upon the question whether, under the act of February 27,
1 93 (27 U.S. Stat., 478), permitting the reenlistment of men
who have served in the Army as privates for twenty years or
upward , er vice in the Navy can be counted as a part of said
tw nty years' service. I think service in the Navy can not
be so counted, and that a man can not be reenlisted as a
private unless he has already served as such in the Army for
twenty years.
Respectfolly, yours,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRE'l'ARY OF WAR.
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REMISSION OF FINES-ALIEN IMMIGRATION LAW.
The fines jmposed after a verdict of guilty of the statutory mis.demeanor
of allowing certain foreign pauper jmmigrants to land after b eing
ordered to detain them are not a claim within the meaning of section
3469 of the Revised Statutes, and can not be compromised under that
statute.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

November 23, 1890.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge receivt of your letter of the 21st instant asking for my opinion, " . .Whether or
not the Secretary of the Treasury may authorize a compromise of a claim under section 3469, Revised Statutes of the
United States, founded on a judgment rendered in favor of
the United States in a civil action to recover :fines of $1,200,
incurred by Frederick Warren under section 10, act of March
3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1084), through fa~lure to detain certain alien
passeugers on board the steamship Kansas."
The papers accompanying your letter do not, as I understand them, show that any judgment has been rendered .
in favor of the United States in a civil action against Frederick Warren to recover :fines of $1,200. I am, therefore,
precluded from giving any opinion upon the question
propounded in your letter.
If it be meant to ask whether fines to the amount of $1,200
imposed by way of sentence after a verdict of guilty found
against said Warren as the result of a trial upon an indictment for the statutory misdemeanor committed by him iri
allowing certain foreign pauper immigrants to land after he
had been ordered to detain them can be compromised, I
concur in the opinion of the Solicitor of the Treasury that
such :fines are not a " claim" within the me3!ning of section
3469 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, and can
not be compromised under that statute.
Respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
Hon. WM. E. CURTIS,
Acting Secretary of the Treasury.
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CONGRESSMAN-RETIRED ARMY OFFICER.
The question whether Congressman Sickles can receive pay as a retired
Army officer is one of grave doubt which only a determination of the
Supreme Court can satisfactorily settle.
·
DEPA.R'J'MENT OF JUSTICE,

Decernber 5, 1893.
Sm: Yours of the 24th ultimo, in which you state that you
still desire my qpinion upon the right of Congressman, Maj.
Gen. D. E. Sickles, to be paid as a retired Army officer, is at
hand.
Section 1763 of the Revised Statutes provides that "no
person who holds an office, the salary or annual compensation attached to which amounts to the sum of two thousand
five hundred dollars,. shall receive compensation for discharging the dµties of any other office, unless expressly
authorized by law."
In view of the provisions of this section, the Supreme
Court of the United States has held that a consul-general of
the United States at London, whose salary amounted to
$2,500, could not draw pay as a retired Army officer.
But in the same case the court affirmed the doctrine that
a p ~rson holding two offices or employments under the Government, when the services rendered or which might be
required under them were not incompatible, is not precluded
from receiving a salary or compensation of both, and stated
among other grounds for its judgment that it agreed with
the Treasury Department in the conclusion that the duties
of the offices of the plaintiff as consul-general at London and
of a retired Army officer were incompatible.
Further, the court of appeals of the State of New York has
held in a forcible and elaborate judgment that a retired Army
officer, unless and until assigned to duty at the Soldiers'
Home, does not hold an office within the meaning of that
word as used. in section 1763 of the Revised Statutes. This
proposition does not seem to have been argued, or, if argued,
not to have been considered by the Supreme Court.of the
U ~ited States in its decision in the Badeau case.
Under these circumstances and iu this state of the adjudications, and in view of Article I, section 6, of the Constitution, providing that "no person holding any office under the
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United States shall be a ~ember of either House during his
continuance in office," the question whether Congressman
Sickles can receive pay as a retired Army officer is one of
grave doubt.,. which only a determination of the Supreme
Uourt can satisfactorily settle. It can be brought before that
court if so desired in the same maimer as the Badeau case
was brought there; that is, by a transmission of Gen. Sickles's claim to the Court of Claims in the manner prescribed
by section 1063 of the Revised Statutes.
The departmental practice to pay in such cases, as in that
of Gen. Rosecrans and others, has, I believe, been called to
your attention.
Respectfully, yours,
RICH.A.RD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF W .A.R.

OFFICERS OF THE ARMY DETAILED TO COLLEGES.
The act of November 3, 1893, chapter 13, leaves it within the discretion of the President to make the detail of officers of the Army for
colleges wholly from the active list of the .A.rmy, or wholly from
retired officers who, "upon their own application," may be detailed
for those services, or from both lists in such proportion as he sees fit
and the applications for such detail from the- retired officers will .
allow. No other limit than 100 is set to the number of such officer"
th.a t can be detailed from either list. The ' 1 five years' service in the
Army/' as well as the limit of detail to four years, applies to officers
detailed from either list. Officers of the retired list detailed for college duties prior to November 3, 1893, and still on duty under such
detail, are entitled to full pay, beginning from the passage of the act.
Section 1260, Revised Statutes, refers to additional compensation from
the United States, not from the colleges.
DEPARTMEN'.l' OF JUSTICE,

Decernber 8, 1893.
Sm: Your communication of December 2, 1893, desires my
construction of the act of November 3, 1893, entitled "An
act to increase the number o( officers of the Army to be
detailed to colleges " and submits ·several specific inquiries
to which your request replies.
On June 14, 1869 (13 Opin., 99), Attorney-General Hoar,
in response to a letter of inquiry from the Secretary of War
on the subject of officers of the Ar.my who had been retired;
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said: " The status of an officer placed upon the retired list
i not very distinctly set forth in the statutes." Subsequent
legislation has not dispelled the obscurity to which my predecessor in office referred.
By act of .A-ugust 3, 1861 (12 Stat., 287), provision wa
first made for the retirement of officers of the Army. By
act of July 17, 1862, the provision was extended, and by.section
12 it was enacted that " The President is hereby authorized
to assign any officer retired under this se~tion or the act of
August third, eighteen hundred and sixty-one, to any appropriate duty; and such officer thm; assigned shall receive the
full pay and emoluments of his grade while s.o assigned and
employed."
By act of January 21, 1870, it was provided, "That no
r etired officer of the Army shall hereafter be assigned to
duty of any kind or be entitled to receive more than the
pay and allowances provided by law for retired officers of his
grade."
By act of July 15, 1870 (16 Stat., 320), it was provided that
"any retired officer may, on his own application, be detailed
to serve as a professor in any college. (But while so serving
uch officer shall receive no additional compensation. ")
Several amendments of section 1225, Revised Statutes,
not material however to the present inquiry, were subsequently enacted.
By the act of November 3, 1893, section 1225, Revised
Statutes, was further amended "so as to permit the Pre ideut to detail, under the provisions of said act, not to exceed
one hundred officers of the Army of the United States, and
no officer shall be thus detailed who has not had :five years'
ervice in the Army, and no detail to such duty shall extend
for more than four years. And officers on the retired list of
the Army may, upon their own application, be detailed to
ucli duty, and, when so detailed, shall receive the full pay
of' their rank."
nder ection 1094, Revised Statutes, "the Army of the
United Stat s hall consist of * * * the officers of the
Army on the retired list * * *."
In United States v. Tyler (105 U. S., 246), the Supreme
Court decided that officers of the Army on· the retired list
are till in the military service.
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I am then of opinion1. That the law does authorize the detail of 100 officers
from the active list of the Army, but that it does not require
it. It is within the discretion of the President to make the
detail wholly from the <1ctive list of the Army, or wholly
from officers of the retired list who, "upon their own application," may be detailed for this service, or he may make
the detail in such proportions as he sees fit (and the applications for such detail from the retired officers will allow)
from both lists.
2. The details which may be made from all the ·officers of
the Army are limited by the act of November 3, 1893, to 100
of such officers, and these may be taken by the President
from either the active or the retired lists of the Army, or
from both. No other limit is set to the number of such officers that may be detailed from the retired or the active lists.
3. The "five years' service in the Army" required by section 1225 applies as well to officers on the retired as to those
on the active lists of the Army.
4. The limit of detail tofour years applies as well to officers
detailed from the retired as to those from the active lists of
the Army.
5. Officers of the retired list who were detailed for college
duties prior to November 3, 1893, and who are still on duty
under such details, are entitled to full pay only from the
passage of the act,, nuder and by virtue of which alone is
their right to full pay derived.
Section 1260, Revised Statutes, which authorized the detail
of a retired officer fo.r college duties, provided, "that while
so serving such officer shall be allowed no additional compensation." Tha,t this does not refer to any additional compensation from the college, but from the United States, is
evident from the language employed, which does not prohibit
the receiving but the allowing of the additional compensation.
And then section 1259, which provides for the assignment to
duty of retired officers at the Soldiers' Home, provided, "that
they receive from tho Government only the pay and emoluments allowed by law to retired officers."
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
'rhe SECRETARY OF WAR.
5687-VOL 20--44
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INFORMERS' COMPENSATION.
Informers are not entitled to compensation under the anti-moiety act of
June 22, 1874,chapter 391, section 4, unlesstheinformationisconveyed
directly to the chief officer of the customs. Giving information to
an inferior officer is not necessarily equhalent the:r:eto. If desirable
that informers should communicate with the collector otherwise than
personally, the Secretary of the Treasury can mak& regulations for
the future covering that case.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUS'.l'ICE,

Declmber 11, 1893.
SIR: I have the honor to ackn.o wledge your communica-

tion of November 21, in which you ask whether information
given to a deputy collector or to an inspector in the customs
service, who.is not himself within the meaning of the law a.
" chief officer of the customs," is nevertheless information
furnished to the chief officer of the customs within the meaning of section 4 of the anti-moiety act of June 22, 1874, so
as to entitle the informer to compensation.
The question is a somewhat difficult one. In one sense
every report made to an inferior officer of the customs is a.
report to the chief officer, as it is the duty of the inferior
officer forthwith · to make complaint to the collector of the
district by s·e ction 15 of the same act. If, however, every
report to an inferior officer is equivalent to a report to the
chief officer, the word "chief," apparently carefu1ly selected
in section 4, would become altogether surplusage. The purpose of Congress seems to have been to restrict as far as
possible the temptation to inferior customs officers to get fees
as informers indirectly through outside confederates. I
think, therefore, that Congress intended information for
which compensation was to be demanded to be given to the
chief officer of the customs of the district or port either person ally or in such manner as the Treasury Department might
prescribe, to insure against subsequent claims of inferior
officers, as afterthought, that their confederates had furnished
the means of detecting fraud.
Of course there may be circumstances where the information was transmitted through the inferior omcer in such a
way that it could be properly considered as coming to the
chief officer within the meaning of the statute. These ca es

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

691

Obligations and Securities of the United States.

would depend largely on questions of fact, as to which I am
not made competent to advise. If it is for the convenience
of the service that informers communicate with the collector
otherwise than personally, I think it would be in your power
to make regulations for the future covering the case. ,
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

OBLIGATIONS AND SECURITIES OF THE UNITED STA.TES.
A canceled postage stamp is not an obligation or security of the United
States within the Revised Statutes, section 5430.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

December 30, 1893.
Sm: Your communication of December 26 incloses an
advertising pamphlet, the cover of which contains the facsimile of an envelope bearing a 2-.cent United States postage
stamp, and asks my offi.cial opinion whether the engraving
of the die or printing of the stamp is contrary to the United
States law.
"Stamps and other representatives of value of whatever
denomination, which have been or may be issued under any
act of Congress," are included in the definition of the words
''obligation or other security of the United States ' i in section
5413 of the Revised Staiutes, and that the "printing, photographing, Il!aking, or executing any engraving, photograph,
print, or impression in the likeness of any such obligation or
other security, * * * except under the authority of the
Secretary of the Treasury," is made a criminal offense by
section 5430.
It may be seriously doubted whether the question of likeness or simHitude is not a question of fact, as to which I am
not authorized to give an official opinion. This doubt it is
unnecessary to resolve, however, for in my opinion postage
tamps :1re not representatives of value and are not obligations or securities of the United States except so long as ·
they remain uncanceled and unused. ·T he stamp on the
advertisement shown me is represented with a postmark
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over it; wherefore, without con idering any other question ,
it i my opinion that the engraving of the die and printing
of the tamp are 11ot contrary to law.
Very re pectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

ADVANCES TO CONTRACTORS-BOND OF INDEMNITY.
A proposed bond of indemnity for advances to a con tractor for building a.
V/3S8el deemed unsafe, and the suggestion made that the contractor lie
required to execute a refunding bond with adequate personal or real
security, or both, to cover as well advances heretofore made as any
which may lie made hereafter.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ,

January 5, 1894.
Sm: I have considered the subject of your letter of January 3 and inclosures therewith, and am of the opinion that
the Treasury Department can not with safety make advancement to the constructor ·without first obtaining from him
adequate security to indemnity the Government against loss
by r a on of uch advancement.
Whil the law governing the case is correctly tated in the
text-books and deci ions cited in the letter of December 29,
1 93, from the Solicitor of the Treasury, and may be found
further tated with p erhap more persua 'ive authority in the
text and note of the latest edition of Benjamin on Sale , yet
for the guidance of an Executive Department of the Government it i not nece ary to look further than the decisions
of the Suvr me Court of the United State , which are not
merely per ua ive, but binding hP-re; and that court in the
ca. e of larlcson v. Steien (106 U.S., 505) ha tated the rule
witll a per pi uity which repels further attempt at elucidation.
I have grave doubt whether the form of a bond of indemnity which a companie your letter will secure the end
d , ired. It eem io recognize an ab olute sale of the ve el
in it pre, ent condition to the United tate in con iderai n f th money already and to be advanced. Then in its
condition it re rye to the uitecl State the right to reject
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the said vessel and to insist upon an accurate fulfillment of
the said contraet. These two provisions seem to me to he
repugnant, besides the further objection to allowing _the
Government to become the owner by purchase of the unfinished vessel and thus become liable to any loss that may
-result from the destruction of the vessel .before completion, or
from the failure of the contractor to complete it at all.
A.s the matter stands now the Government is , secured
against loss resulting from the conduct of the contractor by
bis bond with sureties, and that security might perhaps be
imperiled by a change of ownership of the vessel.
I suggest, as the safest and simplest plan for securing the
Government against loss by reason of advancements,- that
the contractor be required to execute a refunding bond with
adequate personal or real security, or both, to cover as well
advancements heretofore made as any which may be made
hereafter.
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

CHINESE LABORERS-CERTIFICATE BY CONSULAR OFFICERS
OF CHINA.
Consular officers of China stationed in foreign countries, being duly
empowered by the Chinese Government, may properly issue the certificates required by section 6 of the act of ,July 5, 1884, chapter 220, and
certificates issued by such duly authorized consular officers of China
in foreign countries accurately conforming to the requirements of section 6, are the certificates contemplated by the law.
Semble, Chinese laborers coming to this country merely en route to some
other country may lawfully be permitted to pass through the United
States.
DEPARTMENT OF JUS'l'ICE,

January 8, 1894.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your letter of December 27th ultimo, requesting my opinion upon the questions1. Whether or not under section 6 of the act approved July
5, 1884, entitled ''An act to amend an act entitled 'An act to
execute certain treaty stipulations relating to the Chinese,'
approved May 6,1882," consular officers of China stationed in
foreign countries can properly certify to the statements which
under the law cited the certificates are required to set forth~
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2. Whether or not the certificates issued by the con ular
officers of Cllina in a foreign country are the certificates contemplated by the law.
3. Whether or not the transit through the United States
of Chinese laborers, alleged to be destined to other countries,
is permitted by law ..
Section 6, referred to above, provides:
"That, in order to a faithful execution of the provisions of
this act, every Chinese person, other than a laborer, who
may be entitled by said treaty or this act to come within the
United States, and who shall be about to come into the
United States, shall obtain the permission of and be identified as so entitled by the Chinese Government, or of such
other foreign Governments of which at the time such Chinese
person shall be a subject, in each case to be evidenced by a
certificate issued by such Government which certificates
shall be in the English languag·e and shall show such permission with the name of the permitted person in his or her
proper signature, and which certificate shall state the indi-.
vi<lual, family, and tribal name in full, title or official rank,
if any, the age, height, and all physical peculiarities, former
and present occupation or profession, when and where and
bow long pursued, and place of residence of the person to
whom the certificate is issued, and that such person is
entitled by tb,is act to coine within the United States."
The req ufrement of this section is that the "permission"
to and "identification" of the Chinese person shall be "evidenced by a certificate issued by such Government." The
overnment can act, in the issuance of such certificate ,
-0nly through and by its officers and agents. If it chooses to
sele ·tits consular officers in foreign -countries as such officer
and agents it has the right so to do, and it is not competent
for this Government to question the propriety or fitne8 of
th choice.
I am of the opinion that such consular officers of China,
b ing duly empowered by the Chinese Government, may
l)roperly i ·sue the certificates in question.
2. Certificates is · ued by the duly authorized consular officers of China in foreign countries and accurately conforming in their content to the requirements of ection 6 are the
certificate contemplated by the law.
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3. In my judgment, and while there is room for difference
of opinion, Chinese laborers coming to this country merely

en route to some other country may lawfully be permitted to
pass through the United States.
Respectfully, yours, .
RICHARD OLNEY.
The

SECRE'l'ARY OF THE TREASURY.

NOTES IN CIRCULATION.
Notes of a Natfona,l Banking Association, signed by the proper officers,
are not "notes in circulation" within sections 5214 and 5215 of the
Revised Statutes, so long a1:! the · bank has never parted with any
interest in or control over them, and may either issue them or cause
them to be canceled or destroyed at its option.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January Io, 1894.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of tbe 8th
instant, inquiring whether the notes of a national banking
association are "notes in circulation" within the meaning of
sections 5214 and 5215 of the Revised Statutes simply
because tbey have been signed by the proper officers of the
bank.
In my judgment the notes referred. to can not b~ regarded
a13 in circulation simply because duly executed, nor so long
as the bank has never parted with any interest in or control
over them, and may either issue them or cause them to be
canceled or destroyed at its option.
Respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY ..
'Ihe SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.
Revised Statute , section 190, proldbiting certain employes of the United
States from prosecuting certain claims against the Government for
two years after the termination of their employment, applies to all
claims which were pending in any of the Departments while the
employe was in the employ of the Government.
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The statutory prohibition covers persons receiving regular employment
who take oath of office and have power to administer oaths to witnes es, although they bold no office known to the statute law, but are
employed and paid under a general appropriation for detection of
crimes, investigation of official acts, efo.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

J anitary 12, 1894.
Sm: Your communication of January 6 refers to me a
letter of the First Comptroller concerning the construction
of section 190 of the Revised Statutes, and asks me for my
official opinion upon the following ques~ions propounded by
him:
"1. Does section 190, Revised Statutes, app1y only to an
ex-employe of the same Department in ~hich be is pro:::;ecuting the claim wbicb was pending while he was in the employ
of such Department 0?
"2. If not, does it apply only to a claim which was pending in the Department in which be was employed while he
was so employed and which claim is now being prosecuted
before another Department, or does it apply to all claims
which were pending in any of the Departments while he was
employed in one of the Departments 1
'' 3. Does this section prohibit au examiner of the Department of Justice from prosecuting claims of the prohibitive
character, or is such an examiner not within the provisions
of ection·1901" ·
·
Section 190 is as follows:
"It shall not be lawfl!-1 for any person appointed after the
first da,y of June, one thousand eight -h undred and seveutytwo, as an officer, clerk, or employe in any of the Departments to act as counsel, attorney, or agent for prosecuting
any claim against tbe United States which was pending in
either of said Departments wbile he was such officer, clerk,
or employe, nor in any manner, nor by any means to aid in
the pro ecution of any such claim within two years next
after he shall have cea.,e<l to be uch officer, clerk, or
employe."
Thi section is a reenactment of ection 5 of the po,·t-office
appropriation act of June 1, 1872, chapter 256. In revising
the section the word, "either of", which do not appear in
the original act, were inserted.
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In my opinion, the first question propounded is clearly to
be answered in the negative, and the last clause of the second question in the affirmative.
The third question propounded relates to the case of "an
examiner of the Department of Justice." No such officer is
known to our statute law. The examiners, so called, in this
Department are persons employed by the Attorney-General
under the annual appropriations " for the detection and
prosecution of crimes against the United States preliminary
to indictment; for the investigation of official acts, records,
and accounts of officers of the courts," etc. (See, for example, the sundry civil appropriation act of March 3, 1893,
chap. 208, 27 Stat., 607.) The persons so employed, however,
rnceive regular appointments, take the oath of office, are
regarded as officers or clerks of the Department, and as
such administer oaths to witnesses under section 183 of the
Revised Statutes. They are not employed by the job, but
are employed genera1ly to perform such work as they may
be called upon to do until death, resignation, or removal.
I think that an examiner is clearly within the provisions of
the section referred to.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.

The

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

OBLIGATIONS AND. SECURITIES OF THE UNITED Sl'ATES-

ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
An uncanceled posta.ge stamp is an obligation or security of the United
States within the meaning of the Revised Statutes, section 5430.
The question of "similitude" under such statute is a question of fact as
to which the Attorney-General is not permitted to render an official
opinion,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 16, 1894.
SIR: I am in receipt of your communication of J anua,ry
11 with relation to my opinion of December 30 concerning
the use in advertisements of facsimiles of canceled postage
stamps. You ask whether my answer is intended to convey
the opinion· that it 1s not unlawful for an unauthorized pers on to evade the law ·by printing an exact copy of a 2-cent
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postage stam_v. You inform me further that the die used in
priuting the imitation stamp submitted for my former opinion
is a perfect Jikenes. of the die for printing an uncanr.eled
2-cent p0stage stamp, and that in printing the ad ver tisement
then submitted the cancellation mark was made by a separate and distinct die.
My former opiuion had ·no reference to the use of di es for
printing the facsimiles of uncanceled postage stamps. Section 5430 of the Revised Statutes provides that" every person
wlrn engraves, or causes or procures to be engraved, or as ists
in engraving auy plate in the likeness of ·a ny plate designed
for the printing of" any obligation or security of the United
States, "or who brings into the United .States from auy foreign place any such plate, except unn er the direction of the
Secretary of the Treasury or other proper officer, or with
any other intent in either case than that such plate be used
for the printing of obligations or otlJer securities of the
United States; ·or who has in his control, custody, or possession any metallic plate engraved after the similitude of any
plate from which such obligation or other security has been
printed, with intent to use such plate or suffer the same to
b used in forging or counterfeiting any such obligation or
ecurity, or any part thereof," is punishable with :fine and
imprisonment. I would call your attention iu this conn ection also to the act of February 101 1891, chapter 127, section 4.
I am of opinion that an uncanceled postage stamp is
an obligation or ecurity of the United States within · the
meaning of ection 5430; and my opinion of December 30
ha no reference to a plate or likeness of any plate designed
for the printing of postage stamps. Whether any particular
die or plates possess . such similarity as to come witltin the
section is a question of fact as to which I am not permitted
by the statute to render an official opinion.
Very re ' pectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SE RE1'.A.RY OF THE TREASU RY.
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ATTORNEY-GENERAL-LIQUORS.
A request for an opinion of the Attorney-General should cont,ain a clear
statement of facts- a clear statement of the question an answer to
which is asked. He should not be left to seek out the facts and infer
the question submitted, from correspondence inclosed.
The word "liquors" in the tariff act of October 1, 1890, chapter 1244,
par~grapb 10, does not include ,~hisky.
DEP AR'rMENT OF JUSTICE,

Jam.1,ary 18, 1894.
SIR: I am in receipt of your communication of January 13
inclosing copy of a letter from Mr. Albert Scott, of Louisville, Ky., and an opinion thereon from the Solicitor of the
Treasury. Mr. Scott requests to be advised "whether or not
bonded manufacturing warehouses can be established for the
-bottling of whisky and the labeling thereof with any original
brand or trade-mark for export."
As I gather from the correspondence inclosed in your letter, Mr. Scott bases his claim upon section 10 of the McKinley tariff act of October 1, 1890, chapter 1244. The Solicitor
of the Treasury has decided that "no authority is given by
said section for the establishment of warehouses for bottli~g
or labeling whisky for export," and in inclosing· me "the opin-.
ion you say: "I have to request an expTession of your views
thereon ."
No question of law is clearly stated in your letter, as
required in case of an application for an official opinion from
the ~Htorney-General. It is well settled that the question
to which an answer is required, as well as the statement of
facts upon which the question is based, should be clearly
contaiued in the request for the opinion, and that the Attorney-General should not be left to seek out the facts and infer
the question submitted from the correspondence inclosed.
Section 10 of the act referred to relates to warehouses for
the manufacture of "medicines, preparations, compositions,
perfumery, cosmetics, cordials, and other liquors manufactured wholly or in part of domestic spirits, intended for
exportation." I understand the question of law submitted
by you t~ be whether wbisky is a liquor within the meaning
of this section. Tbe word "liquor" has different significa-

a
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tions in different portions of our tariff legislation. (Hollender v. Jlfagone, 149 U. S., 586.) I think that in this section
the Solicitor of the Treasury is clearly right in holding that
it does not incln<le whisky.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

SURVEYOR OF CUSTOMS.
If there be no collector of the port at Galena, Ill., and all the duties of
that office are imposed upon the surveyor of customs, then his acts
done in the performance of the duties and functions of the office of
collector of the port are as . valid and effective as if done by a collector of the port. His certificate in conj.unction with that of the
local inspector of steamboats is sufficient to authorize the Secretary
of War to draw his warrant as provided in the act of Congress authorizing tbe city of Galena, Ill. , to complete certain improvements of the
channel of the Galena River.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 18, 1894.
SIR: I have your communication of the 16th of January,
in which, after reciting so much of the act of Congress
authorizing the city of Galena, Ill., to complete certain
imp~·ovements of the channel of Galena River, as provides
that '' if the conditions of this act have been complied with
the collector of the port of Galena and the local inspectors
of steam boats for that district shall certify to the fact," etc.,
you state that "Mr. Charles H. Miller, who signed the certificate, is the surveyor of customs for that port and acts as
collector." And yon request my opinion "whether the certificate presented is sufficient authority for the Secretary of
War to draw his warrant as provided in the act of Oongre s
above quoted."
The power or duty imposed by the statute upon the collector of the port of Galena, Ill., is an official and not a peronal power or duty. If there is no collector of the port at
Galena, but all the duties of that office are imposed upon the
urveyor of cu toms, th n bi act done in the performance
of the duties and functions of the office of collector of the
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port are valid· and as effective as if done by a " collector of
the port;" and in this case his certificate is sufficient, when
made in conjunction with the "local inspector of steamboats," to authorize the Secretary of War to draw his warrant as provided in the act of Congress referred to.
Very respectfully,
RIOHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.

REFUND OF DIREC_T TAXES.
Under the act for the refund of direct taxes, the Secretary o~ the Treasury is authorized to pay to the governor of Tennessee, as trustee,
moneys received by the United States on the resale ofland in Tennessee in excess of the tax assessed thereon and of the amount bid therefor at the original sale made for the collection of the direct tax.
DEP.A.R1'MENT OF JUSTICE,

January 20, 1894.
Sm: I have yours of the 22d of September last, inquiring
whether, under the provisions of an act of Congress, entitled
"An act to credit and to pay to the several States and Territories and the District of Columbia all moneys collected under
the direct tax levied 'by the act of Congress approved August
5, 1861," the Secretary of the ~I.1reasury is authorized to pay
to the governor of Tennessee, as trustee, moneys rec.eived by
the United States on the resale of lands in Tennessee in
excess of the tax assessed thereon, and of the amount bid
therefor~ at the original sale made for the collection of the
direct tax under an act of Congress approved August 5,
1861 1 and other acts amendatory thereof.
In my judgment, while the construction of the act is not
free from difficulty, the better opinion is that it authorizes
and requires the Secretary of the Treasury to pay the moneys
in question to the governor of Tennessee. · Congress meant
to refund collections by the United States from individuals
as well as from the States. But, to relieve the Secretary of
the Treasury from the auditing of a multitude of small
accounts and to enable the parties interested to prove their
claims and get their money in the easiest and most expeditious manner, the general purpose of the act manifestly
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is that moneys reimbursed to individuals shall reach them
through the medium of the governor or some other State
officer or agent constituted by the legislature of the State a
trustee for that purpose.
Respectfully, yours,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY .

.A. TTORNEY-G ENERAL.
The aclvisal)i]ity of bringing suit is not a question of law upon which
the Attorney-General's opinion may be asked.
It is inexpedient for the Attorney-General to render an official opinion
1;ts to whether a civil suit or criminal prosecntion if brought by the
Government ought to be decided by the courts in its favor.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF

JUSTICE,
Januciry 29, 1894.
SIR: Your communication of Jan nary 24 incloses certain
corre~1)ondence terminating in an opinion by the Solicitor of
the Treasury advisiug that suit should be brought against an
·nineged Canadian smuggler by attaching his goods in transit
through the State of Maine. You ask my opinion as to the
advi ability of bringin.g this suit. Section 356 of the Revised
Statutes authorizes the Attorney-Genera_l to give opinions
upon questions oflaw. The advi ability of bringing the suit
is not a question of law and not a question upon which the
Attorney-General's opinion can be required or given. It has
been, moreover, considered inexpedient for the AttorneyGeneral to render an official opinion as to whether a civil
uit or criminal prosecution, if brought by the Government,
ought to be decided by the courts in its favor, such question being "e sentially judicial in character." (19 Opin.,
670.) For these reasons I am obliged to return the papers
without answering the question submitted.
Very re, pectfully,
RICHARD OLXEY.
The SE RETA.RY OF THE TREAS RY.
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DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE-CHIEFS OF DIVISIONATTORNEY-GENERAL.
Chiefs of division in the Department of Agriculture are subject to all .
the regulations. in accordance with law which may be prescribed by
the head of the Department. While the regulations posted in the
Department of Agriculture seem to be Yalid, yet until the lawfulness of some particular regulation is actually called in qnestion no
opinion respecting its legality can pr'operly be asked for or given.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 29, 1894.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your letter of January 26, 1894, asling my opinion1. As to the power of the chief .clerk of the Department
of Agriculture, in his relation to the "chiefs of divisions"
in said Department.
2. Whether the copy of rules and regulations for employes of the Department of Agriculture are in accordance
with law.
In reply I beg to say that by section 161~ Revised Statutes" The bead of each Department is authorized to prescribe
regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the government
of bis Department, the conduct of its officers and clerks, the
distribution and performance of its business, and the eustody,
use, and. preservation of the records, papers, and property
appertaining to it."
Section 166 Revised Statutes provides:
"Each head of a Department may, from time to time, alter
the distribution among the various bureaus and offices of
bis Department, of the clerks allowed by Ia.w, as he may
:find it necessary and proper to do."
Generally, the term "chief. of division," with the · duties
attached to the office, are mere matters of convenience,
designed for th.e economic and efficient dispatch of business,
and rest altogether within the discretion of the head of the
Department.
In the Department of Agriculture the term appears to be
recognized. by Congress in the appropriation acts as attayhed
to the persons in charge of the several divjsions of natural
science which are employed in accomplishing the objects of
that Department.
·
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I am of opinion, however, that such chiefs of divi ions are
yet subject to all the regulations in accordance with law
which may be prescribed by the head of Department.
The regulations posted in your Department, copies of
which accompany your letter, appear to be legal and valid.
But it should be added that until the lawfulness of some
particular regulation is actually called in question, no opinion respect.ing its legality can properly be asked for or
given.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF AGRICULTURE,

NOTES IN CIRCULATION.
Section 5214, Revised Statutes, means instruments binding the banks to
the holder or holders as promises to pay; therefore bank notes signed
and actually pa.id out over the counter, or otherwise so dealt witll as
to become liaLilities of the bank, are notes in circulation; but notes
merely held ju the vault of the bank, whether signed or unsigned,
and notes so sign ed and held, and carried on the books of the bank,
are uot notes in circulation, and notes that have been obligation of
the bank, but ease to be so, return and remain jn the bank for whatever p!.!riod, are not during such period its notes in circulation.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUS'fICE,

February 2, 1894.
Sm: I have yours of the 31st ultimo, requesting a construction. of ection 5214 of the Revi. ed Statutes of the
Uuited tate , providing for a tax or duty upon a national
bank alcnla,ted upon the avera.ge f1lllount of its "notes in
circulation," and asking that the opinion given may answer
the following q_ue tions, to wit:
( l) Whe~her notes received from the Comptroller are to be
reo-ard d a in circulation when held in the vault of the bank
un 'io-ned; or (2) when so held in the vault of the bank
i 0 ·ned; or (3) when so held and signed and taken up on tlle
book of th bank as ca h but not actually 11aid out OY r
it ' ount r; or (4) when so signed and actually paid out over
the · ount r f he ba11k; or (5) when, haviug been ~igned
and a ually aid out by the bank, they are returned to it
n remaiu in the bank for a longer or shorter time.

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

705

Remission of Fine-A.lien Immigration· Law.

The true meaning of section 5214 is to be arrived at by
considering not merely its own particular provisions, but
those of various other statutes of the United States in which
the same subject-matter, to wit, '' notes in circulation," is
dealt with. Without referring to them in detail, an examination of them makes it entirely clear that by " notes in circulation," as used in section 5214, Congress means instruments binding the bank to the holder or holders as promises
to pay. So loug as they are not obligations of the bank to
be redeemed or paid according to their tenor they are not
"notes in circulation."
The answers to the specific questions above stated can
therefore be readily given. Bank notes signed and actually
paid out over the counter, or otherwise so dealt with as to
become liabilities of the bank, are " notes in circulation."
But notes merely held in the vaultR of the bank, whether
signed or unsigned, and notes so signed and held and carried on the books of the bank, are not its "notes in circulation." For the same reason notes that have been obligations
of the bank, but cease to be so and retµrn and remain in the
bank for whatever period, are not, during such period, its
" notes in circulation."
Respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

REMISSION OF FINE-ALIEN IMMIGRATION LAW.
The case of a fine or penalty incurred for violation of the alien immigration law does not fall within the purview of the statutes embraced
under Title LXVIII, and the Secretary of the Treasury is not authorized to remit the same.DEP .A.R'.l'MENT OF JUSTICE,

February 3, 1894.
Sm: Your letter of J?ecember 11~ 1893, requests my opinion
'' whether the Secretary of the Treasury has power under
Title LXVIII of the Revised Statutes to remit or mitigate
the penalties incurred in the case."
The "case" referred to appears from your letter to have
been a proceeding at the suit of the United States against
Frederick Warren, to recover the penalty J>rescribed foi· vio5687-VOL 2 0·-45
.

706

HON. RICHARD OLNEY.
Remission of Fine-Alien Immigration Law.

lation of section 10, chapter 551, act of March 3, 18!H, which
provides: * * * "and if any master, agent, consignee,
or owner of such vessel shall refuse to receive back on board
the vessel such aliens, or s:tiall neglect to detain them thereon,
or shall refuse or neglect to return them to the port whence
they came, or to pay the cost of their maintenance while on
land, such master, etc., shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished by a fine not less than three
hundred dollars for each and every offense.'' * * *
In this proceeding there was conviction and judgment
against the defendant for $1,200. Upon writ of error to the
circuit court of appeals this judgment was affirmed. The
final order, however, is suspended, awaiting the action of the
Secretary of the Treasury upon the application of the convict
for a remission of the fine _ascertained against him by the
judgment of the court.
The power of the Secretary of the Treasury to remit penalties and fines and forfeitures has been the subject of frequent
opinions from this Department, as well as some causes adjudicated in the courts.
In the case of The Margaretta (2 Gall., 517-518), Judge
Story said:
"The power to remit penalties and forfeitures is one of the
·most important and extensive powers which can be exercised
under the Government. It vitally affects the rights, the
revenues, and the prerogatives of the United States. These
can not be waived or extinguished except in cases and by
.the person· provided bylaw. The party, therefore, who sets
up a Treasury pardon to purge away a forfeiture must show
that such pardon is within the purview of the powers confided to that Department."
And in Gray Jaclcet (5 Wall., 369), which was a case of
maritime prize of war, the court said:
"The power of the Secretary to remit forfeitures and penalties is defined and limited by law. The jurisdiction is a
special one, and he may not transcend it. If he do, his act
is void."
On December 14, 1868, my predecessor in office, Mr. William M. Evart , in re pon e to an inquiry from the Secretary
of the Trea ury as to the power of the Secretary under the
act of March 3, ~863, section 10 (sec. 3469, Rev. Stat.), to
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compromise a claim in favor of the United States again::;t a
surety in a forfeited recognizance given for the appearance
in the United States district court of a person charged with
robbing the mails, said:
"The Btatute was not intended to ve~t in the Secretary
of the Treasury any authority, or impose upon him any
duty touching tlle administration of the criminal laws of the
United States. Its purpose simply was to enable the Government to realize the largest amounts from money claims which
might be of doubtful recovery or enforcement, and to accomplish this object the Secretary of the Treasury was empowered to compromise such claims upon the recommendation
of the counsel having charge of them and of the Solicitor of
the Treasury. This power is strictly, therefore, a fiscal one,
and is to be exercised in each case upon :fiscal conditions
alone."
He concludes, however:
"But if it was made to appear to · the Secretary of the
Treasury that the United States could not realize by judgment and execution the foll amount of the debt by reason
of the insolvency of the surety or other impediment, the
Secretary was authorized, upon the concurring recommendations of the district attorney and the Solicitor of the Trea.sury, to effect a compromise of the claim upon the best terms
that could be obtained." (12 Opin., 543.)
January 30, 1879, my predecessor in office, Hon. Charles .
Devens, in reply to an inquiry from the Secretary of the Treasury as to the power of the Secretary to accept a '' compromise offered in discharge of a claim of the ·united States
before judgment, where the proponent is fully able to pay
the entire amount claimed, but in which case the district
attorney recommends the acceptance upon the ground tliat
he doubts his ability to obtain a judgment for want of evidence," said (16 Opin., 260):
* * * "It seems to me that a compromise may prop-··
erly be recommended, not upon the ground that the case is
a hard one as against the defendant, but upon the ground
upon which contested claims are often compromised by
partie , in view of the uncert~iuty as to their obtaining a,
_juugment."
And on June 27, 1889 (19 Opin., 345), my immediate pred-
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ecessor in office,. Hon. W. H. H. Miller, in reply to a request
from the Secretary of the Treasury for an opinion upon the
very subject-matter now submitted by you, coucludes a
lengthy opinion by stating:
* * * "That it is extremely doubtful whether the
power to compromise given in section 3469 extends to the
case of a fine; and I am confirmed in this view by the consi<l.eration that there is, as already stated, another section in
the Revised Statutes (sec. 5292) which invests the Secretary
of the Treasury with ample power to mWgate or remit all
fines growing out of infractions of the reveuue and navigation laws."
_
As far back as March 3, 1797, Congress provided by law
for the remission of fines, penalties, and forfeitures. The act
appears as section 5292, Revised Statutes. As it is there
printed, it is .liable to erroneous construction by reason of
defective punctuation. It provides:
" Whenever any person who shall have incurred any fine,
penalty, or forfeiture, or disability, or may be interested in
any vessel or merchandise which has become subject to any
seizure, forfeiture, or disability by authority of any provisions of law," etc.
This might seem to provide for two distinct classes of
cases, to wit, "any person who shall have incurred any fine,"
etc., or who'' may be interested in any vessel or merchandise which has become subject to any seizure, forfeiture, or
di ability." But by reference to the original act, which will
be found 1 Statutes, page 506, it will be seen that the title
i "An act to provide for mitigating or remitting the forfeiture , penalties, and disabilities accruing in certain cases
therein mentioned.:,
From which it would seem that the language "any person," and "any fine, penalty," etc., is limited to the "certain
ca e therein mentioned," which are cases "levying or collecting any dutie or taxes," and "registering recording of
hip ," "enrolling and licem,ing of ships," etc.
And upon examining the statutes collated under Title
L V II entitled "Remi ion of fines, pen~lties, and forfeitur ," it will be een that section 5292 provides for remi ion of fine, by the Secretary after and upon a summary
inv tigation of the ca e by the di trict judge.
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Section 5~93 provides for the remission of :fines by the Sccretarv in a limited class of cases, upon iuve_stig~tion of the
.
.
facts ·"'
under rules prescribed
by the Secretary himself.
Section 5294 relates to the remission by the Secretary of
fines, etc., provided for in Jaws relating to steamboats, etc.
The case of a fine or penalty incurred for violation of the
pro~isions of the alien immigration law does not tberef~>re,
in my judgment, fall within the purview of the statutes
embraced under Title LXVIII.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SE0RETARY OF THE TREASURY.
DISTRICT ATTORNEY-COMPENSATION. Sections 299 and 824 of the Revised Statutes have no application to services rendered under section 827 of the Revised Statutes, compensation
for which is to be fixed and allowed in the manner prescribed by the
provisions of the lat~er statute.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTIOE,

.Febrtttary 6, 1894.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of February
1, transmitting the account of Edward Mitchell, U. S. attorney, southern district of New York, for the quarter ending
December 31, 1893, for fees for services rendered under section 827, Revised Statutes, on behalf _of the United States,
in suits brought against collectors of customs, and inquiring
"whether, in view of the provisions of section 299, Revised
Statutes," the allowance under section 827 of the Revised
Statutes should be limited to. the fees prescribed in section
824."
.
The .question has on several occasions been considered by
my predecessors with the 'Uniform result, in which I concurf
viz, that sections 299 and 824 of the Revised Statutes have
no application to services rendered under section 827 of the
Revised Statutes-the compensation for which is to be fixed
and allowed in the manner prescribed by the provisions of
the latter statute.
I return Mr. Mitchell's account.
,
Respectfully, yours,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.
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SAMPLE PACKAGES.
A cont ract wit h the Government construed as in itself not meaning to

use the t erm "sample packages" in the restricte rl sense of mer chandise free of duty as samples only and of no commercial value.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 7, J 894.
Sm: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of
February 3, 1894, submitting the contract between William
Utz and tbe Secretary of the Treasury of the 31st J anuary,
1888, and the claim "for $6,760.80 for cartage on 50,080 packages of dutiable merchandise to the public stores," asserted
thereon for said Utz through his attorneys, and the opinion
of the Solicitor of the Treasury of July 13, 1893.
My opinion js asked " as to whether or not the contractor,
Mr. Utz, is entitled under his contract to such allowance as
fs now claimed."
·
In the letter of Febru·a ry 6, 1893, from the attorneys of
the claimant, presenting his claim, it is said: " We have
advised Mr. Utz that under the tel'ms of the contract he was
required to carry for 1 cent per package only such as contained merchandise of no commercial value and which would
be submitted free of duty as samples only."
I do not concur in this view of the contract.
The language of the contract is that the contractor is to be
paid '' at the r~te of 14~ cents per package for all packages
from the importing vessel and from general order store and
warehouse to the public store, with the exception of sample
packag s, and that said party of the first part will cart all
sample package from all points at the rate of 1 cent per
package.''
.Article 345, Customs Regulations 1892, recognizes two
kind of articles imported as samples, to wit:
".Article of no mercantile value imported as samples, not
for ale, nor subject to duty, nor to formal entry," and
"Sampl imported in quantities and intended to be old
by jobber are dutiable." ·
The con ract i ilent a to the kind of" sample packacre"
contemplated in it, and there is nothing in the accompanying
p ap r to indicate which of the two kinds was in the mind of
the partie at the time of the contra.ct.
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I am of opinion, then, tha.t on the ba,sis of the contract
alone Mr. Utz is not entitled to the amount claimed by him

merely because the packages "contained merchandise of
dutiable value on which duty was assessed and collected by
the Government."
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

SIOUX MIXED BLOOD-ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
The question whether or not the Sioux half-breed or quarter blood is
an Indian within the meaning of the act of March 2, 1889, chapter
405, is to be determined not by the common law, but by the laws or
usages of the tribe.
Such laws or usages are not matters of which judicial notice can be
taken, but present questions of fact upon which the Attorney-General
can not advise.
Affirmatively, a person apparently of mixed blood residing upon a
reservation and claiming to be an Indian is in fact an Indian.
'Requests for opinions of the Attorney-General should be accompanied
by a definite statement of the material facts and formulation of the
questions to which an answer is desired.
The Attorney-General can not be asked to exercise appellate jurisdiction upon mixed questions of fact and law.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 9, 1894.
Sm: Your letter of January 4, :;i,sking my opinion with
relation to the citizenship of Jane E. Waldron, and the
opinions of Assistant .Attorneys-General Shields and Hall,
therewith transmitted, have received my careful attention.
It appears that Mrs. Waldron's mother was a half-breed
Sioux Indian. Her father was white and supported his
family off the reservation until 1883 or 1884, after she came
of age. At that time, meeting with reverses, they came .to
the agency and were placed on the roll as entitled to rations,
etc. Mrs. Waldron's husband is also a white man.
Mrs. Waldron claims the rights of a Sioux Indian under
the act of Much 2, 1889, chapter 405, entitled "An act to
divide a portion of the reservation of the Sioux Nation of
Indians in Dakota into separate reservations, and to secure
the relinquishment of the Indian title to the remainder, and
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for other purposes.'' This act carves out six small re ervations from the great reservation of the Sioux Nation, and;
releases the balance of the land to the United State .
Various provisions are made in the act for allotment of
lands in severalty, and under one of these plaintiff claims as
an '; Indian receiving and entitled to rations and annuities
at either of. the agencies mentioned in this act at the time
the same shall take effect."
Her claim to an allotment has raised a number of interesting questions in your Department, among which you subrrut
the question, '' Whether the common-law rule that the offspring of free persons follow the condition of the father prevails in determining the status of children born to a white·
man, a citizen of the United States, and an Indian woman,
his ·wife."
It will be noticed that the act under consideration was
dependent for its validity upon the consent of the Indians.
(Sec. 28.) In other words, it was substantially a treaty witl1_
the Sioux Nation; acts in this form having taken the place
of the ancient Indian treaty since the latter was prohibited
by act of Congress in 1871. By the agreement confirmed m
this act the Sioux Nation gave up a large amount of territory,
and the rights conferred on the nation or on individuals were
in consideration thereof. The persons entitled to such rights
are the persons who at t,he time of the agreement constituted
the Sioux Nation and were lawful members thereof. The
que tion, therefore, whether any particular person is or is not
an Indian within ~he meaning of this agreement is to be
determined, in my opinion, not by the common law, but by
the laws or usages of the tribe. (See Western Cherokee
Indians v. United States, 27 C. Cls., 1, 54; United States v.
Old Settlers, 148 U. S., 427, 479.) As to these laws or u ages,
I am not informed and am not qualified to advise. I do
not think that they can be regarded as matters of which
judicial notice can be taken. They present rather questions
of fact like other local usages. Presumptively, a per on
apparently of mixed blood re iding upon a reservation and
cl iming to be an Indian is, in fact, an Indian. (Famous
>:. mith v. United States, 151 U.S., decided January 3, 1 94.)
Other interesting questions are discussed in the opinion,
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but tl1ey are not presented in such a way that I can answer
them. No definite statement of facts is submitted,. nor are,
the questions to which an answer is desired separately fornrnlate<l. · "Where an official · opinion from the head. of this
D epartment is desired on questions of Jaw arising on any
case, the requ~st should be accompanied by a statement o~
the material facts of the case, and also the precise questions
on which advice is wanted." (14 Opin., 367, 368; 18 Opin.,
487, 488; 19 Opin., 465, 466, 696.)
You submit all tbe evidence for my consideration, requestfog my opinion "upon all of the questions considered in the
opinion of the Assistant Attorney-General for the Department of August 18, 1893." This substantially asks me to
exercise appellate jurisdiction over a decision upon mixed
questions of fact and law. This I am not empowered to do.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

NAVIGABLE WATERS 01!., THE UNITED STATES.
The St. Louis and Cloquet rivers, being navigable waters of the United
St ates, can be obstructed by dams only by permission of the Secre~
t ary of War, to whom Congress has by express statute given exclusive
jurisdiction of the subject.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 9, 1894.
Srn: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 7th.
in stant, in which, referring to the application of the Altemonte Water Company for permission to construct dams
across the St. Louis and Cloquet rivers, you ask my opin-.·
ion whether the Secretary of War has jurisdiction in the
premises.
Upon the facts as stated in your letter, both the St. Louis
and Cloquet rivers must be deemed navigable waters of the
United States. Being such, they can he obstructed by dams
only by permission of the Secretary of War, to whom Congress by express statute has given exclusive jurisdiction of
the subject.
Respectfully, yours,
RICHARD O~NEY.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.
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ATTORNEY-GENERAL-TREASURY DEPARTMENT.
The Solicitor of the Treasury is an officer of the Department of Ju tice
and not of the Treasury Department.
Actions to recover moneys due the United States, not involving any
issue of fraud, do not come in any way under the direction of the
Secretary of the Treasury. (Rev. Sta.t., 376.)
The question whether such an action is maintainable is a question arising in th e Department of Justice, and therefore the Attorney-General's opinion can not be asked upon it by the Treasury Department.
The "collection of the revenue" under the superintendence of the Secretary of the Treasury within the meaning of Revised Statutes 249
relates to the proceedings of the collectors and their subordinates, and
not to those of district attorneys.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 10, 1894.

Srn: On January 29 you asked my opinion upon the ad visability of attaching certain goods of an alleged debtor to the
United States while in transit through the State of Maine
in bond en route from England to Canada. That opinion I
declined to give, because the advisability of bringing a suit
is not a question of law and because also it is inexpedient for
the Attorney-General to render an official opinion as to how
the uit, if actually brought, ought to be decided by the courts.
You now refer the matter to me again, asking my opinion
whether these goods can be attached by the laws of the State
of Maine and whether such attachment would be in contravention of treaty or statute. The second of the grounds
stated for declining an opinion upon the former que tion
applies to these questions as well.
And for another rea on I am debarred from rendering an
official opinion. Although brought to recover the duties on
goods previou ly smuggled by the defendant, yet the propo eel action would be simply an action of assurnpsit for
money ' due. No issue of fraud would be involved. It
would, therefore, not come under the direction of the ecretary of th 1rea ury by section 376 of the Revi ed tatute .
.It would be a uit "fa which the United State is a party,
or intere ted," within the meaning of section 379 of the
Revi eel Sta ute . A to such uit , "the Solicitor of the
Tr a ur hall have power to in truct the di trict·attorneys/
etc., by th t rms of that ection . The Solicitor of the
Trea ury i an officer of this Department, as is al o the dis-
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trict attomey for the district of Maine. The questions of
law stated in your communication, therefore, arise in the
Department of Justice, and not in the Treasury Department,
and are not questions upon which I am authorized to give
an opinion to the Treasury Department by section 356 of the
Revised Statutes. It is true that by secpion 249 it is in
your province to "direct the superintendence of the collect jon of the duties on imports." I do not think, however,
th at this section is intended to substitute the Secretary of
the Treasury for the Attorney-General as the officer controllin g the actions of the Solicitor of the Treasury in such suits.
I have held in the Bloch and Cutajar cases that by the
peculiar provisions of section 376 prosecutions for frauds or
attempted frauds upon the revenue are to be directed by the
Secretary of the Treasury instead of by the Attorney-General. This, however, is an anomaly, and , the word "collection " in section 249 applies, in my opinion, to the proceedings of collectors and · ~heir subordinates, and not to those
of district attorneys. .
For thes.e reasons the papers are again returned without
opinion upon the questions submitted.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
N0TR.-The following is the letter referred to in the foregoing opinion:
OCTOBER 21, 1893.
SIR: Your letter of October 13, 1893, in relation to frauds upon the
revenue at the port of New York by one Cutajar, and the failure of the
U. S. att orney to act upon information furnished by the collector, seems
to raise the same question of departmental authority which has been
discussed b etween us in the case of United States against Bloch. On
reviewing the statutes I am still unable to perceive that I have any
prop er aut hority in this matter of punishing frauds upon the revenue.
The act of August 2, 1861 (12 Stat:, 285), charged the Attorney-General
"with the general superintendence and direction of the attorneys and
marsh als of all the districts in the United States and Territories as to
the manner of discharging their respective duties." An explanatory act
was passed on August 6, 1861 (12 Stat,, 327), providing that the above
enactment should not be "construed to repeal, modify, or in an y way
affect an y l aw now in force confining or regulating the duties of the
Solicitor of the Treasury."
By the act of March 3, 1863 (12 Stat. 1 739), ' ' the Solicitor of the
Treasury, under direction of the Secretary of the Treasury," was
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directed ·to " take cognizance of ail frauds or a tterupted fraud upon
the revenue," and charged with "a general supervision over the measures for their prevention and detection, and for the prosecution of persons
charged with the cornrnission thereof." For the purpose of enabling him
to perfory:i these dut.ies he was authorized to employ not more than
three additional clerks. The Rtatute seems impliedly to have abrogated
the statute of 1861, in so far as direction of district attorneys with
relation to these prosecutions was concerned. This act was entitled
"An act to prevent and punish frauds upon the revenue," etc.
Tile act establishing the Department of Justice (act of June 22, 1870
16 Stat., 162) transferred the Solicitor of the Treasury from the 'frea ~
ury Department to the Department of Justice, and directed that he
should exercise his functions "under the supervision and control of the
head of the Department pf Justice." This act might be construed to
abrogate the act of 1863 so far as it placed the Solicitor under direction
of the Secretary of the Treasury in the matter of frauds upon the
revenue.
The Revised Statutes, however, reenact all of the statutory provisions auove referred to, which a,p pear as sections 349,350,362, and 376.
The reenactment of the provision of tho statute of 1863, that the Solicitor of the Treasury, as to ceitain of his duties, is to act under the
direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, seems to me to constitute an
exception to the provision of section 350, directing that he shall be
under the supervision and control of the Attorney-General.
There does not seem to have been any uniformity of ruling upon this
point, and I have been reluctant to rule definitely upon it. Practical
considerations, however, seem to me to confirm the opb1ion above
expre sed. The Solicitor of the Treasury is familiar with the details of
all these matters, anu has a special clerical force assigned to him for
that purpose. The civil and criminal proceedings arise out of the same
transactions; and should be under the supervision of the same officer.
I think, therefore, that in this Cutajar Case, as well as the Bloch Case
and all others of a similar nature, I should refrain from interfering by
directions to district attorneys.

*
Very respectfully,

*

*

*

RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY
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DEPARTMENT CLERKS.
The word "meritorious ' relating t o Department clerks asking sick
leave under the legislative appropriation act of March 3, 1893, chapter
211, section 5, is surplusage.
The worcl "exceptional" in the same act r aises a question of fact upon
which the Attorney-General can not advise.
The tatute construed wit!J relation to the inclusion of Sundays and
holidays in annual leave and sick leave.

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

717

Department Clerks.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 10, 1894.
SIR: I am in receipt of your commuuica tion of January 22,

asking my opinion as to various questions raised by section
5 of the legislative appropriation act of March 3, 1893. This
section, after provisions as to the length of the working day
of Department clerks, contains the following provisos:
'' And provided further, That the head of any Department
may grant thirty days' annual and thirty days' sick leave,
with pay, in any one year to each clerk or employe the sick
leave to be allowed in cases of personal illness only, or where
some member of the immediate family is afflicted with a contagious disease and requires the care and attendance of such
employe, or where his or her presence in the Department
would jeopardize the health offellow-clerks: .And be itfurther
provided, That in exceptional and meritorious cases, where
to hmit such sick leave would work peculiar hardship, it may
be extended, in the discretion of the head of the Department,
with pay not exceeding sixty days in·any one case or in any
one calendar year."
You ask me first as to the meaning of the phrase "exceptional and meritorions" in the second of these provisos;
whether the phrase. refers to the employe's record, to bis general condition and circumstances, or both. In my opinion
the word "meritorious" in this proviso is but surplusage.
If the case is not meritorious the employe should not receive
any sick leave at all. The phrase must, therefore, be read
as equivalent to '' exceptional as well as meritorious." The
word "exceptional" I do not thiuk susceptible of precise
definition as matter of law. It is the evident intent of Congress that sick leave beyond thirty days should be granted
only in extraordiuary cases. Whether 'the cases are or are hot
extraordinary must, however, be left to the discretion of the
bead of Departments. Whether it is to be applied only to
cases of great penury, or to cases of great merit in the
employe's past services, or to cases where the Government is
peculiarly responsible for the illness, as in the matter of the
victims of the recent Ford's Theater disaster, or in the case of
an employe broken down by overtime work, are questions not
capable of solution from the words of the law alone. It

..
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may, indeed, be important that the practice of all the Executive Departments should be the same in this regard; but, if
so, the practice must · be fixed by agreement between the
heads of Departments themselves.
For the same reason I can not state as matter of law
whether the case of an employe who has already taken his
thirty da,y s' annual leave a,s well as his thirty days' sick leave
can be considered exceptional.
You also ask me whether, in computing the annual leave
and sick leave under the first proviso, Sundays and holidays
occurring during absence should be charged against the
absentee. Upon this question I am iuformed that the practice of the different Departments has not been uniform. No
· aid, therefore, is afforded by departmental practice in the
solution of this question. It has been the practice of this
Department to charge Sundays and holidays again t the
ab entee when they intervene during the period of ab ence.
That is, if an employe obtain leave of absence from Monday
to Saturday, inclusive, he is not charged with any Sunday
a part of his period of absence. If, however, bis leave is
from Saturday to Saturday, inclusive, he is charged with
th " urnJay included in that period. In the absence either of
g eneral and uniform departmental practice, or of specific
direction from Congress, it is my opinion that the practice of
thi Department i the correct interpret!:Ltion of the law.
Unl
otherwise specially stated, statutory provisions for
noti e, etc., of a given number of days are usually considered
to inclucle m1days and holidays in the count, at least unless
the period of notice is very short. Statutes, therefore, often
This conclusion is somewhat
specifically except them.
trengthened by the fact that the statutory annual leave .is
made thirty day , or, as near as may be, one-twelfth of the
calendar. It would ~eem to be the Congressional intent that
a ·h employe might take a month's vacation, the length
th reof bein g expres ed in day on account of the varying
length of the caleudar month .
Your la t question is, therefore, to be auswered in the
affirmativ .
Very respectfully,
RICH.A.RD OLNEY.
The EORETA.RY OF THE NA. VY.
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A'fTORNEY-GENERAL-BICYCLES "AS PERSONAL EFFECTS "STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.

The opinions previously rendered by this Department (17 Opin., 679; 20
Opin., 648) as to the dutiability of bicycles adhered to.
When Congress adopts substantially the language of a previous statute,
whether from the statute book of the United States or from that of
any State, it is presumed to adopt therewith the judicial construction
already placed upon the language of the act.
The same principle applies in lesser degree to long-settled departmental
construction.
The opinion of September 8, 1893 (20 Opin., 648), as to the effect to be
given to opinions of the attorney-General adhered to.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 12, 1894.
Sm: Your communication of January 29, relating to
bicycles brought into the United States by travelers fo1· purpos~s of travel, has received careful attention. The question
in dispute in your Department has been whether bicycles
can be considered in any case as personal effects within the
meaning ·of paragraph 752 of the McKinley tariff act of
1890, placing on the free list the following articles:
' 1 Wearing
apparel and other personal effects (not mercha.ndise) of persons arriving in the United States; but
this exemption shall not be held to include articles in actual
use and necessary _and appropriate for the use of such
persons for the purposes of their journey and present comfort and conv·enience, or which are intended for any other
person or persons, or for sale."
The present difficulties in your Department arise from a
series .of rulings, commencing with the opinion of AttorneyGeneral Brewster, rendered April 4, 1884, on the corresponding paragraph of -the tariff act of 1883. (17 Opin., 679.)
That tariff act placed on the free list" wearing apparel in
actual use and other personal effects (not merchandise)
* * * of persons arriving in the United States." It
did not cont::i,in the qualifying clause above quoted from
the act of 1890. That clause, however, so fa.r as it affects
bicycles brought in for the purpose of a bicycle trip by the
importer llimself, lias .rather a fo,vorable bearing il.i::rn otherwise on the importer's claim. If the clrnngcs since made,
therefore, have any effect on Attorney-General Brewster's
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ruling that bicycles are personal effects within the meaning
of tbe statute, their effect is to strengthen his position.
When tbe question was :first under consideration, and up
to the time of Attorney-General Brewster's decision, there
was some room for argument on both sides. On one hand
Acting Attorney-General Taft, following precedents in cases
,o n the construction of wills, which restricted the general
meaning of the word ''effects" by application of the rule
ej'usdem generis had held that carriages were neither "personal effects" nor ''household effects" within the meaning of
similar provisions of the Revised Statutes. (15 Opin., 113,
125.) The circuit court, reversing his-decision, had held them
to be household effects in the case of Morga.n v. Arthur, from
which it might be argued that they were not personal effects,
.and that if carriages were not persona.I effects neither were
bicycles; on the other hand, it could be argued that bicycles
were distinr.tly personal, as distinguishea. from household
·effects; that they could be used only by one person at a time;
that they were even like saddles, differently constructed for
the use of the different sexes; that they are customarily carried
-0nbaggagecarsaspersonal baggage; and thatwhenimported
for the purpose of a bicycle trip, the bicycle accompanies the
importer even more steadily than his trunk or the majority
-0f his wearing apparel. On one hand it could be likened to
a carriage, on the other to c.m tches or a walking stick. On
one hand the rule ejusdem generis might be appealed to by
the Government, as bicycles are so different in nature from
wearing apparel. On the other hand, the applicability of
this principle was questionable; and, indeed, it was shortly
.after shaken by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Arthur v. Morgan. (Jl2 U.S., 495, 499.)
The whole question was presented, as I have said, to Attorney-General Brewster for his determination. He decided it
iin the affirmative, and his decision was duly adopted and
promulgated by the Treasury Department. (Syn. Dec., No.
c6384). No court has ever decided to the contrary.
Years afterwards in some manner the questio11 ch.me before
-one of the Board of General Appmisers appointcu. under
t11e cn ~tom admiui trative act of 1800. How it came before
tliem I am not informed, as it was foe duty of the collector
.to admit the articles free under the Secretary's instructions.
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In this instance, however, the collector held them dutiable,
and the appraisers sustained his decision. (Syn. Dec., No.
10395.) This decision was under the law of 1883.
Meanwhile the act of 1890 had already been passed. This
act was drawn by persons doubtless thoroughly familiar
both with the previous law and with the Treasury decisions
thereunder. The fact that it contained no provision looking
to the exclusion of bicycles from the position of personal
effects has weight as evidence that the decision was in
accordance with the intent of Congress. It is a familiar principle tbat when Congress adopts substantially the language
of a, previous statute, whetber from the statute book of the
United States or from that of any State, it intends to adopt
therewith the judicial .construction already placed upon the
language of the act. The same principle applies in lesser
degree to long-settled departmental construction. While
inclining to agree with Mr. Brew.ster's opinion, regarded as res
nova, notwithstanding the learned argument of the appraisers
to the contrary, I feel also that after t.his lapse of time, and
under these circumstances, the matter should have been considered at rest by all administrative officers.
The question was submitted by you last summer, whether
the ruling of this Department would be modified by reason
of the decision of the appraisers or the . intervention of tbe
act of 1890. On August 28, 1893, the then Acting AttorneyGeneral answered that the opinion .of Attorney-General
Brewster was still adhered to, and was applicable to the act
of 1890 as well as to that of 1883. This ruling also was
adopted and promulgated by the Treasury Department.
(Syn. Dec., No. 14368.) By some cause not explained this
decision, however, was not universally conformed to, hut duty
was again sought to be collected on a bicycle, and the question thus came again before the appraisers, who, on January
12, 1894, reiterated their former decision.
Your communication of January 29 now asks my opinion
whether, under the circumstances, the instructions of your
Department should be modified to conform to the decision of
the appraisers.
In answer to this question I can do no more than quote
from my Opinion rendered to you on September 8, 1893, on
the legal force of the rulings of this Department.
5687-VOL 20-46
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"The act of 1870, section 4, establishing the Department
of Justice, provided that written opinions prepared by a
subordinate in the Departmeut may be approved by the
Attorney-General, and that 'such approval so indor ed
thereon shall give the opinion the same force and effect as
belong to the opiriions of the Attorney-General.' This provision is embraceu in substantially the same language in
section 358 of the Revised Statutes. Evidently, therefore,
Congress contemplates that the official opinions signed or
indorsed in writing by the Attorney-General shall have some
actual and practical force. Congress's intention can not be
doubted that administrative officers should regard them as
law uutil withdrawn by the Attorney-General or overruled
by the courts, thus confirming the view which generally prevailed, though sometimes hesitatingly expressed, previous to
the establishment of the Department of Justice." (5 Opin.,
97; 6 Opin., 334; 7 Opin., 699,700; 9 Opin., 36, 37.)
The question now presented is substantially the same as
that presented last summer. The duty of this Department
ended with the rendition of the opinion, and it can not with
propriety advise further. (17 Opin., 332.)
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRE'.l'..A.RY

OF

THE TREASURY.

REIMPORTED WHISKY.
Reimported whi.sky when withdrawn from bond is taxable according to
the number of gallons at the time of importation.

DEP..A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,
February 12, 1894.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the th
in taut, a ·king for an opinion upon the question whether
reimported dome tic whi ky when withdrawn from bond i
to be a e ed on the basi of the quantity as ascertained at
the time of the withdrawal, or as ascertained at the time of
the ntry.
Tb pre i e que tion seem~ to have been decided in the
cir •uit court of the United "tates for the district of Kentuck (Loi1,isville Public Warehouse Go. v. The SurvmJor of
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the Port of Louisville, 48 Fed. Rep., 372), where it was held
that reimported whisky when withdrawn was taxable according to the number of gallons at the time of importation.
That adjudication should be considered as settling the matter until and unless called in question by some other adjudication of equal weight.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF '.l'HE TREASURY.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
The owners of a vessel inquired of t,h e Secretary of the Treasury whether
if they rebuilt the vessel in Canada it could be thereafter reregistered
as a vessel built in the United States: H eld, That this was not a question arising in the administration of the Treasury Department, and
therefore the official opinion of the Attorney-General could not be
asked upon it.
DEPARTMENT OF JUS'.l'ICE,

1/ebruary 17, 1894.
Sm: Your communication of February 15, 1894, asks my
opinion whether if a certain American steamer shall be rebuilt
in Canada by being lengthened amidships she can be reregistered on her return as a vessel built in the United States.
It appears that the question is not presented to you for
your present action, but that the owners of the vessel, which
is still unrepaired, inquire as to what your- future action
would be in case they decided to have the repairing done in
Canada.
I do not think this a question arising in the administration
of your Department within section 358 of .the Revised Statutes, and therefore, for the reasons stated in my opinion of
September 13, 1893, in the case of a Chinese laborer, it would
not be proper for me to give the opinion requested.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
Requests for the opinions of the Attorney-General must be accompanied
with a statement of facts and separate formulation of the questions
to which an answer is desired. ..
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The opinion asked must be one _needed for the guidance of the officer
asking.
The Attorney-General's opinion can not be asked upon questions relating only to the duties of the Commission to the Five Civilized Tribes
appointed under the Indian appropriation act of March 3, 1893, chapter
209, isection 16.
DEPARTMENT OF JUS1'ICE,

February 19, 1894.
SIR: Your communication of February 16 asks my opinion
as to the present validity and effect of certain land grants to
railroads in the Indian Territory. It does not submit a definite statement of facts, or formulate separately the questions
to which an answer is desired, and for that reason I am not
warranted by the precedents in giving a,n opinion. These
precedents are cited.. in my opinion rendered to you February
9, 1894, in the matter of the mixed-blood Sioux Indians.
For another reason, moreover, I am not authorized to give
you an official opinion in this matter. Section 356 of the
Revised Statutes provides that an opinion may be required
by the heacJ. of any Executive Department'' on any questions
of law arising in the administration of his Department." It
has always been held that questious not so arising can not
be answered on such requisition. (See opinion in the matter
of the tab Commission, 19 Opin., 7.) "The opinion ·hould
be needed for bhe guidance of the head · of a Department,
and hould relate to ome matter carnng for action or decision
on his part." (Opinion in the matter of the Commissioner of
Patent , June 7, 1893.)
The questions now a ked are submitted by you at request
of the Commission to the Five Civilized TribeE!, appointed
by section 16 of the Indian appropriation act of March 3,
1 93, chapter 209. You are not given any control over the
proce dings of the Cornmis ioners, except to pass upon their
account aud receive their reports for transmis ion to Congre . Advice which can not be asked directly by the
Comrni ioners I am not authorized to answer, even when
they put the question through the head of another Department. (18 Opin., 107.)
Very l'e. pectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.

The

ECRET.A.RY OF THE INTERIOR,
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SILVER CERTIFICATES-LAWFUL MONEY.
Silver certificates are not lawful money within the meaning of section
4 of the act of June _20, 1874, chapter 343, and section 9 of the act of
July 12, 1882, chapter 290.
DEP.A.RTMEN'l' OF JUSTICE,

.
February 20, 1894.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your favor of the.
17th instant requesting my opinion upon the question
whether silver certificates authorized by section 3 of tlle
act of February 28, 1878, are lawful money within the meaning of section 4 of the act of June 20, 1874 (18 Stat. L., chapter 343), and section 9 of the act of July 12, 1882 (22 Stat. L.,
chapter 290).
Silver certificates are just what they purport to be on their
face and by their terms-that is, they attest the fact that
the United States has on deposit so many silver dollars
which will be paid to the holder upon the pr·esentation and
surrender of such certificates. If they can be regarded as
money at all it is only because the United States agrees to
receive them "for customs, taxes, and all public dues," and
only to that extent and for those specific purposes.
In my opinion they are not '' lawful money" within the
meaning of the statutes above referred to, to wit: Section
4 of the ·a ct of June 20, 18_74 (18 Stat. L., chapter 343), and
section 9 of the act of July 12, 1882 (22 Stat. L., ch~pter 290).
Respectfully, yours,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

OPIUM-TRANSFER THROUGH UNITED STATES.
The Secretary of the Treasury has not the power to prohibit the transfer of goods through the United States destined to Mexico.
DEP.A.R'.l.'MENT OF JUSTICE,

February 20, 1894.
SIR: Your letter of February 12, 1894, requests my opinion
as to the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to
authorize the transportation through the United States to
Mexico of opium imported at San Francisco:
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Chapter 190, Supplement Revised Statutes, page 293, provide : "That when any merchandise * * * imported at
the ports * * * San Francisco, shall appear by the
invoice or bill of lading and manifest of the importing vessel
to be consigned to and destined for either of the ports pecified in the seventh section of this act, the collector at the
port of arrival shall allow the said merchandise to be shipped
immediately after the entry prescribed in section two of this
act has been made."
The seventh section referred to designates Brownsville,
Tex., as one of the ports.
This chapter repeals sections 2990-2997, Revised Statutes.
Section 3002, Revised Statutes, provides:
" ny imported merchandise in the original packages,
which shall have been duly entered and bonded in pursuance
of the provisions relating to warehouses, may be withdrawn
from warehouse for immediate exportation without payment
of duties, to Chihuahua, in Mexico" (by routes indicated in
that section).
Customs Regulations, 1892, Treasury Department, articles
572-574, provide for "withdrawals for transportation and
exportation to Mexico ; " and, articles 442-452, "for merchandise in transit to Mexico."
By several statutory provisions the importation of opium
into the United States is restricted and regulated. But I
bave been able to find no statute touching the importation of
opium in conflict with the general provisions above referred
to for the importation of merchandise at ports of the United
States in transit for Mexico.
I, therefore, concur in the opinion of the Solicitor of the
Trea ury that the Secretary of the Treasury has not the
power to prohibit the tran it of goods through the United
States de tined to Mexico.
'
Very re pectfulJ y,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.
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FINES, PENALTIES, AND FORFEITURES-REMEDY.
While sections 17 and 18 of the act of June 22, 1874, chapter 391, offer
a remedy to one who is exposed to a fine, penalty, or forfeiture in the
cl!.ses therein provided for, yet such a remedy is not exclusive, but
the relief may also be extended under section 3469, Revised Statutes.

DEPARTMENT OF JUS'l'ICE,
·
February 20, 1894.
SIR: I have .the honor to acknowledge your letter of the
9th instant, asking my opinion "as to whether this case, the
amount involved exceeding $1,000, comes properly within the
provisions of section 5292, Revised Statutes, and of sections
17 and 18 of the act of June 22, 187 4, and is thereby
excluded from the provisions of section 3469, Revised Statutes."
I am of opinion that while sections 17 and 18, chapter 391
(18 Stat. L. ), afford a remedy to one who is exposed to a fine,
penalty, or forfeiture in the cases provided for in that chapter, that such remedy is not exclusive, but that the relief may
also be extended under section -3469, Revised Statute~.
While section 3469 is found, under title 36, providing for
"debts due by or to the United States," yet it will be seen
that section 3473, under the same title, treats duties on imports as being among such <l.ebts, and this view of the scope
of section 3469 appears to have been taken by my pr~decessors in office (16 Opin., 259, 570; 18 Opin., 72).
The question is by no means free from doubt. But under
the circumstances of this 'case, as detailed in the letter from
Henry 0. Platt, U. S. attorney, southern di~trict of New
York, of February 3, 1894, and the letter of the Solicitor of
the Treasury of February 5, 1894, I think the Secretary of
the 1'reasury can safely act under section 3469.
As to the further inquiry contained in your letter, I reply
that under section 20, chapter 391, "it shall be the duty of
&uch collector and district attorney to furnish to the Secretary of the Treasury all practicable information necessary
to enable him to protect the interests of the United States.
Very respectful~y,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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DEPARTMENT CLERKS-ATTOR EY-GENERAL.
The provisions of the act of March 3, 1893, chapter 211, section 5, relating to the hours of service annually and sick leave of Departm ent
clerks, are applicable to the Department of Agriculture.
The nature of the evidence required from applicants for leave and sufficiency of reasons for extending or limiting hours of labor are mat ters within the discretion of the ~ecretary as to which the AttorneyGeneral can not advise.
When an employe is not connected with the Department during the
entire calendar year his leave should be prorated.
The Assistant Secretary of Agriculture is not a clerk or employe within
the meaning of the statute; as to the chiefs of divisions, quaere.
There is no limit to the right of the head of a Department to demand
service of his subordinates.
The head of a Department can not require the Attorney-General's. opinion as to his power to do an act unless it is his intention to do it if he
has the power.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 21, 1894.
SIR: I am in receipt of your communication of January
31, ubmitting a number of questions raised by the act of
M areh 3, 1893, chapter 211, section 5, relating to the hours of
labor, annual leave, and sick leave of clerks and employes
in the Executive Departments. This section is, in my
opinion, applicable to your Department. Your questions
relating to the length of sick leave allowable and to the
method of computing Sundays and holidays are answered
in an opinion recently given to the Secretary of the Navy,
a copy of which I herewith inclose. The nature of the evidence to be required from an employe applying for annual or
sick leave, and the sufficiency of reasons for extending or
limiting hours of labor are matters intrusted by the statute
to your di cretion, a to which I can not a<lvise. An
employ not connected with the Department during the
entir alendar year is not entitled to the full annual or sick
leave, which should be prorated.
The As i tant Secretary of Agriculture, who is an officer
appoiut d by the President, with the a.dvice and con ent of
the Senate, is not a clerk or other employe within the meaning of the ction under con ideration. Chief: of <livi. ions
in h Tr a ury Department have been held by m predee or to be clerk (15 Opin., 3, 6), and if the chief: of division in your Department have imilar du tie the ame ruling
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would apply to them. This would seem to be true of part of
your chiefs of divisions at least.
The above remarks dispose of all the questions submitted
by you, except your general question whether there is '' any
exemption below the Secretary as to punctuality, hours of
labor, and daily attendance, without the permission of the
Secretary." The answer to this question is to be found in
section 161 of the Revised Statutes, which gives y.ou authority to prescribe regulations not inconsistent with the 1aw for
t he government of your Department, the conduct of its officers and clerks, and the performance of its business. There
seems to be no limitation to your right ·to demand service
of your subordinates. The only limit that I can find upon
your authority is in th~ section above referred to, which prohibits you from allowing more than a certain latitude to the
persons therein described. I do not understand that you
desire either to shorten the hours or lengthen the annual or
sick leave of any official of your Department. If there be no
such intention, the question as to your power to do so in the
case of any given official would ·not be one presently arising
in the administration of your Department and which, there·
for e, I would be authorized to answer.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.

The

SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE.

CHINESE--ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
Natives of China who are subjects of Great Britain are prohibited
entran ce to this country by the act 9f July 5, 1884, chapter 220.
Th e Attorney-General should not express an official opinion upon a
j udicial question as·to which the circuit courts are in conflict.
The Attorney.General can not give an official opinion upon a case which
h as not yet actually arisen.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 21(1894.
SIR: Your communication of February 17, as I understand it, asks my opinion whether Chinese laborers who .
have become subjects of some foreign power other than
China are prohibited. from entering the United States by
our anti-Chinese legislation. The cases before your Depart-
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ment appear ·t o relate to Chinamen who have become subjects of Great Britain. You refer to a decision of 'the circuit
court in United States v. Douglas (1 7 Fed. Rep., 634). That
decision was rendered prior to the act of July 5, 1884, which
provides in section 15" That the provisions of this act shall apply to all subjects
of China, and Chinese whether subjects of China or of any
other foreign power."
It is clear from this provision that persons of Ubinese race,
subjects of Great Britain, are prohibited entrance to this
country, with the possible exception of such persons who are
not natives of China. It may be questioned whether the
word'' Chinese" in that act applies to persons who a.re Chinese only by race, but natives of another country who never
owed allegiance to China. It has been decided iu the California circuit (In re Ah Lang, 18 Fed. Rep., 28) that such
persons were prohibited entrance even before the passage of
the act of 1884. . A solution of the doubt was attempted by
the act of September 13, 1888, chapter 1015, section 3, the
present validity of which act is, however, still an un ettled
question. (See also act of May 5, 1892, chap. 60, secs. 2, 3,
4.) As this question is one upon which the circuit courts
have differed in opinion, and which has not apparently been
settled by appeal or by statute, I do not think that it is one
upon which I should express an official opinion.
A to persons of Ollinese race not natives of Great Britain,
I can not undertake to give an opinion until the case actually arise. They may depend upon the construction of special treaty stipulations. (Thb Cherokee Robacco, 11 Wall.,
616, 621; Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U. S., 190, 194.)
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY

OF

THE TREASURY.

DEPARTMEN'fAL PRACTICE.
On a doubtful que tion as to fees chargeable in customs matters after it
has beeu long settled by Departmental practice founded on a deci ion
of the Board of General Appraisers, the .Attorney-General will not
und rtake to pa s independent judgment as to the orjgiual merits.
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 21, 1894.
SIR: Your communication of February 1~ asks my opinion
whether the fee of 25 cents "for receiving manifest of each
railroad car or other vehicle laden with goods, wares, or merchandise from a foreign contiguous territory" was abolished
by section 22 of the customs administrative act of June 10,
1890. It appears that this question was submitted to the
Board of General Appraisers, and by them decided in the
negative September 13, 1890. (Syn. Dec., No. 10247.) This
view apparently was approved by the then Secretary of the
Treasury, and the departmental practice has been in accordance therewith. The question being a doubtful one, I do not
think that the practice so adopted ought to be changed at
this late day without a decision of the court. I would, therefore, answer your question in the negative without passing
any independent judgment upon its original merits. I do not
understand from your letter that there has been any change
in practice which could affect the question.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.
REPORT-EXAMINER.
A report signed by an examiner or clerk appointed pursuant to section
2940, Revised Statutes, and approved hy the appraiser, is not in compliance with the requirements of section 2615, Revised Statutes.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 21, 1894.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication
of the 15th of February in regard to the administration of
the customs laws at the port of New York and asking my
opinion "as to the legality of a return signed by an examiner or clerk and approved by the appraiser."
- It appears from your letter that the "reports," provided
for in section 2615, Revised Statutes, have sometimes been .
signed by p~rsons other than the officer who actually made
the examination and inspection of the merchandise. That
section requires that the assistant appraise1· at the port of
New York shall examine and inspect such merchandise as
the appraiser may direct "and truly report to him the true
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value thereof, according to law. Such re.p ort shall be subject to revision and correction by the appraiser, and when
approved by him shall be transmitted to the collector, and
shall be deemed an appraisernent by the U.S. local appraiser
of the district, of sueh merchandise, required by law."
Section 2940, Revised Statutes, provides for the appointment of examiners at the port of New York "to aid each
of the assistant appraisers in the examination, appraisement,
and inspection of merchandise." The qualifications for this
office appear to be the same as those of assistant appraiser.
No re·ason is apparent why the examiner may not perform
all duties of the assistant appraiser. The report required in
section 2615 is the report of the assistant appraiser and
should be authenticated as such by his signature. A report
signed by an examiner or clerk can not be said to be the
report of the assistant appraiser.
Inasmuch, however, as the statute appears to limit the
functions of the examiner to examination and inspection of
merchandise and requires that the report of such examination and inspection shall be made by the assistant appraiser,
·~ am of opinion that a report signed by the examiner or
clerk and approved by the appraiser is not in compliance
with the requirements of section 2615.
Very respectful1y,
RICH.A.RD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.
RENT OF EAL FI HERIES-COMPROMISE.
It is competent for the nited tates to recover by proper legal proceeding the difference between the amounts actually received as rent
and bonus from the seal fisheries and the amounts oalled for by the
t rm of the lease as rent and bonus for the same years, notwithstanding the action of a prior Secretary of the Treasury in reducing sums
due und r the lease by what bis e timate was of the lessee's claims
for damacre, inasmuch as it appears such claims were not legal and
valid.
uch action of the prior Secretary, even if it binds his successor, as to which qurere, does not conclude the nited tates.
DEP..A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Febr'l.lary 23, 1894.
Sm: I have your· of January 9, la t, relating to the
bde te lne to the nited tate._ of the North American
C mm r ial Company, 1 ee of the eal islands of Ala ka.
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In an opinion given by this Department under date of
August 7, 1893, the conclusion was reached that the Secretary of the Treasury was without power to reduce either the
rent reserved in the lease to the North American Commercial
Company or the bonus of $7.62¼ therein agreed to be paid
upon each skin taken and shipped, and that the differences
between the amounts actually received by the Secretary of
the Treasury as rent and bonus for the years 1890-'92 and
the amounts called for as such rent and bonus by the terms
of the lease were still due to and recoverable by the United
States.
You now call attention to a claim of the company-not
before brought to my notice-that the reductions of rent
and bonus allowed the company by Secretary Foster were
the result of a compromise by which the demands of the
United States under the lease were abated as a consequence
and in consideration of the release by the company of certain large claims for unliquidated damages.
The alleged compromise involves the doubtful question of
any general authority belonging to the Secretary of the
Treasury, independently of any express statute and simply by
virtue of his office, over claims against the United States for
unliquidated damages. It is also open to the serious objection that the company's claims, if a legitimate subject of
compromise by the Secretary, could be so compromised only
in the manner pointed out by the provisions of section 3649
of the Revised Statutes of the United States. Without now
insisting upon these objections, however, and assuming for
present purposes only that the facts are as stated, I am still
unable to see that the result reached in the opinion already
given -is in any wise affected. It was there taken for granted
that the lawful demands of the Government had been
reduced without consideration, on grounds of sympathy or
sentiment, or on general considerations of what was proper
and liberal under the circumstances. The new feature now
presented is .that they were reduced for a consideration,
to wit: The release of certain claims by the company. That
ne'.V feature puts in issue the nature of that consideration,
and necessitates the inquiry whether the claims .released
were or were not legally valid claims. If they were not the
act of the Secretary in allowing them, and in abating the
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just demands of the United States by reason of them, was
without authority of law and beyond his jurisdiction. An
examination of the papers submitted shows tlrnt such was
the character of the company's claims. They were claims
for damages caused by the act of the United States in reducing the company's catch of fur seals to 7,500 per year. But this precise thing the United States reserved to itself the
absolute right to do by the express terms of the lease, the
language of which is: "It (the company) also agrees to obey
and abide by any restrictions or limitations upon the right
to kill the seals that the Secretary of the Treasury sbaU
judge necessary, under the law, for the preservation of the
seal :fisheries of the United States; and it agrees that it will
not kill or permit to be killed, so far as it can prevent, in
any year a greater number of seals than is authorized by the
Secretary of the Treasury."
It follows, therefore, that notwithstanding Secretary Fostei·' · action in reducing the sums due to the United States
under the lease by what must be assumed to have been his
estimate of the fair value of the company's claims for damages, it is, nevertheless, competent for the United States to
reeover the difference between what it should have received
an l what it actually received, by proper legal proceedings.
The ompany strenuously insists that Secreta,ry Foster's
ac ion in the premises must be regarded as a finality, and
can not be reopened and reviewed by his successor. Whether
tllat -position be or be not correct, it is not material to consider. Even if it be correct, nothing more follows than that
the present ecretary of the Treasury can not by antl of
him ·elf recon ider or revise the action of his predece · or.
But uch action, if it concludes the Secretary, does not conclude the United State . It may still assert its rigbt.
through the courts and may therein recover of the company
any um which is justly due to it, and which has thus far
not been realized through the unwarranted proceeding of
one of it agents.
Re pectfully,
RICH.A.RD OLNEY.
The SECRF.T.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.
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SUSPENSION OF PENSIONS.
The urgent deficiency act of December 21, 1893, chapter 3, prohibits a
suspension, without notice, of payments under forged or fraudulent,
pensions and prohibits further suspension of payments under pensions
theretofore ordered to be suspended.
At the expiration of the statutory notice, however, the Commissioner of
Pensions may decide the case and stop payment of the pension without precluding himself from thereafter reopening the case at the request
of the pensioner when justice requires.
.
Although a statute may have apparently unreasonable and extraordinary
results, yet there is no rule of construction to avoid those results
when there is no ambiguity.
Suspension is a continuing act.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 24, 1894.
SIR: I am in receipt of your communication of February
21, inclosing a letter from the Commissioner of Pensions and
asking advice concerning the interpretation of the proviso to
the urgent deficiency act of December 21, 1893, which proviso is as follows:
"That any pension heretofore, or that may hereafter be,
granted to any ·applicant under any law of the United States
authorizing the granting and payment of pensions on application made and adjudicated upon, shall be deemed and held
by all officers of the United States to be a vested right in
the grantee, to that extent that payment thereof shall not be
withheld or suspended until, after due notice to the grantee
of not less than thirty days, the Commissioner of Pensions
after hearing all the evidence shall decide to annul, vacate,
modify or set aside the decision upon which such pension was
granted. Such notice to the grantee must contain a full and
true statement of any charges or allegations upou which such
decision granting such pension shall be sought to be in any
manner disturbed or modified."
Y()ur :first question is as follows :
"Where facts come to the knowledg~ ofthe Commissioner
from which it appears clearly that a pension was obtained
by fraud or forgery, does the proviso of the act of December
21, 1893, take from the Commissioner the power to suspend
the payment of the pension until after he shall have given
the notice mentioned in the proviso, and shall have acted
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definitely in the case, after the lapse of the thirty days or ·
longer time stated in the notice P
The Commissioner states, as an example, that there are
some hundreds of suspended pensions involved in frauds at
Norfolk, Va., part of which at least are confessedly based on
perjury and even forged testimony, the claii11 agent being
now in the penitentiary, and several of his accomplices having been also convicted. A still larger number in New .
Mexico are said to be in the same position, the claim agent
having pleaded guilty and being now in the penitentiary.
Some hundreds of pensions obtained by a claim agent in Iowa
are stated to have strong presumptive evidence of fraud, over
thirty indictments having· been returned against him by the
grand jury. Yet the Commissioner states that at the time of
writing the evidence upon these pensions is not aU in. If the
proviso under consideration applies to pensions granted upon
. forged or fraudulent papers, then the United States · must
pay out large sum of money in cases like these without any
hope of its subsequent recovery.
If there were any room for doubt as to the meaning of the
statute, courts would lean strongly against a construction
-carrying such extraordinary results,. I can find, however, 110
ambiguity in it o far as it bears on this question. It clearly
.applies to every certificate that has been lawfoUy granted by
tlrn Pen ion Office, whether the evidence upon which the
-office acted wa complete or incomplete, honest, fraudulent,
-OL' forged.
Such certificate may still, of course, be canceled
upon charge made, but until the thirty days' notice is given,
the evidence received, and a decision reached, the money mu t
continue to be paid, even though the crime ha been conf e, eel and the criminal may be already serving his term of
sentence. In _fact, the tatute practical1y abolishes the right
to u pend payment pendente lite in the e cases.
I have not overlooked the fact that the statute uses the
word "ve ted right," and that the attribute thus given to
th e pension ertificates is not one belonging to other ve ted
right .
ontract ~ and judgment. are vested rights, yetpaym nt und r a contra t induced by fraud or' even mutual
mi tak of fact, and payments under a judgment induced by
fraud or even invalid for ome juri dictional defe t, may
properly be withheld pendente lite, and proceeding to collect
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the money will be restrained when necessary by an injunction from the courts. The right to withhold payments in ·
such cases, pending legal investigatiou, belongs to the Govermnent as well as to the individual. ''lt repeatedly and
unavoidably happens in transactions witli. the Government
that money due to an individual is withheld from him for a
time, and payment suspended in order to afford an opportunity for more thorough examination." (Kendall v. Stokes,
3Eow.,87, 98.) If, therefore, the statute under consideration
declared a pension lawfully granted to be a vested right, and
stopped there, it would doubtless be altog~ther without legal
effect upon the practice of suspension pendi11g investigation
under charges of fraud.
But the statute plainly shows a contrary intent. It is to
be read as if it simply provided tbat pensions which have
been granted as therein described should not be withheld or•
suspended until after due notice, etc.
Your second question is as follows:
"Wh~re prior to the passage of the act of December 21,
1893, referred to, the Commissioner, upon reliable information
that a pension was obtained by fraud or forgery~ had ordered
the suspension of the payment of the pension, ·and was proceeding in the investigation of the case, but without having
"'given such notice as contemplated in the said proviso of said
act, must he, on the passage of said act, revoke such prior
- order of suspension and allow payment of such pension to be
resumed until he shall have given such notice, and have
definitely acted in the case, after the lapse of time, not less
than thirty days, named in such notice~"
In other words, Is or is not the withholding or suspension
of a pension a continuing act! I think that it is. Does the
statute refer to the actual detention of the money, or to the
fasuance of an order directing that the money be detained Y
I think it clearly refers to the dete.11tion itself, and that it
applies, therefore, to pension moneys, the withholding of
which has already been ordered. I am aware that a judge
of the supreme court of the District of Columbia has held
otherwise, and in an ordinary case I should be inclineil to
follow such a decision as long as it is not overruled or
reversed. That decision, however, was made in the case of
a single pensioner, while the interests of a very large number
5687-YOL 20-47

738

HON. RICHARD OLNEY.
Attorney-General-Solicitor of the Treasury,

of pensioners are involved in the question. I can not believe
that Congress took such a narrow view of the question. It
seems to me plain that they intended the statute to relie"e
all pensioners alike, whether or not the order directing snspens-ion had happened to be made before December 21, 1893.
The second question, therefore, is also answered in the
affirmative.
I do not wish to be understood, however, as advising that
the decision of the Commissioner of Pensions, referred to in.
the proviso under consideration, is necessarily a final and
irrevocable decision. It may occasionally happen that,
while at the expiration of the thirty days the evidence before
him seems clearly to require a revocation of.the pension, the
pensioner is still prqmising to procure further testimony in
support of his claim, and begging for delay. I do not think
that the Commissioner is put in a dilemma requiring him
either to continue paying money on an app~rently fraudulent claim, or, on the other hand, to foreclose forever all
rights of the pensioner. On production of further evidence,
he would have jurisdiction to reopen the case. His proper
course, therefore, would be to make a decision at the close
of the thirty days on the evidence before him, and if further
testimony thereafter produced should alter the ca e, to
reoven hi decision and reinstate the pension, allowing to
the pensioner as arrears any installments which may meanwhile have accrued.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE INTERIOR,
ATTORNEY-GENERAL-SOLICITOR OF THE TREA URY.
The Attorney-General can not be asked to examine and appro,e C{)<les
of rules or forms of applications, etc., adopted by a Department to
apply to cases arising in the future.
The , olicitor of the Treasury is empowered to give such advice a to
matters pen<ling in the Treasury Department.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF

J

S1'ICE,

February 26 189:!.
SIR: I am in receipt of your communication of February
23, concerninrr proposed special lay order permit . You
inclo e therewith a propo ed et of rules for cu, tom
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officers, which rules provide forms of application for prompt
discharge of cargo by steamships in foreign trade, order
granting application, permit for immediate landing thereunder, indemnity bond, and oaths of sureties thereto. You
ask me to adv1se you "whether such plan ma,y legally be
established."
Section 356 of the Revised Statutes provides for the submission to me of questions of law arising in the administration of any of the Executive Departments. The questions
so provided for have always been m1derstood as being questions which have already actually arisen and require decision by the head of a Department. (19 Opin., 331, 414.) I
am not aware that the section has ever been construed to
require from the Attorney-General his personal examination
and approval of codes of rules adopted to meet future cases.
Still lesR has he been required to examine and approve forms
of applications, permits, bonds, and affidavits for future use
in the other Departments. The. establishment of such a
practice would require his entire time. The Solicitor of the
Treasury, an officer of this Department, is instructed to
advise upon such matters, as they may come up for consideration in the Treasury Department. His familiarity with the
~details of the operations of your Department especially
qualify him for such a task. I do not think that tlte statute requires me to undertake the task of examining codes
of rnles and collections, of blank forms, imagining the various contingencies in which their validity might in future be
questioned, and passing judgment on these possible future
problems. For these reasons the papers are returned without opinion.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
Tlle SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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ATTORNEY-GENERAL-SECRETARY OP WAR.
Under section 12, chapter 907, Supplement to the ReYised Statutes, the
establishment of a certain line as essential to the preservation and
protection of a llarbor rests in the <lfacretion of the Secretary of War
alone, and his judgment in the matter must be final and conclusive
until modified by him.
Tbe Attorn ey-General can not be called upon for an opinion which
involves the examination of evidence and the settling of questions of

fact.
DEP.A.RTMENT

OF

JUSTICE,

March 7, 1894.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your letter of March
5, with the ·a ccompanying "statement of facts . and legal
propositions submitted by the attorney of the East River
Gas Company," and also the'' brief prepared in answer to
the said statement," and also a tracing of the eastern shore
of East River, showing the "pier and bulkhead line'' as
established by you under chapter 907, Supplement to Revised
Statutes, act of September 19, 1890, in which letter you ask
my opinion upon the following questions:
"1. Whether the establishment of pier and bulkhead
lines as indicated by the red line is authorized by law~
"2. Whether its establishment and maintenance is a~
interference with the legal rights of the riparian owners V"
Section 12 of chapter 907, Supplement to the Revised
Statute , provides:
"Where it i made ma,nifo~t to the Secretary of Wm that
the establi. hment of harbor lines is essential to the preservation and protection of harbors, he may and is hereby
authorized to cause sucb Jines to be established, beyond
which no piers, wharves, bulkheads, or other works shall be
extended, or deposits made, except under such regulations
as may be prescribed· from time to time by him."
From which it appears that the determination of the
question of fact, that the establishment of a certain line i
e eutial to the preservation aud protection of a harbor, i
referred to the discretion of the Secretary of War alone, and
hi judgment in the matter must be :final and conclusive
until modified by him.
It app ar , further, that such a line has been establi hed
by the Secretary of War, which the East River Ga Com-
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pany complains is an infringement of its rights as a riparian
owner.
That the Secretary· of War ha.s the power to establish a
harbor line there can be no doubt. Whether that power ha.s
in this case been legally exercised must depend upon the consideration of facts which entered into and controlled the judgment of the Secretary of War. What those considerations
were is not disclosed in the letter or papers submitted to me.
The Attorney-General is required to give his opinion to
the head of any Executive Department of the Government
on any question of law arising within the administration of
his Department. It has, however, been uniformly held by
my predecessors in office that the Attorney-General can not
be called upon for an opinion which involves the examination of evidence and the settling of questions of fact. (7 Opin.,
494; 10 Opin., 267; 11 Opin., 189; 14 Opin., 367,368,541; 18
Opin., 487; 19 Qpin., 672.)
It appears to be conceded here that if the waters through
which the red line passes are navigable, the harbor line may
be rightly established there. But the question whether these
waters are navigable or not can not be submitted to the
Attorney-General for bis determination .
.A.gain, the Secretary of War appears to have fully exercised the power given to him by the statute, by having estab]ished the harbor line on the eastern shore of the East
River, and the question presented here is as to whether the
line so established ''is authorized by law."
I do not think it. advisable to express an opinion upon a
question that has already been determined and carried into
effect by the head of a Department.
Whether the establishment and maintenance of this harbor
line is an interference with the legal rights of the riparian
owners is a mixed question of law and fact, upon which, in
the absence of any statement of the facts, it is not ·properfor reasons already stated-that I should express an opinion.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF WAR.
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SIOUX ML~ED BLOODS-ATTOR :rEY-GENERAL.
The Attorney-General can not consider matter merely evidential in character and make :findings of fact thereupon. Questions referretl to him
are analogous to questious referred to the Supreme Court upon certificate of division of opinion in lower courts. He has no general appellate power.
Opiuion of February 9, 1894 (20 Opin., 711), as to the meaning of the
wor<l. "Indians" given in legislation r egarding the Sioux;, reaffirmed.
An Indian may accept an allotment of property as an indivjdual under
a treaty and at the same tiwe rejoin his tribe without obj ection so far
as the United States is concerned.
History of the Sioux half-breetl scrip under the treaty of Prairie du
Chien considered.
DEP A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

111arch 13, 1 94.
SIR: Your communication of February 21 submits a new
statement of facts in the matter of Mrs. Jane E. W aldron.
which was the subject of my opinion of February 9, and a:::k
me whether on this statement of facts she is entitled to an
allotment of land on the ceded Sioux Reservation within the
provisions of the act of March 2, 1889, chapter 405. In cluded
in your statement of facts are some matter merely evidei1tial
in character, and I am not authorized to consider the e for
the purpose of making a finding of fact therefrom for my.·elf.
Under the precedents I can use only fact found by yon and
sul>mittecl, a in the case of an agreed statemeut of fact
submitted to a court.
Mr'. Waldron's mother was a half-breed of the Sioux race.
She was recognized by the United States as a, person entitled
to Sioux half-breed scrip under the act of Jul y 17, 1 .)4
chapter 83. She actually received and accepted her porti n
of ti.Ji. scrip, as did her parents, both of whom were halfbreeds. Whether they then reRided with their tribe, or up n
the land in exchan °·e for which the scrip wa , given, or 1. ·
where, is not stated.
She thereafter married a white man Arthur ,an :fet r.
who i , ta.tecl to have upported hi family off the re 1T, ·
tion. It i not tated where her daughter Mr . Waldr u. •
wa born, but it app ars that be wa brouo-ht up off th
reserva ion. It is not . tated whether or not the fath ·r. \ au
Meter, i ' an adopted member of the tribe. From 1 '"':{ on. h
all(l hi. family, including Mrs. vValdron, ha·rn be n re 2'·
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nized by the United States as Sioux Indians, and have drawn
rations as such at the Indian Agency. As I understand
your sta! c111ent, they have resided upon the reservation.
Mrs. Waldron's husband, however, is a white man not claiming Sioux citizenship.
My opinion has already been given you to the following
effect: As Mrs. Waldron is a person partly of Sioux blood,
residing on tbe reservation and claiming to be an Indian,
the presumption is that she is in fact an Indian until the
contrary is shown. The controlling question, however, is
whether or not she had a right by the laws and usages of the
Sioux tribe to claim membership therein at the date of the
agreement of 1889; and this is a question of fact which I am
not qualified to decide. The fact may be ascertained by circumstantial evfdence in default of direct proof, but I have
no general appellate authority, and as above stated, can not
weigh evidence and make findings therefrom. Questions
referred to the Attorney-Genera.I in a case of this kind are
analogous to questions referred to the Supreme Court upon
certificate of division of opinion in the lower courts. His
decision can not operate as a disposition .of the whole case if
there is any doubt or incompleteness in the facts. I can not,
therefore, consi.der the statements of American Horse before
the Sioux Commission referred to in your letter. Assuming
there to be no sufficient evidence one way or the other on the
question of her right to recognition by the tribe, the case rests
upon the general presumption of her Indian citizenship, un1ess
this is affected in some way by the treaty of Prairie du Chien
and lier mother's subsequent receipt of scrip thereunder.
The language of the treaty of Prairie du Chien of July 15,
1830 (7 Stat., 328), is referred to as tending to prove that the
wortl '' Indian" in documents relating to the Sioux excludes
half-breeds and other mixed bloods. Very clear language
would be required to have this effect. Half-breeds residing
with their tribes have, as a general rule, al ways been regarded
as Indians, and even whites adopted by the tribes have been
regarded as Indians so far as property rights are concerned.
( ee 4 Opin., 258, 260; 7 Opin., 174, 753; Oklahoma act of
May 2, 1890, secs. 30, 31.) Treaty stipulations accordi.ng1y
are deemed to apply to half-breeds as well as full bloods,
unless otherwise therein specially provided. ( Pennock v. Com-
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missionrrs, 103 U. S., 44, 46). The treaty of Prairie du Chien
does not purport to be with the entire Sioux Nation, but
ou]y with six bands therein mentioned, joined with the Sac.
and Foxes and other tribes not belonging to the Sioux at
all. These tribes obtained permission by the treaty to bestow
certain land::; on "the half-breeds of their nation," "their
half-breeds," ''the half-breeds of said tribes and bands."
This Janguage implies that the half-breeds are members of
the tribes, although for some reason then intending to make
a separate settlement. The phraseology in this regard varies
in different Indian treaties, even in- the treaties with different bands or tribes of the Sioux Indians. Sometimes halfbreeds or mixed bloods are distinguished from "fodians;"
sometimes fnll bloods are referred to as a subdivision only.
No great stress can be put on these variations of language
occurring in treaties or legislation relating to particular
bands, and at great intervals of time. (See Yankton treaty
of April 19, 1858, .Art. VI, VII; Sisseton and Warpeton
treaty of February 19, 1867, .Art. VIII, IX; agreement of
.Angu t 15, 1876, with Ogalalla and other bands, art. 7,
incorporated in the act of February 28, 1877, chap. 72;
Indian appropriation act of May 15, 1886, chap. 333, 24
Stat., 39.)
It remains to consider whether the special provision made
for Mr' . Waldron's ancestors by the treaty of Prairie du
Chien, and her mother's receipt of scrip therefrom arising,
operate h1 any way to bar her present claim. That treaty
was intended, among other things, to separate the fullblooded Indians from the half-breeds of the tribes therein
mentioned, and the half-breeds were given a right of occupation of a specified tract of country on the fi sissippi
River, in the present State of Minnesota., "holding by the
same title arnl in the same manner tbat other Iudian titles
are held;" but the treaty provided tha~ the President might
thereafter a sign to any of the said half breeds in fee ~imple
portion of aid tract, not exceeding 640 acres to each individual. The half-breed , however, refu eel to avail themselve of the e provisions, and by a subsequent treaty it wa
provided that 150,000 should be paid them by the United
Stat in lieu thereof. This provision, however was rejected
by the Senate, and the treaty amended accordingly Sep-
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tember 4, 1852. (10 Stat., 954-958.) _Many of the mixed
bloods, however, were actually in occupation of the land,
and accordingly Congress passed the act of July 17, 1854,
chapter 83, known as the Sioux half-breed scrip act. This
act anthorized the President to obtain from the Sioux mixed
bloods the land in question by exchange, and for that purpose to issue scrip, giving to each person not less than 40
nor more thm~ 640 acres of land, to be located within said
reservation or e1sew here, and to expose the balance of the
land to public sale.
The state of facts then existing, and the re~son for passing
a statute instead of making a treaty; are shown in the Congressional proceedings of May 5, 1854. · (28 Cong. Globe, 1114,
1115.) The half-breeds in question were not regarded as a
tribe with whom a treaty could be made but as individuals.
On the other hand, the Sioux Nation had parted with the
land, so that no treaty with them could accomplish the object
of opening up the land for settlement. Part of the half-breeds
had remained on the land and were supporting themselves in
a civilized manner, while the rest had moved away and were
living an uncivilized life, but were still regarded as having
a legal interest in an equal share. It was for this reason, in
order to ascertain all the persons entitled, whether resi<lent
or not, that a census was directed by section 2 of the act.
It does not appear whether Mrs. Van Meter or her parents
were among the civilized Indians who remained or the uncivilized Indians who went West. In the latter case they probably followed their tribe and never severed their connection
with it. The question, however, I regard as immaterial. As
the tribe had the right to adopt white members, so it had the
right to readopt half-breeds who had been left behind in its
migrations. Mrs. Van Meter_ ·subjected herself to no estoppel
af4 against the Sioux Indians by taking the scrip. It represented individ1pl property; perhaps, even, a who1lyun100kedfor bounty from the U.S. Government. Nor was Mrs. Waldron subject to any estoppel in 1889 as against the United
States, which dealt with the Sioux Nation as a body. It is
well settled that an Indian may hold individual property
under treaty allotment and at the same time rejoin her tribe
without objection, so far as the United States is concerned.
(Pennock v. Commissioners, supra, at p. 48.)
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For the e reasons I do not think that the treaty of 1830, or
any of the proceedings thereunder, overthrow the presmnption arising from Mrs. Waldron's race, residence, and claim
to Indian citizenship, and the recognition of said claim by
the United States officials before and at the time of the agreement of 18S9.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
'i.'

The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

" UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTRACT-DEPARTPART PAYMENTS
MENTAL PRACTICE.
Part pttyments can not be made upon Government contracts unless the
United States thereupon becomes the owner of the work paid for.
In case of aml,iguity in a statute, departmental practice may affect its
construction, when long-continued, uniform, and familiar, but not
when merely recent and occasional.
DEPARTMENT OF JUS'I.1ICE,

March 15, 1894.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your commumcation of Fel.H'uary 28, asking my opinion in the matter of the
contract for the construction of the revenue steamer Oal1.1rnet.
'rhe material fact , as I understaucl tl.J.em, are as follows:
A contract bas been made by your Department for the
cou tructiou of this steamer, and it is part built. The contract I rovide~ for part payments at your option, and you
reo-ar<l it a advisable to make a part payment at the present
time if lawful. The work for which the· payment is asked
ha, 1Jeen already performed. You do not state wllether or
not the coutract provides that the United States shall llave
the ownership of the boat before its completion, or whether
it hall llave any lien on the uncompleted boat for such part
payment . I am informed, however, that tq,ere is no such
provi ·ion iu the contract; tbat part payments made during
tue construction of the vessel are protected only by tbe peronal r pon il>ility of the contractor and hi bondsmen;
tllat if every in" tallment but one had been paid upon the
v ::-;el and it were sub tautially completed, it could neverthe1 ·s b transferred by the contractor to a third party, with no
remedy to the United tates but an action for damage .
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• Section 3648 of the Revised Statutes provides as follows:
"No advance of public money shall be made in any case
whatever. And in all cases of contracts for the performance
of any service or the delivery of articles of any description
for the use of the United Stat~~, payment shall not exceed
the value of the service rendered or of the articles delivered
previously to such paym~n t." * * · *
The intem of this provision is that the United States
should not pay for any work or materials until it had
received their benefit. The true construction of the section,
in my opinion, should be in accord with its intent. It matters not that the work for which pay is asked has already
been done. No benefit therefrom has as yet accrued to the
United States. I think that the section should be construed
to prevent any part payments unless the United States
thereupon becomes the owner of tb,e work paid for. The
precedents to which I have been referred, as showing an
. established practice to the contrary, are not fully analogous.
It is true that part payments are made upon the construction of public buildings, docks, etc. These, however, are
real estate, and the materials become the property of the
United States as the work goes on. The contracts for building vessels made by the Navy Department contain special
stipulations giving the United States a lien upon the work
done and paid for.
You state "that the practice has been to make partial payments." It is possible that such a practice may be so long
continued, uniform, and familiar ;:i,s to affect the construction
of the statute. No merely recent or occasional practice could
have this effect. (Merritt v. Cameron, 137 U. S., 542, 5.51,
5.32.) I am not sufficiently informed by your letter to advise
upon this point.
Since, upon the facts as now presented, your question as
to the right to make part payments must be answered iu the
negative, the other questions put by you do not require
attention .
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY. ·
The SECRE'l'ARY OF THE TREASCRY.
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LOTTERY .
.A certa,in company's plan of business considered and declared a lottery
within section 3894, Revised Statutes, as amended by the act of Sep-

tember 19, 1890, chapter 908.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Ma,rch 19, 189!.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 1st of
February last, incloding a copy of bond and booklet issued
by the Provident Bond and Investment Company, and, as I
understand,requesting my opinion upon the question whether
the company's plan of business is or is not a "lottery" within
the rnea11ing of section 3894 of the Revised Statutes of the
U nite<l States, as amended by the act of September 19, 1890.
It appears that before submitting the question to me the
.Assistant .Attorney-General for your Department reached
and expressed an opinion upon it, after a thorough study of
the facts and all the legal principles involved. His discus" sion of the matter seems to me to have practically exhausted
the subject, and makes it only necessary for me to add that,
in my judgment, the conclusion arrive'd at by him is unquestionably correct. It has the support, so far as I have been
able to ascertain, of every judicial utterance upon the subject
that bas yet been given. Indeed, in view of the judgment
and opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in
United States v. Horner (147 U. S., 449), it is difficult to see
how any other re ult than that reached by the Assistant
.Attorney-General is possible.
Very respectfully,
RICH.A.RD OLNEY.
The POS'.l'M.A.STER-GENER.A.L.
SURETIES.
fwo supplemental contracts made with a contractor when the contract
itself had contemplated and providecl for such changes, which have
been made in the manner fixed by the contract, do not impair the
ol>ligations of the sureties on the contractor's bond.
DEP.A.R'.l'MENT OF JUSTICE,

JJforch Ht, 1 9!.
I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 6th
in tant inclo ing copies (1) of contract of John Gillie. '\\ith
the .i:Tavy Department, for construction of a dry dock at
IR:
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Brooklyn, N. Y., together with the specifications for work
under the contract; (2) of John Gillies's bond with sureties for
the fulfillment of the contract; and (3) of supplemental contract arising out of the le.n gthening of the dock.
You state that another change in the dimensions of the
dock was made by widening the same, the change being
made in the manner stipulated in the contract and being provided for, as I understa,nd, by another supplemental contract.
Your inquiry i~ whether these changes have affected th~
liabilities of the sureties on the contractor's bond, so that if
the contract be declared forfeited under section 11 the United
States could not hold them for damages growing out of the
contractor's failure to perform _his contract.
It may be observed that if *the liabilities of the sureties
could be released by the changes made in the requir<lments
of the contract that mischief has already been done and will
not be aggravated by the forfeiture of the contract under
the eleventh section.
It is clear, however, in my judgment, that such changes
have in no way impaired the obligations of the sureties on
the contractor's bond. They are changes which the contract
itself contemplated and provided for and which have been
made in t}:le manner fixed by the contract. In executing
the bond, therefore, the sureties agreed to the changes in
advance, and their liability is now exactly the same as if the
requirements resulting from 't hem had formed part of the
original contract.
Respectfnlly, yours,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE N.A.VY.

ASSIGNABILITY OF INDEBTEDNESS-CHEROKEE NATION.
The assignability of the indebtedness of the United States to the Cherokee Nation is jnstifiecl under the general law and under the proviso
contained in section 10 of the act of March 3, 1893, chapter 209.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

.
March 21, 1894.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your"
communication of this date, requesting my opinion upon the
question whether the Cherokee Nation, under the g·eneral
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law, or under the proviso contained in section 10 of the act
of March 3, 18D3, bas authority to make a transfer of tbe
indebtedue s of the United States to said nation. You submit an opinion given upon the question by Assistant
Attorney-General Hall and approved by yomself.
The discussion of the matter by the Assistant AttorneyGeneral is ample and auy addition to it, if feasible, would
be superfluous. It is only necessary to add, therefore, that
I entirely concur in the conclusions reached by him and
approved by yourself, and that in my judgment the assign_
ability of the indebtedness of the United States to the
Cherokee N atiou is fully justified, both under the general
law and under the proviso contained in section 10 of the act
of March 3, 1803.
:·Respectfully, yours,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The

SECRET.A.RY OF 'l'HE INTERIOR.

DETAIL OF CLERKS-OFFICERS OF THE ARMY.

It is competent for a, head of a Department to alter the disposition
among tho various bureaus and officers of the Department of the
clerks allowe"d by law as he may find it necessary and proper to do,
taking care that in no case· shall any such clerk be paid from any
appropriation ma<l6 for contingent expenses or for any specific or
general 1)11rpo. unles such payment is specifically proviuecl for in
the law granting the appropriation.
The Secretary of Agriculture can legally detail any such officers or
emp]oyes from his Department n may be requested by the Civil
ervi e Commi ·s ion, bub he can not assign an officer of the Army
detailecl for service in the ·weather Bureau to any other duties than
tiJo e for which he is by law authorized to be detailed in the Weather
Bureau.
DEP .A.RTl\'.IENT OF JUS'l'ICE,

March 21, 1804.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge ~our letter of the
13th iu taut, ubmitting for my opinion the following ques• tion :
1. Whether a clerk, or clerks, who are drawing salarie
from a Jum1 um, appropriated for a specific purpose, can be
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leg·ally detailed to perform work in other divisions of the same
Department, or for duty to the Civil Service Commission 1
2. Uan it be inferred that when an officer, or officers, of the
Army are detailed for duty to the Weather Bureau of the
Department of Agriculture, they are to be confined to expert
and scientific work connected with the Weather Bureau; or
has the Secretary of Agriculture the power to detail such
officers to fill statutory offices, or to perform the administrative functions, such as are required of civilians, when
appointe<l to statutory offices 1
By act of 5th of August, 1882, Supplement Revised Statutes, chapter 389, section 4, page 37 4, it is provided:
·"And no civil officer, clerk, * * * shall hereafter be
employeu at the seat of Government in any Executive
Department or subordinate bureauorofficethereof, or be paid
from any appropriation made for contingent expenses, or for
any specific or general purpose, unless such employment is
authorized and payment therefor specifically provided in the
law granting the appropriation, and then only for services
actually rendered in co\1-nection with _and for the purposes of
the appropriation from which payment is made, and at tile
rate of compensation usual and proper for such services."
In Natham, Plummer v. The United States (24 0. Ols., 517)
the petitioner had been employed by the Attorney-General
as an expert accountant, he being at the time a duly
appointed· clerk in the Department of Justice. His services
as expert accountant were more valuable than his services
as an ordinary clerk. The Court of Claims declined to allow
the claim for compensation as expert accountant, and referring to the act of Congress above-cited, said:
"The purpose of Congress in these provisions can not be
mi taken. It is to deprive officers of the Government of all
authority to employ in any of the Executive Departments at
the secit of Government, or in the subordinate bureaus or
offices thereof, civil officers, clerks, * * * except such
a :i may be specifically appropriated for by Congress. The
second paragraph, as above quoted, makes the same prohibition against the employment of such persons at the seat of
Government to be paid from appropriations for specific as
well as general purposes." * * *
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The court holding that the Attorney-General had no
authority to employ the clerk as an expert accountant,
denies bis claim for extra services.
Section 166, Revised Statutes, provides that: "Each head
of a Department may, from time to time, alter the distribution among the various bureaus and offices of his Department of the clerks alloweu by law as be may find it necessary and proper to do."
.
And this section is expressly excepted from repeal, or modification, by anything in the act of August 5, 1882, above
referred to.
In answer to your first question, then, I am of opinion that
it is competent for you, as head of a Department, to " alter
the disposition among the varioµs bureaus anu offices of"
your "Department of the clerks a11owed by Jaw, as you
may find it necessary and proper to do;" taking care, however, that in no case shall any such clerk be paid from any
appropriation made for contingent expenses, or for any specific or general purpose, unless such payment is specifically
provided for in the law granting the appropriation.
Ry chapter 211 (27 ~tat. L., 682) ft is required that "the
heads of the respective Executive Departments shall detail
from time to time such officers and employes as may be
required by said Commission (Civil Service) in their investigations."
I am of opinion then that the" Secretary of Agriculture
can legally detail " any such officers and employes from his
Department as may be requested by the Civil Service Commissio11.
In reply to your second question I beg to say that by
chapter 1266 (26 Stat. L., 653) the Weather Bureau was
attached to the Department of Agriculture and made to
~onsi ·t of "one Chief of Weather Bureau and such civilian
employe. a Congress may annually provi<le for: * * *
Provided, That the Chief Signal Officer of the Army may,
in the discretion of tbe President, be detailed to take charge
of aid Bureau, and in like manner other officer of the Army
not exceedin·g four, expert in the duties of tlie weather ...,eiTice, may be as ignea to duty with the Weather Bureau, and
whHe o serving ball receive the pay and aHowance to
which they are entitled by law."
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I do not think that the Secretary of Agriculture can legally
assign such Army officers, so detailed, to any other duties in
his Department than those for which they are by law so
authorized to be detailed in the Weather Bureau.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF AGRICULTURE.
LIMITATION OF CLAIMS.

The six years' limitation of time for presenting claims under the act of
March 3, 1887, chapter 359, applie,; only to suits in the Court of Claims·
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 23, 1894.
Sm: Answering your inquiry of March 20 whether you
are debarred by the Tucker Act of March 3, 1887, chapter
359, section 1, from allowing claims filed in your Department more than six yeal's after the rights have accrued for
which the claims are made, I have tlle honor to advise you
that the limitation in said act is by its terms applicable only
to suits in the Court of Claims, and does not restrict your
jurisdiction in any way.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW.
Uncopyrighted lithographs may be imported, although they may be
copies of the copyrighted paintings.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 24, 1894.
Sm: Answering your communication of March 19, I have
the· honor to advise you that, in my opinion, the international
copyright act of March 3, 1891, chapter 565, does not prohibit the import:-1tion of uncopyrighted lithographs, although
the e lithographs may be copies of copyrighted paintings.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.
5687-VOL 20-48
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INFORMERS' COMPENSATION-OFFICERS.
Informers who are appointed special inspectors without compensation
except their interest as informers in tbe result of seizures are uot
officers of t,he United States within the anti-moiety act of June 22, 1874,
-chapter 391, section 4.
Nor are persons on the pay roll as temporary laborers but at the time off
duty-that is, receiving no pay.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 26, 1894.
SIR: Your communication of March 23 incloses a letter
from the collector of customs at San Francisco, asking
whether certain persons described by him are officers of the
United States within section 4 of the anti-moiety act of June
22, 1874, chapter 391. The persons described by him belong
to the classes, first, informers, who, after conveyiug information of frauds on the customs to the collector, are appointed
by him special inspectors for the purpose of making seizures,
without further compensation than their interest in possible
moieties arising therefrom; and, second, persons appearing
on the weigher's pay roll as temporary laborers, but who, at
the time of obtaining and giving the information, are off
duty-that is, receiving no pay. It is my opinion that
neither of these classes of persons are officers of the United
States within the meaning of the statute referred to.
Very respectfully,
RICH.ARD OLNEY.
The SECRE'l'.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

INDEX.
ABSENCE FROM DUTY.
1. A clerk in a department absent from duty while n,t Omaha, Nebr.,
at a prize drill, duly ordere<l. by the superior officer of the
National Guanl, of which he is a member, is entitle<l. to pay
whilo so absent. 437.
."
2. Employes of the United States, ·who are members of the National
Guard, are not entitled to leave of absence from their respective duties without loss of pay or time, in order to engage in
rifle practice, even although in the general or<lers of commanding general of the militia, such rifle practice may be called a
parade. 66e.
AB ENCE ON PAY.
1. ection 4 of the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 128, inhibits heads

of Departments and the Executive from granting leave of absence
to Department cierks with pay and without charging the time
against the periou of absence allowed annually by law in every
case, except that of the sickness of the cl~rk concerne<l.. 303.
2. The appropriation act of March 3, 1893, chapter 211, section 5, prohibit auy other leave of absence on pay where :m employe
has, before July 1, 1893, been absent for a longer period than
ninety days during the calendar year 1893. 607.
3. ection 5 of the appropriation act of March 3, 1893, chapter 211,
does not authorize the heads of Departments to grant leaves
of absence with pay for more than sixty days in i.1ny calendar
year . Th e act applies to the ·urrent year, and absences prior
to ,Jnly 1, 1893, must be taken into account in computing the
total leave to which an _e mploy6 may be entitled during the calcn<lar )'ear ending December 31, 1893. 670.
ADDITIO "°AL DUTY.
1, The additional duty imposed by section 7 of the custo.ns administrative act of June 10, 1890, is not subject to drawback. 247.
2. The aduitional duties provided by the cnstorns administrative act
of June 10, 1890, cl1:1pter 407, are penalties within the meaning
of Revi ·e<l. Statutes, parngmphs 5292 and 5293, and the antimoiety act of June 22, 1874, chapter 391. 660.
ADJOURNMENT OF COKGRESS.
3. ·when Congress adjourns, not sine die, for a longer period than ten
<lays, exclusive of Sundays, a11d certain bills in less than ten
755
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days before such aujournment are placed in the hands of the
Executive for approval or disapproval, it is competent for him
to approve such a bill during the ;>eriod of such adjournment;
probably such a bill not signed would not become a law at the
expiration of the ten days. At any rate, the best plan would
be, in case of the bill not meeting Executive approval, to return
it vetoed when Congress reconvenes; than its validity can be
passeu on by the court. 503.
ADVANCES TO CONTRACTORS.
ee Bo D OF INDEMNITY.
ALLOTMENT 01!' LANDS.
ce IxmANS. Nos.1 and 5.
AMNESTY.
The President has the constitutional power, without Congressional
action, to issue a general pardon or amnesty to classes· of criminal . 330 .

•

APPOINTMENT.
1. The Se<'retary of War is authorized to assign recent graduates,
non-commissioned officers, and civilians to t-he cavalry or
infantry, although "additional" second lieutenants remain in
the engim,ers and artillery, and no vacancies exist in tbe lastnamed branches. 149.
·
· 2. An appointment inadvertently made upon certification from the
eli<rible list of one State, where the appointee was at the time
of the appointment a resident of another State, is not invalid.
274.

APPOINTMENT IN NA VY.
ntlcr the act of March 2, 1889, chapter 96, vacancies in the Line
antl. Marine Corps in the lowest g-rade of commissioned officer ,
must be filled from final graduates of the line and marine corps
at Annapolis; so also as to vacancies in the Engineer Corps.
Vacancies in the Line and Marine Corps can not be .tilled from
the eugiueer corps division, or vice versa. 615.
APPROPRIATION .
.1. The unexpended balance of the amount of the appropriations of
Jnnc 14, 1880, and 1farch 3, 1881, hitherto transferred from the
boo1;:s of the War to those of the Interior Department, now
relicYecl by the act of August 19, 1890, chapter 807, from the
u ·e to ,Yhich by said transfer it had been assigned, can now
properly go back into the original fund. 300.
2. 'rhe IDon y appropriated by the two first acts was applicable for
the payment of damages, as well as for the costs of tht) improYem nt. Jb.
3. The Pre, ident may lawfully use uch portion of the $500,000
anpropriatecl by the act of February 26, 1889, chapter 278, a. he
may deem necessary for the protection o,f the iuterests of the
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United States at that place in making contracts for the control,
whether by lease or purchase, of land in Pago-Pago Harbor.
484.
4. The President may lawfully direct tllat such portion of the
$250,000 appropriated by the sundry civH act of August 5, 1892,
"for providing naval and coaling station" as may be necessary,
be used for the construction of a pier re<]_uired in providing a
naval and coal station in the harbor of Pago-Pago, S~moan
Islands. 553.
5. The expense of printing and binding animal industry reports, su::ih
as the Secretary of Agriculture may publish, is to be paid out
of the $850,000 appropriation approved July 5, 1892; not out of
the $75,000 appropriated and placed in the hands of the Public
Printer for the Department of Agriculture. 573.
6. The cost of transportation and subsistence of the men detailed by
the Secretary of the,Navy to guard Government property at the
World's Columbian Exposition must be paid from the fund provided for the Marine Corps and its subsistence. 576, 577.
7. The appropriation of the sundry civil act of March 3, 1893, for the
World's Columbian Commission is not in subjection to the proviso of the appr~priation act of August 5, 1892, chapter 391, for
the same subject. 594.
8. An appropriation to enable the Secretary of Agriculture to prepare certain property for an experiment station and to remove
a previous experiment station to a new site, is a "permanent
specified appropriation" within the act of June 20, 1874, cbapter
328, section 5. 599.
9. The French Government may be reimbursed its expenses in taking
cbarge of' American seamen brought back accused of crime on
the requisition of the United States consul, from the $5,000
appropriation of the act of July 16, 1892, chapter 197, for
expenses bringing home persons charged with crime. 600.
10. 'l'he act of March 3, 1893, chapter 212, contemplates a gunboat
built of steel, ,not on the "composite" plan. 617.
11. It is not permitted th e Secretary of State, by the joint resolution
of Congress approved February 25, 1893, to authorize the construction of a wharf different in character from that specified in
the resolution, even if from a change in the circumstances the
construction of that sort of wharf with that appropriation has
become impracticab1e. 653.
·
See PUBLIC p ARK.
APPROPRIATION FOR PUBLIC BUILDINGS.
1. An appropriation for a public building must be made in express
terms. 54. •
2. The act of March 3, 1891, chapter 527, does not carry an appropriation. 54.
ARMY OFFICERS.
See COMMISSIONER OF SOLDIERS' HOME, No. 2.
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ARTIFICIAL LIMBS.
Under section 4787, Revised Statutes, as amended March 3, 1891,
the money commutation in lieu of an artificial limb can be had
every three years, and the 11eriods of three years run from the
time when such limb was furnished, 11ot from July 17, 1870. 83.
AS8IGNABILITY OF INDEBTED:.KESS: ·
The assignability of the indebtedness of the United States to the
• Cherokee Nation is justified under the general law and under
the proviso contained in section 10 of the act of March 3, 1893,
chapter 209. 749.
ASSIGNMENT OF CLAIM.
The head of a Department is prohibited by section 3477, Revised
Statutes, from cooperating with a contractor having a balance
due him in the Treasury in assigning this balance to an outsider
before the issuing of the warrant or warrants for payment of
the amount proposed to be assigned. 578.
ASSIGNMENT TO SERVICE.
The Secretary of "\Var may appoint recent graduates, non-commissioned officers, and civilians to cavalry and infantry service,
although they rem~in "additional second lieutenants'' in the
engineer's and artillery service, and there are no vacancies in
said service. 149.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
1. The .Attorney-General is not authorized to give an official opinion
to the b.ead of a Dep:1rtment as to questions arising in any other
Department. 50.
2. The Attorney-Geueral is not authorized to review an interpretation of the law laid down by the Civil Service Commission at
the request of the 'ecretary of the Interior, where no question
in the matter is pending in the Interior Department. 15 .
3. The Attorney-General is not authorized to give to the Secretary of
the Treasury bis opinion as to the proper construction of a pension appropriation act, because the Treasury Department is
bound to follow the rulings of the Department of the Interior
in considering that act. 178.
4. The Attorney-General declines to advise the Secretary of the Treasury as to whether certain pictures of coins are a violation of
section 3 of tile act of February 10, 1891, chapter 127, on the
gronnd that this is a question for the courts and not for the
Executive Department. 210.
5. The Attorney-General decline to give an opinion where the reque t
for the opinion contains no statement of :facts and presents no
question of law. 220.
6. The Attorney-General will not give an opinion where the suujeetmatter submitted shows no question of law arising in the administration of the Department submitting it. 249.
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7. The Attorney-General is not required to give an opinion except on
such questions as are necessary to guide the head of the Department. 251.
8. The Attorney-General is required only to answer questions of law,
and can not consider questions of fact upon evidence submitted. 253.
,.
9. The Attorney-General does not give opinions where the question
is so general as not to show wh?'t the question is that has. arisen
in any Department. 258.
10. The Attorney-General can not investigate the papers and recor~s
for the purpose of ascertaining the facts upon which a question
arises. 2i0.
11. The Attorney-General can not reverse the decision of the Civil
Service Commission or require it to issue a certificate of reinstatement. 270.
12. In the absence of action on the part of Congress declaring forfeiture or directing suit, the Attorney-General is not warranted in
instituting proceedings to recover to the United States the title
and possession of the land granted by section 19 of the act of
March 3, 1877, chapter 108. 307.
13. The Attorney-General can not at the instance of the Secretary of
the Treasury express an opinion on the question whether the
Civil Service Commission should issue a certificate of reinstatement to a clerk in the Treasury Department. 312.
U. The Attorney-General is not authorized to give an opinion on a
question judicial in character. 314.
15. The Attorney-General <tan not properly give an opinion where it
does not appear that some question exists calling for the action
of the Department requesting it. 383.
16. The Attorney-General declines to express a,n opinion to the
Postmaster-General on tho question whether a certain publication is within the description of matter which the statute
denominates "~econd class," on the ground that it is a pure
que tion of fact which it is the province of the PostmasterGeneral to decide. 384-.
17. The Attorney-General can not properly decide what are the limits
of the jurisdiction of the consul in China. 391.
18. Tbe Attorney-General will express no opinion where the matter
is not one requiring the action of the head of a Department as
being within his official duties. 420.
19. ·where the Attorney-General is not called upon to give an opinion
upon any question pending undetermined, but is asked to review
and express his conclusion upon the correctness of interoretation and applications of law heretofore made, he is not permitted to give an opinion, nor will he give an opm1on upon a
hypothetical case as to questions which may arise in the
future. 440.
20. Whether or not certain person; are within the so-called eighthour labor law is a question of fact not for the Attorney-General
to determine. 459.
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21. Where certain contractors who e uid for performing certain work
for the Government has been accepted, state that before signing
the contract they desire to know what portion of the work the
eight-hour law will affect, the Attorney-General is not authorized to give an opinion in such case. 463.
22. It is not permissible for the Attorney-General to give an opinion
except in a case actlrnJly arising in the administration of one of
the Departments. 465.
23. ·where terms are used in a statute in their ordinary acceptation and
the duty of applying it in a particular matter js one of administration merely, that duty can not be devolved upon the AttorneyGeneral. 487.
24. Before rendering an opinion, the Attorney-Generalrequiressuccinct
statements of the facts and of the question of law arising thereon,
upon which the opinion is desired. 493.
25. The Attorney-General is precluded from giving an opinion as to
whether an appointment would be likely to occasion confusion
or a conflict of anthority. 4-94-.
26. The Attorney-General will decline to give an opinion as to the
a11plicability of the so-called eight-hour law to a certain contract for public work, for tho reason that the contractor, not
tho Secretary of the Treasury, is liable for the violation of the
law. 500.
27. The question by whose fault or negligence, if anyone's, a wrongful payment has ueen made, is a question of fact or of mixed
law and fact which only the court can determine, and the
A ttorney-Genoral shouhl not e:s:pr:ss an opinion thereon. 524.
28. Whore no statement of facts is presenteu, the Attorney-General
can not render an opinion. 526.
29. ·whether various schemes are "dependent upon lot or chance,"
within the meaning of the lottery law, is a mere question of
fact, upon which the Attorney-General is not authorized to give
an opinion. 530.
30. Tho Attorney-General is neither required nor authorized to give
an opinion to the head of a Department, except ju cases actually
pending for decision by him in snch Department. 536.
31. The Attorney-General will not answer a question purely judicial
in its nature. 539.
32. The question as to the right of a State to tax land on an Indian
reservation is judicial and not adminrstrative. The AttorneyGeneral ought not to express an opinion on it. 277.
33. The Attorney-Generali::. prohibited from giving an opinion unless
an occasion has actually ari en requiring the action of a head
of a Department. 583.
.
34. The power of the Attorney-General to give an opinion ou request
of the heacl of a Departm nt is confined to que tions of law
ari ing in the administratjon of the Department calling for the
opinion. 588.
35. ,vhether certain compilers belong to any of the description of
persons named in paragraph 7 of special department rule So. I,
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is entirely a matter of fact, as to which the Attorney-General
can ex.press no opinion. 590.
36. The Attorney-General can not be asked to give a list in advance
of the occupatio11s, employment in which woulcl constitute
"laborers" within the meaning of the Chinese acts. He can
only answer as to each case when it arises. 602.
37. The Attorney-General should not give an official opinion, except
to the President or to th e head of an Executive Department,
with reference to matters in the direct or supervisory control of
the head; accordingly he should not at present auswer the
question whet,her the Commissioner of Patents, in an inquiry
insti_tnted uncler section 467, Reviseu Statutes, ha,s the power
to appoint a referee to take testimony and report with his conclusions thereon, subject to revision by the Commissioner of
Patents, and afterwards by tho Secretary of the Interior. 608.
38. The Attorney-General can not give an official opinion except upon
a question of law which has already arisen and which is submitted upon a definite statement of facts, not leaving it to him
to draw inferences of fact from correspondence or documents.
614.
39. The Attorney-General can give official opinions only upon questions of law actually arising in the adrnin:i:str::ttiou of the
Department, and which are at the time pending, and which
must be uetermined in oruer tlrnt the work of the Department
may be properly administered. He _is reluctan(i to lHtss upon
any question whose answer may bring the Department of Justice into conflict with a judicial tribunal. 618.
40. A j ndge of a State court rnfused a claim of employ&s of the
\Var Department to exemption from jnry duty. He notified the
Department, however, that he would excuse the men from such
duty if, in the opinion of the Depart~ent, it would seriously
prejudice the public interest : Held, That no such serious occasion has yet arisen as woul<.l justify the Attorney-General in
reviewing the ruling of the State judge. 618.
41. The Attorney-General has no authority to givo an official opinion
upon the reasonableness of fees demanded by persons proposing
to act as attorneys for Indian litigants. 620.
42. The Attorney-General can not be asked to authorize an investigation to lJe made, in onler that an official opinion may be rendered by him basetl on the result of such investigation. 640.
43. Official opinions of tho fAttorn ey-General are to be followed by
the other Departments. 648.
44. The Attorney-General can not attempt to frame n, definition of
statutory language to cover all future cases. 649.
45. The construction of regulations of the Ci-vil Service Commission
is a matter entirely within the province of the Commi::;sion, and
should 110t be attempted by the Attorney-General. 649.
46. Questions of pure law actually arising in the administration of
the Treasury Department and requiring the personal attention
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of the Secretary of the Treasury, may be ·referred to the Solicitor of the 'l'reasury or to the Attorney-General. If referred to
the latter, his answer should be regarded by the Department as
law, until withdrawn by him or overruled by the courts. 654.
47. ~ Chinaman, resident in the United States, asked the Secretary
of the Treasury whether if be should revisit his native country
he could la.wfully return to the United States afterwards:
Helcl, That this was not a question arising in the administration of the Treasury Dep:irtment and therefore the official opinion of the Attorney-General could not be asked upon it. 667.
48. The Attorney-General should not answer the general question
"whether loan and savings associations" are corporations doing
the business of bankers, brokers, or savings institutions within
the meaning of section 5243 of Revised Statutes, as the question
is rather a judicial than an executive one, an<l. moreover, the
name alone does not offer sufficient information. 673.
49. The question of "similitude" under Revised Statutes, section
5430, is a question of fact as to which the Attorney-General is
not :permitted to reno.er an official opinion. 697.
50. A request for an opinion of the Attorney-General should contain
a clear statement of the question an answer to which is asked.
He shoultl not be left.to seek out the facts anu infer the questious
submitteu from correspondence inclosed. 699.
51. The advisability of bringing suit is not a question of law upon
which the Attorney-General's opinion may be asked. 702.
52. It is inex11edient for the Attorney-General to render an official
opinion as to whether a civil suit or criminal prosecution, if
bronght by the Government, ought to be decided by the courts
in its favor. 702.
53. While the regulations posted in the Department of Agriculture ·
seem to be valid, yet until the la,wfulness of some particnlar
regnlation is actually called in question no opinion respecting
its legality can properly be asked for or given. 703.
54. 'fhe laws br usages of a tribe of Indians are not matters of which
j uui~ial notice can be taken, but present questions of fact upon
which the Attorney-General can not advise. 711.
55. Reque ts for opinions of the Attorney-General should be accompanied uy a definite statement with the material facts, and a
formulation of the questions to which an answer is desired.
711.
•
56. The Attorney-General can not be a~ed to exercise appellate jnrisuictiou upon mixed questions of law and fact. 711.
57. The olicitor of the Treasury is au officer of the Department of
Ju tice and not of the Treasury Department. 714-.
58. The questjon whether an action to recover money uue the United
, 'tate not involving an issue of fraud, is maintainable, i a
question arising in tho Department of .Justice and therefore the
Attorney-General's opinion can not be asked upon it hy the
Treasury Department. 714.
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59. The word "exceptional n in the act of March 3, 1893, chapter 211,
section 5, raises a question of fact upon which the AttorneyGeneml c,an not advise. 716.
60. The owners of a vessel inquired of the Secretary of the Treasury
whether, if they rebuilt the vessel in Canada, it could be thereafter reregistered as n, vessel ,built in the United States: Held,
That this was a question arising in the administration of the
Treasury Department and therefore the. official ,opinion of the
Attorney-General could not be asked upon it. 723:
61. Requests for the opinions of the Attorney-General must be accompanied with a statement of facts and separate formulation of
the questions to which an answer is desired. 723.
62. The opinion asked must be one needed for the guidance of the ·
· officer asking it. 724.
63. The head of a Department can not require the Attorney-General's.
opinion as to bis power to do an act unless it is his intention .to
do it if he has the power. 728.
64. The nature of the evidence required from applicants for leave and
the sufficiency of reasons for extending or limiting the hours of
I::i.bor are matters . within the discretion of the head of the
Department, as to which the Attorney-General can not advise.
728.
65. The Attorney-General should not express an official opinion upon
a judicial question as to. which the circuit courts are in conflict. 729.
66. The Attorney-General can not give an official opinion upon a case
which has not yet actually arisen. 729.
67. The Attorney-General can not be called upon for an opinion which
involves the examination of evidence and the settling of questions of fact. 740.
68. Twenty opinions, 648, followed as to the effect to be given to the
opinions of the Attorney-General. 719.
69. Tb~ Attorney-Gener~l's opinion can not be asked on questions
relating oulyto the duties of the Commission to the Five Civilized Tribes, appointed under the Indian . approp'riation act of
March 3, 1893, chapter 209, section 16. 724.
70. On a doubtful question as to fees chargeable in customs matters,
after it bat:1 been long settled by departmental practice ·founded
on a decision of the Board of General Appraisers, the AttorneyGeneral will not undertake to pass independent judgment as to
the original merits. 73Q.
71. The Attorney-General can not be asked to examine and approve
codes of rules, or forms of application, etc., adopted by a
Department to apply to cases arising in the future. 738.
72. The Attorney-General can not consider matter merely evidential
in character and make findings of fact thereupon. Questions
referred to him are analogous to questions referred to the Supreme
Court upon certificate of division of opinion in the lower courts.
He has no general appellate power. 742.
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AUDITOR FOR POST-OFFICE DEPARTMENT.
See POSTMASTER'S AccouNTS.
BICYCLES.
The opinions previously rendered by the Department of Justice
that bicycles are "personal effects" within the meaning of our
tariff acts adhered to. 64_8, 719.
BID.
A bid made under a mistake of fact may be recalled.
See CONTRACT, Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5.

1

BONA FIDE RESIDENCE.
The meaning of the term u bona fide residence" in a particular
act, that of July 11, 1890, chapter 667, appropriating money for
the expenses of the Civil Serviae Commission, laid down. 60.
BOND.
1. A. surety company is a proper bondsman on the bond of consular
officials. 16.
2. A bond executed in a firm name by a part~er duly authorized by
power of attorney so to execute it is obligatory upon the firm.
311.
3. The President can require a bond from the register of wills and
recorder of deeds of the District of Columbia for the faithful
accounting by them of fees receivetl by them. 508.
BOND-AIDED RAILROAD.
The Government having contracted with a corporation for the
transportation of United States seamen from New York to Sa.u
Francisco, and a portion of the route having been over railroads
aided by the Governme1i.t under the act of July 1, 1862, chapter
120: Held, That all compensation earned by the said bond-aided
railroad should be withheld until determined in accordance
with that act or until judicially determined. 11
BOND OF INDEMNITY.
A proposed bond of indemnity for advances to a contractor engaged
in building a vessel deemed unsafe, and the suggestion made
that IJic contractor be required to execute a refunding bond
with adequate personal or real security or both to cover as well
advances heretofore as any which may be made herea.fter. 692.
BOUNTIES.
Bounties are not payable on sugar made between April 1, 1891, and
July 1, 1891. 2.

BRIDGE.
1. The Secretary of War is authorized by section 7 of the river and
harbor acts of 1890 and 1892 td approve or disapprove the location or plan of a hridge,t]H:, c-onstrnctio11 of which is duly author-
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ized by an act of the le.gislature of the State,. whon the waters
to be bridged are wholly within the limit of that State. 101.
2. The authority conferred-upon the Secretary of ·war by section 7 of
the river and harbor act of 1890, chapter 97, is limited to the
cases of bridges authorized by State law to bo erected over
waters the navigable portions of which lie wholly within the
limits of the State. 488.
3. The duty of the Secretary of War, considered with reference to
the act of February 28, 1891, chapter 382, incor1)orating the
Arlington Railway Company, and laicl down to be to approve
the specifications, manuer of constructing, and materials of the
proposed bridge. He is authorized to relocate it if t_h e place
designated by the compan-y is a reasonable compliance with
the terms of the ·act. 549.
BURDEN OF PROOF.
When a person of the Chinese race found unlawfully in this
country claims he sho11ld be removed to some other country
than China, the burden of proof is upon him to show that he
is a subject of such other country. 171.
BUREAU OF PRINTING AND ENG RA YING.
i". The Bureatf of Printing and Engraving can not now use steam
plate-printing presses. 33.
2. The Bureau of Printing and Engraving is still required by section
2 of the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 123, to submit estimates of
the cost c,f executing work for the Post-Office Department.
132.

CALIFORNIA DEBRIS COMMISSION.
'rho members of the California Debris Commission do not hold
civil office within meaning of Revised Statutes, section 1222,
noi· does ReYisecl Statutes, section 1224, necessitate their withdrawal from the E'.»gineer Corps. 604.
CARTAGE .
Only the cartage actually paid for by the Government is required
to be let out by public bidding. 35.
CERTIFICATE.
t,ee SURVEYOR

OF CUSTOMS.

CERTIFICATE OF CONSULAR OFPICERS OF CHINA.
Consular officers of China stationed in foreign countries and duly
empowered by the Chines~ Government may properly sign the
certificates required by s ection G of the act of July 5, 188!,
chapter 220, and certificates issue£1 by snch duly authorized
consular officers ofCbina in foreign countries, accurately conforming to the !eqnirements of section 6, are the certificates
contemplated by the law. 693.
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CERTIFICATION OF LAND.
The certification of land already covered by a homestead or preemption entry, is erroneous and without authority of law. 224.

CERTIORARI.
"be question whether or not a writ of certiorari should be applied
for in any customs revenue cases decided by the circuit court
of appeals depends upon the extent and value of the importations; the loss to the Government by reason of an ad verse
decision; the degree of doubt as to the proper construction;
the fact that different circuit courts of appeal have reached
opposite conclusions upon the same question, and other like
consitlerations. 533.

CHEROKEE NATION.
The assignability of the indebtedness of the United States to the
Cherokee Nation is justified under the general law and under
the proviso contained in section 10 of the act of March 3, 1893,
chapter 209. 749.

CHIEF ENGINEERS .
The relative rank among the chief engineers changes with the
seniority in that grade, but such change may be indicated by a
notification from the s~cretary of the Navy . No e::rnminati•m or
appointment o~ confirmation by the Senate is necessary. 358.

CHIEF OFFICERS OF THE CUSTOMS.
1. Neither inspectors nor agents are "chief officers of the customs"

within the meaning of our ta riff legislation. 675.
2. The phrase '' chief officer of tho customs" refers to the collector or
acting collector of each collection district, ~ncluding the surveyor of any district in which there is no collector, and also to
an officer legally in charge of any statutorilyrecognized port,
not being the headquarters of tho collection district. 675.

CHIEFS OF DIVISION.
Chiefs of di vision in the Department of Agriimlture are su"bject to
all the regulations in accordance with law which may be prescribed. by the head of the Department. 703.

CHL:A.
The appropriation act of 1891 authorizes the expenditure of no
money for a prison house at China except at Shanghai. 391.

CHINE E.
1. Chinese persons found unlawfully in the United States mu t be
removed directly to China, unless they show they arc subjects
of any other foreign power, and the burden of proof is upon
theni. to show this. 171.
2. The owner of a restaurant is not necessarily a laborer within the
meaning of the Chinese acts. 602.

INDEX.

767

CHINESE-Continned.
3. Natives of China, though subjects of Great Britain, are prohibited
entrance to this country by the act of July 5, 1884, chapter 220.
729.

CHINESE LABORERS.
Sernble: Chinese laborers coming to this coun~ry merely en route
to some other country may lawfully be permitted to pass through
the United States. 6~3.
CIRCULATION 01!' NOTES.
A national bank paying out on checks or otherwise notes of a
bank chartered in a foreign country is subject to a tax of 10
per cent upon the toAl amqunt of all notes it has received and
used as a circulating medjum. 534.
CITIZEN.
A oitizen of the United States wllo expatriates himself can not
use his adopted country as a means of arbitration for act.s of
the United States done when he was a citizen thereof. 118 . .
CITIZENSHIP.
A certificate of the governor and commander in chief of the
colony of Hongkong and its dependencies, and vice-admiral of
the same, to the fact that he believes the person to be a British
subject is not evidence to prove such citizenship. 42t

CIVIL OFFICE.
The members of the California Debris Commission, created by
the a,ct of March 1, 1893, cha,pter 183, do not hold civil oc'fice
within the meaning of section 1222, Revised Statutes, nor does
section 1224 necessitate their withdrawal from the Engineer
Corps. 604.
CIVIL SERVICE.
Employes of the Weather Bureau of the Department of Agriculture on duty away from and outside of the city of Washington are not members of the classified civil service. 345.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION.
1. It is not within the authority of the Attorney-General to reverse
tho decision of the Civil Service Commission, or to require it to
issue a, certificate of reinstatement. 270.
2. The members of civil service commissions are officials of the
resp!3ctive Departments in connection with which they act.
Their application arnl examination papers are the officitil records
or papers of the President or of the head of a Department, and
their prodnction can not be compelled in court when the President or l1ead of Department having legal custody of them
decides that the public interest will forbid their production.
557.
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3. By the civilservice act of January 15, 1882, cha,p ter27, and by the
legislative appropriation act of July 11, 1890, chapter 667, any
person may apply. to be examined for appointment in the
departmental service who is n.nd has been for six months an
actual bona fide resident of the county of which h:,e claims to
be a citizen. 649.
4. The President and Civil Service Commissioners can make all
reasonable regulations as to the nature of the test required to
establish the fact of six months aetual bona fide residence in
the State, but the Commissioners can not by regulation construe a definition of the statutory language so as to require
six mouths continual physical pwsence in the State as well as
residence. 649.
,CIVIL SERVICE RULES.
1. Extension of the civil service rules to new offices does not oper:1te
as restrictions upon the right of appointment until examiuations have been 1>rovicled for such offices by the Civil Senice
Commission. It is not material, however, whether or not such
examinations produce cr.ndidates eligible for the offices. In
case of failure, noncompetitive examinations may at once be
demanded. 584.
2. The President's order of January· 5, 1893, amending postal rule
No. 1 (ur..der the civil service act of January 15, 1883, chapter
27), went into effect at once, in so far as it calls for classification by the Postmaster-General and for the provision of examinations by the Civil Service Commission; otherwise it went
into effect at-each free-delivery post-office as soon as the classification was completed an<l. first examination provided at that
office. 584-.
-CLAI1\1S.
Claims under the act of March 3, 1883, known as the Bowman Act,
must be paid to the party or t.o his legal representative. 115.
-CLAIMS AGAiNST THE UNITED STATES.
1. Section 190, Revised Statutes, prohibiting employes of the United
States from prosecuting certain claims against the Government
for two years after the termination of their empioymcnt, applles
to all claims which were pending in any of the Departments
while the empioye was in the employ of the Government. 695.
2. Thestatutory prohibition of section 190, Revised Statutes, inclncles
persons receiving regular employment who take oath of offico
and lrnve power to administer oaths to witnesses, although th ey
bold no office known to the statute law and are employed and
paid under a general appropriation for the detection of crime.
695.

-COAL.
Bituminous coal, imported for the use of'the Government, ls clntiable under the act of October 1, 1890 chapter J2M, paragraph

432. 314.
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COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS.
The Commissioner of Indian Affairs and bis sub9rdinates and
Indian agents have full discretion to remove from the Indian
reservation any person not of the-tribe of Indians entitled to
remain there, and an order of the State court restraining him
from so doing should be disregarded. 245.
COMmSSIONER OF NAVIGATION.
The President is not clothe<l with authorit,y to reverse the decision
of the Commissioner of Navigation so as to adjust the claims of
Sweden and Norway for the return of tonnage dues alleged to
have been erroneously exacted. 367.
COMMISSIONER OF PENSIONS.
The Commissioner of Pensions and Department of the Interior
have sole jurisdiction to administer and construe the pension
laws. 178.
COMMISSIONER OF SOLDIERS' HOME.
1. The Commissioners of the Soldiers' Home may permit the governor,
deputy governor, and treasurer of the Home, who are retired
Army officers and who reside at the Home, to make use of ordi.
nary supplies of fuel, light, forage, etc., produced at the Home
or pnrchased for it, and they may pay the treasurer, out of the
funds of the Home, a salary for his services. 350.
2. A person duly designated to take char~e of the office of JutlgeAdvocate-General and to pe:rform its duties pending the suspension from duty of the Judge-Advocate-General is qualified to
act as a commissioner of the Soldiers' Home in the District of
Columbia. 483.
3. The Board of Commissioners of the Soldiers' Home can not delegate to the governor of the Home discretionary police authority
for the preservation of good order within its limits. 514.
4. They can not empower him to arrest, detain, or deliver over to the
court authorities non-military persons committing crimes less
than capital, except in the cases where any person may make
an arrest without warrant or precept. 514.
COMMISSIONERS OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
ee SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.
COMMON CARRIERS.
By section 3 of the act of June 10, 1880, chapter 190, the Secretary
of the Treasury may modify the form of contract rnade with
common carriers so as to permit them to remove the goods
from the vessel and place them in the warehouse or other secure
place, providing care be taken to stipulate that the liability as
common carriers sha~l continue until custody and possession of
the merchandise has been delivered to and accepted l>y the collector. 674.
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COM,PE A.TION.
1. Retirecl,officers of the Army detailed for college duties prior to the
passage of the act of November 3, 1893, hapter 13, and still on
duty under said detail, are entitled to full pay, beginning from
the _pa sage of that act. 6::i7.
2. Sectious 299 and 824 of the Revised Statutes have no application
to services rendered uncler section 827 of the Revisecl Statutes,
compensation for which is to be fixed and allowed in the manner prescribed by the provisions of the latter statu~e. 709.
See Di TRICT ATTORNEY, Nos.1, 2, 4, 5; vVEATIIERBUREAu,No.2.
T

COMPROMISE.
1. Section 2 of the act of March 3, 1891, chapter 551, does not of
itself give authority to anyone to settle or compromise judgments enteTed under the contract-labor law of February 26,
chapter 176, by the third section thereof. 530.
2. The fines imposed after a, verdict of guilty of the statutory misdemeanor of allowing certain pauper immigrants to land. after
being ordered to detain them, are not a claim within the meaning of section 3,169 of the Revised Statutes, and can not be
cornpromised under that statute.
3. It is competent for the United States to recover by proper legal
proceeu.ings the ui.fference between the amounts actaally
received as rent and bonus from the seal fisherie an<l the
amounts ·allecl for by the terru of the lease as rent and bonus
for the same years, notwithst~mtling the action of a prior Secretary of the Treasury in redu cing sums due under the laws by
what his estimate was of the lessee's claims for damage, inasmuch as it appears such claims were not legal and valid. Such
action of the prior Secretary, even if it binds his successor,
which is doubtful, does not conclude the United States. 732.
COMPTROLLER.
The Comptroller and Commissioner of Customs have no legal status
as advisers of the Secretary of the Treasury upon legal questions. 654..
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY.
The Comptroller of tho Currency can not inquire what use the
creclitors of .a bank propose to make of a dividend paicl. 269.
CONDEMNATION OF LAND.
Two proceeding for condemnation of land resulted in an order of
the proper court that upon payment of the award, together
with the sum taxed as costs, into the registry of the court, the
nited ta,tes marshal deliver a proper deed to the Cnited
tates: IIeld, That on payment of said award and cleliYery of
aid deed a valid title will vest iu the United States. 431.
'ee PARK COMl\HS IO .
CO GRE 'MA .
Tb que tion whether a Congressman can receive pay a a retired
army offi er is one of grave doubt, which only the determination
of the upreme Court can satisfactorily settle. 686.
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CONSENT OF STATE.
See LAND FOR PUBLIC
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CONSULAR DUTIES.
A person in charge of a consular office, but without the appointment and qualifications prescribed by the law, can not lawfully
perform the duties of the consulate, nor should he be permitted
to perform unofficial duties, such as notarial service. 92.
COXSULAR JURISDICTION.
The sentence of imprisonment imposed in a consular court in
China need not be served within the limits of the consul's ordinary juri::;diction, but· may be served in any prison in China.
391.

CONTRACTS.
1. Where the Government advertises for bids on designated routes
for carrying the mails a formal acceptance of the bid binds the
Government. 293.
2. A contract for the carrying of foreign mail for a term of years can
not be changed by agreement between the parties to service for
another term of years unless a new contract is submitted to
competition and awarded to the original party to the contract.
321.

3. When on July 28, 1892, a formal acceptance of bid was given, but
a minor detail was left to be agreed upon and the forma,l contract and bond were afterwards to be prepared and executed,
no contract was executed prior to the pas<,age of the act of
August 1, 1892, chapter 352, within the meaning of the third
section thereof. 44,5.
4. A bid that prescribes a time for completing work some months
later than the specification, and that also pro"i;ides for cessation
of work on a certain contingency, is inconsistent with the specification and contrary to the spirit of section 3709, Revised Statutes1 and the river and harbor act of 1888. 496.
5. No binding contract is entered into by merely writing a party of
the acceptance of his bid that modifies the specification, when
no formal contract is signed as provided by section 374.4, Revised
Statutes. Ibid.
6. Where a contract with the Government is duly annulled by the
Government, pur,· uant to its terms, when it becomes clear that
the Goven1ment can not suffer any loss on account of the
annullment of the contract in question, then the contractors are
entitletl to receive the reserve moneys. 511.
See SURETIES, Nos. 31 4.
CONTRACT-LABOR LAW.
1. Persons coming to this country for the sole purpose of aiding
exhibitors at the World's Fair do not fall wit,hin the contractlabor laws. 89, 151.
2 . .1. either section 2 of the act of March 3, 1891, chapter 551, nor any
previous law referred to in that section, gives the power to set-
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CONTRACT-LABOR LAW-Continued.
tle or compromise judgments entered under section 3 of the contract-labor law of February 26, 1885, chapter 164. 530.
CORPORA.TIO :rs.
1. A corporation organized under the laws of any State is a citizen
of the United States within the meaning of the .act of March 3,
1891, chapter 519, providing for foreign mail service. 161.
2. The State of Rhode Island is not a corporation within the meaning of the river and harbor act of 1890, chapter 907. 606.
COSTS.
The refunds adjudged to be made by the United States in suits
for illegal assessment of duties do not include costs. 273.
COSTS OF SUIT.
The t erm "costs of suit" means taxable costs, not attorneys
fees. 4-9.
CREDIT.
The act of September 30, 1890, chapter 1126, is mandatory, and
compels the Postmaster-General to credit the sum named in the
act on the accounts of the postmaster named therein. · 315.
CRIMES IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES.
No Federal court has jurisdiction to try persons, whether or not
claiming to be American citizens, for crimes committed in foreign countries. There are no common law offenses against the
United States. 590.
CRIMINALS.
See IMMIGRANTS, No. 3; COMMISSIONER OF SOLDIERS' HoME,
Nos. 3, 4.
CROW INDIA.NS.
See INDIANS, No. 4.
CUSTOMS A.DMir ISTRATIVE A.CT.
1. The customs administrative act of June 10, 1890, chapter 407, does
not repeal the act of May 1, 1876, chapter 89, providing for
separate packages in one impoi·tation. o.
2. Section 14 of the customs administrative act of Jnne 10, 1890,
chapter 407, requires the importer,· if he desires to make a contest, to prote1:1t anc.1 pay the duties and charges within ten days
after liquidation ,vhere goods are entered for consumption, or to
protest within ten days where entered in bond only. 183.
DEFir ITIO S.
1. Tlte words" costs of suits" in the appropriation act for the Navy
Department of June 30, 1890, chapter 640, relate to the ordinary
taxed co ts of suits and not to fees of counsel. 49.
2. A general rule, applicable to all ca1:1es, can not be formulated as to
what constitutes" actual bona fide evidence" under the act of
July 11, 1 90, chapter 66. 60.
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DEJnNITIONS-Continued.
3. The word "mile,n as used in the act of March 3, 1891, chapter 519,
section 5, means a mile of 5,280 feet. 98.
4. It is safer practice for the .Attorney-General not to attempt to
define the word "emigrant," but to consider each case on its
particular merits. 371.
5. .A timber dry dock is oneofthe "public works" of the United States
under the eight-hour law of .August 1, 1892, chapter 352. 445.
6. Rifle practice is not a parade within the meaning of the act of
March 1, 1889, chapter 328. 669.
7. Neither inspectors nor agents are ,: chief officers of the customs"
within the meaning of our tariff legislation. 675.
8. The phrase " chief officer of the customs" refers to the collector
or acting collector of each collection district, including the
surveyor of any district in which there is no collector and also
to an officer legally in charge of any stat.utorily recognized port,
not being the headquarters of the collection district .. 675.
9. The word ''liquors" in the tariff act of October 1, 1890, chapter
1244, section 10, does not include whisky. 699.
·
DEPARTMENT.AL PRACTICE.
1. When the meaning of a statute is clear it can not be affected by
departmental practice. 592.
2. On a doubtful question a.s to fees chargeable in customs matters,
after it has been long settled by departmental practice founded
on a decision of the Board of General .Appraisers, the .AttorneyGeneral will not undertake to pass independent judgment as to
the original merits. 730.
3. In a case of ambiguity in a statute, departmental practice may
affectits construction when long continued, uniform,and familiar,
but not when merely recent and occasional. 746.
See STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, No. 18.
DEP.ARTMENT CLERKS.
1. The word '' meritorious," relating to Department clerks asking sick
leave under the legislative appropriation act of March 3, 1893,
chapter 211, section 5, is surplusage. 716.
2. The act of March 3, 1893, chapter 211, section 5, construed as regards
the inclusion of Sundays and holidays in annual leave and sick
leave. 716.
3. When an employe is not connected with the Department during
the entire calendar year, his leave of absence should be prorated. 728.
4. The nature of the evidence required from applicants for leave and
the sufficiency of reasons for extending or limiting the hours
of labor are matters within the discretion of the head of the
Department, as to which t,he .Attorney-General can not advise.
728.
See .ABSENCE FROM DUTY; .ABSENCE ON PAY.
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DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE.
1. Chiefs of divisions in the Department of Agriculture are subject
to the regulationa in accordance with law which may be prescribed by the head of the· Department. 728.
2. The provisions of the act of March 3, 1893, chapter 211, section 5,
relating to the hours of service, annual and sick leave of
Department clerks are applieable to the Department of .Agriculture. 728.
3. The Assistant Secretary of Agriculture is not a clerk or employe
within the meaning of the act of March 3, 1893, chapter 211,
section 5. Quer~· as to the chiefs of divisions. 728.
DEPUTY MARSHAL.
An Indian agent is not prohibited by statute from acting as a
deputy marshal. 494.
DESERTER.
A soldier enlisted. for three years in August, 1862, who deserts in
a short time and then reenlists in October, 1862 for nine months
and serves faithfully and is discharged and is then arrested
in January, 1864, for desertion, is admitted to an hospital and
agaiu deserts, is, by his second desertion, barred of relief under
the act of March 2, 1889, chapter 390. 288.
DE'fAIL l?OR DUTY.
The Secretary of the Navy may detail men to guard property of
the Government placed on exhibition at the World's Columbian
Exposition. 576,577.
DETAIL OF CLERKS.
It is competent for a head of a Department to alter the disposition among the various bureaus and offices of the Department
of the clerks allowed by law as he may find it necessary and
proper to do, taking ca,re that fo no case shall any such clerk
be paicl from any appropriation made for contingent expenses
or for any specific or general purpose, unless such payment is
specifically provided for in the law granting the appropriation.
750.
DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF AMERICAN REPUBLICS.
The director of the· Bureau of American Republics may be
appointed or removed by the Secretary of State of the United
States without the assent of the Republics contributing to the
support of the Bureau. 558.
DIREC'f TAX.
The indebtedness of the State of Indiana arising from an overpayment should be set-off against the money coming to that
State under the act of March 2, 1891, chapter 496. 363.
See SET-O.FF, No. 1.
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DISBURSING AGENTS.
A disbursing agent is liable for moneys deposited in private banks,
not designated by the Secretary of the Treasury as places of
deposit, although authorized by the board of town site trmitees
to deposit in those banks. 24.
See VOUCHER.
DISCLAIMER BY THE UNITED STATES.
In a certain case, the facts held not to justify a disclaimer on the
part of the United States of its power to interfere with the
extension of a railway company. 539.
DISTRIBUTION OF MONEYS DUE CONTRACTOR.
When a balance is due a contractor and there are conflicting
claimants the proper course is to keep the custody of the balance until the respective rights of cJaimants to it have been
determined by a decree of the court. 578.
DISTRICT ATTORNEY.
1. A United States district attorney is entitled to receive for making
examination under section 838, Revised Statutes, in a seizure
case tried or disposed of by the court, such sum as the Secretary
of the Treasury shall deem reasonable upon the ·certificate of
the judge, arn:l the receipt of said sum will not preclude him
from recovering under section 824, Revised Statutes, the fees he
would be entitled to. 399.
2. Suits and proceedings by the receiver of a failed bank are within
the duties of a district attorney within section 380 of the
Revised Statutes. His compensation is not regulated by the fee
bill prescribed by statute, nor should it be paid by the Government and not out of the fund of the trust, but the amount of
fees to be allowed in any given case is a matter to be adjusted
by the Comptroller in the exercise of a legal discretion under
the advice of the Solicitor of the Treasury. 476.
3. Under the Indian appropriation act of March 3, 1893, chapter 209,
distri~t attorneys are not required to represent In di ans in suits
brought by them in States where thoy do not reside, founded on
claims of inheritance from white persons, not members of their
tribes. 620.
4. The opinion of Attorneys-General Garland and Miller (18 Opin,,
192, autl 19 Opin., 354) followed as to the construction of Revised
Statutes, section 827, relating to extra compensation for the
district attorney for the southern. district of New York. 654.
5. Sections 299 and 824 of the Revised Statutes have no application
to services rendered under section 827 of the Revised Statutes,
compensation for which is to be fixed aud allowed in the manner prescribed by the provisions of the latter statute. 709.
DRAWBACK.
The additional duty imposed by section 7 of the customs administration act of June 10, 1890, chapter 407, is not a subject of drawback. 247.
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DUTIES.
1. The duty on refined sugar imported since April 1, 1891, on which
a drawback had been collected prior to April 1, 1891, is levied
at the rate prescribed by the tariff act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121. 77.
2. When duties are based on weight under the tariff act of October
1, 1890, the provisions of the act apply to all importations,
whether made before or since the act took effect. 80.
3. Bituminous coal imported for the use of the United States is now
subject to duty. 314.
4. The President having proclaimed that enumerated imports from
designated countries shall cease to be free of duty on March 15,
goods shipped prior to that date are admitted at the old rate of
duty. 357.
5. The interpretation acquiesced in hitherto by the Department of
Justice by letter to the Secretary of the Treasury of date January 26, 1893, that "feather-stitched b}.'ai<ls" are dutiable as
braids under paragraph 354 of the tariff act of 1890, shou]d also
apply to the term ''braids" as used in paragraph 324 of the tariff
act of October, 1883.
6. The nrovision of section 7 of the act of February 8, 1875, chapter
36, admitting foreign-made bags free of duty, they having been
exported from the United States filled with grain and returned
emnty, was repealed hy section 5 of the act of October 1, 1890,
chapter 1244. 630.
7. The opinion of Attorney-General Brewster (17 Opin., 679) as to
bicyles being personal effects and exempt from dut,y adhered
to. 648.
8. Reimport.eel. whisky, when withdrawn from bond, is taxable
according to the nnmber of gallons at the time of importation.
722.
'
E.A.S'r RIVER.
The waters of the East River comprise navigable waters of the
United States lying wholly within the limits of a State. 479.
EIGHT-HOUR L.A.W.
1. The eight-hour law does not apply to a contract for furnishing
materials, such as post-office locks, to be used in -a Government;
building. 454.
2. The o-callecl eight-hour law is of general application, and the
limifation of public works applies only to tho e under a contractor or subcontractor. 459.
ELECTORAL VOTES.
Unless the President of the enate has in his custody by the fourth
Monday of January, two certificates from each State of the electoral vote for President and Vice-President, it is the duty of the
Secretary of tate to sencl special me sengers for the certificat.e
under the control of the district judge of the di trict in which
the State is included whose certificate is mi sing. 521.
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ELLIS ISLA.ND.
See Il\BHGRANT FUND, No. 2.
EMPLOYES OF' BUREAU OF ENGRA. YING A.ND PRINTING.
The act of July 6, 1892, chapter 154, relating to leave of absence
of employes of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing contemplates a maximum absence of thirty days with a contjnuance of
average compensation and a leave of absence and pay during
the same to a piece worker whose services and consequent earnings are less than the maximum determined by the average
amount of his work and of his pay therefor. 429.
EMPLOYES OF THE UNITED STA1'ES.
See CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.
ENGINEERS CORPS.
Members of the California Debris Commission are not required by
Revised Statutes, section 1224, to withdraw from the Engineer
Corps. 533.
·
ENTRY.
The separate entry of the packages contained in one importation
is still permitted. 5.
EVIDENCE .
A. certificate of the governor and commander in chief of the colony
of Hongkong and its dependencies that he believes a person to
be a British subject is not competent evidence to prove such
citizenship. 424.
EXAMINER.
A report signed by an examiner or clerk appointed in pursuance
to section 2940 of the Revised Statutes, and approved by the
appraiser, is not in compliance with the regulations of section
2615, Revised Statutes. 731.
EX.AMIN A:TION.
See NAVY.
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION.
A tate st:ttute that the United States "shall have the right of
exclusive legislation and concurrent jurisdiction" is not a compliance witll an act of Congress for the erection of a building
providing for exclusive jurisdiction save as to the administration of the criminal laws of. the State and the service of civil
process thereunder. 242.
See LAND FOR PUBLIC BUILDING.
EXTENSION OF TIME.
No officer of the Government has power to extend for one year the
time for the withdrawal of certain reimported whisky, now in
the bondec} warehouse. 642,
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EXTRA COMPENSATION.
1. Extra compensation to soldiers is not now authorized by law. 18.
2. The act of March 3, 1891, chapter 540, appropriating money for a
new edition of the Postal Laws and Regulations, does not authorize the Postmaster-General to grant extra compensation to any
officer of his Department whom he may designate to perform
that work. 221.
3. Suits against the United States, under section 15 of the act of June
10, 1890, chapter 1244, are directly within the line of duty of ihe
district attorneys, and fall within section 824 of the Revised
Statutes, and the compensation of district attorneys for their
services in defending such suits is limited to the fees prescribed
by section 824 of the Revised Statutes. 228.
See DISTRICT ATTORNEY, Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5.
FEATHER-STITCHED BRAIDS.
See DUTIES, No. 5.
FEES.
See EXTRA COMPENSATION; DISTRICT ATTORNEY.
FERRY SERVICE.
See IMMIGRANTS, No. 1.
FOREIGN-BUILT VESSELS.
Where a foreign-built vessel wrecked in foreign waters and repaire<l in an American shipyard at an expense exceeding threefourths of the cost of the vessel when repaired sails under a
foreign flag and is then solcl by the foreign owner to a citizen of
the United States, she is entitled to registry under section 4136
of the Revised 8tatutes. 253.
FOREIGN MAIL SERVICE.
1
·where a contract is made with a company for carrying the foreign mails pursuant to the act of March 3, 1891, chapter 519, in
vessels of the third class, provided for in that act, but the Secretary of the Navy accepts the vessels as of the fourth class,
but not of the third class, the company can not be paid at the
rate of compensation provided for in the act for vessels of the
third class, nor even at the rate prescribeJ for vessels of the
fourth class, but must be paicl under section 4009 of the Revised
, tatutes. 409.
See OCEAN MAIL SERVICE.
FORFEITURES.
Forfeitures providecl for by the act of June 10, 1890, chapter 407,
section 9: are not confined (except to the general clause coverin<T from ''lawful act or omission") to cases ju which the
United States has been actually deprived of lawful duties. 683.
See PENALTIES j REMEDY.
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FREEDMEN'S HOSPITAL AND ASYLUM.
See SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR,
GENERAL APPRAISERS.
1. The Geueral Appraisers are ' limited ~nan appeal to a review of
the duty imposed upon articles as to which a reappraisal is
ordered. · 39.
2. While the Treasury Department may accept decisions of the
Board of General Appraisers as a rule of action to be followed
in the classification of importations, it is not compelled by law
to do so. 648.
GETTYSBURG.
See INJUNCTION, No. 2.
GOVER"N"MENT PROPERTY.
1. A perpetual license to use Government property can not be
granted by the Secretary of War unless authorized by act of
Congress. 93.
2. No authority exists either in the President or in the Secretary of
War to sell expensive improvements erected by the Government
on land that was the subject of a prior grant, but supposed to be
a part of the public domain. An application to sell should be
made to Congress. 284, 420.
GUNBOAT.
The act of March 3, 1893, chapter 212, contemplates a gunboat
built of steel, not one on the "composite plan." 617.
HEAD OF A DEPARTMENT.
The head of a Department incurs no personal liability by executing an instrument that should not have been e-xecuted, if he
acts in reliance upon properly chosen subordinates whose ability
and good faith he has no reason to question. 573.
IMMIGRANT FUND.
1. The salary of the Superintendent of Immigration and of his clerical assistants authorized by section 7 of the act of March 3,
1891, chapter 551, may be paid by the Secretary of the Treasury
out of the immigrant fund. 69.
2. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to expend from the
immigrant fund such money as may be necessary for :finishing
certain contracts and making final payments thereon in connection with putting Ellis Island in condition for use as a
r eceiving station for immigrants. 379.
IMMIGRANTS.
1. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to enter into a contract for ferry transportation to Ellis Island for a reasonable
term, and confer the exclusive privilege of transportation on
the contractor with the right to collect a reasonable cha~ge,
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IMMIGRAN'rS-Continued.
provicled the right be subject to the rights of the Government
and its emp1oyes and to such legislation as Congress may enact
and to such rules as he may adopt. 217.
2. A supervising inspector or special inspector may be appointed by
the Secretary of the Treasury to perform such services as in
his judgment will best promote the efficient administration of
the immigrant-inspection service, and may be properly compensated from the immigrant fund. 259.
3. Immigrants who reside here, taking no steps to become citizens,
return to a foreign country and are convicted of crime and serve
out a sentence, and then attempt to return to the United States,
fall within sections 2 and 4 of the act of August 3, 1882, chapter
376, and section 1 of the act of March 3, 1891, chapter 551, and
should not he permitted to land. 371.
4. By the immigration act of March 3, 1891, chapter 551, the steamship companies are responsible for the safe custody of immigrants pronounced improper persons to land by the commissioner of immigration at Ellis Island, pending an appeal in
proceedings of habeas corpus, but shipowners so responsible
may, provided in every case they first obtain permission of the
inspection officer, deta,in the immign1nts in some suitable place
offship until the time of sailing. 415.
See REMISSION OF FINES; RBMISSION OF PENALTY.
IMMIGRATION AND CONTRACT-LABOR LAWS.
1. Our immigration and contract-labor la.ws do not apply to skilled
a. i tan ts at the World's Fair, coming to assist in putting up the
goods of foreign exhibitors. 89.
2. Our immigration and contract-labor laws do not apply to workmen
coming solely to assist exhibitors at the World's Columbian
Expo'3itiou. 151.
IMPORTATIONS.
A crank shaft and a steamer shaft brought to this country from a.
foreign country to repair a vessel of that country lying uisabled
in our ports are articles imported into the country within the
meaning of section 2503 of the Revised, tatutes, and section 2502
of the tariff act of 1883. 194, 257.
IMPROVEMENTS.
When the Government expends large sums of money on improvements erected on what is supposed to be the public domain, but
proves to be the ubject of a prior grant, the title to the buildings
so erected vests in the United States. 284, 603.

INDIA AGE T.
An Indian agent is not prohibited by statute from acting as a
deputy mar hal. 494.

I DIANS.
1. Allotment of land may be made to individual Indians of the Nez

Perce tribe under the act of February 8, 1887, chapter 119. 42.
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2. Puebl'l Indians are not covered by section 5 of the act of August
15, 1876, chapter 289, nor by the act of July 31, 1882, chapter
360. 215.
3. An order of a State court restraining an Indian agent from ousting
trespassers fron an Indian reservation should be disregarded as
without jurisdiction. 245.
4. The fourth paragraph of the agreement concluded with the Crow
Indians August 27, 1892, pursuant to the act of July 13, 1892,
is valid and of binding force. 517.
5. An Indian may accept an allotment of property as an individual
under a treaty, and at the same time rejoin .his tribe without
objection so far as the United States is concerned. 74-2.
See COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS; Sroux MIXED BLOOD;
DISTRICT ATTORNEY, No. 3.
INDIAN TERRITORY.
The President is not authorizetl to appoint a commissioner of. the
World's Columbian Exposition from.Indian Territory. 452.
INFORMER'S COMPENSATION.
1. The antimoiety act of June 22, 1874, chapter 391, ·takes away the
right of Treasury officials to receive moieties under the
Revised Statutes, section 4233. 592.
2. Informers are not entitled to compensation under the antimoiety
act of June 22, 1874, chapter 391, section 4, unless the information is conveyed directly to the chief officer of the customs.
Giving information to an inferior officer is not necessarily
equivalent thereto. If it be desirable that informers should
communica,te with the collector other'Wise than personally, the
Secretary of the Treasury can make regulations for the futurecovering that case. 690.
3. Informers who are appointed special inspectors without compensation except their interest as informers in the result of seizures
are not officers of the United States within the antimoiety net
of June 22, 1874, chapter 391, section 4. Neither are persons on
the pay roll as temporary laborers, but at ~he time off dutythat is, receiving no pay. 754.

INJUNCTION.
1. An order of a State court restraining au Indian agent from ousting
trespassers from an Indian reservation should be disregarded as
without jurisdiction. 24.5.
2. The Secretary of War it, authorized to take condemnation :proceedings to acquire land over which a trolley railroad is being constructed, that is a portion of the battlefield of Gettysburg, and
may apply to the court for an injunction to restrain the operation and construction of sai<l. railroad. 628.
INSANE ALIEN IMMIGRANT.
An insane alien immigrant may be permitted to laud in this
country under proper bontl that the Government be protected
against loss from her coming here. 79.
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INTERE T.
1. No authority exists for the payment of interest upon refunds made
in conformity with judgments obtained in cases on appeal under
section 15 of the customs-administrative act of June 10, 1890,
chapter 407. 238.
2. Where an appeal by the Government is dismissed in a customs
case and the mandate of the court says nothing upon the subject of interest, none can be paid or allowed. 408.
3. The act of March 2, 1891, chapter 496, contemplates the repayment of interest ancl penalties collected by the Government
under the direct-tax act. 412.
4. Interest can not lawfully be paid on a judgment of the Court of
Claims against the United States where no appropriation is
made for the payment of .interest. 423.
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW.
N oucopyrighted lithographs may be imported, although they may
be copies of copyrighted paintings. 753.
JURISDICTION.
Where a statute providing for a public building requires a cession
by the State of jurisdiction over the property to the United
States, a statute of that State, conferring exclusive legislation
and concurrent jurisdiction with the State to the United States,
is not a compliance with the terms of the statute. 298.
LAND FOR PUBLIC BUILDING.
The consent of a State ceding land for a public building providing
that the tate shall forever retain concurrent jurisdiction over
the place to the extent that all legal and military processes
issued under the authority of the State may be executed anywhere on such place or in a.ny building thereon, does not satisfy
the provi ion of section 355 of the Revised Statutes. 611.
LAND GR.ANT.
See ATTORNEY-GENERAL, No. 12.

L.AN FORD.
The claim of one Langford to lands allotted in severalty to Indians
of the Nez Perce t:ribe discussed and considered. 42.
LA, FUL MONEY.
ilver certificates are not lawful money within the meaning of
section 4 of the act of June 20, 1874, chapter 343, and section
9 of the act of July 12, 1882, chapter 2!:10. 725.
LE.AVE 01!' .AB E:N"CB.
The act of July 6, 1 92, chapter 154_. relating to leave of absence
of employes in the Bureau of Engraving and Printino- contemplates a maximum absence of thirty days, with a contiunauce
of average compensation, and a leave of ab ence and pay durinu
the same to a pieceworker whose services and earnin"' are
le s than the maximum, determined by the average amount of
his work and of his pay therefor. 429.
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LICENSE.
1. An instrument purporting to convey the use of a strip of land
belonging to the Government, although containing the word
"lease," held merely a license, revocable at the pleasure of the
Department giving it, and the property of the licensee properly
removed from the l and by the Government if he refuses to
remove it after reasonable notice. 527, 537.
2. An irrevocable license to use Governme,ut property can not be
grante<l. by the Secretary of War unless authorized by act of
Congress. 93.
LHHTATION OF CLAIMS .
The six years' limitation of time for presenting claims under the
act cif March 3, 1887, chapter 359, applies only to suits in the
Court of Claims. 753.
LIQUORS.
The word "liquors" in the tariff act of October 1, 1890, chapter
124.4, section 10, does not include whisky. 699.
LOCATION OF PUBLIC BUILDINGS.
While the Secretary of the Treasury has the power to locate the
public building at Portland, Oreg., within the present limits of
that city, yet it would l>e more in accord with the intent of the
act of Congress of January 24, 1891, chapter 91, to locate the
building in the limits as they existed at the time said act was
passed. 320.
'
LOS'r HORSES.
Claims filed in 1890 for horses lost in the Indian war of 1855 and
1866 are barred by the proviso of the appropriation act of March
3, 1873. 152.
LOTTERY.
A certain company's plan of business considered and declared a
lottery within section 3894 of the Revised Statutes, as amended
September 19, 1890. 203, 748.

LOUI 'IANA LEVEES .
The State of Louisiana is the owner of a servitude or interest in
the land of ripar'ian owners along the Mississippi River for the
purpose of building levees to restrain its waters within definite
limits during flood times. The United States having undertaken
to share in the task, the State bas for that purpose surrendered
to the United States its servitude and land to be occupied by
levees of the :Mississippi River Commission. The United States
will not, therefore, be subjected to liability to persons whose
land is taken by the Commission for such levees. 625.
McKINLEY ACT.
The President has no power to issue the proclamation provided for
in section 3 of the act of October 1, 1890, chapter 1244, to take
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effect in futuro, nor has he the power to reimpose duties on one
or m~re of the five articles named in said section, but not on
the others. In the proclamation the particular country on whose
products the duties are to be reimposed should be named. 290.
MACHJNERY.
Machinery brought to this country from a foreign country to
repair a disabled vessel of that country lying in our ports is
imported into the country within the meaniilg of our tariff acts
and is subject to the duty prescribed by those acts. 194,257.
MAILS.
A pamphlet and the accompanying papers decided·to be lottery
advertisements and u-µmailable matter. 203.
See FOREIGN MAIL SERVICE and OCEAN MAIL SERVICE.
MAPS.
The Secretary of Agriculture is authorjzed to procure the maps_
appropriated for his Department. 41.
MARINE CORPS.
1. The Marine Corps may be detailed ·to guard the Government exhibition at the World's Columbian Exposition. 576,577.
2. The actual subsistence of enlisted men of the Navy employed in
taking care of the wares and other Government property placed
on exhibition at the World's Columbian Exposition may be paid
f-rom the fund provided for the Marine Corps and its sulJsistence. 576,577.
MASTER OF STEAM YESSELS.
Section 14 of rule 5 of General Rules and Regulations, adopted by
the Board of Supervising Eugineers and appro-ved by the ecretary of the Treasury, was authorized by section 4405 of the
Revised Statutes, and has now the force of law. 212.
MEDAL OF HONOR.
A claim for a medal of honor considered and advice given that it
be not entertained. 421.
MILE.
The word "mile" interpreted in the act of March 3, 1891, chapter
519, cction 5, to mean a mile of 5,280 foet. 98.
MISSING ERTIF'ICATE.
See ELECTORAL VOTE.
MITIGATI .i: OF , E -rTENCE.
The nmmary court act of October 1, 1890, chapter 1259, doe not
permit the reviewing officer ttJ mitigate or to approve of pan
and disapprove of another part of a sentence of a ummary
court. 346.
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NATIONAL GUARD.
See ABSENCE FROM
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NAVIGABLE WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. What are navigable waters of the United States, discussed and
defined. 101.
2. The Chicago River and its branches are navigable waters of the
United States. 101.
·
3. The St. Louis and Cloquet rivers_, being naviga}>le waters of the
United States, can be obstructed by dams only by permission of
the Secretary of War, to whom Congress has, by express statute,
given exclusive jurisdiction of the subject. 713.

NA.VY.
The officers to be promoted in the U. S. Marine Corps to the succession of vacancies arising July 10, 1892, need not be examined
under the act of July 28, 1892, chapter 315, providing for the
examination of certain officers of the Marine Corps. 433.
NOTARY .
.A. notary's authority to administer an oath exists not by virtue of
his office, but by positive enactment. A notary of AustriaHungary not authorized by the laws of his country to administer oaths or take affidavits lacks-the necessary authority to
administer oaths prescribed by section 4892 of the Revised
Statutes. 455.
NOTES IN CIRCULATION.
1. Notes of a, national banking association signed by the proper
officers are not "notes in circulation" within the meaning of
sections 5214 and 5215 of the Revised Statutes, so long as the
bank bas never parted with any interest in or control over them,
and may either issne them or cause them to be canceled, at its
option. 695.
2. Section 5214, Revised Statutes, means instruments binding the
bank to the holder or holders: as promise to pay. Therefore
bank notes signed and actually paid out over the counter, or
otherwise so dealt with as to become liabilities of the bank, are
notes in circulation, but notes merely held in the vault cif the
bank, whether signed or unsigned, and notes so signe.cl and held
and carried on the books of the bank, are not notes in circulation, and notes that have been obligations of the bank but ceased
to be so, and return and remain in the bank for whatever period,
are not, during such period, its notes in circulation. 704,

NOTICE.
1. .A.n unconditional announcement by the Secretary of the Treasury
that the interest on 4¼ per cent bonds payable at the pleasure
of the Government would cease after a certain day, would
reqnire the Secretary to pay all the bonds covered by the
.notice. 127.
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2. It would seem competent for the Secretary of the Treasury to
insert in a notice that interest on bonds would terminate on a.
certain day, a statement that if the holders desired them continued at tho pleasure of the Government at a lower rate of
interest the request woultl be granted if the bonds were
deposited before a certain time. 127.
NUMBER IN GRADE.
See REMISSION ORDER.
O.A.TH.
The form of oath for separate packages contained in one importation was not changed by the act of June 10, 1890, chapter 407,
repealing section 2841 of the Revised Statutes. 5.
See NOTARY.
OBLIGAr:.IONS AND SECURrrrns OF THE UNITED ST.A.TES.
1. A canceled postage stamp is not an obligation or security of the
United States within the meaning of Revised Statutell, section
5430. 691.
2. An uncanceled postage stamp is an obligation or security of the
United States within the meaning of Revised Statutes, section
5430. 697.
OCEAN MAIL SERVICE.
1. The act of March 3, 1891, cha,pter 519, entitled "An act to provide
for ocean mail service between the · United States and foreign
port and to promote commerce," should be construed so as to
leacl to certainty. 161.
2. There is no authority in the act of March 3, 1891, chapter 519, for
in. ertion in the contracts of a condition by which the Postma ter·General and the contractor may subsequently vary the
terms •of the contract without submitting it to competition.
lbic1.

3. The Postmaster-General is not authorized after the commencement of foreign mail service, to increase the number of trips
ancl increase the compensation proportionately. Ibid.
4. The Postmaster-General is not permitted to have any vessels, other
than those of the first class, leave mails at Great Britain, even
if on the way to a port on the continent. Ibicl.
5. A corporation organized under the laws of any State is a citizen of
the United States within the meaning of the act of March 3,
1 91, chapter 519. Ibicl.
6. A person bidding pursna,nt to the act of March 3, 1891, chapter 519,
on various routes for foreign mails, can not refuse to carry oui
one bi(l because another was not accepted, even if he verballi
saicl his bid was conditioned on his receiving both contract . 293.
7. Section 817, Postal Laws and Regulations, does not apply to con·
tracts made under the act of March 3, 1891, chapter 519. 293.
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8. A person honestly refusing to carry out bis bid because another
route was not also awarded him, can not be prosecuted under
section 3954, Revised Statutes, as amended August 11, 1876. 293.
9. The Postmaster-General may properly accept from the holder of a
contract to perform second-class services, a proposal to perform
fin,t-class services, under the act ·of March 3, 1891, chapter 519,
on the condition that if the proposal be accepted the existing
contract shall be rescinded; but he ought, before advertising for
such first-class services, to require the holder to stipulate that
in consideration of the above, the existing contract shall, at the
option of the Postmaster-General, be void in case some other
party tban the company shall be the successful bidder for such
first-class services. 30J.
10. A contract for ocean mail service for ten years can not be changed
to one with the same party for :five years, unless the party procure the same by new bidding, after due advertisement, and any
change in the original contract releases the sureties from their
liability thereunder. 321.
11. Where a prop9sal for carrying foreign mails is accepted in vessels
of the third class, which the Secretary of the Navy subsequently
accepts as of the fourth class, the company is entitled to receive
compensation, under section 4009, Revised Statutes, but not at
the rate prescribed in the act of March 3, 1891, chapter 519, for
vessels either of the third or fourth class. 409.
OJ?FICERS.
Informers who are appointed special inspectors without compensation, except their interest as informers in the result of seizures,
are not officers of the United States within the antimoiety act
of June :J2, 1874, chapter 391, section 4. Neither are persons on
the pay roll as temporary laborers, but at the time off duty-that
is, receiving no pay. 754:.
OFFICERS OF TIIE ARMY.
The fecretary of ~griculture can legally detail such officers or
employes from his Department as maybe requested by the Civil
Service Commission, but he can not assign an officer of the Army
detailed for service in the Weather Bureau to any other duties
than those for which he is by law authorized to be detailed in
the Weather Bureau. 750.
OFFICERS OF THE ARMY DETAILED TO COLLEGES.
The act of November 3, 1893, chapter 13, leaves it within the discretion of the President to make the detail of officers of the Army
for colleges wholly from the active list of the Army, or wholly
from retirecl officers who "upon their own application may be
cietailed" for this service, or from both lists in such proportion
as he sees :fit and the application for such detail from the retired
officers will allow. No other limit tl1an 100 is set to the nmnLer
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of such officers that can be detailed from either list. The five
years' service in the Army is the limit of detail. The four years
applies to officers detailed from either list. 687.
Ol!'FICES.
Accepting an appointment to an office the term of which is to commence in future does not, until it commences, affect an office
previously held by the appointee. 593.
OFFICES ESTABLISHED BY APPROPRIATION ACTS.
'l'he term of the new professor at the Military Academy created
by the act of March 1, 1893, chapter 186, did not commence until
July 1, 1893. 593.
OPIUM.
The Secretary of the Treasury has not the power to prohibit the
transfer of opium through the United States destined to Mexico.
725.
PARDON.
1. The President's constitutional pardoning power covers the case of
the offense in Utah of unlawful cohabitation. 330, 668.
2. The President has the constitutional power without Congressional
action to issue a general pardon or amnesty to classes of offenders. 330, 668.
PARK COMM! SION.
1. Where a park commission is limited by the act creating it to the
expenditure of a certain sum of money, and has made offers
within the sum limited by the act creating it, but fears that
owing to many of these offers not being accepted the award in
judicial proceedings would be higher than the amount limited
by the act, it is nevertheless the duty of the commission to
proce cl with Hs work, and then possibly, if the awards are
higher than the amount of the appropriation, it can abandon a
portion of the territory incluJ.ed in its map. 67.
2. Th mere fact that a commission instructed by the act creating
it to institute condemnation proceedings to acquire certain
lands for a public park-unless an agreement for the purchase
thereof can be maue within thirty days from the filing of it
maps has begun such proceeding-does not preclude it from later
coming to an agreement with the purchaser as to the purchase
price of the land. 1!:l9.
PARTNER.
If a power of attorney, signed by the individual members of a
firm a well a in the furn name, confers explicit authority upon
one of H memb rs to use the partnership name in signing
checks and executing certain custom-house bonds, act done in
compliance with it are ohligatory upon the :firm. 31t.
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PART PAYMENTS.
Part payments can not be made upon Government contracts unless
the United States thereupon becomes the owner of the work
paid for. 746.
PATEN'f RIGHTS .
The Secretary of the Navy may lawfully contract with an ensign
of the Navy for the purchase of patent rights in improvements
of B. L. R. ordnance for the use of the Navy where the ensign
was not employed to make experiments, but pays the expense
of obtaining letters patent, and wh~re no expense was authorized or facility furnished by the Board of Ordnance to aicl him
in making or perfecting his invention. 329.
PAYMENT.
1. A proper construction of the Bowman Act does not warrant the
making of a Treasury draft payable to any other parties than
those named in the act, or their executors or adminisLrators.
115.
2. The act of March 3, 1875, chapter 149, does not apply to an
unliquidatecl claim in favor of a State arising out of charges
which are subject to equitable recoupment in an unadjusted
transaction, and payment may properly be made to the State of
Veri;nont of its share of the Itloney collected from it under the
direct tax act of August 5, 1861. 134.
3. The payment of duties and charges on goods entered for consumption, as well as the protest, must be made within ten days after
their liquidation if the importer desires to contest the rate of
duty assessed. 183.
4. Payments can not be made upon Government contracts unless the
United States thereupon becomes the owner of the work paid
for. 746.
PENALTIES.
While sections 17 and 18 of the act of June 22, 1874, chapter 391,
offer a remedy to one who is exposed to a fine, penalty, or forfeiture in the cases therein provided for, yet such a remedy is
not exclusive, but the relief may also be extended under section
3469, Revised Statutes. 727.
See AD1'ITIONAL DUTIES, No. 2; SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY,
Nos. 11, 12; OCEAN MAIL SERVICE, No. 2.
PENSION.
A person who enlisted in a regiment of the Pennsylvania militia, pursuant to the President's proclamation for six months' volunteers, even if the regiment was not actually mustered into
the service of the United States, but was engaged in its service,
has a pensionable status under the first subdivision of section
4693 of the Revised Statutes. 322.
PINKERTON LAND CLAIM.
'l'he claim of one Pinkerton to certain land discussed, and the
remedy, if be has one, pointed out. 118.

790

INDEX.

POSTMASTER.
If a postmaster be commissioned to serve until the end of the
next session of the Senate, and during that session his nomination is sent for confirmation 1'o the Senate but rnmains unacted
u1JOn by that body at its adjournment, t,he responsibility of his
sureties will continue for sixty days under the provision of sec-tion 3836 of the Revised Statutes, if the vacancy is not supplied during that time, and they can lawfully depute anyone
to act as postmaster until a successor is appointed, assuming
possession of the Government property. 447.
POSTMASTER-GENERAL.
The Postmaster-General advised that he may act favorably toward
the acquisition of certain records and books of the postal department of the late Confederate States. 260.
POSTMASTERS' ACCOUNTS.
The Auditor of the Treasury for the Post-Office Department and
the postmasters' accounts in his custody are papers in the Treasury Department, within section 1076, Revised Statutes. 677.
POWER OF ATTORNEY.
Soc PARTNER.
PRESIDENT.
1. The President has constitutional power without Congressional
'sanction to issue a general pardon or amnesty to classes of
offenders. 330.
2. The patdoning power of the President is absolute; not subject to
legislative control. 330, 668 . .
3. The Pre ident's constitutional pardoning power covers the case of
tho offense in Utah of unlawful cohabitation. 330, 668.
4. 'l'he President bas the power to require a bond of the register of
wills and tho recorder of deeds of the District of Columbia
for the faithful accounting by them of the fees received by
them, and it is likewise his power to prescribe the periods at
whi h accountings shall be had and payments made into the
Treasury of the United States. 508.
e Punuc PARK .
,
PROCLAMATION.
See McKI LEY

A.CT.

PROD CTION OF PAPERS.
See CIVIL 'ERVICE COMMISSION, No. 2.
PROMOTIONS.
See SECRETARY

OF AGRIUULTURE,

No . 3;

CHIEF ENGINEERS;

AVY.

PUBLIC BUILDING.
A.n appropriation for a pnbliu building is not presumed unless
given in express language. 5-1.
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PUBLIC CARTAGE OF MERCHANDISE.
Section 25 of the act of June 22, 1874, chapter 391, regarding the
letting out of the cartage o_f merchandise in the custody of the
Government to the lowest bidder, applies only to such cartage
as is paid for by the Government and not to cartage the experlse
of which is paid by the individual importer. 35.
PUBLIC DOMAIN.
A railroad company to which has been granted by the United
States every alternate section of the public lan:d not mineral,
designated by odd numbers, to the extent of twenty alternate
sections per mile on each side of its railroad, possesses no
authority to select its own lands, locate them ju sections, and
then cut timber from the land which it has so surveyed. 542.

PUBLIC MONEYS . .
Public money cannot be deposited in private banks unless authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury. 24.
PUBLIC PARK.
Where an appropriation for acquiring title to land for a public
park is limited to $1,200,000, and the law requires the President
to decide that the price to be paid for various parcels of land
was reasonable, and a commission has presented for his decision
a report of appraisers in condemnation that would make the
cost of the park considerably exceed that sum, it would not be
lawful for the President to decide that the price so submitted
was reasonable. 326.
PUEBLO INDIANS.
Section 5 of the act of August 15, 1876, chapter 289, and the act
of July 31, 1882, chapter 360, are not applicable to the Pueblos
of New Mexico. 215.
PURCHASE OF LAND.
Neither the act of August 19, 1890, chapter 806, nor the appropriation in the sundry civil act of March 3, 1891, _c hapter 542,
authorizes the purchase of lands adjoining specified roads leading to and part of the Chickamauga and Chattanooga Military
Park. 482.
See JURISDICTION.
QUARANTINE REGULATIONS.
1. The Surgeon-General of the Marine-Hospital Service and the
Secretary of the Treasury may, with the approval of the President, make proper quarantine regulations. 466.
2. The only limitation on the powers conferred upon the Surgeon.
General of the Marine-Hospital Service and the Secretary of the ·
Treasury, subject to the approval of the President, to make
quarantine regulations with reference to immigration from infected ports, is that the Federal regulations must not interfere
with State laws. It is competent for these officials to prescribe
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a longer period of quarantine, both for persons and cargo, than
the State laws prescribe, the regulations carefully providing
that the Federal jurisdiction should attach upon the expiration
of State action. 468.
3. Under the quarantine act of February 15, 1893, chapter 114, a
regulation may properly be made requiring inspection by
official authorities of State and local maritime quarantines, to
ascertain whether the national quarantine regulation3 are being
complied with. 645.
RATE OF COMPENSATION.
See TELEGRAPH SERVICE;

OCEAN MAIL SERVICE,

No. 11.

REAPPRAISAL.
A reappraisal by a general appraiser can be hacl only as to articles
as to which the appraisal is complained of. 39.
RECORDER OP DEEDS AND REGISTER OF WILLS.
The President can require a boncl of the recorder of deeds and
register of wills of the District of Columbia for the proper
accounting of fees received by them, and can prescribe time for
such accounting and for payment into the Treasury of the
United States. 508.
REENLIS'rMEN'r.
Under the act of February 27, 1893, chapter 168, service in the
Navy can not be counted and a man can not be reenlisted as a
private unless he has served already as such for twenty years in
the Army. 684.
REFUND.
1. The Secretary of the Treasury should insist upon the right ofsetoft" against the demand of West Virginia for a refund
the
direct tax to the extent of the equitable proportion of the debt
of ViTginia for which West Virginia is Hable. 240.
2. Under the act of March 2, 1891, chapter 496, interest and penalties
are collections, and should be repaid, but costs are not. Where
redemption of lands held for direct taxes was made, the party
in interest should be repaid the taxes, penalties, and interest
paid by him for such redemption. 412.

of

REFUND OF DIRECT TAXES.
Under the act for the refund of direct taxes the Secretary of the
Trea ury is authorized to pay to the governor of Tenne see as
trustee moneys received by the United States on the re ale of
land in 'l'ennes ee in excess of the tax assessed thereon, and of
the amount bid therefor at the original sale made for the collection of the direct tax. 701.
REID CLAIM.
The claim of one R id to moneys in the Treasury discu sed and
r~jected as already pas eel upon adversely. 372.
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REMEDY.
1. The remedy of a party for a land claim in New Mexico is under
the act of March :3, 1891, chapter 539. 118.
2. While section!'! 17 and 18 of the act of June 22, 1874, chapter 391,

offer a remedy to one who is exposefl to a fine, penalty, or forfeiture in the cases therein provided for, yet such a remedy is
not exclusive, but the relief may also be extended under section
3469, Revised Statutes. 727.
REMISSION OJ<, FINES.
The fines imposed after a verdict of guilty of the sta.tutory misdemeanor of allowing certain pauper immigrants to land after
befog ordered to detain them, are not a claim within the meaning of section 3469 of the Revised Statutes and can not be
compromised under that statute. 685.

REMISSION OF PENALTY.
The case of a fine or penalty incurred for vfolation of the alien
immigration law does not fall within the purview of the statutes
embracecl in Title LVXIII, and the Secretary of the Treasury is
not authorized to remit the same. 705.
See RES ADJUDICA.TA., No. 3.
REMISSION OF REVENUE TAX.
The tax of $2 prescribed by section 1969 of the Revised Statutes
can not be remitted upon skins taken from seals killed by the
natives for food. 407.
REMISSION ORDER.
An order remit,ting the unexecuted sentence of a suspended lieutenant-commander retaining his number in grade does not
advance him two numbers in grade above two corresponding
officers promoted during his suspension from duty, although
their commissions bore date subsequent to his. 243.
REMOVAL FROM O1:<':FICE.
By the act of April 25, 1890, chapter 156, the President is authorized to appoint World's Fair Commissioners on nomination of
the governors of the States and Territories. The term of office
was not fixed. Its duties were executive in nature. Such commissioners are removable by joint action of the Presic1ent and
governor. An appointment "to succeed R. M. '\V., removed," is
sufficient evidence of such removal. 641.
RENT OF SEAL FISHERIES.
1, It is competent for the Secretary of the Treasury under the existing lease of the right of. taking fur-seal skins on the islands of
St. Paul and St. George to make a reduction of the yearly rental
for the year ending May 1, 1891, proportionate to the reduction
made by him below the limit named in the lease of the number
of seals which the lessee has been permitted to kill on these
islands. 51.
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2. The, ecretary of the Treasnry has the same authority to make a
reduction in the rate per skin to be paid by the lessee of seal
fisheries at the- islands of St. Paul and St. George, Alaska, that
he has in the case of the other stipulated rental in the lease.
510.

3. There is no power in the Secretary of the Treasury to remit the
rent provided for under the lease of March 12, 1890, to the North
American Commercial Company, nor has he the right to reduce
the amount of the bonus of $7.62½ provided for in said lease to
be paid upon each skin taken and shipped. The abatements
hitherto ma<le were without authority of law and the balance
of the annual rental and of the bonus of $7.62-t per skin not
hitherto paid by the lessee is still due to the United States and
recoverable by it. 634.
4. It is competent for the United States to recover by proper legal
proceedings the difference between the amounts actually received
as rent and bonus from the seal :fisherfes, and the amounts called
for by the terms of the lease as rent and bonus for the same
years, notwithstanding the action of a prior Secretary of the
Treasury in reducing sums due under the laws by what bis estimate was of'tbe lessee's claim for damage, inasmuch as it appears
such cl aims were not legal and valid. Such action of the prior
Secretary, even if it binds his successor, as to which query, does
not conclude the United States. 732.
See SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, No. 5.
REPEAL.
Where a repealing statute expires by its own limitation the act
r peale<l is thereby revived. 4.66.
The act of May 1, 1876, chapter 89, was not repealed by section
29 of the customs administrative act of June 10, 1890, chapter
407. 5.
REPORT.
A report signed by an examiner or clerk appointed in pursuance
to section 2940 of tho Revised Statutes, and approved by the
apprai er, is not in compliance with the regulations of section
2615, Revised Statutes. 731.
RES AD.J DICATA.
1. The principle of res adjttdicata applies to departmental action of a.
final nature. 280.
2. A claimant to money in the Treasury is bound by a decision of
the proper Department adversely to his laim until the decision
is set a icle. 372.
3. When a contract for the construction of a vessel for the Governm nt contains a clause imposing a penalty for each day' delay
beyond the stipulated time for fini bing the ves el and pro"iding that any question as to liability for the collection of aid
penalty should be referred to the ecretary of the Navy for
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decision and his decision shall be conclusive upon all parties to
the contract, it is not proper for a subsequent Secretary of the
Navy to remit the amount of penalties imposed by the predecessor and pay that sum to the contractor. 631.
RETIRED ARMY OFFICER.
The question whether a Congressman can receive pay as a retired
Army officer is one of grave doubt which only the determination of the Supreme Court can satisfactorily settle. 686.
REVOCATION OF ORDER OF SUSPENSION.
1. An order revoking a selection for appointment can not be
revoked. 64.
2. Where an order suspending pay of a mail contractor is properly
made by the Postmaster-General, it should not be revoked on
an unsupported application to vacate it, disclosing no substantial ground for the application. 280.
REW AREHOUSING.
The act of March 28, 1854, section. 3000, Revised Statutes, does
not authorize repeated rewarehousing, but where merchandise
has been rewarehoused ip. conformity with the l'egulations and
practice of the Department, the action of the Department can
not be declared unauthorized. 309.
See EXTENSION OF TIME.
RIPARIAN OWNERS.
See LOUISIANA LEVEES·,
RIVER AND HARBOR ACT.
The effect of the river and harbor act of September 19, 1890, chapter 907, on the rights of the States over navigable waters discussed. 101.
ROCK CREEK PARK.
1. It is the duty of a park commission limited by the act creating it
to an expenditure of $1,200,000, which has itself assessed valuations at $830,000, but fears it will be unable to agree with all
the property owners to accept its estima.te of value, and that
if it institutes condem11ation proceedings t,he award will exceed
the amount limited in the act, to go ahead and perform its duty
under the statute. 67.
2. The President may certify to the reasonableness of the price of
land proposed to be taken under the act of September 27, 1890,
chapter 1001, for Ro.ck Creek Park, where the total price to be
paid does not exceed the amount appropriated by that act. 377.
SALARIES.
1. Probably itis within the province of the oead of a Department to
compensate agents employec.l by the Department by stated salaries in full for all traveling expenses as well as for services. 601.
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2. The salary of the Superintendent of Immigration is payable from
the immigration fund. 69.
3. The salary of an official should not be withheld as falliug within
the act of March 3, 1875, chapter 149, to meet a judgment reco,erecl against him as surety for a former Government employe.
626.

SAMOAN ISLANDS.
See APPROPRIATION, Nos. 3, 4.
SAMPLE PACKAGES.
A contract with the Government construed as in itself not meaning to use the term "sample packages" in the restricted sense
of merchandise free of duty as samples only and of no commercial value. 710.
SEALED CARS.
1. Tbe Secretary of the Treasury is not precluded by the seals from
examiuing the contents of cars sealed in a contiguous forei!-rn
conn try whether the merchandise was produced in that country
or imported into it and then imported into the United States.
26.

2. Section 3102, Revised Statutes, allows the Secretary of the Treasury to impose similar regulations as to sealed cars, and an entry
similar to that required by the immediate transportation act.
86.

SEAL FI 'HERIES.
See RENTAL OF SEAL FISHERIES.
SEAL KINS.
The tax of $2 prescribed by section 1969 of the Revised Statutes
can not be remitted upon skins taken from seals killed by the
natives for food. 407.
SECRETARY 0~' AGRICULTURE.
1. The 'ecretary of Agriculture has authority to procure the maps
and charts for which an appropriation was made for his Department by the act of March 3, 1891, chapter 54-4. 4-1.
2. The, ecretary of Agriculture may detail a person now in the clas i:fied service of his Department to duty elsewhere in the ela sified
service of his Department provided his compensation be not
increased. 573.
3. He may promote from cla s 1 to class 3 ancl from class 2 to cla, 4
without regarding intermediate steps. 573.
4. The ecretary of Agriculture can legally detail such officer or
employcs from his Department as may be rcque tccl by the fri1
ervice Commission, but be can not as ign an officer of th
Army detailed for service in the ·w eather Bureau to any other
duties than tho e for which he is by law authorized to be
detailed in the Weather Bureau. 750.
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SECRETARY OF THE CHILEAN COMMISSION.
There is nothing in the treaty concluded by Chile and the United
States on August 7, 1892, or in the appropriation for carrying it
into effect, which prevents the President from requiring service
under the treaty from the American secretary or agent or from
making compensation therefor at any time before the organization of the commission. 595.
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.
The relations of the Secretary of the Interior to· the :Freedmen's
Hospital and Asylum are unchanged by the act of March 3,
1893, chapter 199, save. that the Commissioners of the District
of Columbia are given the supervision and control of expenditures for the :Freedmen's Hospital and .Asylum. 652.
SECRETARY OF STATE.
·The Secretary of State of the United States is authorized to
appoint and to remove the director of t,he Bureau of American
Republics without the consent of the other Republics contributing to its support. 558.
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.
The Secretary of the Navy is not prohibited by section 3718 of
the Revised Statutes from contracting with an ensign of the
Navy for the purchase of patent rights and improvements in
B. L. R. ordnance for use in the Navy, wj,iere the ensign was not
employed to make experiments, paid for his own patent, and
was afforded ·no facilities by the Board of Ordnance for the
improvement of his invention. 329.
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
1. The Secretary of the Treasury has no authority to appoint special
inspectors of sealed cars. 26. ·
2. The Secretary of the Treasury may have an examination made of
cars sealed fa a foreign country for passage through this
country. 26.
3. The Secretary of the Treasury may modify the regulations with
Great Britain as to sealed cars. 26.
4. 'l'he Secretary of the Treasury has power to reduce the rent of the
seal fisheries. proportionate to the reduction of the catch of seals
prescribed by him. 51.
5. The Secretary of the Treasury may treat the lease of the seal :fisheries as modified to conform to the intention of the parties at
the time it was made. 62.
6. The Secretary of the Treasury is not permitted to grant an irrevocable license to use Government property. 93.
7. The power of the Secretary of the Treasury to contract with State
commissions of immigration was withdrawn· by the act of
March 3, 1891, chapter 551. 69.
8. The power of the Secretary of the Treasury to issue silver certificates under the act of July 14, 1890, chapter 708, considered.
124.
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SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY-Continued.
9. The Secretary of the Treasury has, apparently, power to insert in
a notice stating that the interest on bonds would terminate
after a certain day the statement that if the holders desired a.
continuance of the bonds at a smaller rate of interest during
the pleasure of the Government the request would be granted
within certain limits, provided the bonds be deposited before a
certain date. 127.
10. The Secrntary of the 'freasury has no power to seize pictures of
coins. 2~0.
11. 'l'he Secretary of the Treasury may remit the "additional duties"
provided for by the customs-administrntive act of June 10, 1890,
chapter 407, but he has no power to remit any part' of the duties,
strictly so called, however erroneously they may have been
assessed. 660.
12. The case of a fine or penalty incarred for violation of the alien
immigration law does not fall within the purview of the
statutes embraced under Title LVXIII, and the Secretary of the
Treasury is not authorized to remit the same. 705.
13. Actions to recover moneys due the United States,. not involving
any issue of fraud, do not come in any way under the direction
of the ecretary of the Treasury. (Rev. Stat., sec . 376.) 714-.
14. "Collection of the revenues" under the superintendence of the
Secretary of the Treasury within the meaning of Revised Statutes, section 24.9, relates to proceedings of collectors and their
subordinates allll not to those of district attorneys. 714.
15. The Secretary of the Treasury has not the power to prohibit the
tran ,fer of goods through the United States destined to Mexico.
724.
See b1MIGRA '£ FUND, Nos. 1, 2; IMMIGRANTS, Nos. 1, 2; RENT OF
s~:AL FISllERIES, Nos. 2, 3, 4.
SECRETARY OP WAR.
1. The duty of the Secretary of War in case of a bridge obstructing
rnwignble waters considered. 101.
2. The, ccretary of War has power to appoint recent graduates, noncommissioned officers, and civilians to the cavalry or infantry
srnice, although "additional" second lieutenants remain iu the
engineer and the artillery service and no vacancies exi t in aid
service. 149.
3. The ,'ecrotary of War has no power to prevent the deposit of
ballast in Kew York Harbor at a distance of more than three
miles from the shore at low-water mark. 293.
4. The ccrctary of "\Var is authorjzed by section 7 of the river and
bftrbor act of 1892 to approYe pr disapprove the location or
plans of a bridge duly authorized by a tate legislature over
waters wholly within the limits of a State. 479.
5. The 'ecrctary of War is not authorized to approve or di approve
th plan or locations of bri<1ge authorized by- a , tate legdature over waters the navigable portions of which do not lie
wholly within the limits of a, State. 488 •
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SECRETARY OF WAR-Continued.
6. By the act of February 28, 1891, chapter 382, incorporating the
Washington and Arlington Railroad Company, the Secretary of
War is empowered to approve the specifications, plans, and
materials of the proposed bridge and the manner of its construction and to consent to its relocation at a place which under
the circumstances jg a reasonable compliance with the act. 549,
7. The St. Louis and Cloquet rivers, being navigable waters of the
United States, can be obstructed by dams only by permission
of the Secretary of War, to whom Congress has, by express
statnte, given exclusive jurisdiction of the subject. 713.
8. By section 12, chapter 907, Supplement to the Revised Statutes,
the establishment of a certain line as essential to the preserva-·
tion and protection of a harbor rests in the discretion of the
Secretary of War alone, and his decision in the matter must be
final and conclusive until .modified by him. 740.
SELECTION FOR APPOINTMENT.
When an order is made revoking a seiection for appointment that
order can not be revoked. 64.
SERVICE OF. SENTENCE.
See CONSULAR JURISDICTION.
SET-OFF.
1. By section 3481 of the Revised Statutes it is the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to set--off against the demand of West Virginia for a refund of the direct tax the equitable proportion of
the debt of Virginia to the United States for which West Virginia is liable. 240.
2. There should be set-off under the.act of March 3, 1875, chapter
149, the indebtedness of the State of Indiana to the United
States arising from an ov:erdemancl against the same coming to
that State by the act of March 2, 1891, chapter 496. 363.
3. The salary of a Federal judge should not be withheld as falling
within the act of March 3, 1875, chapter 149, to meet a judgment
recovered against him as surety for a former Government
employe. 626.
SIOUX MIXED BLOOD.
1. The question whether or not a Sioux half-breed or quarter blood
is an Indian within the meaning of the act of March. 2, 1889,
chapter 405, is to be determined not by the common law, but
by the laws and m,ages of the tribe. 711.
•
2. A person, a,p parently of mixed blood, residing upon a reservation
and claiming to be an Indian is in fact an Indian. 711.
3. History of tlle Sioux haJ.f-breed scrip under the treaty of Prairie
du Chien considered. 742.
4. The opinion of February 9, 1894 (20 Opin., 711), as to the meaning
of the word "Indians," given in legislation regarding the
Sioux, reaffirmed. 742.
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SILVER BULLION.
Under the act of July 14, 1890, <:hapter 708, silver certificates can
be is ued on the seigniorage arising from purchases under this
act, but Tre~sury notes can not be issued on said seigniorage.
124.
SILVER CERTIFICATES.
Silver certificates are not lawful money within the meaning of
section 4 of the act of June 20, 1874-, chapter 343, and section 9
of the act of July 12, 1882, chapter' 290. 725.
SOLDIER.
Extra compensation to soldiers is not now authorized by law. 18.
SOLICITOR OF THE TREASURY.
1. The opinion of the Solictor of the Treasury may be asked upon
any question of pure law, or of mixed law and fact, arising in
the Treasury Department, except questions involving the construction of the Constitution of the United States. His opinions
have no binding force. 654.
2. The Solicitor of the Treasury is an officer of the Department of
Justice and not of the Trea~ury Department. 714.
3. The Solicitor of the Treasury is empowered to give advice as to
codes uf rules and forms of applications as to matters pending
in the Treasury Department. 738.
STATE.
1. The power of a State to legislate as to navigable waters is subject to the paramount power of Congress when it has acted in
the ma,tter. 101.
2. The invasion of the State of Vermont in 18EA considered historically, and concluded to have been an attack on the United States
by the Confederates. 134.
3. The . tate of Rhode Island is not a person, corporation, or association within the meaning of the river and harbor appropriation
act of 1890, chapter 907. 606.
STA'l'UTE OF LIMITJ.TIONS.
The proviso of the appropriation act of March 3, 1873, bars claims
for horses lost in the Indian war of 1855-'56 and not pre ented
until the year 1890. 152.
STATUTORY CONSTR CTION.
1. Section 6 of the act of July 1, 1862, chapter 120, includes seamen as
well as laud troops. 11.
2. A statute shoulll not be construed so as to lead to an absurdity. 9.
3. Tho act of 1farch 3, 1883, chapter 123, rnquiriug the Bureau of
Printing and Engraving to submit estimates of the co t of certain work for the Post-Office :Pepartment, is mandatory in it
provision ~. 132.
4. The words " uch arms or corps," in the act of May l7 1 6, ·hapter 338, r efer to the "arm or corps" the duties of which t he
graduate has been adjudged competent to perform, ancl the word
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"vacancy" used in the same act, contemplates a vacancy in the
arm of the service iu which an additional second lieutenant is
then employed. 149.
5. The act of March 3, 1891, chapter 519, providing for ocean mail
service between the United States and foreign ports, should be
construed strictly, so as to lead to definiteness and certainty in
view of the object of Congress in passing said act. 161.
6. Statutes of doubtful language should be read in the light of the
circumstances under which they were passed. 183.
·
7. Section 4136 of the ReYised Statutes should be construed in connection with section 4132 and in the light of the purpose of Congress in passing both sections. 253.
8. Section 2 of the act of October 1, 1890, chapter 1244, is exhaustive
upon the subject of free goods, so that an article not mentioned
in said section can not be held to be nondutiable because of any
previous law granting it exemption from duty. 314.
9. Where a repealing statute expires by its own limitation the act
repealed is thereby revived. 466.
10. A mistaken opinion of the legislature conc~rning the law does not
make the law. 530.
11. When the meaning of a statute is clear it can not be affected by
departmental practice. 592.
12. Where the meaning of the Revised Statutes is obscure or ambiguous a reference may be had to the original to assist in determining the revisions, but when the meaning is clear and free from
doubt no such reference is necessary or permissible. 634.
13. The law looks at facts, not names. 660.
14. A construction which would make the results of a law unreasonable should be avoided. 660.
15. Section 5 of' the act of March 3, 1893, chapter 211, applies to the
current year, and absence prior to July 1, 1893, must be taken into
account in computing the time to which an employe may be
entitled during the calendar year. 670.
16. If there is any doubt as to the meaning of a statute imposing a
tax on State-bank circulation the doubt must be resolved in
favor of exemption. 681.
17. Section 1260, Revised Statutes, refers to additional compensation
from the United States, uot to that received from colleges. 687.
18. When Congress adopts substantially the language of a previous
statute, whether from the statute book of the United States or
from that of any State, it is presumed to adopt therewith the
judicial constructiou already placed upon the language of the
act. The same principle applies in lesser degree to long settled
depail'tmental construction. 719.
19. Although a statute may have apparently unreasonable and extraordinary results, yet there is no room for construction to avoid
these results when there is no ambiguity. ·735.
20. In a case of ambiguity in a statute departmental practice may
affect its construction when long continued, uniform, and familiar, but not when merely recent and occasional. 746.
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STiAM PLATE PRES, E
St am plate-printing presses cannot be used in the Bureau of Printing and Bngraving since the act of March 2, 1 89, chapter 411,
without a compliance ·with the terms of that law. 33.
STIPULATION.
While no legal objection would exist if the right of appeal from
judgments of the Court of Claims in the direct-tax cases be
waived by the parties by stipulation on record 1,o the payment
of such claims prior to the expiration of the ninety days within
wllich appeals may be taken, yet the Department of Justice
deems it unwise to adopt any general rule of giving such stipulations. 547.
SUBPCE A.
See CIVIL SERVICE C0l\UIISSION, No. 2.
SUGAR.
Refined sugar imported since April 1, 1891, on which a drawback
was collected when exported prior to that date, is subject to the
rate of duty prescribed by the tariff act of 1883. 77.
SUMMARY COURT ACT.
The act of October 1, 1890, chapter 1259, does not' give the reviewing offic •r power to mitigate or approve a part and disapprove
another part of the sentenco of the summary court. 346.
SUPER! 1 TBNDEN1' OF IMMIGRATION.
See SALARIES, No. 2.
SUPERVI ION OP ST ATE OFFICIALS.
See QUARANTINE REGULATIONS.
SURETIE .
1. Any change in a contract for ocean mail service between the parties thereto, r. leases the sureties from subsequent liabilities.
321.

2. If a postmaster be commissioned to se:BVe until the end of the next
session of the Senate, and during that session his nomination is
sent for the co11sicleration of the enate, but remains unacted
upo1,1 at its acljonrnment, the re pon ibilitie of his suretie contin no for sixty days under the provision of section 3 36, Revi ed
Statntes, if tho vacancy is ,not :filled during that time, and the
sureties can law folly take possession of the Government property and depute anyone to act as postmaster until the ,acancy
be filled. 447.
3. A surety upon the bond of a Government contractor is not dischargNl from liability thereon by the contractor thereafter
agrneiug to pay the moneys received by him to some third person, or enterjng into any partnerilhip, or being served with an
injunction order restraining him from paying out auy of uch
moneys except to the plaintiff in the injunction suit, the Government not recognizing any of such proceedings in any way.
643.
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STTRETIES-Continued.
4. Two supplemental contracts made with a contractor when the
contract itself contemplated and provided for such changes,
which have been made in the manner fixed by the contract, do
not impair the obligations of the sureties on the contractor's
bond. 748.
SURETY COMPANY.
A surety company autho-rized by the laws of the State where it is
organized, to act as bondsman, is a proper surety on the bonds
of United States consular officials. 16.
SURVEYOR OF CUSTOMS.
If there be no collector of the port of Galena, Ill., and all the duties
of that office are imposed upon the surveyor of chstorus, then his
acts done in performance of the duties and functions of the office
of collector of the port are as valid and effective as if clone by a
collector of the port. His certificate in conjunction with that of
the local inspector of steamboats is sufficient to authorize the
Secretary of V\Tar to draw his warrant as provided in the act of
Congress authorizing the city of Galena, Ill., to complete certain
improvements of the channel of the Galena River. 700.
SUSPENSION OF PENSIONS.
1. The urgent deficiency act of December 21, 1893, chapter 3, prohibits the suspension without notice of payments under forged
or fraudulent pensions and prohibits further susJ1ension of payments under pensions theretofore ordered to be suspended. 735.
2. At the expiration of the statutory notice the Commissioner of
Pensions may dedde the case and stop payment of a pension
without precluding himself from thereafter reopening the case
at the request of the pensioner when justice requires it. 735.
3. Suspension is a continuing act. 735.
TARIFF ACT OF 1890.
1. Refined sugar imported since April 1, 1891, on which a drawback
has previousl,y been taken, is subject to the rate of duty prescribed by the tariff act of 1883. 77.
2. Where duties are bases on weight by the tariff act, of 1890, it applies
to all importations and not merely to those imported since th~
ac~ took effect. 80.
TAX ON STATE BANK CIRCULATION.
The tax on State banks imposed by the act of February 8, 1875,
chapter 36, section 19, applies only to promissory notes and nf't
to quasi negotiable paper. 681.
TAX RECEIPTS.
Tax receipts are satisfactory evidence that land is redeemed and
discharged from a tax sale and taxes. 430.
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TELEGRAPH SERVICE.
Where the Government 'has power to send telegraph message. by
a bond-aided railway system or by an independent company'
system located partly over the bonded rail way company's route,
and delivers them to the independent company's system without request that they be forwarded over the bond-aidecl railway route, payment must be made at the rate prescribed by
the Postmaster-General. 581.
TEN PER CENT TAX ON CIRCULATION OF NOTES.
A national bank paying out on checks and otherwise notes of a,
bank chartered in a foreign country, is subject to tax of ten
p er cent upon the total amount of all notes it has received and
used as a circulating medium. 534.
TONNAGE DUES.
See COMMISSIONER

OF NAVIGATION.

TRANSFER.
See APPROPRIATION,

No.

1.

TREASURY NOTES.
1. Treasury notes can not be issuecl on the seigniorage made under
the silver bullion act of July 14, 1890, chapter 708. 124.
2. The notes authorized to be issued in payment of silver bullion by
the act of July 14, 1890, chapter 708, are not receivable on deposit in exchange for the currency certificates authorized by the
act of June 16, 1872, chapter 346. 317.
TREATY OF WASHINGTON.
Article 29 of the Treaty of Washington was terminated two years
after the date of the giving of the notice provided for in article
33 of said treaty. 388.
UNITED STATES.
1. Where the United States, either as a trustee for others, or as ultima
hceres, may be interested in the dispoAition of certain moneys
in the Treasury, they should move to vacate the letters of administration granted by a probate court without jurisdiction, obtained by a person wrongfully claiming to be a creditor of the
p erson to whom the moneys belong. 372.
2. The act of March 3, 1887, chapter 556, is mandatory and makes it
the duty of the United States to bring a suit to restore title to
the United States, if the party to whom the land was erroneously certified under a prior certification does not give or procure a relinquishment or reconveyance. 224.
See LOUISIA..~A LEVEES.
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY.
See EXTRA COMPENSATION
UNITED STATES NOTES.
See TREAS URY NOTES.

DISTRICT ATTORNEY.
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VACANCY.
The acceptance of an appointment as chief of the Record and
Pension Office of the War Department, with the rank, pay, and
allowances of a colonel by a surgeon of the United States Army
creates a vacancy in the latter office. 427.
VACANCY IN HEAD OF DEPARTMENT.
A vacancy in the head of a Department can not be temporarily
filled for a longer period than ten days, either by operation of
law or by designation of the President. 8.
VERMONT.
The invasion of the State of Vermont in 1864 was really an invasion of the United States. 134.
VETO.
See .ADJOURNMENT

OF CONGRESS.

VOUCHER.
Where an Indian agent's account consists of a recejpt roµ, not the
original paper, but merely the abstract of several vouchers
accompanying it, one of which contains but one item that is
false that bears no relation to the other items in the account,
the penalty of section 8 of the act of July 4, 1884, chapter 180,
reaches no further than to take away the agent's right to credit
for any part of that item. Aud where the false item occurs in
the printed form entitled "Pay roll of regular employes," and is
signed by twelve persons, each setting opposite his na.me the
kind of work done by him, the receipts thus taken are so many
separate and distinct vouchers within the meaning of the proviso of the above section. 561.
WEATHER BUREAU.
1. The employes of the Weather Bureau of the Department of Agriculture on duty outside of and away from the city of Washington are not members of the classified civil service. 345.
2. The acts of October 1, 1890, chapter 1266, and March 3, 1891,
chapter 544, permit the Secretary of Agriculture to reduce the
compensation of any person in the weather service transferred
from the War Department to his Department, and also permit
him to appoint to the $1,500 positions provided for in the latter
act any of the persons so transferred, and to promote to the
vacancies created by such appointment any other persons so
transferred, even if the salary of the person so promoted is
thereby increased. 395.

WEIGHT.
See TARIFF AcT

OF

1890, No. 2.

WHISKY.
Reimported whisky when withdrawn from bond is taxable according to the number of gallons at the time of importation. 722 • .
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WORLD'S COLUMBIAN EXPO, ITION.
1. It is competent for the 'ecretary of the Treasury to make payment
for her services to the secretary of the Ladie ' Board of Managers of the ·w orld' Columbian Exposition. 237.
2. The President is authorized to appoint commiR ion rs , of the
World's Columbian Commissj(ln only from such Territories as
are organized and have a political status under the act of
Congress. Indian Territory is not such a Territory. 452.
See REMOVAL FROM OFFICE.
WORLD'S FAIR.
1. Varions acts and sections of acts appropriating money for the
\Vorld's Columbian Exposition construed and interpreted. 566.
2. Held, considering together the acts of April 25, 1890, chapter 156,
July 13, 1892, chapter 165, and August 5, 1892, chapter 3 O, that
the branch office of the World'& l!~air of 1893 must be closed on
Sunday. 598.
3. App1·opriations contained in the act of August 5, 1892, chapter
381, for the World's Fair are still available, notwithstanding
ihe fact that the fair is open on Sundays. 623.
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